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PREFACE

To derive the best frorti any book, one must read it

with knowledge of the ideas which underlie it and of the

purpose with which it was produced. Every sincere book

relating to law is inevitably and distinctly colored by its

PREFACE

author's idea of what law is. Therefore it seems proper

for me to present my own views.

I conceive law to be the aggregation of rules which

courts of justice feel themselves more or less obligated to

follow in deciding controversies. To some extent these

rules are formulated and declared by legislative author-

ity. Most of them, however, have been evolved by judges

themselves.

To derive the best fr6m any book, one must read it
with knowledge of the ideas which underlie it and of the
purpose with which it was produced. Every sincere book
relating to law is inevitably and distinctly colored by its
author's idea of what law is. Therefore it seems proper
for me to present my own views.
I conceive law to be the aggregation of rules which
courts of justice feel themselves more or less obligated to
follow in deciding controversies. To some extent these
rules are formulated and declared by legislative authority. Most of them, however, have been evolved by judges
themselves.

These latter rules are not always easy to formulate;

if they were, there would be no need for real text-books.

Even the precise utterances of various judges can not

always be accepted as rules. I believe that no judge has

power, either practically or theoretically, to bind other

judges by any declaration of rule or command, but that
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the only obligation felt by courts is the obligation to con-

form to prior judicial action. It is therefore prior judi-

cial conduct under given circumstances which determines

the action of later judges, rather than prior declarations

as to what such conduct ought to be.

In the great majority of cases, actual decision does

accord with the mere verbal declarations of what ought

iii

These latter rules are not always easy to formulate;
if they were, there would be no need for real text-books.
Even the precise utterances of various judges can not
always be accepted as rules. I believe that no judge has
power, either practically or theoretically, to bind other
judges by any declaration of rule or command, but that
the only obligation felt by courts is the obligation to conform to prior judicial action. It is therefore prior judicial conduct under given circumstances which determines
the action of later judges, rather than prior declarations
as to what such conduct ought to be.
In the great majority of cases, actual decision does
accord with the mere verbal declarations of what ought
iii
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to be done. But not infrequently a judge in deciding the
case before him will state what he would have done had
the facts been otherwise. He states what he believes to
be a rule, without being called to act upon it. In many
other cases judges have· rendered decisions that actually
conform to prior related decisions, but have given as reason for the decision some assumed rule which is really
inconsistent with the earlier ones. These dicta, therefore, can not blindly be accepted as rules of law.

to be done. But not infrequently a judge in deciding the

case before him will state what he would have done had

the facts been otherwise. He states what he believes to

be a rule, without being called to act upon it. In many

other cases judges have rendered decisions that actually

conform to prior related decisions, but have given as rea-

son for the decision some assumed rule which is really

inconsistent with the earlier ones. These dicta, there-

fore, can not blindly be accepted as rules of law.

Rules of law, like the laws of any other science, must

be deduced from a critical analysis and study of legal

phenomena. And these phenomena, to my mind, are the

decisions actually rendered by courts of justice. I do

not mean that the comments and stated reasons of the

judges may be disregarded. On the contrary, they are

an intrinsic part of the phenomena of decision. They

must be considered and given the fullest effect of guid-

ance. But if one admits that, while judges may act on

Rules of law, like the laws of any other science, must
be deduced from a critical analysis and study of legal
phenomena. And these phenomena, to my mind, are the
decisions actually rendered by courts of justice. I do
not mean that the comments and stated reasons of the
judges may be disregarded. On the contrary, they are
an intrinsic part of the phenomena of decision. They
must be considered and given the fullest effect of guidance. But if one admits that, while judges may act on
each case as it comes before them, they may not command other judges how to act, one must of necessity
deduce the rule of action primarily from the acts themselves. Hence I have sought always for some judicial
custom of decision, as indicating the rule of law more
truly than does judicial speech alone.
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each case as it comes before them, they may not com-

mand other judges how to act, one must of necessity

deduce the rule of action primarily from the acts them-

selves. Hence I have sought always for some judicial

custom of decision, as indicating the rule of law more

truly than does judicial speech alone.

In another respect, also, I have looked beyond the mere

words of decisions. Judicial opinions often merely state

the facts of a case as though they were in themselves a

self-evident reason for the decision. No rule at all is

stated. A text writer can follow this example and merely

state the rule to be that when facts are thus and so the

decision will be thus and so. But if law is truly the per-

fection of reason, there should be a rational basis for all

In another r espect, also, I have looked beyond the mere
words of decisions. Judicial opinions often merely state
the facts of a case as though they were in themselves a
self-evident reason for the decision. No rule at all is
stated. A text writer can follow this example and merely
state the rule to be that when facts are thus and so the
d rision will be thus and so. But if law is truly the perf ection of r eason, ther e should be a rational basis for all
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PREFACE

'decisions-some reason founded on utility, or on consistency with other and correlated rules of law. Only through
knowledge of these reasons-whether they rest in the
utility of consistency only, or of something else-can a
lawyer possibly predict what will be the decision-~ or
advise the court what should be the decision-in cases of
somewhat novel facts. It is only through deduction of
the reason, the rule for decision, from study of many decisions that the essential facts can possibly be separated
from the immaterial.
It is just this analysis, it seems to me, which distinguishes a text-book from a digest. The latter presents
the phenomena. That is, it gives the facts and decisions
of cases. The former takes enough of these phenomena
for reasonable certainty and attempts, through inductive
analysis, to present the underlying causes of the decisions for use in future cases. If it does not do this, it is
only a compilation itself. A text-book and a digest are,
therefore, not substitutes for each other, but one supplements the other.

PREFACE V

decisions — some reason founded on utility, or on consist-

ency with other and correlated rules of law. Only through

knowledge of these reasons — whether they rest in the

utility of consistency only, or of something else — can a

lawyer possibly predict what will be the decision — or

advise the court what should be the decision — in cases of

somewhat novel facts. It is only through deduction of

the reason, the rule for decision, from study of many deci-

sions that the essential facts can possibly be separated

from the immaterial.

It is just this analysis, it seems to me, which distin-

guishes a text-book from a digest. The latter presents

the phenomena. That is, it gives the facts and decisions

of cases. The former takes enough of these phenomena

for reasonable certainty and attempts, through inductive

analysis, to present the underlying causes of the deci-

sions for use in future cases. If it does not do this, it is

only a compilation itself. A text-book and a digest are,

therefore, not substitutes for each other, but one supple-
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ments the other.

The law of Sales has already been so well analyzed and

presented by men like Williston and Meechem that a new

book is hardly justified so far as substance of the rules

alone is concerned. But, inasmuch as students of any

science disagree more or less as to the causes of its phe-

nomena, it is always possible that a new writer may bring

something of value by way of explanation and of reason

for the rules.

There is also possible value in a new manner of pre-

senting an old subject-matter. Some books, for instance,

group rules of law according to their relation to certain

The law of Sales has already been so well analyzed and
presented by men like Williston and l\!Ieechem that a new
book is hardly justified so far as substance of the rules
alone is concerned. But, inasmuch as students of any
science disagree more or less as to the causes of its phenomena, it is always possible that a new writer may bring
something of value by way of explanation and of reason
for the rules.
There is also possible vaJue in a new manner of presenting an old subject-matter. Some books, for in tance,
group rules of law according to their relation to certajn
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concrete things, such as the "law of electricity" and the

"law of automobiles." Likewise, they group the rules

of a particular subject around certain things, or certain

acts, as, in Sales, bills of lading, or delivery of posses-

sion.

On the other hand, the rules may be grouped according

to persons affected, which is the plan I have chosen.

Each rule may itself be discussed as relating to a legal

right of one person, a lack of right in another, or a legal

concrete things, such as the "law of electricity" and the
''law of automobiles.'' Likewise, they group the rules
of a particular subject around certain things, or certain
acts, as, in Sales, bills of lading, or delivery of posses-

.

SlOn.

power of a third. For example, the transfer of a bill of

lading by an insolvent buyer may, in some circumstances,

terminate the seller's right to retake possession of the

goods while still in transit. This one legal result can be

discussed as a right of the buyer of the bill of lading to

receive the goods themselves, as a lack of right in the

original seller to retake possession, or as a power of the

original buyer to cut off his seller's right of stopping the

goods. Or the one rule can be discussed by repetition
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under all three forms. This last method has the advan-

tage of the clarity which comes from demonstrating a

matter in all its aspects. Nevertheless, it is not at all

essential to completeness of presentation and does re-

quire a great amount of space. For the sake of brevity,

I have discussed each rule only once, and, so far as prac-

ticable, I have treated each rule in the aspect of a right

of some person. In some instances, however, notably as

to the rights of original owners against persons other

than the buyer, it seemed advisable, for the sake of order-

liness, to put the discussion under lack of right of the

other person.

Although discussing any particular rule once only

saves considerable space, it does force upon the reader

On the other hand, the rules may be grouped according
to persons affected, which is the plan I have chosen.
Eaeh rule may itself be discussed as relating to a legal
right of one person, a lack of right in another, or a legal
power of a third. For example, the transfer of a bill of
lading by an insolvent buyer may, in some circumstances,
terminate the seller's right to retake possession of the
goods while still in transit. This one legal result can be
discussed as a right of the buyer of the bill of lading to
receive the goods themselves, as a lack of right in the
original seller to retake possession, or as a power of the
original buyer to cut off his seller's right of stopping the
goods. Or the one rule can be discussed by repetition
under all three forms. This last method has the advantage of the clarity which comes from demonstrating a
matter in all its aspects. Nevertheless, it is not at all
essential to completeness of presentation and does require a great amount of space. For the sake of brevity,
I have discussed each rule only once, and, so far as practicable, I have treated each rule in the aspect of a right
of some per son. In some instances, however, notably as
to the rights of original owners against persons other
than the buyer, it seemed advisable, for the sake of orderliness, to put the discussion under lack of right of the
other p er son.
Although discussing any particular rule once only
saves consider able sp ace, it does force upon the reader
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PREFACE vii

the task of making his own comparisons between differ-

ent rights, and requires him to remember that any right

of one person connotes a complementary lack of right in

other persons.

In presenting my own idea of what law is I have said

that it is the rules which courts feel more or less obliged

to follow. I do not believe that even in theory courts are

the task of making his own comparisons between different rights, and requires him to remember that any right
of one person connotes a complementary lack of right in
other persons.

absolutely bound to follow the rules of precedent. Actu-

ally, it is indisputable that they do modify and depart

from established rules when they believe that economic

utility so warrants. "Witness, for instance, the develop-

ment of rules as to implied warranty in sales of food.

If courts do thus consider the economic effect of a deci-

sion, and consciously or subconsciously depart from the

letter of established rules at the dictate of pragmatic con-

siderations, one who would predict the decision in any

case must do more than familiarise himself with the rules

of precedent "alone. He must observe and understand the
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trend of change which is taking place in those rules. He

must be a student of socio-economic rules and theories

as well as of the rules of legal precedent.

It is not improbable that, eventually, complete text-

books will include an analysis of economic and social

factors hkely to affect judicial decision, which they will

correlate with their discussion of precedent. The idea is

most intriguing. I have, myself, however, made no

attempt to do this, but have conventionally left to the

reader the contentious question whether courts may

properly depart from precedent and, when they do so

depart, by just what considerations they are influenced.

It has been said that technical text-books are neces-

In presenting my own idea of what law is I have said
that it is the rules which courts feel more or less obliged
to follow. I do not believe that even in theory courts are
absolutely bound to follow the rules of precedent. Actually, it is indisputable that they do modify and depart
from established rules when they believe that economic
utility so warrants. Witness, for instance, the development of rules as to implied warranty in sales of food.
If courts do thus consider the economic effect of a decision, and consciously or subconsciously depart from the
letter of established rules at the dictate of pragmatic considerations, one who would predict the decision in any
case must do more than familiarise hi1nself ·with the rules
of precedent ·alone. He must observe and understand the
trend of change which is taking place in those rules. He
must be a student of socio-economic rules and theories
as well as of the rules of legal precedent.
It is not improbable that, eventually, complete textbooks will include an analysis of econo1nic and social
factors likely to affect judicial decision, which they will
correlate with their discussion of precedent. The idea is
most intriguing. I have, myself, however, made no
attempt to do this, but have conventionally left to the
reader the contentious question whether courts may
properly depart from precedent and, when they do so
depart, by just what considerations they are influencnc1.
It has been said that technical text-books are neces01 1t1ze by
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sarily too elementary and incomplete to be of much value
to readers already trained in the subject, or are too difficult reading for untrained students. I do not think this
is true of books on law. The subject is full of tenns, to
be sure, which have a technical connotation unrecognized
by laymen, and many rules are really complexes of other
more elemental rules which lawyers rather take for
granted. But a book which uses words and phrases in
their usual sense and which proceeds 5equentially from
elemental principles to the more complex ones can be
clear and comprehensible to lay readers and yet be so
detailed in its subject-matter as to serve also the needs
of trained practitioners.

sarily too elementary and incomplete to be of much value

to readers already trained in the subject, or are too diffi-

cult reading for untrained students. I do not think this

is true of books on law. The subject is full of terms, to

be sure, which have a technical connotation unrecognized

by laymen, and many rules are really complexes of other

more elemental rules which la^vyers rather take for

granted. But a book which uses words and phrases in

their usual sense and which proceeds sequentially from

elemental principles to the more complex ones can be

clear and comprehensible to la}^ readers and yet be so

detailed in its subject-matter as to serve also the needs

of trained practitioners.

It is in this belief that I have written what follows,

hoping that the small size of the book and its arrange-

ment, without necessarily derogating its real technical

value, will make it more available to some readers than

a more voluminous work would be.
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John Barker Waite.

Aim Arbor, Michigan.

It is in this belief that I have written what follows,
hoping that the small size of the book and its arrangement, without necessarily derogating its real technical
value, will make it more available to some readers than
a n10re voluminous work would be.
JOHN BARKER

wAiTE.

Ann Arbor, Michigan!
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CHAPTER I

General Principles

The law of Sales is concerned essentially with the

CHAPTER I

transfer of ownership to personal property. It does not

include the origin of ownership in the first instance, nor

does it involve the character of the rights and liabilities

which accrue to ownership. It comprises only the trans-

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

fer thereof with the attendant rights and liabilities,

whatsoever they may be, from one person to another.

The law of Sales is concerned essentially with the
transfer of ownership to personal property. It does not
include the origin of ownership in the first instance, nor
does it involve the character of the rights and liabilities
which accrue to ownership. It comprises only the transfer thereof with the attendant rights and liabilities,
whatsoever they may be, from one person to another.

Meaning of Sale. — ^A sale may be defined as the

transfer from one person to another of the absolute own-

ership of some specific chattel, for a reciprocal compensa-

tion which is in money or something valued by the par-

ties in terms of money.

The word ''sale" has also a secondary meaning, in

which sense it implies not an accomplished transfer of

the ownership, but an agreement to transfer it. It may

thus apply to an agreement which has been performed,
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or to an agreement to be performed, and its use in

either significance is indiscriminate. Thus in some

cases the court uses ''sale" and "contract of sale" as

quite different from "agreement to sell" and as mean-

Meaning of Sale.-A sale may be defined as the

ing actual transfer of ownership.^ On the other hand

"sale" is often used in reference to the "contract"

transfer from one person to another of the absolute ownership of some specific chattel, for a reciprocal compensation which is in money or something valued by the parties in terms of money.
The word "sale" has also a secondary meaning, in
which sense it implies not an accomplished transfer of
the ownership, but an agreement to transfer it. It may
thus apply to an agreement which has been performed,
or to an agreement to be performed, and its use in
either significance is indiscriminate. Thus in some
cases the court uses "sale" and "contract of sale" as
quite different from ''agreement to sell'' and as meaning actual transfer of ownership. 1 On the other hand
"sale" is often used in reference to the "contract"
regardless of whether the contract has been carried to
execution or not. Thus one court uses it in saying, 2 "In
many cases of sales of personal property it is a very nice

regardless of whether the contract has been carried to

execution or not. Thus one court uses it in saying,** "In

many cases of sales of personal property it is a very nice

1 — Low V. Pew, 108 Mass. 347; wood v. Cutting Packing Co., 76

Oklahoma Moline Plow Co. v. Cal. 212, 9 Am. St. 199.

Smith, Okla., 137 Pac. 285; Black- 2 — Oliphant v. Baker, 5 Denio

379.

1-Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347;
Oklahoma Moline Plow Co. v.
Smith, Okla., 137 Pac. 285; Black·

wood v. Cutting Packing Co., 76
Cal. 212, 9 Am. St. 199.
2-0liphant v. Baker, 5 Denio
379.
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2 THE LAW OF SALES

and difficult question to determine • • • whether the

title has passed."

If one bears in mind this duplex use, as indicating

either an agreement to transfer the title, or an ac-

complished transfer, he will find no real confusion aris-

ing from it, despite the rather remarkable literal confu-

sion, because the context practically always shows the

sense in which it is employed.*

No definition is wholly clear unless all the terms by

which it is expressed are themselves definite and precise.

In defining **sale" as the transfer of ownership, one is

met at the outset by an uncertainty as to just what con-

stitutes ** ownership. " In the abstract it may be defined

as the fundamental right to enjoyment of the particular

thing to which it is said to attach. (It is obvious

that the terms '* right," ''privilege," ''power," and

similar expressions are not used here in any precise

sense, such as that of the so-called Hohfeltian terminol-
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ogy.) In the case of corporeal property, as distinct from

mere ' ' rights, ' ' enjoyment has always been so completely

predicated on physical possession, that ownership is often

defined in terms of possession, and is the fundamental

right to possession of a particular piece of property.*

But in addition to the right of possession, there are

other powers, privileges and duties in respect to things,

which are recognized by the courts. Certain of these

privileges, etc., commonly follow as a matter of course

from ownership or, conversely, an o^vner is said to have

certain definite privileges and liabilities.*

3 — "S(3 feeble and precarious sary in modern times, the clumsy

was property without possession, term 'special property' was em-

or rather without possessory rem- ployed to denote the rights of a

edies, in the eyes of medieval possessor not being owner." Pol-

lawyers, that Possession largely lock & Wright, "Possession," p. 5.

usurped not only the substance

but the name of Property, and 4 — "The term 'property' al-

when distinction became neces- though in common parlance fre-

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 1, (1), (2), (3), (4), and 76, "Sale".

and diflkmlt question to detennine • • • whether the
title has passed.''
If one bears in mind this duplex use, as indicating
either an agreement to transfer the title, or an accomplished transfer, he will find no real confusion arising from it, despite the rather remarkable literal confusion, because the context practically always shows the
sense in which it is employed.•
No definition is wholly clear unless all the terms by
which it is expressed are themselves definite and precise.
In defining "sale" as the transfer of ownership, one is
met at the outset by an uncertainty as to just what constitutes ''ownership.'' In the abstract it may be defined
as the fundamental right to enjoyment of the particular
thing to which it is said to attach. (It is obvious
that the terms "right," _ "privilege," "power," and
similar expressions are not used here in any precise
sense, such as that of the so-called Hohfeltian terminology.) In the case of corporeal property, as distinct from
mere ''rights,'' enjoyment has always been so completely
predicated on physical possession, that ownership is often
defined in terms of possession, and is the fundamental
right to possession of a particular piece of property. 3
But in addition to the right of possession, there are
other powers, privileges and duties in respect to things,
which are recognized by the courts. Certain of these
privileges, etc., commonly follow as a matter of course
from ownership or, conversely, an owner is said to have
certain definite privileges and liabilities. 4
3-"Sd feeble and precarious
was property without possession,
or rather without possessory remedies, in the eyes of medieval
lawyers, that Possession largely
usurped not only the substance
but the name of Property, and
when distinction became neces-

sary in modern times, the clumsy
term 'special property' was employed to denote the rights of a
possessor not being owner." Pollock & Wright, "Possession," p. 5.
4- "The term 'property' although in common parlance fre-

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 1, (1), (2), (3), (4), and 76, "Sale".
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The composite whole of these powers, privileges and
duties is ordinarily thought of as constituting ownership.
Occasionally, however, it transpires that certain of these
component powers, privileges, or duties, are attributed by
courts to one individual while the others are, at least by
implication, attributed to another. The query is at "once
presented, whether "ownership" can be divided, whether
two persons, one having the right to ultimate possession
and the other having different rights in respect to the
same chattel, can both be called "owners" of it. If ownership is not divisible, so that they.can not both be owners,
how many of the component rights usually constituting
"ownership," or which of them, are absolutely essential
for the law to call their possessor owner~ No attempt
need be made to answer this question here, but specific
reference to it is necessary because knowledge of the
question is itself the solution of much confusion, to be
pointed out later, as to whether or not ''title'' has passed
when certain legal powers and privileges have passed
and others have not. 6

GENERAL PRINCIPLES 3

The composite whole of these powers, privileges and

duties is ordinarily thought of as constituting ownership.

Occasionally, however, it transpires that certain of these

component powers, privileges, or duties, are attributed by

courts to one individual while the others are, at least by

imphcation, attributed to another. The query is at once

presented, whether ''ownership" can be di\'ided, whether

two persons, one having the right to ultimate possession

and the other having different rights in respect to the

same chattel, can both be called ' ' owners ' ' of it. If own-

ership is not divisible, so that they can not both be owners,

how many of the component rights usually constituting

"ownership," or which of them, are absolutely essential

for the law to call their possessor owner f No attempt

need be made to answer this question here, but specific

reference to it is necessary because knowledge of the

question is itself the solution of much confusion, to be

pointed out later, as to whether or not ' ' title ' ' has passed

when certain legal powers and privileges have passed
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3

and others have not.^

Sale Distinguished From Other Transactions. — A

transfer of anything less than enough of these component

rights and duties, to constitute the ownership — or,

more concretely, a transfer of anything less than the

fundamental right to control possession — is not a "sale"

but is called by some other name such as "bailment,"

"pledge," etc. The name which a contract gives to a

particular transaction does not determine the number

quently applied to a tract of land 504. And see the excellent exposl-

or a chattel, in its legal signifi- tion in Some Fundamental Legal

cance means only the rights of Conceptions. 23 Yale L. Jr. 16.

the owner in relation to it. It 5_cf., "The action * * * must

denotes a right over a determin- be brought by the owner, although

ate thing. Property is the right the ownership need not be abso-

Sale Distinguished From Other Transactions.-A

of any person to possess, use, en- lute but may be that of a bailee."

joy and dispose of a thing." Eaton Garvan v. N. Y. C. Rr., 210 Mass.

transfer of anything less than enough of these component
rights and duties, to constitute the ownership-or,
more concretely, a transfer of anything less than the
fundamental right to control possession- is not a "sale"
but is called by some other name such as "bailment,"
"pledge," etc. The name which a contract gives to a
particular transaction does not determine the number

V. B. C. & M. R. R. Co., 51 N. H. 275.

quently applied to a tract of land
or a chattel, in its legal significance means only the rights of
the owner in relation to it. It
denotes a right over a determinate thing. Property is the right
of any person to possess, use, enjoy :and dispose of a thing." Eaton
v. B. C. & M. R.R. Co., 51 N. H.
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504. And see the excellent exposition in Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions. 23 Yale L. Jr. 16.
5-Cf., "The action * • • must
be brought by the owner, although
the ownership need not be absolute but may be that of a bailee."
Garvan v. N. Y. C. Rr., 210 Mass.
275.
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and character of the powers and privileges trans-

ferred, but the name is itself determined by the num-

ber and character of the powers intended by the parties

to be transferred. Therefore, in any given case

the inquiry is not directly whether the transaction was

intended to be by name a sale, or a bailment, or a pledge,

but rather, what powers, etc., were intended to be trans-

ferred. The answer to this question can not be deter-

mined by any rule of thumb. Each case must be decided

upon its own particular circumstances. All that can be

said is that the real or apparent intent of the parties

will control and is the thing to be determined. // the

parties intended the transaction to pass the ownership

of the property the courts will call the transaction a

sale and give it effect as such. 7/ they intended to con-

vey powers less than complete ownership the courts will

call it something less than a sale and give it only such

effect as was intended.
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-By Whom Distinction Is Made. — The real intention

of the parties being the determinative issue, it would

seem properly a fact to be determined by the jury.^

It is the province of the court, however, to decide, and

to instruct the jury accordingly, just what rights and

powers the parties must have intended to transfer

to have intended a transfer of ownership and, con-

versely, what reservation of powers in the transferor

constitutes a withholding of ownership from the trans-

feree. Courts sometimes speak as though such reserva-

and character of the powers and privileges transferred, but the name is itself determined by the number and character of the powers intended by the parties
to be transferred.
Therefore, in any given case
the inquiry is not directly whether the transaction was
intended to be by name a sale, or a bailment, or a pledge,
but rather, what powers, etc., were intended to be transferred. The answer to this question can not be determined by any rule of thumb. Each case must be decided
upon its own particular circumstances. All that can be
said is that the real or apparent intent of the parties
will control and is the thing to be determined. If the
parties int ended the transaction to pass the ownership
of the property the courts will call the transaction a
sale and give it effect as such. If they intended to convey powers less than complete ownership the courts will
call it something less than a sale and give it only such
effect as was intended.

tion or transfer of particular powers showed intent.

This transfer or reservation of particular powers con-

stitutes as a matter of law a transfer or retention of

ownership because it is incompatible with the legal idea

6 — Rauber v. Sundback, 1 S. D. Cook v. Lion Fire Ins. Co., 67 Cal.

268; Crosby v. Del. & Hud. Canal 368; Webster Bros. Milling Co. v.

Co., 119 N. Y. 334; Id. 128 N. Y. Bingham, 14 Ariz. 50.

641; Id. 141 N. Y. 589; Brown

Bros. V. Gilliam, 53 Mo. App. 376;

--By Whom Distinction Is Made.-The real intention
of the parties being the determinative issue, it would
seem properly a fact to be determined by the jury. 6
It is the province of the court, however, to decide, and
to instruct the jury accordingly, just what rights and
powers the parties must have intended to transfer
to have intended a transfer of ownership and, conversely, what r eservation of powers in the transferor
constitutes a withholding of ownership from the transferee. Courts sometimes speak as though such reservation or transfer of particular powers showed intent.
This transfer or reservation of particular powers constitutes as a matter of law a transfer or retention of
ownership because it is incompatible with the legal idea
6- Rauber v . Sundback, 1 S. D .
268; Cros by v . Del. & Hud. Canal
o., 119 N. Y. 334; Id. 128 N. Y.
641 ; Id. 141 N. Y. 589; Brown
Bros. v . Gill iam, 53 Mo. App. 376 ;
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of ownership in the other person. The lack of pre-

cision in speaking of the matter leads some courts to

say that because the parties intended certain powers

or duties to be in one party the title is in him, while

other courts instruct the jury that if they find ^hose

particular powers or duties were intended to be in one

person they must find that the parties intended title

to be in him. The one thus appears to make title

a matter of determination by the court from admitted

facts, the other appears to leave it to the jury as a matter

of intent. But it may be observed that the result is the

same whether the court deduces it for itself from pre-

liminary facts already ascertained, or orders the jury

so to find upon the same preliminary facts. It is essen-

tially these preliminary facts, that is to say, the par-

ticular powers and privileges which the parties intended

to pass or not to pass, which must be ascertained by the

jury. If the intent to pass certain rights and powers is
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admitted by the parties, or the court thinks it could not

be disputed, the court can decide "what name shall be

given the transaction, as a matter of law; but if there

is dispute as to what rights and powers the parties in-

tended to pass, the case should be submitted to the

jury with instructions as to what name they shall give

the transaction accordingly as they find that the parties

intended to pass or not to pass certain rights and powers.

When, however, the entire transaction is in the form of a

written contract, the court will ''construe" the contract

and decide for itself the question of what particular

rights, powers and liabilities the parties intended to pass,

and thus practically take the case from the jury entirely.'

Rules for Distinction. — The courts have laid down

a number of propositions as to what particular legal

7— Fleet V. Hertz, 201 111. 594, Oxley, 80 Ind. 580; D. M. Ferry

94 Am. St. 192, See the peculiar & Co. v. Hall, 188 Ala. 178, L. R.

combination in Ginsburg v. Lum- a. 1917 B 620 containing a

ber Co., 85 Mich. 439; Reissner v. lengthy annotation.

5

of ownership in the other person. The lack of precision in speaking of the matter leads some courts to
say that because the parties intended certain powers
or duties to be in one party the title is in him, while
other courts i~struct the jury that if they find ihose
particular powers or duties were intended to be in one
person they must find that the parties intended title
to be in him. The one thus appears to make title
a matter of determination by the court from admitted
facts, the other appears to leave it to the jury as a matter
of intent. But it may be observed that the result is the
same whether the court deduces it for itself from preliminary facts already ascertained, or orders the jury
so to find upon the same preliminary facts. It is essentially these preliminary facts, that is to say, the particular powers and privileges which the parties intended
to pass or not to pass, which must be ascertained by the
jury. If the intent to pass certain rights and powers is
admitted by the parties, or the court thinks it could not
be disputed, the court can decide what name shall be
given the transaction, as a matter of law; but if there
is dispute as to what rights and powers the parties intended to pass, the case should be submitted to the
jury with instructions as to what name they shall give
the transaction accordingly as they find that the parties
intended to pass or not to pass certain rights and powers.
When, however, the entire transaction is in the form of a
written contract, the court will ''construe'' the contract
and decide for itself the question of what particular
rights, powers and liabilities the parties intended to pass,
and thus practically take the case from the jury entirely. 1

-Rules for Distinction.-The courts have laid down
a number of propositions as to what particular legal
7-Fleet v. Hertz, 201 Ill. 594,
94 Am. St. 192, See the peculiar
combination in Ginsburg v . Lumber Co., 85 Mich. 439; Reissner v.
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powers the parties must have intended to transfer to

constitute change of "ownership". These all, however,

have the common characteristic that they show which

person was intended fundamentally to control possession

and enjoyment of the thing.

The law is simple enough, but it is obvious that in

many cases there is no way of determining absolutely

what the parties did intend in this regard. The issue

becomes, therefore, merely a conclusion of mind from the

particular facts and the facts are apt to be so incon-

clusive that two wholly fair and able minds may differ

absolutely. It is this possibility of difference of opinion

by two courts on essentially similar cases that makes

much apparent conflict. It is not, however, a conflict

of law, in the sense of a rule of determination, but only

a difference of conclusion as to real intent. In such

cases it is highly probable that the parties had no real

intent as to title at all ; did not think of anything beyond

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the immediate and obvious facts of the transaction. A

finding of "intent," therefore, is only presumptive, a

legal construction from the facts. Such constructive in-

tent is properly a matter for the court rather than for the

jury, which latter is supposed to ascertain only actual

facts. But while, as noted above, very many courts do,

themselves, make the finding as a matter of law, there are

no established rules of presumption to guide them. "What

rules there are, simply declare what intent shall, or shall

not, constitute a transfer of ownership, leaving court or

jury to ascertain as matter of conclusion in each case what

was the particular intent.®

Bailment. — Thus, if the parties intend that the

particular thing transferred shall, sooner or later, be

returned to the transferor the transaction is not a change

8 — The process of forming a Ex parte White, L. R. 6 Ch. Ap.

judicial opinion from the facts, Cas. 397, 19 Wkly. R. 488.

without guiding rule. Is shown in

THE LAW OF SALES

powers the parties must have intended to transfer to
constitute change of "ownership". These all, however,
have the conimon characteristic that they show which
person was intended fundamentally to control possession
and enjoyment of the thing.
The law is simple enough, but it is obvious that in
many cases there is no way of determining absolutely
what the parties did intend in this regard. The issue
becomes, therefore, merely a conclusion of mind from the
particular facts and the facts are apt to be so inconclusive that two wholly fair and able minds may differ
absolutely. It is this possibility of difference of opinion
by two courts on essentially similar cases that makes
much apparent conflict. It is not, however, a conflict
of law, in the sense of a rule of determination, but only
a difference of conclusion as to real intent. In such
cases it is highly probable that the parties had no real
intent as to title at all; did not think of anything beyond
the immediate and obvious facts of the transaction. A
finding of ''intent,'' therefore, is only presumptive, a
legal construction from the facts. Such constructive intent is properly a matter for the court rather than for the
jury, which latter is supposed to ascertain only actual
facts. But while, as noted above, very many courts do,
themselves, make the :finding as a matter of law, there are
no established rules of presumption to guide them. What
rules there are, simply declare what intent shall, or shall
not, constitute a transfer of ownership, leaving court or
jury to ascertain as matter of conclusion in each case what
was the particular intent. 8
--Bailment.-Thus, if the parties intend that the
particular thing transferred shall, sooner or later, be
returned to the transferor the transaction is not a change
8- The process of forming a
judicial opinion from the facts,
without guiding rule, is shown in

Ex parte White, L. R. 6 Ch. A'P.
Cas. 397, 19 Wkly. R. 488.
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of ownership and not, therefore, a sale.® And this is true

even though the transferee of the thing is to do something

to it, even to the extent of completely altering its form.^°

On the other hand, an intention that the transferee need

not return it constitutes a transfer of title despite, the

fact that he is to return something of like kind, or any

equivalent.''^ It must be remembered, however, that the

real intention of the parties in this respect is often very

difficult to decide and is the true cause of dispute in

the case.^*

Sale on Approval. — If the parties intend that the

transferee of the thing shall have the option to return

it or to keep it, the question of ownership depends

upon a further fact of intention, namely whether the

parties intend the thing to be returned unless the

transferee shall choose to keep it, or to be kept by the

of ownership and not, the ref ore, a sale. 9 And this is true
even though the transferee of the thing is to do something
to it, even to the extent of completely altering its form. 10
On the other hand, an intention that the transferee need
not return it constitutes a transfer of title despite .. the
fact that he is to return something of like kind, or any
equivalent. 11 It must be remembered, however, that the
real intention of the parties in this respect is often very
difficult to decide and is the true cause of dispute in
the case. 12

transferee unless he shall choose to return it. The first

intention does not pass title until the option is exercised
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and is usually called a "sale upon approval" or some

synonymous phrase.^' The second intention passes title

until the option is exercised, and is usually called some-

thing to the effect of a " sale -with privilege of return. ' '^**

As one court said,^^ "An option to purchase if he liked is

9— Bretz v. Diehl, 117 Pa. St. 13— Fleet v. Heitz, 201 111. 594,

589, 2 Am. St. Rep. 706. 94 Am. St. 192, (court thought in-

10 — Wheat delivered to trans- tent very clear) ; In re Miller &

feree to be manufactured into Brown, 135 Fed. 871; Hallidie v.

flour and returned held to have Sutter St. Ry. Co., 63 Cal. 575,

remained the property of the (^ourt itself appears to have de-

transferor, Mallory v. Willis, 4 termined the question of intent).

N. Y. 76.

11— Bretz V. Diehl, 117 Pa. St. 14— Gottleib v. Rinaldo, 78 Ark.

589, 2 Am. St. 706; Norton v. 123, 6 n. s. 273. In re Miller &

Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153. Brown, 135 F. 868; Hallidie v.

12 — As an illustration compare Sutter St. Ry. Co., 63 Cal. 575.

the cases of Morton v. Woodruff,

2 N. Y. 153, and Mallory v. Willis, 15— Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass.

4 N. Y. 76. 198.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19.

--Sale on Approval.-If the parties intend that the
transferee of the thing shall have the option to return
it or to keep it, the question of ownership depends
upon a further fact of intention, namely whether the
parties intend the thing to be returned unless the
transferee shall choose to keep it, or to be kept by the
transferee unless he shall choose to return it. Th~ first
intention does not pass title until the option is exercised
and is usually called a ''sale upon approval'' or some
synonymous phrase. 13 The second intention passes title
until the option is exercised, and is usually called something to the effect of a ''sale with privilege of return.' '14*
As one court said, 16 ''An option to purchase if he liked is
9-Bretz v. Diehl, 117 Pa. St.
589, 2 Am. St. Rep. 706.
10-Wheat delivered to transferee to be manufactured into
flour and returned held to have
remained the property of the
transferor, Mallory v. Willis, 4
N. Y. 76.
11-Bretz v. Diehl, 117 Pa. St.
589, 2 Am. St. 706; Norton v.
Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153.
12-As an illustration compare
the cases of Morton v. Woodruff,
2 N. Y. 153, and Mallory v. Willis,
4 N. Y. 76.

13-Fleet v. Heitz, 201 Ill. 594,
94 Am. St. 192, (court thought intent very clear) ; In re Miller &
Brown, 135 Fed. 871; Hallidie v.
Sutter St. Ry. Co., 63 Cal. 575,
(court itself appears to have determined the question of intent).
14-Gottleib v. Rinaldo, 78 Ark.
123, 6 n. s. 273. In re Miller &
Brown, 135 F. 868; Halli die v.
Sutter St. Ry. Co., 63 Cal. 575.
15-Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass.
198.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 19.
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essentially different from an option to return a purchase

if he should not like. In one case the title will not pass

until the option is determined ; in the other the property

passes at once subject to the right to rescind and return."

So also when the parties have transferred possession

with the intention merely that the transferee shall either

sell the goods to another and return the money, or shall

return the goods, the law is that title has not passed and

there is no sale. The person in possession is not owner,

but only an agent with authority to pass the title. Only

when he does pass it is there a sale. Conversely, when

the transferee of the goods is not to return them unless

some contingency happens, even though he is to pay

for them only as he sells them to some one else, the law

is that title has passed. The former is usually called

** consignment for sale" and the latter *'sale with privi-

lege of return".

Pledge. — If the transferee is expected and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

intended by the parties to return the thing transferred

unless the transferor shall fail to do something, (such

as repay a sum of money received from the transferee,

within a stated time,) the transaction is a ''mortgage"

or ''pledge" rather than "sale" and does not pass title.

The fact that the parties have themselves called the

transaction a ' ' sale ' ' has comparatively little effect upon

judicial determination of their intent at any time, but it

seems to be of especially slight effect when the issue is

essentially different from an option to return a purchase
if he should not like. In one case the title will not pass
until the option is determined; in the other the property
passes at once subject to the right to rescind and return.''
So also when the parties have transferred possession
with the-intention merely that the transferee shall either
seil the goods to another and return the money, or shall
return the goods, the law is that title has not passed and
there is no sale. The person in possession is not owner,
but only an agent with authority to pass the title. Only
when he does pass it is there a sale. Conversely, when
the transferee of the goods is not to return them unless
some contingency happens, even though he is to pay
for them only as he s ells them to some one else, the law
is that title has passed. The former is usually called
"consignment for sale" and the latter "sale with privilege of return".

between a sale or mortgage possibility.

Gift. Exchange. — To constitute a sale there must

be not only a transfer of title, but also a reciprocal trans-

fer of money, or of something else on which the parties

have placed a money value. This money recompense is

not necessary to a transfer of title, but it is necessary

to constitute the transfer of title a "sale". If the mone-

tary recompense is absent the transaction is called by

some otlicr name. If there is nothing given in exchange

for the title at all, the transfer is usually denominated

--Pledge.-If the transferee is expected and
intended by the parties to return the thing transferred
unless the transferor shall fail to do something·, (such
as repay a sum of money received from the transferee,
within a stated time,) the transaction is a "mortgage"
or "pledge" rather than "sale" and does not pass title.
The fact that the parties have themselves called the
transaction a" sale" has comparatively little effect upon
judicial determination of their intent at any time, but it
seems to be of especially slight effect when the issue is
between a sale or mortgage possibility.
--Gift. Exchange.-To constitute a sale there must
be not only a transfer of title, but also a r eciprocal transfer of money, or of something else on which the parties
have placed a money value. This money recompense is
not nee ssary t o a t ransf er of title, but it is necessary
to onstitute the transfer of title a " sale". If th~ monetary r mpcn. ·e is absent the transaction is called by
som' th r nam . If ther is nothing given in exchange
for the title ut all, the transfer is usually denominated
I 111.l

by

E JET A CH VE

9

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 9

a "gift". If there is something exchanged for it, but

no monetary value is fixed upon the exchange, the trans-

action is called a ''barter and exchange".

So far as the privileges, powers and duties which con-

stitute ownership are concerned it makes no difference

whether the transfer was by way of gift, barter and

exchange or sale. But whether the transaction is a sale

or a gift does make a difference when the question is

whether the transfer has taken place or not. And even

in this respect there is no difference between a sale and

an exchange. In the case of a gift it is held that no

title passes until possession has been transferred, while

in the case of either sale or exchange title may pass be-

fore transfer of possession — a point that is more fully

discussed later.

The practical importance of the distinction between

sale, gift and exchange arises whenever one of those

transactions is attended, as a transaction, with certain
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consequences which do not follow from the others. Prac-

tically all cases involving a real difference and making

the name important arise under statutes imposing a pen-

alty upon certain "sales" which is not imposed expressly

upon gifts and exchanges. Thus, a statute of Arkansas

prohibited the ''sale" of hquor to minors. A minor

having become possessed of a quantity of whiskey which

was not to his taste, induced a saloon-keeper to give him

whiskey of a different quality in exchange for that which

he already possessed. This saloon-keeper was then

indicted for selling liquor to the minor contrary to the

statute. The court discharged the defendant, on the

mere statement of facts as admitted, because the trans-

action was not a ' ' sale ' ' but an ' ' exchange ' ', which latter

was not forbidden by the statute.^® Under another statute

16 — Gillan V. State, 47 Ark. "sell, exchange, give, barter or

555. The court was undoubtedly dispose of" liquor, while that re-

influenced in this decision by the lating to minors used the word

fact that a statute relating to "sell" only.

Inaians expressly forbade one to

a "gift". If there is something exchanged for it, but
no monetary value is fixed upon the exchange, the transaction is called a ''barter and exchange''.
So far as the privileges, powers and duties which constitute ownership are concern d it makes no difference
whether the transfer was by way of gift, barter and
exchange or sale. But whether the transaction is a sale
or a gift does make . a differ ence when the question is
whether the transfer has taken place or not. And even
in this respect there is no differ ence between a sale and
an exchange. In the case of a gift it is held that no
title passes until possession has been transferred, while
in the case of either sale or exchange title may pass before transfer of possession-a point that is more fully
discussed later.
The practical importance of the distinction between
sale, gift and exchange arises whenever one of those
transactions is attended, as a transaction, with certain
consequences which do not follow from the others. Practically all cases involving a r eal differ ence and making
the name important arise under statutes in1posing a penalty upon certain ''sales'' which is not imposed expressly
upon gifts and exchanges. Thus, a statute of Arkansas
prohibited the ''sale'' of liquor to minors. A minor
having become possessed of a quantity of whiskey which
was not to his taste, induced a saloon-keeper to give him
whiskey of a different quality in exchange for that which
he already possessed. This saloon-keeper was then
indicted for selling· liquor to the minor contrary to the
statute. The court discharged the defendant, on the
mere statement of facts as admitted, because the transaction was not a" sale" but an "exchange", which latter
was not forbidden by the statute. 16 Under another statute
16-Gillan v. State, 47 Ark.
555. The court was undoubtedly
influenced in this decision by the
tact that a statute relating to
1na1ans expressly forbade one to

·
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which forbade any one either to "sell" or to "give'*

liquor to a minor it was held that one was not guilty who

furnished a minor whiskey in exchange for his promise

to return a like quantity at a later date. The court said

that the accused had neither "sold", since there was no

price in money, nor did he "give", since he got some-

thing in exchange.^'''

The fact that some money is given in exchange

together with other things, does not make the transac-

tion a sale if the exchange as a whole has no monetary

value placed upon it. Thus, a slave dealer exchanged

two slaves which he owned plus $100 in money for two

other slaves. After the transaction had been carried

out, one of the parties desired to evade its effect and

alleged that it was void because the dealer had no license

and a statute of the state declared that all sales, made

under the circumstances, without a license should be

void. The transaction was held valid, however, on the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ground that it was not a "sale" even though part of

the exchange was in actual money. The court laid down

the proposition that actual money need not pass in order

to constitute a sale, that in business life real money

seldom does pass, but that Avhatever is given in exchange

"must be treated as so much money" and its value must

be estimated in relation to money, not merely in rela-

tion to the thing for which it is exchanged."

As this court said, the consideration need not be in

money, for the transaction to constitute a "sale", if its

value is estimated in terms of money. Neither need

17 — Coker v. State, 91 Ala. 92. a statute prohibiting sales, Com.

This court expressly overrules the v. Packard, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 101;

case of Com. v. Abrams, 150 Mass. even though money be given back

393,which had held precisely simi- ^^ter as a bona fide return gift

lar circumstances to constitute a ^^^ "^^ ^ "^^^^ colorable evasion,

«galg.. Finley v. State, Tex., 47 S. W.

A "gift", even though by a 1015; Ace. Wood v. Territory of

hotel-keeper through the agency of Oregon, 1 Ore. 223.

a waiter and to one who expected 18 — Gunter v. Lecky, 30 Ala.

to pay Is not a "sale" within 591.

which forbade any one either to "sell" or to "give"
liquor to a minor it was held that one was not guilty who
furnished a minor whiskey in exchange for his promise
to return a like quantity at a later date. The court said
that the accused had neither "sold", since there was no
price in money, nor did he "give", since he got something in exchange. 17
The fact that some money is given in exchange
together with other things, does not make the transaction a sale if the exchange as a whole has no monetary
value placed upon it. Thus, a slave dealer exchanged
two slaves which he owned plus $100 in money for two
other slaves. After the transaction had been carried
out, one of the parties desired to evade its effect and
alleged that it was void because the dealer had no license
and a statute of the state declared that all sales, made
under the circumstances, without a license should be
void. The transaction was held valid, however, on the
ground that it was not a "sale" even though part of
the exchange was in actual money. The court laid down
the proposition that actual money need not pass in order
to constitute a sale, that in business life real money
seldom does pass, but that whatever is given in exchange
"must be treated as so much money" and its value must
be estimated in relation to money, not merely in relation to the thing for which it is exchanged. 18
As this court said, the consideration need not be in
money, for the transaction to constitute a "sale'', if its
value is estimated in terms of money. Neither need
17-Coker v. State, 91 Ala. 92.
This court expressly overrules the
case of Com. v. Abrams, 150 Mass.
393,which had held precisely similar circumstances to constitute a
"sale."
A "gift", even though by a
hotel-keepe r through the agency of
a waiter and to one who expected
to pay is not a "sale" within

c.:::1. ·-- . .
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a statute prohibiting sales, Com.
v. Packard, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 101;
even though money be given back
later as a bona fide return gift
and not a mere colorable evasion,
Finley v. State, Tex., 47 S. W.
1015; Acc. Wood v. Territory of
Oregon, 1 Ore. 223.
18-Gunter v. Lecky, 30 Ala.
591.
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the estimate be in accordance with what others might
value it. All that is necessary is that the parties
treat it as though it were the equivalent of a specified amount of money. Thus in Brunsoold v. Medgorden19 the plaintiff had sold land to defendant for a stated
price of $9600. It was agreed that the plaintiff would
accept in lieu of money a certain stock of groceries
valued at their wholesale cost. As a matter of fact the
groceries were actually worth only about 70% of their
wholesale price. Although the agreement was thus
an exchange of groceries for land, with a fictitious value
set upon the groceries, the court nevertheless, by way of
dictum, declared the transaction to be a "sale" rather
than a ''barter and exchange ''. 20
For a transaction to constitute a sale it is not essential
that the thought of transferring title have been in the
minds of the parties, nor that the transfer of title have
been the primary motive. It is enough to give the transaction the legal effects of a" sale" if it does in fact result
in a transfer of ownership of the goods. 21

GENERAL PRINCIPLES 11

the estimate be in accordance with what others might

value it. All that is necessary is that the parties

treat it as though it were the equivalent of a speci-

fied amount of money. Thus in Brunsoold v. Medgor-

den^® the plaintiff had sold land to defendant for a stated

price of $9600. It was agreed that the plaintiff would

accept in lieu of money a certain stock of groceries

valued at their wholesale cost. As a matter of fact the

groceries were actually worth only about 70% of their

wholesale price. Although the agreement was thus

an exchange of groceries for land, mth a fictitious value

set upon the groceries, the court nevertheless, by way of

dictum, declared the transaction to be a *'sale" rather

than a ^'barter and exchange".^"

For a transaction to constitute a sale it is not essential

that the thought of transferring title have been in the

minds of the parties, nor that the transfer of title have

been the primary motive. It is enough to give the trans-
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action the legal effects of a ' ' sale " if it does in fact result

in a transfer of ownership of the goods.*^

19— Iowa, 153 N. W. 163. v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533; People

20— Picard v. McCormick, 11 v. Clair, 221 N. Y. 108; Com. v.

Mich. 68. As a matter of recovery Miller, 131 Pa. 118; State v. Lotti,

of "purchase price" or "damages"; 72 Vt. 115.

Studebaker Corp. v. Gollmar, 150 Contracts to manufacture ar-

N. W. 442, 159 Wis. 226. tides are held, in many jurisdic-

21 — The furnishing of food in a tions, to be "sales" within the

restaurant is a "sale", so that an meaning of the Statute of Frauds,

action for breach of warranty can Under the Statute, which re-

be maintained. Friend v. Childs quires certain contracts of "sale"

Co., Mass., 120 N. E. 407; Barring- to be in writing, the interpretation

ton V. Hotel Astor, 171 N. Y. S. of the word is somewhat more

840; Leahy v. Essex Co., 148 N. liberal than is its interpretation

Y. S. 1063; Race v. Krum, 146 N. under penal statutes. Purcell v.

19-Iowa, 153 N. W. 163.
20-Picard v. McCormick, 11
Mich. 68. As a matter of recovery
of "purchase price" or "damages";
Studebaker Corp. v. Gollmar, 150
N. W . 442, 159 Wis. 226.
21-The furnishing of food in a
restaurant is a "sale", so that an
action for breach of warranty can
be maintained. Friend v. Childs
Co., Mass., 120 N. E. 407; Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 171 N. Y. S.
840; Leahy v. Essex Co., 148 N.
Y. S. 1063; Race v. Krum, 146 N.
Y. S. 197, affd. 222 N. Y. 410.
Oont,r a, Merrill v. Hodson, 88
Conn. 314; Valeri v. Pullman Co.,
218 Fed. 519.
And so that statutes prohibiting
"sales" of game, liquor, adulterated :nilk, etc. apply. Com. v.
Phoenix Co., 157 Ky. 180; Com.

Y. S. 197, affd. 222 N. Y. 410. Miner, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 513; Sursa

Contra, Merrill v. Hodson, 88 v. Cash, 171 Mo. Ap. 396; Moss v.

Conn. 314; Valeri v. Pullman Co., Culver, 64 Pa. 414, 3 Am. Rep. 601;

218 Fed. 519. Welch v. Bigger, 24 Idaho 169.

And so that statutes prohibiting See the discussion under that

"sales" of game, liquor, adulter- heading.

ated milk, etc. apply. Com. v. Under the English "Profiteering

Phoenix Co., 157 Ky. 180; Com. Act", the furnishing of food by a
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v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533; People
v. Clair, 221 N. Y. 108; Com. v.
Miller, 131 Pa. 118; State v. Lotti,
72 Vt. 115.
Contracts to manufacture articles are held, in many jurisdictions, to be "sales" within the
meaning of the Statute of Frauds.
Under the Statute, which requires certain contracts of "sale"
to be in writing, the interpretation
of the word is somewhat more
liberal than is its interpretation
under penal statutes. Purcell v.
Miner, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 513; Sursa
v. Cash, 171 Mo. Ap. 396; Moss v.
Culver, 64 Pa. 414, 3 .A-m. Rep. 601;
Welch v. Bigger, 24 Idaho 169.
See the discussion under that
heading.
Under the English "Profiteering
Act'', the furnishing of food by a
Origi~
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Subject Matter of Sales. — Anything can be sold which

is capable of being owned in a legal sense.^'^

The law permits the transfer of ownership of anything

which it recognizes as being the objectof property rights.

It makes no difference therefore whether the subject of

the sale is corporeal property, so tangible as a cow, for

instance, or a mere incorporeal legal right, such as an

invention whose exclusive use is secured by patent, or

the good will of a business. A mere ''privilege" of doing

some particular thing may be transferred to another and

the transaction will be called a ''sale".^^

restaurant keeper has been held

to be a "sale". Rex v. Birming-

ham Profiteering Com., (1920) K.

B. 57, 89 L. J. R. 57; so also the

compounding of a prescription and

transfer of the resultant product,

Subject Matter of Sales.-Anything can be sold which
is capable of being owned in a legal sense. 22
The law permits the transfer of ownership of anything
which it recognizes as being the object ·of property rights.
It makes no difference therefore whether the subject of
the sale is corporeal property, so tangible as a cow, for
instance, or a mere incorporeal legal right, such as an
invention whose exclusive use is secured by patent, or
the good will of a business. A mere "privilege" of doing
some particular thing may be transferred to another and
the transaction will be called a '' sale''. 23
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Rex V. Wood Green Profiteering

Com., (1920) K. B. 55, 89 L. J. R. 55.

22 — There are some rights which

can be enforced against any per-

son, and hence come within some

definitions of a right in rem, but

which so completely appertain to

the individual in whose favor they

run that they can not conceivably

be transferred. Such, for instance,

is the right of privacy and the

right to a reputation — as distinct

restaurant keeper has been held
to be a "sale", Rex v. Birmingham Profiteering Com., (1920) K.
B. 57, 89 L. J. R. 57; so also the
compounding of a prescription and
transfer of the resultant product,
Rex v. Wood Green Profiteering
Com., (1920) K. B. 55, 89 L. J. R. 55.

from business good will. While

it may be said that these, although

rights in rem, are incapable of

transfer of ownership and there-

fore can not be the subject of a

sale, it may also be said that they

are not the subjects of ownership

in a legal sense. The issue is,

however, purely one of terminol-

ogy; if such rights may be said

to be "owned" they must be ex-

cepted from the statement of the

text, which is in that case too

broad in its unqualified form.

23 — In Hathaway v. Bennett, 10

N. Y. 108, plaintiff had "bought"

from X the privilege which X

had by agreement with Bennett of

selling the latters newspapers

through a certain district. The

suit was occasioned by Bennett's

refusal to supply papers to

plaintiff. The contract held that

Bennett might revoke the priv-

ilege at any time but that so long

as it did exist it was capable of

"sale" and its ownership had been

transferred to plaintiff so as to

make him owner of it.

In Hoyt V. Holly, 39 Conn. 326,

12 Am. Rep. 390, plaintiff, a phy-

sician had agreed with defendant

22-There are some rights which
can be enforced against any person, and hence come within some
definitions of a right in rem, but
which so completely appertain to
the individual in whose favor they
run that they can not conceivably
be transferred. Such, for instance,
is the right of privacy and the
right to a reputation-as distinct
from business good will. While
it may be said that these, although
rights in rem, are incapable of
transfer of ownership and therefore can not be the subject of a
sale, it may also be said that they
are not the subjects of ownership
in a legal sense. The issue is,
however, purely one of terminology; if such rights may be said
to be "owned" th ey must be excepted from the statement of the
text, whi ·h is in that ·ase too
broad in its unqualified form.

that in return for payment by

defendant he would introduce de-
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23-ln Hathaway v. Bennett, 10
N. Y. 108, plaintiff had "bought"
from X the privilege which X
had by agreement with Bennett of
selling the latter·s newspapers
through a certain district. The
suit was occasioned by Bennett's
refusal to supply papers to
plaintiff. The contract held that
Bennett might revoke the privilege at any time but that so long
as it did exist it was capable of
"sale" and its ownership had been
transferred to plaintiff so as to
make him owner of it.
In Hoyt v. Holly, 39 Conn. 326,
12 Am. Rep. 390, plaintiff, a physician had agreed with defendant
that in return for payment by
defendant he would introduce defendant to his patients and transfer to him the good will of so
many as he could and would himself remove from practice. The
issue was only whether such a
contract was valid and enforcible
and the court upheld it, calling
it a "sale" of the good will.
The transfer of an interest in
a partnership was called a "sale"
in Van Bracklin v. Smeallie, 140
N. Y. 70, and declared to be effective. Acc. Slidell v. McCoy's Exs.
II
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fendant to his patients and trans-

fer to him the good will of so

many as he could and would him-

self remove from practice. The

issue was only whether such a
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-Choses in Action~-Some effort has been made,
from time to time, to distinguish between the transfer
of property which exists because of a right of legal action
against all persons generally and that property which
consists only of a right of legal action against some
particular person or persons. The former ar e technically called property rights, or rights in rem, and the
latter are called rights in personam. At one time the
latter, that is, the right of action against a particular
person, could not be transferred. It could be exercised
only by the person in whom it had been originally created.
That is to say, the possessor of the right could go through
all the motions and follow the forms of transferring
it to another but the courts would refuse to allow that
other to exercise it. In legal effect, therefore, it was
not transferred. By a progress of development which
need not here be discussed, it has come to pass that at
the present day such rights of action can be transferred
so that they may be enforced by the transferee in the
name of his transferor at least, and usually in his own
name. But because of the fact that at one point in the
development of the legal privilege of transferring
them they could be enforced by the transferee only
in the name of the transferor, and the transferee
could not be said therefore to be ''owner'' of the
right of action, one finds frequent intimation that such
rights can not be "sold". "Assignment" of the right
was the proper term for the transfer. But since the privilege of transferring the right of action has come to the
point where the transferee can exercise it in his own
name he has acquired at least one of the rights of ownership and is generally called ''owner''. Likewise, the
transfer is indiscriminately called ''assignment'' or
"sale". It is immaterial whether the transaction be
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Choses in Action. — Some effort has been made,

from time to time, to distinguish between the transfer

of property which exists because of a right of legal action

against all persons generally and that property which

consists only of a right of legal action against some

particular person or persons. The former are techni-

cally called property rights, or rights in rem, and the

latter are called rights in personam. At one time the

latter, that is, the right of action against a particular

person, could not be transferred. It could be exercised

only by the person in whom it had been originally created.

That is to say, the possessor of the right could go through

all the motions and follow the forms of transferring

it to another but the courts would refuse to allow that

other to exercise it. In legal effect, therefore, it was

not transferred. By a progress of development which

need not here be discussed, it has come to pass that at

the present day such rights of action can be transferred
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80 that they may be enforced by the transferee in the

name of his transferor at least, and usually in his own

name. But because of the fact that at one point in the

development of the legal privilege of transferring

them they could be enforced by the transferee only

in the name of the transferor, and the transferee

could not be said therefore to be ''owner" of the

right of action, one finds frequent intimation that such

rights can not be ''sold". "Assignment" of the right

was the proper term for the transfer. But since the priv-

ilege of transferring the right of action has come to the

point where the transferee can exercise it in his own

name he has acquired at least one of the rights of owner-

ship and is generally called "owner". Likemse, the

transfer is indiscriminately called "assignment" or

"sale". It is immaterial whether the transaction be

15 La. 340. The right to receive sale to satisfy a judgment against

a part of rents collected by a re- the owner of the right, Verplanck

ceiver may be "sold" at judicial v. Verplanck, 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 104.

16 La. 340. The right to receive
a part of rents collected by a receiver may be "sold" at judicial
D1gitiz
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sale to satisfy a judgment against
the owner of the right, Verplanck
v. Verpla.nck, 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 104.
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called a "sale" or not; the fact is that the legal power
to exercise certain rights of suit can now be transferred
from one person to another. 20
Contractual Features.-The law does not recognize a
transfer of absolute ownership in a thing except as the
result of mutual intention. The original owner must
intend, actually or apparently, to give up his ownership
in favor of the new party, and the new one must have a
like intention to receive it. 25 (One possible exception
is that of judicial sale wherein the ownership is transferred by order of the court regardless of the desires
of the present owner.) Since agreement is essential to
change of legal title, it may be said that every sale, in
the sense of an accomplished transfer of title, is the result
of an agreement to sell.
This agreement may be coincident with the transfer
itself, or it may precede the actual transfer by a greater
or less moment of time. When the agreement and transfer are coincident, the same acts of the parties serve
to effectuate the transfer and to demonstrate the intent
itself. If, for instance, B should walk into a store, pick
up an article of merchandise, hand the proper price
to the proprietor with the latter's acceptauce of it, and
leave the store with the article in his possession, all
without a spoken word, there would coincidently both
be demonstrated a mutual intent that title should be

14 THE LAW OF SALES

called a **sale" or not; the fact is that the legal power

to exercise certain rights of suit can now be transferred

from one person to another.'^**

Contractual Features. — The law does not recognize a

transfer of absolute ownership in a thing except as the

result of mutual intention. The original owner must

intend, actually or apparently, to give up his ownership

in favor of the new party, and the new one must have a

like intention to receive it.^^ (One possible exception

is that of judicial sale wherein the ownership is trans-

ferred by order of the court regardless of the desires

of the present owner.) Since agreement is essential to

change of legal title, it may be said that every sale, in

the sense of an accompHshed transfer of title, is the result

of an agreement to sell.

This agreement may be coincident with the transfer

itself, or it may precede the actual transfer by a greater

or less moment of time. When the agreement and trans-

fer are coincident, the same acts of the parties serve
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to effectuate the transfer and to demonstrate the intent

itself. If, for instance, B should walk into a store, pick

up an article of merchandise, hand the proper price

to the proprietor with the latter 's acceptance of it, and

leave the store with the article in his possession, all

without a spoken word, there would coincidently both

be demonstrated a mutual intent that title should be

24 — It does not seem necessary he does get the fundamental

to the particular subject matter of right of enjoyment, see the con-

this book to discuss in detail the troversial articles by Messrs. Cook

levelopment of the power to trans- and Williston in 29 Harvard L. R.

fer rights in action nor the partic- 816, 30 Harvard L. R. 99, 30 Har-

ular limitations still existing, all vard L. R. 449.

of which can be found in any good 25 — A finder of property does

work on contracts. As to the not acquire an absolute ownership

various correlated rights, other since his rights are subordinate

than the mere right of suit, which to those of the original owner even

the transferee of a right to sue though he has all the rights of

acquires, and particularly whether owner in respect to other persons.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 76, "Goods".

24-lt does not seem necessary
to the particular subject matter of
this book to discuss in detail the
levelopment of the power to transfer rights in action nor the particular limitations still existing, all
of which can be found in any good
work on contracts. As to the
various correlated rights, other
than the mere right of suit, which
the transferee of a right to sue
acquires, and particularly whether

he does get the fundamental
right of enjoyment, see the controversial articles by Messrs. Cook
and Williston in 29 Harvard L. R.
816, 30 Harvard L. R. 99, 30 Harvard L. R. 449.
25-A finder of property does
not acquire an absolute ownership
since his rights are subordinate
to those of the original owner even
though he has all the rights of
owner in respect to other persons.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 76, "Goods".
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transferred and the transfer itself would be legally

accomplished.^^

On the other hand, the parties may enter into a present

agreement that ownership of a thing shall be trans-

ferred at some time in the future. This agreement,

whether carried into execution coincidently with' its

formation, or subsequently to be fulfilled, has all the

characteristics of an ordinary contract. If it has been

executed and the transfer of title effectuated in accord-

ance with it, the rules in respect to executed contracts

apply. If the transfer has not been made, the rights of

the parties are determined in accordance with the general

rules of contracts to be performed. There must be the

usual capacity of parties, consideration, absence of fraud

or mistake and the like. This preliminary and necessary

contract is not discussed as such in this book, but must

be studied in works particularly devoted to that subject.

It is sufficient here to call attention to the fact that there
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must have been an effective contract to transfer the own-

ership, before the law ivill, by recognition thereof, create

an actual transfer of the ownership.^

26— Peelers v. State, 154 Wis.

111.

15

transferred and the transfer itself would be legally
accomplished. 26
On the other hand, the parties may e~ter into a present
agreement that ownership of a thing shall be transferred at some time in the future. This agreement,
whether carried into execution coincidently with' its
formation, or subsequently to be fulfilled, has all the
characteristics of an ordinary contract. If it has been
executed and the transfer of title effectuated in accordance with it, the rules in respect to executed contracts
apply. If the transfer has not been made, the rights of
the parties are determined in accordance with the general
rules of contracts to be performed. There must be the
usual capacity of parties, consideration, absence of fraud
or mistake and the like. This preliminary and necessary
contract is not discussed as such in this book, but must
be studied in works particularly devoted to that subject.
It is sufficient here to call attention to the fact that there
must have been an effective contract to transfer the ownership, before the law will, by recognition thereof, create
an actual trans! er of the ownership!,
26-Peeters v. State, 154 Wis.
111.
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CHAPTER II

Transfer of Title

Rules for Determining the Passing of Title

Passing of Title. — Assuming that the parties liave so

CHAPTER II

acted that there is a contract to which the law can give

effect, the question at once arises whether the transfer

of title has been accomplished. This is the issue on

TRANSFER OF TITLE

which, fundamentally, most of the htigation over sales

has been based. On the answer to it rest, of course, the

liabilities and rights of the parties in respect to the

RULES FOR DETERMINING THE

thing concerned.

p ASSING

OF TITLE

The following discussion is necessarily divided into

Passing of Title.-Assuming that the parties have so
acted that there is a contract to which the law can give
effect, the question at once arises whether the transfer
of title has been accomplished. This is the issue on
which, fundamentally, most of the litigation over sales
has been based. On the answer to it rest, of course, the
liabilities and rights of the parties in respect to the
thing concerned.
The following discussion is necessarily divided into
two sections. It is obvious, as a matter of logic, as well
as a rule of law, that courts can not consider where the
ownership of a thing resides unless they know what particular thing it is whose title is in question. Until the
parties themselves have decided just what particular
thing they intend to transfer, no court can say whether
that thing has been transferred. Often the controversy
is really duplex; first, whether the parties have in fact
agreed upon the particular thing, and, second, whether
if so agreed, they have transferred its ownership. The
two issues can not possibly, with intelligence, be discussed
or considered as one. The logical arrangement would be
to treat the underlying question first, and to discuss the
rules by which it is determined whether the particular
thing has been agreed upon. But, for reasons which
present themselves throughout the discussion, it seems
practical wi dom to treat first the passing of titl , upon
an as. umption that the pa~ties have agreed upon the specific chatt 1 aff cted, and then to discuss the correctness
of that assumption.

two sections. It is obvious, as a matter of logic, as well

as a rule of law, that courts can not consider ^vhere the

ownership of a thing resides unless they know what par-

ticular thing it is whose title is in question. Until the

parties themselves have decided just what particular

thing they intend to transfer, no court can say whether

that thing has been transferred. Often the controversy
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is really duplex; first, w^hether the parties have in fact

agreed upon the particular thing, and, second, whether

if so agreed, they have transferred its ownership. The

two issues can not possibly, Avith intelligence, be discussed

or considered as one. The logical arrangement would be

to treat the underlying question first, and to discuss the

rules by which it is determined whether the particular

thing has been agreed upon. But, for reasons which

present themselves throughout the discussion, it seems

practical msdom to treat first the passing of title, upon

an assumption tlint the parties have agreed upon the spe-

cific chattel affected, and then to discuss the correctness

of that assumption.
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Intent Governs. — When the transaction concerns a

definite and specified thing, whose ownership the seller

is legally capable of transferring, the primary and funda-

mental principle is, that the title will be treated as having

been transferred when the parties intend it should be,

and only when they so intend.*

Change of Possession Not Essential. — There are no

formalities or legal conditions which must be complied

Intent Governs.-When the transaction concerns a
definite and specified thing, whose ownership the seller
is legally capable of transferring, the prima ry and fundamental ptinciple is, that the title will be t reated as having
been trans! erred when the parties intend it should be,
and only when they so intend.""
~

with before an intent to pass title will be given effect by

the courts.! (But see the discussion of the ''Statute of

Frauds".) It is not necessary, for instance, that pos-

session be transferred for the ownership to be passed.

Historically, the rule was otherwise ; the rights of owner-

ship were inseparable from physical possession.^ In the

case of a gift, already commented on as a transfer of

ownership without anything received in exchange, this

original necessity of a change of possession still exists.

Courts will not recognize title as having passed by way
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of gift unless and until the possession of the thing has

passed to the recipient of the gift. But it is now thor-

oughly settled that where there is a reciprocal exchange

of something, even though it be only a promise, for the

thing whose title is to be transferred, a change of pos-

session is not essential to vest in the transferee, at least

as against the transferor, rights and privileges which

usually connote ownership.^

1— See Pollock & Maitland, II, 531; Shrimer v. Meyer, 171 Ala.

181. 112; Wade v. Moffett, 21 111. 110,

2 — The history of this develop- 14 Am. Dec. 79; VanBrocklin v.

ment is summed up by Prof. Ames Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70, 72; Baker

in 8 Harvard L. R. 252, 258. Per- v. McDonald, 74 Neb. 595, 1 L. R.

kins V. Halpren, 257 Pa. 402, 101 A. (n. s.) 337; Bradley v. Wheel-

Atl. 741; Com. V. Hess, 148 Pa. 98, er, 44 N. Y. 495; Bertelson v.

17 L. R. A. 176; Cope's Est, 191 Bower, 81 Ind. 512; Schwab v.

Pa. 589; Brewer v. Mich. Salt Oatman, 113 N. Y. S. 910;

Assn., 47 Mich. 526; Sherwood v. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63;

Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 11 Am. St. 1 H. Blackstone 357; 2 Id. 211;

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 18, (1), (2), 19.

tSee Uniform Sales Act, Sections.

Change of Possession Not Essential.-There are no
formalities or legal conditions which must be complied
with before an intent to pass title will be given effect by
the courts.t (But see the discussion of the "Statute of
Frauds".) It is not necessary, for instance, that possession be transferred for the ownership to be passed.
Historically, the rule was otherwise; the rights of ownership were inseparable from physical possession. 1 In the
case of a gift, already commented on as a transfer of
ownership without anything received in exchange, this
original necessity of a change of possession still exists.
Courts will not recognize title as having passed by way
of gift unless and until the possession of the thing has
passed to the recipient of the gift. But it is now thoroughly settled that where there is a r eciprocal exchange
of something, even though it be only a promise, for the
thing whose title is to be transferr ed, a change of possession is not essential to vest in the transferee, at least
as against the transferor, rights and privileges whi0h
usually connote ownership. 2
1-See Pollock & Maitland, II,
531; Shrimer v. Meyer, 171 Ala.
181.
112; Wade v. Moffett, 21 Ill. 110,
2-The history of this develop74 Am. Dec. 79; VanBrocklin v.
ment is summed up by Prof. Ames
Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70, 72; Baker
in 8 Harvard L. R. 252, 258. Perv. McDonald, 74 Neb. 595, 1 L . R.
kins v. Halpren, 257 Pa. 402, 101
A. (n. s.) 337; Bradley v. WheelAtl. 741; Com. v. Hess, 148 Pa. 98,
er, 44 N. Y. 495; Bertelson v.
17 L. R. A. 176; Cope's Est., 191
Bower, 81 Ind. 512 ; S chwab v.
Pa. 589; Brewer v. Mich. Salt
Oatman, 113 N. Y. S. 910 ;
Assn., 47 Mich. 526; Sherwood v.
Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T . R. 63;
Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 11 Am. St.
1 H. Blackstone 357; 2 Id. 211;
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 18, (1), (2), 19.
tSee Uniform Sales Act, Section 3.
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18 THE LAW OF SALES

It is true that if possession is not passed to the buyer,

third persons acting in good faith may acquire from the

seller the rights of ownership as against even the first

buyer. In a sense, therefore, until possession actually

passes to the buyer the seller has still the legal power to

control the right to possession. And so, in a sense, he

has practical ownership. If he chooses fraudulently to

sell to a third person who takes possession, that person

has, in some jurisdictions, the legal right to keep posses-

sion, and, hence, has ownership. This might be put upon

the ground either that the original buyer's rights are

set aside in favor of the third person because he failed

to take possession, or that title remained in the seller

because of his continuing in possession and could still

be passed to the third person. The decisions themselves

are not clear as to what ground they rest on. Some

of them do use expressions which make it appear that

they consider ''ownership" never to have passed to
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the original buyer because he did not have possession.

At most, however, this apparent conflict is one of termi-

nology only — namely, how completely and exclusively

5 T. R. 683; Meade v. Smith, 16 would be after a deUvery of goods

Conn. 345; Whitcomb v. Whit- in pursuance of a general con-

ney, 24 Mich. 486; Poling v. Flan- tract. The very appropriation of

agan, 41 W. Va. 191; Dixon v. the chattel is equivalent to de-

Yates, 5 B. «fe Ad. 313, 340, "I take livery by the vendor, and the as-

it to be clear that by the law of sent of the vendee to take the

England the sale of a specific specific chattel, and to pay the

chattel passes the property in it price, is equivalent to his accept-

to the vendee without delivery. ing possession. The effect of the

* ♦ * Where there is a sale of contract, therefore is to vest the

goods generally, no property in property in the bargainee." Fel-

them passes till delivery, because lows v. Bost. & Me. R. R., 78 N.

It is true that if possession is not passed to the buyer,
third persons acting in good faith may acquire from the
seller the rights of ownership as against even the first
buyer. In a sense, therefore, until possession actually
passes to the buyer the seller has still the legal power to
control the right to possession. And so, in a sense, he
has practical ownership. If he chooses fraudulently to
sell to a third person who takes possession, that person
has, in some jurisdictions, the legal right to keep possession, and, hence, has ownership. This might be put upon
the ground either that the original buyer's rights are
set aside in favor of the third person because he failed
to take possession, or that title remained in the seller
because of his continuing in possession and could still
be passed to the third person. The decisions themselves
are not clear as to what ground they rest on. Some
of them do use expressions which make it appear that
they consider ''ownership'' never to have passed to
the original buyer because he did not have possession.
At most, however, this apparent conflict is one of terminology only-namely, how completely and exclusively

until then the very goods sold are H. 594, 98 Atl. 481; Johnson v.

not ascertained; but where, by Tabor, 101 Miss. 78; Young v. In-

the contract itself, the vendor golsbe, 208 N. Y. 503; Townsend

appropriates to the vendee a spe- v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325;

clfic chattel, and the latter thereby Briggs v. U. S., 143 U. S. 346.

agrees to take that specific Contra, dictuvi only, Georgia

chattel, and to pay the stipu- Marble Works v. Minor, 128 Ark.

lated price, the parties are then 124, 193 S. W. 498.

in the same situation as they

5 T. R. 683; Meade v. Smith, 16
Conn. 345; Whitcomb v. Whitney, 24 Mich. 486; Poling v. Flanagan, 41 W. Va. 191; Dixon v.
Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313, 340, "I take
it to be clear that by the law of
England the sale of a specific
chattel passes the property in it
to the vendee without delivery.
• • * Where the re is a sale of
goods generall y, n o property in
them passes till delivery, because
until the n the ver y goods sold are
not ascertained ; but where, by
the contract itself, the vendor
appropriates to the vendee a specific chattel, and the latter thereby
a gr ees to take tha t spe cific
chattel, and to pay the stipula ted price, the parties a r e then
in the sam e situa tion as they
Di

·u.. e

would be after a delivery of goods
in pursuance of a general contract. The very appropriation of
the chattel is equivalent to delivery by the vendor, and the assent of the vendee to take the
specific chattel, and to pay the
price, is equivalent to his accepting possession. The effect of the
contract, therefore is to vest the
property in the bargainee." Fellows v. Bost. & Me. R. R., 78 N.
H. 594, 98 Atl. 481; Johnson v.
Tabor, 101 Miss. 78; Young v. Ingolsbe, 208 N. Y. 503; Townsend
v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325;
Briggs v. U. S., 143 U . S. 346.
Contra, di ct1mi only, Georgia
Marble Works v. Minor, 128 Ark.
124, 193 s. w. 498.
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must one control the legal right of possession in order

properly to be called the legal "owner". The courts are

agreed, that, whatever he be called, the buyer, even though

he does not take possession, has all the customary rights

and liabilities of ownership except as to certain third per-

sons who take possession from the seller in good faith.'

Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of opinions

speak of him as having acquired the ''ownership". Ac-

cordingly his rights will be called ' ' o^vnership " in this

discussion.

The ownership may pass to the buyer, if the parties

so intend, even though by their agreement he has not

even the right to possession, without further act, such

as payment of the price.*

Likewise, certain rights generally appertaining to title

will pass to the buyer even though the goods are in the

adverse possession of a third person, and the transaction

is generally called a '*sale".^

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Payment Not Essential.— PajTnent is not essential to

the passing of title when the parties have not intended

that it shall be.^

Presumptions of Intent.— This rule, that the intention

3 — The rights of such third per- 6— Thompson v. Brannin, 94

sons are discussed Post, p. 212. Ky. 490; Allen v. Rushfort, 72

4— Clark V. Greeley, 62 N. H. ^eb. 907; Bayne v. Hard, 79 N. Y.

394; State v. MuHin, 78 O. S. 358, g. 208; Richardson v. Insurance

125 Am. St. 710; Obery v. Lander, co., 136 N. C. 314, but compare,

179 Mass. 125; Lester v. East, 49 Hughes v. Knott, 138 N. C. 105;

must one control the legal right of possession in order
properly to be called the legal ''owner''. The courts are
agT ed, that, whatever he be called, the buyer, even though
he does not take possession, ha all the cu tomary rights
and liabilities of ownership except as to certain third persons who take possession from the seller in good falth. 8
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of opinions
speak of him as having acquired the "ownership". Accordingly his rights will be called '' o-wnership'' in this
discussion.
The ownership may pass to the buyer, if the parties
so intend, even though by their agreement he has not
even the right to possession, without further act, such
as payment of the price. 4
Likewise, certain rights generally appertaining to title
will pass to the buyer even though the goods are in the
adverse possession of a third person, and the transaction
is generally called a "sale ". 6

Ind. 588; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn. Parker v. Davis, 13 O. C. C. R.

& Cress. 360. 631; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn.

5 — Cartland v. Morrison, 32 Me. & Cress. 360; see also cases cited

190. But compare the decisions, above and those referred to in

based upon public policy, in subsequent sections.

O'Keefe v. Kellogg, 15 111. 347; Mc- By statute of some states pay-

Payment Not Essential.-Payment is not essential to
the passing of title when the parties have not intended
that it shall be.6

Cully V. Hardy, 13 111. Ap. 631; ment is made an essential to the

Erickson v. Lyon, 26 111. Ap. 17; passing of title of certain kinds

Presumptions of Intent.-This rule, that the intention

Young V. Ferguson, 11 Ky. 298. of goods. See the discussion under

See the contention of Mr. Ames, "conditions precedent", Post, p. 33.

that "title" does not pass, in 3

Harvard L. R. 342.

3-The rights of such third persons are discussed Post, p. 212.
4-Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H.
394; State v. Mullin, 78 0. S. 358,
125 Am. St. 710; Obery v. Lander,
179 Mass. 125; Lester v. East, 49
Ind. 588; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn.
& Cress. 360.
5-Cartland v. Morrison, 32 Me.
190. But compare the decisions,
based upon public policy, in
O'Keefe v. Kellogg, 15 Ill. 347; Mccully v. Hardy, 13 Ill. Ap. 631;
Erickson v. Lyon, 26 Ill. Ap. 17;
Young v. Ferguson, 11 Ky. 298.
See the contention of Mr. Ames,
that "title" does not pass, in 3
Harvard L. R. 342.
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6-Thompson v. Brannin, 94
Ky. 490; Allen v. Rushfort, 72
Neb. 907; Bayne v. Hard, 79 N. Y.
S. 208; Richardson v. Insurance
Co., 136 N. C. 314, but compare,
Hughes v. Knott, 138 N. C. 105;
Parker v. Davis, 13 O. C. C. R.
631; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn.
& Cress. 360; see also cases cited
above and those referred to in
subsequent sections.
By statute of some states payment is made an essential to the
passing of title of certain kinds
of goods. See the discussion under
"conditions precedent", Post, p. 33.
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of the parties determines when title passes to specific
property, is simple and explicit enough, and involves no
difficulty when the parties have made their intention
clear. Controversy arises only where the parties can
not agree as to what their intent was, or had no conscious,
no real intent as to title at all.
If the parties had an actual and conscious, although
unexpressed, intent, it would properly be the function
of a jury to determine what it was, as a question of fact.
But, it is common experience that the parties to a sale
very seldom have any conscious thought whatever as
to the exact point of events at which title is to pass.
The ultimate result is all that enters into their calculation. It is impossible in such case to speak of the "fact"
of their intent. There is no such fact. Yet there must
be some point in the transaction at which title passed,
and it becomes the duty of the court to say what this
point was. This is not a finding of fact, but rather a
decision of what the court thinks would have been the
fact if the parties had thought about the matter. In
other words, it is a judicial conclusion as to what normal
men in like circumstances would probably have intended
had their attention been directed to the matter. This
distinction between finding the actual fact of intent by
a jury, and a conclusion by the court of what might
have been the normal intent had there been a conscious
one, has not been clearly made by the courts.
Some courts have left the question of intent to the
jury, without discussion of reason for so doing, apparently as a matter of course, as though it were a question
of fact. 7 Generally, however, where the matter is left to

20 THE LAW OF SALES

of the parties determines when title passes to specific

property, is simple and explicit enough, and involves no

difficulty when the parties have made their intention

clear. Controversy arises only where the parties can

not agree as to what their intent was, or had no conscious,

no real intent as to title at all.

If the parties had an actual and conscious, although

unexpressed, intent, it would properly be the function

of a jury to determine what it was, as a question of fact.

But, it is common experience that the parties to a sale

very seldom have any conscious thought whatever as

to the exact point of events at which title is to pass.

The ultimate result is all that enters into their calcula-

tion. It is impossible in such case to speak of the "fact"

of their intent. There is no such fact. Yet there must

be some point in the transaction at which title passed,

and it becomes the duty of the court to say what this

point was. This is not a finding of fact, but rather a

decision of what the court thinks would have been the
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fact if the parties had thought about the matter. In

other words, it is a judicial conclusion as to what normal

men in like circumstances would prohahly have intended

had their attention been directed to the matter. This

distinction between finding the actual fact of intent by

a jury, and a conclusion by the court of what might

have been the normal intent had there been a conscious

one, has not been clearly made by the courts.

Some courts have left the question of intent to the

jury, without discussion of reason for so doing, appar-

ently as a matter of course, as though it were a question

of fact.'' Generally, however, where the matter is left to

7 — In Graff v. Fitch, 58 111. 373, was not intended to pass, and the

the trial court left the matter with jury should have been left to de-

the jury with instructions that, if cide the real intention. In Rich-

they found certain facts as alleged, ardson v. Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 314,

title did not pass. This was held it was held that the question of

error by the Supreme Court on intent should have been left to

the ground that such facts only the jury. See Stewart v. Hen-

created a presumption that title ningson Produce Co., 88 Kan. 521,

7-ln Graff v. Fitch, 58 Ill. 373,
the trial court left the matter with
the jury with instructions that, if
they found certain facts as alleged,
titl e did not pass. This was held
error by the Supreme Court on
the ground that such facts only
created a pr esumption that title
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was not intended to pass, and the
jury should have been left to decide the real intention. In Richardson v. Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 314.
it was held that the question of
intent should have been left to
the jury. See Stewart v. Henningson Produce Co., 88 Kan. 621,
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the jury at all, it is left with specific instructions that a

strong presumption of intent arises from certain facts.'

The great majority of courts, without specifically say-

ing anything about it, treat this intent as a question to

be determined by the court according to established rules

of presumption. These rules of presumption are burlt

upon certain factors which are frequently recurrent in

transactions of sale, and which, because of their common

recurrence, furnish standards that will apply to nearly

every case.

Form of Agreement. — The tense of the words used

does not have any material weight with the court. In

Tarling v. Baxter, for instance,® it was held that title had

passed, although the form of the agreement was to pass

title in the future, being, '*I have * * * agreed to

the jury at all, it is left with pecific instructions that a
strong presumption of intent arises from certain facts. 8
The great majority of courts, without specifically saying anything about it, treat this intent as a question to
be determined by the court according to established rules
of presumption. These rules of presumption are built
upon certain factors which are frequently recurrent in
transactions of sale, and which, because of their common
recurrence, furnish standards that will apply to nearly
every case.

sell" and '' I have * * * agreed to buy". In Sher-

win V. Mudge^° the w^ords were ''A sells and B buys",

but the court held that there was no intent to pass the
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title at that time.*^

Nothing Remaining to be Done by Seller. — In

general, if nothing remains to be done, under the terms

50 L. R. A. (n. s.) Ill; Wilkin- were undisputed — thus leaving for

son V. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386; the jury only the finding of the

Morrow v. Reed, 30 Wis. 81 ; Cun- overt facts from which the court

ningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 553; might deduce the intent. Accord,

Weld V. Came, 98 Mass. 152; Bur- Miller Milling Co. v. Butterfield,

rows V. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291; etc.. Co., 32 Idaho 265, 181 Pac.

Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend. 703 ; Pittsburgh etc. Co., v. Cudahy

(N. Y.) 31; Moats v. Strange Co., 260 Pa. 135.

Bros. Hide Co., 185 la. 356, 170 N. 9—6 Bam. & Cress. 360.

--Form of Agreement.-The tense of the words used
does not have any material weight with the court. In
Tarling v. Baxter, for instance,9 it was held that title had
passed, although the form of the agreement was to pass
title in the future, being, "I have • • • agreed to
sell" and" I have • • • agreed to buy". In Sherwin v. Mudge 10 the words were "A sells and B buys",
but the court held that there was no intent to pass the
title at that time. 11

W. 456. 10—127 Mass. 547.

8 — Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 11 — Walti v. Gaba, 160 Cal. 324;

20 Mo. 553; Burrows v. Whit- Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614, "I

aker, 71 N. Y. 291; Lingham v. have bought" — title held not to

Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324. In Cas- have passed. Piano Co. v. Piano

--Nothing Remaining to be Done by Seller. - In
general, if nothing remains to be done, under the terms

sinelli v. Humphrey Supp. Co., 43 Co., 85 O. S. 196, "I hereby trans-

Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523, it was held fer my full right of ownership"

to be a question for the court if held not indicative that title was

it involved the construction of a passed,

written contract, or if the facts

50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 111; Wilkin·
son v. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386;
Morrow v. Reed, 30 Wis. 81; Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 553;
Weld v. Came, 98 Mass. 152; Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291;
Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend.
(N. Y.) 31; Moats v. Strange
Bros. Hide Co., 185 la. 356, 170 N.
w. 456.
8-Cunningham v. Ashbrook,
20 Mo. 553; Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291; Lingham v.
Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324. In Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supp. Co., 43
Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523, it was held
to be a question for the court if
it involved the construction of a
written contract, or if the tacts

t:y
I TER E A CH VE
Dig1t1z

were undisputed-thus leaving for
the jury only the finding of the
overt facts from which the court
might deduce the intent. Accord,
Miller Milling Co. v. Butterfield,
etc., Co., 32 Idaho 265, 181 Pac.
703; Pittsburgh etc. Co., v. Cudahy
Co., 260 Pa. 135.
9-6 Barn. & Cress. 360.
10-127 Mass. 547.
11-Walti v. Gaba, 160 Cal. 324;
Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614, "I
have bought"-title held not to
have passed. Piano Co. v. Piano
Co., 85 0. S. 196, "I hereby transfer my full right of ownership"
held not indicative that title was
passed.
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of the contract, except for the buyer to pay the agreed

price and take possession, the courts assume, in the

absence of any showing of contrary intention, that title

has passed. The presumption is that the parties intended

the title to pass as soon as everything else was done

according to contract, regardless of the physical posses-

sion, or of actual payment.^^* But if parties clearly in-

tend that title shall not pass until payment, the courts will

give effect to that intention.

-Something Remaining to be Done by Seller. — On

the other hand, it may be said broadly that whenever

the parties have agreed that the seller is to do some

of the contract, except for the buyer to pay the agreed
price and t ake possession, the courts assume, in the
absence of any showing of contrary intention, that title
has passed. The presumption is that the parties intended
the title to pass as soon as everything else was done
according to contract, regardless of the physical possession, or of actual payment.tu But if parties clearly intend that title shall not pass until payment, the courts will
give effect to that intention.

act before the buyer could logically and naturally, accord-

ing to the agreement, take possession, a strong legal pre-

sumption arises that they did not intend title to pass until

--Something Remaining to be Done by Seller.-On

that act should be done.

The reason for this presumption is variously stated,

and is not definitely ascertainable. But, although the
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courts which follow this rule do not themselves state

the reason for it, there is a possible reason which very

logically justifies this presumption of intent. Ownership

carries with it the risk of loss. It is a fair presumption

that a buyer would not intend to take title to goods and

to assume this risk of loss, unless he could have also the

right to protect his goods from loss without violating the

terms of the agreement. In cases where the seller is to

12 — Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn, fine this presumption to cases in

& Cress. 360; VanBrocklin v. which it positively appears that

Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Baker v. payment was not to be immedi-

McDonald, 74 Neb. 595, 1 L. R. A. ate, as where a term of credit

(n. s.) 474. Piano Co. v. Piano Co., ^^ expressly given. See the dis-

85 O S 196 cussion under "Cash Sale", Post,

Contra, dictum only, that pay- P- 33- Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136;

ment is a prerequisite to passing ^ich. Cent. Ry. v. Phillips, 60 111.

of title, Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 1^^-

614. See also cases cited ante, that

A number of decisions, particu- title may pass before payment and

larly the very earlier ones, con- delivery.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 1.

the other hand, it may be said broadly that whenever
the parties have agreed that the seller is to do some
act before the buyer could logically and naturally, according to the agreement, take possession, a strong legal presumption arises that they did not intend title to pass until
that act should be done.
The reason for this presumption is variously stated,
and is not definitely ascertainable. But, although the
courts which follow this rule do not themselves state
the r eason for it, there is a possible reason which very
logically justifies this presumption of intent. Ownership
carries with it the risk of loss. It is a fair presumption
that a buyer would not intend to take title to goods and
to assume this risk of loss, unless he could have also the
right to protect his goods from loss without violating the
terms of the agreement. In cases where the seller is to
12-Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn.
& Cress. 360; VanBrocklin v.
Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Baker v.
McDonald, 74 Neb. 595, 1 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 474. Piano Co. v. Piano Co.,
8b 0. s. 196.
Oontra, di ct'ltm only, that pay·
ment is a prer equisite to passing
ot title, Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East
614.
A number of decisions, particularly the very earlier ones, con•see Uniform Sales Act, Section

Di iti...

fine this presumption to cases in
which it positively appears that
payment was not to be immediate, as where a term of credit
is expressly given. See the discussion under "Cash Sale", Post ,
p. 33. Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136 ;
Mich. Cent. Ry. v . Phillips, 60 Ill.
190.
See also cases cited ante, that
title may pass before payment and
delivery.
19, Rule 1.

~·

NTERNET A CHIVE

UNIVE

TRANSFER OF TITLE
TRANSFER OF TITLE 23

weigh or otherwise measure the goods in order to deter-

mine the total price, it is presmnable that the agreement

contemplates the seller's keeping possession until he does

do such weighing. If, then, the buyer should, without

the seller's permission, take possession of the goods be-

fore the seller had weighed them, he would violate the

implied terms of the agreement. It is not reasonable to

assume that the buyer intended to take title to goods at

a time when he could not physically protect them from

loss without violating his agreement with the seller. To

say that legally he could take possession without violation

of the contract, because he has title, is begging the ques-

tion. By the terms of the agreement he can not take

possession until the seller has done the weighing and

therefore can not act freely to protect the goods. The

presumption that he does not intend to take title under

such circumstances has, therefore, a thoroughly sound

reason for its existence.
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In accordance with this general rule, if goods whose

total measurement is unknown are sold at a stipulated

price per unit, and it is the duty, or the privilege, of the

seller, with or without the buyer's aid, to weigh or other-

wise measure the mass in order to determine the total

price, it is presumed that title was not intended to pass

until that should be done. In the cases coming within

this rule it may be observed that the agreed control of

possession is in the seller. The buyer is not entitled to

take possession until the seller shall have exercised his

privilege, or performed his duty, by determining the

total price. On the action of the seller therefore depends

the agreed, as possibly distinct from the legal, right to

possession. The buyer can not tender payment and take

possession — and so protect himself from loss — until the

seUer has determined what the total price is. The same

thing is true when the seller is to ascertain the quality

of the goods in order to fix the actual price, and, in gen-

eral, when the seller is the one who is to do anything

whatever that is necessary to a determination of the

23

weigh or otherwise measure the goods in order to determine the total price, it is presumable that th agreen1ent
contemplates the seller's keeping possession until he doe
do such weighing. If, then, the buyer should, without
the seller's permission, take possession of the goods before the seller had weighed them, he would violate tile
implied terms of the agreement. It is not reasonable to
assume that the buyer intended to take title to goods at
a time when he could not physically protect them from
loss without violating his agreement with the seller. To
say that legally he could take possession without violation
of the contract, because he has title, is begging the question. By the terms of the agreement he can not take
possession until the seller has done the weighing and
therefore can not act freely to protect the goods. The
presumption that he does not intend to take title under
such circumstances has, therefore, a thoroughly sound
reason for its existence.
In accordance with this general rule, if goods whose
total measurement is unknown are sold at a stipulated
price per unit, and it is the duty, or the privilege, of the
seller, with or without the buyer's aid, to weigh or otherwise measure the mass in order to determine the total
price, it is presumed that title was not intended to pass
until that should be done. In the cases coming within
this rule it may be observed that the agreed control of
possession is in the seller. The buyer is not entitled to
take possession until the seller shall have exercised his
privilege, or performed his duty, by determining the
total price. On the action of the seller therefore depends
the , agreed, as possibly distinct from the legal, right to
possession. The buyer can not tender payment and take
possession-and so protect himself from loss-until the
seller has determined what the total price is. The same
thing is true when the seller is to ascertain the quality
of the goods in order to fix the actual price, and, in general, when the seller is the one who is to do anything
whatever that is necessary to a determination of the
DI iti.l
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total price to be paid. In all such cases the legal pre-

sumption is that the parties did not intend title to pass

until the thing should have been done."*

As this rule is practically founded on the decision in

Hanson v. Meyer,^* and that was not a presumption of

intent, but rather a rule that title could not pass till

payment, it may be doubted if there is any real reason,

other than judicial custom in following precedent,

behind the present rule. However, the rule itself exists

as stated, and it can at least be justified by the reason

suggested by the writer.

Even if the measuring or other thing to determine

13— Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y.

550 (quality) ; Frost v. Woodruff,

54 m. 155; Lester v. East, 49 Ind.

588; Smith v. Wisconsin Invest-

ment Co., 114 Wis. 151; Robbins

THE LAW OF SALES

total price to be paid. In all such cases the legal presumption is that the parties did not intend title to pass
until the thing should have been done. 1sAs this rule is practically founded on the decision in
Hanson v. Meyer, 14 and that was not a presumption of
intent, but rather a rule that title could not pass till
payment, it may be doubted if there is any real reason,
other than judicial custom in following precedent,
behind the present rule. However, the rule itself exists
as stated, and it can at least be justified by the reason
suggested by the writer.
Even if the measuring or other thing to determine
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V. Chipman, 1 Utah 335 dictum;

Wesoloski v. Wysoski, 186 Mass.

495; Simmons v. Swift, 5 Barn. &

Cress. 857.

In Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614,

the rule is apparently put on the

ground that the buyer could not

pay the price till the goods were

weighed and that, contrary to the

general rule, title could not pass

till payment.

Boaz & Co. V. Schneider & Co.,

69 Tex. 128, appears to be contrary

to this rule, but is not necessarily

so. The court does say, "Where

the entire mass is sold and must

be measured simply with a view to

the ascertainment of its price for

the purpose of a settlement, the

title passes". In expression this

is in conflict with the presumption

as stated. The actual decision,

however, could have been reached

without any conflict. The other

circumstances were easily suffi-

cient to rebut the usual presump-

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section

tion, and, indeed, it appears that

the measuring was not to have

been done by the seller at all but

by the buyer. The form of state-

ment was founded only on the

veriest dictum in Cleveland v.

Williams, 29 Tex. 204.

Lassing v. James, 107 Cal. 348,

holds with some confusion of lan-

guage, that title had passed des-

pite necessity of weighing by both

parties, to determine total price.

The opinion was based on a mere

dictum In Blackwood v. Cutting

Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212, referring

to lack of identification of the

13-Kein v. Tupper, 52 N. Y. tion, and, indeed, it appears that
550 (quality); Frost v. Woodruff, the measuring was not to have
64 Ill. 155; Lester v. East, 49 Ind. been done by the seller at all but
588; Smith v. Wisconsin Invest- by the buyer. The form of statement Co., 114 Wis. 151; Robbins ment was founded only on the
v. Chipman, 1 Utah 335 dictum; veriest dictum in Cleveland v.
Wesoloski v. Wysoski, 186 Mass. Williams, 29 Tex. 204.
495; Simmons v. Swift, 5 Barn. &
Lassing v. James, 107 Cal. 348,
Cress. 857.
holds with some confusion of Ian·
In Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614, guage, that title had passed desthe rule is apparently put on the pite necessity of weighing by both
ground that the buyer could not parties, to determine total price.
pay the price till the goods were The opinion was based on a mere
weighed and that, contrary to the
diotum in Blackwood v. Cutting
general rule, title could not pass Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212, referring
till payment.
to lack of identification of the
Boaz & Co. v. Schneider & Co., property. See also Groat v. Gile,
69 Tex. 128, appears to be contrary 51 N. Y. 431. In this case the
to this rule, but is not necessarily court confounded the presumption
so. The court does say, "Where with the rule that title can not
the entire mass is sold and must pass till identity is established
be measured simply with a view to and, the latter having been satisthe ascertainment of its price for fied, ignored the former. Sanger
the purpose of a settlement, the v. Waterbury, 116 N. Y. 371.
title passes". In expression this
As soon as the weighing or
is in conflict with the presumption measuring has been done by the
as stated. The actual decision, seller title
passes instantly.
however, could have been reached Thompson v. Brannin, 94 Ky. 490
without any conflict. The other dictitm.
circumstances were easily suffil4- 6 East 614.
ctent to rebut the usual presump•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, note.

property. See also Groat v. Gile,

51 N. Y. 431. In this case the

court confounded the presumption

Di 'ti e b

with the rule that title can not

pass till identity is established

and, the latter having been satis-

fied, ignored the former. Sanger

v. Waterbury, 116 N. Y. 371.

N..,,.ER ET ARCH VE

UN VERS

25

TRANSFER OF TITLE
TRANSFER OF TITLE 25

the price is to be done by the seller, if it is merely to

adjust an agreed proximate price, no presumption that

the seller intended to keep title arises. In so far as this

rule is confined to cases in which the buyer is permitted,

by the contract, to take possession at the agreed approxi-

mate price, without awaiting further weighing, etc., this

exception is quite in accord vdth the underlying reason

suggested.^^

Neither is it presumed that the seller intended to keep

title if the determination of the price is a mere mathe-

matical calculation not requiring him to retain possession

of the goods.^^

In regard to all these statements of rule, it must be said

that there is much conflict and utter confusion of ideas

in the decisions and opinions.

It is sometimes stated, that if the seller is to do some-

thing to complete the goods, or to put them in a deliv-

erable state, title is presumed not to have passed."*
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The reason for this rule may be that suggested above —

that the buyer would hardly intend to take title and its at-

tendant risks while barred from immediate posses-

sion by the seller's right or duty to do something which

would necessitate his possession — or it may be because

the thing whose title the buyer has contracted to accept

is not in existence till the seller's work is done. Thus, if

the sale were existing rough castings, to be polished by

the seller, it might be either that the parties considered

the rough castings as the thing sold and purchased, with

a collateral agreement that the seller should polish

them, or that they intended to transfer title only to pol-

ished castings made from the rough castings pointed out.

If they had in mind the former transaction, if title did not

pass it would be for the former reason. But if they had

15 — Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 16 — Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N.

Mich. 324; Swanwlck v. Sothern, Y. 495.

9 Adolph. & El. 895. 17— Blackwood v. Cutting Pack-

ing Co., 76 Cal. 212.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 2.

the price is to be done by the seller, if it is merely to
adjust an agreed proximate price, no presumption that
the seller intended to keep title arises. In so far as this
rule is confined to cases in which the buyer is permitted,
by the contract, to take possession at the agreed approximate price, without awaiting further weighing, etc., tliis
exception is quite in accord with the underlying reason
suggesied. 15
Neither is it presumed that the seller intended to keep
title if the determination of the price is a mere mathematical calculation not requiring him to retain possession
of the goods. 16
In regard to all these statements of rule, it must be said
that there is much conflict and utter confusion of ideas
in the decisions and opinions.
It is sometimes stated, that if the seller is to do something to complete the goods, or to put them in a deliverable state, title is presumed not to have passed. 17 •
The reason for this rule may be that suggested abovethat the buyer would hardly intend to take title and its attendant risks while barred from immediate possession by the seller's right or duty to do something which
would necessitate his possession-or it may be because
the thing whose title the buyer has contracted to accept
is not in existence till the seller's work is done. Thus, if
the sale were existing rough castings, to be polished by
the seller, it might be either that the parties considered
the rough castings as the thing sold and purchased, with
a collateral agreement that the seller should polish
them, or that they intended to transfer title only to polished castings made from the rough castings pointed out.
If they had in mind the former transaction, if title did not
pass it would be for the former reason. But if they had
15-Lingham v. Eggleston, 27
Mich. 324; Swanwick v. Sothern,
9 Adolph. & El. 895.

•see

16-Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N.
Y. 495.
17-Blackwood v. Cutting Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212.
Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 2.
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in mind the second transaction, obviously there would
be no title to pass until the things contemplated-the
polished castings-should come into existence through
the seller's having done the work. Even in clear cases of
fact, however, the particular reason on which the courts
hold that title has not passed is usually indeterminable.18
Of course, if the facts clearly indicate that the parties
intended title to pass before the seller's further duty
should be performed the courts will give effect to that intention.19

26 THE LAW OF SALES

in mind the second transaction, obviously there would

be no title to pass until the things contemplated — the

polished castings — should come into existence through

the seller's having done the work. Even in clear cases of

fact, however, the particular reason on which the courts

hold that title has not passed is usually indeter-

minable.*®

Of course, if the facts clearly indicate that the parties

intended title to pass before the seller's further duty

should be performed the courts will give effect to that in-

tention.*®

-Something to be Done by Buyer. — The presump-

tion that there was no intent to pass title does not arise

if the weighing, measuring, etc., to determine the total

price is to be done by the buyer. This, again, is in pre-

cise accord with the underlying principle suggested. If

the buyer is to do the weighing, etc., the determination

of the total price is within his o^vn vohtion. It is true

--Something to be Done by Buyer.-The presumption that there was no intent to pass title does not arise
if the weighing, measuring, etc., to determine the total
price is to be done by the buyer. This, again, is in precise accord with the underlying principle suggested. If
the buyer is to do the weighing, etc., the determination
of the total price is within his own volition. It is true
that actually the seller may not let the buyer proceed,
but by the t erms of the agreement, as distinct from physical power, the buyer has the power to control possession,
can take possession when he chooses, without waiting for
the seller to act, and is thereby indicated as the intended
owner. 20
However, as the rule, that title would not pass if there
was something to be done by the seller, originated in the
idea that determination of total price was preliminary to
payment, 'vhich was itself a prerequisite to the passing of
title, some courts have followed the original statement
without making any distinction of those cases where it is
to be done by the buyer. Likewise there is considerable
statement to the effect that if something is to be done
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that actually the seller may not let the buyer proceed,

but by the terms of the agreement, as distinct from phys-

ical power, the buyer has the power to control possession,

can take possession when he chooses, without waiting for

the seller to act, and is thereby indicated as the intended

owner.*°

However, as the rule, that title would not pass if there

was something to be done by the seller, originated in the

idea that determination of total price was preliminary to

payment, which was itself a prerequisite to the passing of

title, some courts have followed the original statement

without making any distinction of those cases where it is

to be done by the buyer. Like\vise there is considerable

statement to the effect that if something is to be done

18 — Blackwood v. Cutting Pack- 495; Lingham v. Eggleston, 27

ing Co., 76 Cal. 212. Mich. 324; Burrows v. Whitaker,

19— Byles v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1; 71 N. Y. 291; Odell v. Boston &

Owen V. Dixon, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 902. Maine R. R., 109 Mass. 50; Turley

20— Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N. Y. v. Bates, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 200.

18-Blackwood v. Cutting Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212.
19- Byles v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1;
Owen v. Dix1m, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 902.
20-Bradley v. Wheeler, 44 N. Y.
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495; Lingham v. Eggleston, 27
Mich. 324; Burrows v. Whitaker,
71 N. Y. 291; Odell v. Boston &
Maine R. R., 109 Mass. 50; Turley
v. Bates, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 200.
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by either party to determine the total price, title is pre-

sumed not to pass regardless of whether it is the seller

or the buyer who is to do the necessary acts. This is

apparently derived from a confusion with the rule of

law that until goods have been identified, as by measur-

ing or sorting from a larger mass, title can not pass.

But again the conflict is for the most part one of expres-

sion only and in practically every case where the broad

statement appears it will be found that other factors

would themselves have precluded a presumption of intent

to pass title.*^

If the parties are to act jointly in doing whatever is

necessary to determine the price it is presumed they

intended the title to stay where it was until such acts

should be done.^^

Delivery to Buyer. — If there has been actual deliv-

ery to the buyer any presumption arising from the neces-

sity of measuring, or doing other things, is rebutted.^''
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Rebutting Circumstances. — These rules, like those

21 — Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Buffington, 103 Mass. 62; Macom-

Wend. (N. Y.) 31, has been cited as ber v. Parker, 13 Pick. (Mass.)

in conflict but the case itself 175; Scott v. Wells, 6 W. & S. (Pa.)

shows that payment had been 357; Leonard v. Davis, 66 N. Y.

made a condition precedent to the 476; Farmers Phosphate Co. v.

by either party to determine the total price, title is pre-

sumed not to pass regardless of whether it is the seller
or the buyer who is to do the necessary acts. This is
apparently derived from a confusion with the rule of
law that until goods have been identified, as by meas~r
ing or sorting from a larger mass, title can not pass.
But again the conflict is for the most part one of expression only and in practically every case where the broad
statement appears it will be found that other factors
would themselves have precluded a presumption of intent
to pass title. 21
If the parties are to act jointly in doing whatever is
necessary to determine the price it is presumed they
intended the title to stay where it was until such acts
should be done. 23

passing of title. Ballantyne v. Gill, 69 Md. 537, 1 L. R. A. 767;

Appleton, 82 Me. 570, seems flatly Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo.

In conflict. In McFadden & Bro. 553; Turley v. Bates, 2 Hurl. &

V. Henderson, 128 Ala. 221, the Colt, 200.

facts show that the seller was ob- Contra in expression although

ligated to do certain other things, the same decisions could have

which he did not do, before the been reached on other and con-

--Delivery to Buyer.-If there has been actual delivery to the buyer any presumption arising from the necessity of measuring, or doing other things, is rebutted. 22

buyer could weigh. In Hoffman v. sistent grounds stated, are An-

Culver, 7 111. Ap. 450, the real rea- drew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend. (N.

son for the holding was that "pay- Y.) 31; Hoffman v. Culver, 7 111.

--Rebutting Circumstances.-These rules, like those

ment was a condition precedent to Ap. 450; Ballantyne v. Appleton,

the passing of title". 82 Me. 570.

22— Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 23— Keim v. Tupper, 52 N. Y.

Mich. 324; Allen v. Greenwood, 550; H. M. Tyler Lumber Co. v.

147 Wis. 626; Mount Hope Co. v. Charlton, 55 L. R. A. 301.

21-Andrew v. Dieterich, 14
Wend. (N. Y.) 31, has been cited as
in conflict but the case itself
shows that payment had been
made a condition precedent to the
passing of title. Ballantyne v.
Appleton, 82 Me. 570, seems flatly
ln conflict. In McFadden & Bro.
v. Henderson, 128 Ala. 221, the
facts show that the seller was obligated to do certain other things,
which he did not do, before the
buyer could weigh. In Hoffman v.
Culver, 7 Ill. Ap. 450, the real reason for the holding was that "payment was a condition precedent to
the passing of title".
22-Lingham v. Eggleston, 27
Mich. 324; Allen v. Greenwood,
147 Wis. 626; Mount Hope Co. v.

Buffington, 103 Mass. 62; Macomber v. Parker, 13 Pick. (Mass.)
175; Scott v. Wells, 6 W. & S. (Pa.)
357; Leonard v. Davis, 66 N. Y.
476; Farmers Phosphate Co. v.
Gill, 69 Md. 537, 1 L. R. A. 767;
Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo.
553; Turley v. Bates, 2 Hurl. &
Colt. 200.
Contra in expression although
tbe same decisions could have
been reached on other and consistent grounds stated, are Andrew v. Dieterich, 14 Wend. (N.
Y.) 31; Hoffman v. Culver, 7 Ill.
Ap. 450; Ballantyne v. Appleton,
82 Me. 570.
23-Keim v. Tupper, 52 N. Y.
550; H. M. Tyler Lumber Co. v.
Charlton, 55 L. R. A. 301.
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referred to later on, are rules of presumption only and

are not rules of title. They do not imply that title must

pass if nothing remains to be done, nor that it can not

pass if something is still to be done by the seller. They

merely furnish formulae by which, in the absence of any

indication of real intent, the courts can reach a consist-

ent assumption of what the parties probably would have

intended had they thought about the matter. This pre-

sumption is fully subject to rebuttal by any particular

circumstance in the case that leads the court to believe

the parties would normally have intended otherwise.**

Likewise, a fortiori, these rules for consistently ascer-

taining mere constructive intention give way before any-

thing which shows a contrary real intention.

Some few cases seem to be opposed to the proposition

that these rules are presumptions only. Their verbiage

states that title has passed, or has not passed, because

of the circumstances, as a matter of law. To some extent

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

this is due to a feeling that unless credit is expressly

given title can not be presumed to have passed till pay-

ment has been made, and that until the price is deter-

mined payment can not be made.*^ But this, as has been

noted, is in conflict with the general rule that title may

have passed even though payment has not been made,

and out of harmony with the cases holding that no pre-

sumption adverse to the passing of title arises when the

buyer is himself to ascertain the price. Examination

shows this statement of irrebuttable rule to be usually

verbiage only and that in the particular case the pre-

sumption is in fact unrebutted and, as a presumption

only, would lead to the same result.'*® The writer does not

24 — Wilkinson v. Holiday, 33 (n. s.) 1. Martineau v. Kitchin,

Mich. 386; Byles v. Colier, 54 L. R. 7 Q. B. 436; Lingham v.

Mich. 1; Graff v. Fitch, 58 111. 373; Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324; Ellis &

Lynch v. Merrill, 72 W. Va. 514, 46 Myers Lumber Co. v. Hubbard, 123

L. R. A. (n. s.) 192; Morrow v. Va. 481, 96 S. E. 754.

Reed, 30 Wis. 81; State v. O'Neil, ^

58 Vt. 140; many authorities are 25— Ante, p. ^4.

collected in the note in 26 L. R. A. 26— Hamilton v. Grordon, 22 Ore.
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referred to later on, are rules of presumption only and
are not rules of title. They do not imply that title must
pass if nothing remains to be done, nor that it can not
pass if something is still to be done by the seller. They
merely furnish formulre by which, in the absence of any
indication of real intent, the courts can reach a consistent assumption of what the parties probably would have
intended had they thought about the matter. This presumption is fully subject to rebuttal by any particular
circumstance in the case that leads the court to believe
the parties would normally have intended otherwise. 24
Likewise, a fortiori, these rules for consistently ascertaining mere constructive intention give way before anything which shows a contrary real intention.
Some few cases seem to be opposed to the proposition
that these rules are presumptions only. Their verbiage
states that title has passed, or has not passed, becausei
of the circumstances, as a matter of law. To some ext ent
this is due to a feeling that unless credit is expressly
given title can not be presumed to have passed till payment has been made, and that until the price is determined payment can not be made. 25 But this, as has been
noted, is in conflict with the general rule that title may
have passed even though payment has not been made,
and out of harmony with the cases holding that no presumption adverse to the passing of title arises when the
buyer is himself to ascertain the price. Examination
shows this statement of irrebuttable rule to be usually
verbiage only and that in the particular case the presumption is in fact unrebutted and, as a presumption
only, would lead to the same result. 26 The writer does not
24- Wilkinson v. Holiday, 33
Mich. 386; Byles v. Colier, 54
Mich . 1; Graff v . Fitch, 58 Ill. 373;
Lynch v . Mer r ill, 72 W. Va. 514, 46
L. R. A. (n. s.) 192; Morrow v.
Reed, 30 W is . 81 ; S t a t e v. O'Neil,
68 Vt. 140; many a uthorities are
collect ed in the note in 26 L . R. A.
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(n. s.) 1. Martineau v. Kitchin,
L. R. 7 Q. B. 436; Lingham v .
Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324; Ellis &
Myers Lumber Co. v. Hubbard, 123
Va. 481, 96 S. E. 754.
25- A nte, p. 24.

26-Hamilton v. Gordon, 22 Ore.
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know of an accepted case in which evidence sufficient to

rebut the presumptions has been ignored on the ground

that the rule was conclusive and not presumptive. Much

of the confusion of expression arises from confusion in

thought wdth the rule of law that title can not pass,

whatever the intent, until property has been identified.

Sometimes this identification is to be by measuring off

from a larger lot and such measuring by way of identifi-

cation has been confused with the measuring of identi-

fied property in order to ascertain total price. The

ensuing conflict of expression is unfortunate, but no

real conflict of holding seems to have arisen.^'

Delivery to Carrier. — The delivery of property

to a carrier for transportation to the buyer, in the

absence of anything else, raises a presumption of intent

to pass title, if it has not already passed. As the matter

of passing title to property by delivery to a carrier is

inextricably interwoven with that of specification of

know of an accepted case in which evidence sufficient to
rebut the presumptions has been ignored on the ground
that the rule was conclusive and not presumptive. 11uch
of the confusion of expression arises from confusion in
thought with the rule of law that title can not pase,
whatever the intent, until property has been identified.
Sometimes this identification is to be by measuring off
from a larger lot and such measuring by way of identification has been confused with the measuring of identified property in order to ascertain total price. The
ensuing conflict of expression is unfortunate, but no
real conflict of holding seems to have arisen. 27
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property by such delivery, the topic is left for discussion

under the latter subject.

Agreement by Seller to Deliver. — An under-

taking by the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer at a

particular place seems occasionally to have led to a hold-

ing that title did not pass until such delivery had been

accomplished. In Gibson v. Inman Packet Co.,^* the plain-

tiff liad sold cotton to B ''to be delivered at N in mer-

chantable shape". It was delivered to the defendant, as a

557; Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291; or left to a jury under proper in-

Pinckney v. Darling, 3 App. Div. structlons? There appears to be

(N. Y.) 553; Frost v. Woodruff, no definite answer to this. In

54 111. 155. some cases the decision has been

27 — If there are facts in the made by the court. In some cases

particular case which it is argued it has been left to the jury.

-Delivery to Carrier.-The delivery of property
to a carrier for transportation to the buyer, in the
absence of anything else, raises a presumption of intent
to pass title, if it has not already passed. As the matter
of passing title to property by delivery to a carrier is
inextricably interwoven with that of specification of
property by such delivery, the topic is left for discussion
under the latter subject.

show a real intent, in conflict with Lynch v. O'Donnell, 127 Mass.

the ordinary legal presumption, is 311; Lingham v. Eggleston, 27

the decision whether they do in Mich. 324.

truth suffice to rebut that pre- 28—111 Ark. 521, Ann. Cas. 1916

sumption to be made by the court, A 1043.

-Agreement by Seller to Deliver.-An undertaking by the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer at a
particular place seems occasionally to have led to a holding that title did not pass until such delivery had been
accomplished. In Gibson v. Inman Packet Co., 28 the plaintiff had sold cotton to B "to be delivered at N in merchantable shape". It was delivered to the defendant, as a
557; Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291;
Pinckney v. Darling, 3 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 553; Frost v. Woodruff,
54 Ill. 155.
27-If there are facts in the
particular case which it is argued
show a real intent, in conflict with
the ordinary legal presumption, is
the decision whether they do in
truth suffice to rebut that presumption to be made by the court,
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or left to a jury under proper instructions? There appears to be
no definite answer to this. In
some cases the decision has been
made by the court. In some cases
it has been left to the jury.
Lynch v. O'Donnell, 127 Mass.
311; Lingham v. Eggleston, 27
Mich. 324.
28-111 Ark. 521, Ann. Cas. 1916
A 1043.
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carrier, consigned to B at N, and was damaged through

the negligence of the defendant before delivery. On suit

by the plaintiff to recover for this loss the defendant

contended that the plaintiff was not the proper person

to bring suit as he had parted with title by his shipment

to the buyer. The court admitted the primary presump-

tion to be that title had passed, but held that a contrary

intention was shown by the agreement to deliver in mer-

chantable shape.^^ In Brown v. Adair ^° the buyer of

fertihzer set up, in defense to an action for the purchase

price, a statute of the state making such sales void unless

certain tags were attached to the bags of fertilizer at

time of sale. The seller proved that tags were attached

at time of contract to sell. The court held, however, that

inasmuch as the sale was to be "f. o. b." at a certain place

the sale was not consummated till delivery to that place

and it must be shown that tags were attached at that

time.^^
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The effect of an undertaking to deliver is, however,

like other matters, merely a circumstance evidencing

intention in regard to title and it will not prevail if other

evidence points to a contrary intent.^^

Some courts when faced with an issue of the effect

upon the passing of title of an obligation to deliver have

left it to the jury to say what intent was demonstrated

by the agreement as to delivery, coupled with all the

other circumstances.^'

This is quite in accord with the rule laid down by some

courts that where more than one inference of intent can

be drawn from undisputed facts the question of intent

must be left to the jury. But those courts which decide

29— Accord, Garvan v. N. Y. C. 30—104 Ala. 652, 16 So. 439.

& H. R. R. R.. 210 Mass. 275, 31— Accord, Ala. Natl. Bk. v.

holding that seller's "obligation Parker, 146 Ala. 513.

to deliver" caused title to remain 32 — McElwee v. Metropolitan

in him so that he could sue the Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Terry v.

carrier for negligence. Westmore- Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520.

land Coal Co. v. Syracuse Lt. Co., 33 — Blakiston v. Davies, Turner

145 N. Y. S. 420 semUe. & Co., 42 Pa. Sup. Ct., 390.

carrier, consigned to B at N, and was damaged through
the negligence of the defendant before delivery. On suit
by the plaintiff to recover for this loss the defendant
contended that the plaintiff was not the proper person
to bring suit as he had parted with title by his shipment
to the buyer. The court admitted the primary presumption to be that title bad passed, but held that a contrary
intention was shown by the agreement to deliver in merchantable shape. 29 In Brown v. Adair so the buyer of
fertilizer set up, in defense to an action for the purchase
price, a statute of the state making such sales void unless
certain tags were attached to the bags of fertilizer at
time of sale. The seller proved that tags were attached
at time of contract to sell. The court held, however, that
inasmuch as the sale was to be "f. o. b."" at a certain place
the sale was not consummated till delivery to that place
and it must be shown that tags were attached at that
time. 81
The effect of an undertaking to deliver is, however,
like other matters, merely a circumstance evidencing
intention in regard to title and it will not prevail if other
evidence points to a contrary intent.82
Some courts when faced with an issue of the effect
upon the passing of title of an obligation to deliver have
left it to the jury to say what intent was demonstrated
by the agreement as to delivery 1 coupled with all the
other circumstances. 33
This is quite in accord with the rule laid down by some
courts that where more than one inference of intent can
be drawn from undisputed facts the question of intent
must be left to the jury. But those courts which decide
29-Accord, Garvan v . N. Y. C.
& H. R. R. R., 210 Mass. 275,
holding that seller's "obligation
to deliver" caused title to remain
in him so tha t he could sue the
carrie r for negligence. W estmorelan d oal o. v. Syracuse Lt. Co.,
145 N. Y. S. 420 senible.
D1giti.l

I TE

by

ET A CHIVE

30-104 Ala. 652, 16 So. 439.
31-Accord, Ala. Natl. Bk. v.
Parker, 146 Ala. 513.
32-McElwee v. Metropolitan
Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Terry v.
Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520.
33- Blakiston v. Davies, Turner
& Co., 42 Pa. Sup. Ct., 390.
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for themselves that an intent not to pass title is evi-

denced by an undertaking to deliver evidently feel that

a rule of inference has grown up in respect to it, just

as the prima facie inference that intent to pass title is

evidenced by delivery to a carrier has become a rule of

law and is not left to the jury.**

While the circumstance of a seller's agreement to

deliver to a particular place is frequently recurrent,

there is comparatively little precedent which shows the

judicial idea of its effect on title because the question of

title seldom arises. When a seller has contracted to

deliver at a certain place as an integral part of the con-

sideration for the buyer's promise to pay, obviously he

can not recover the contract price, whether title has

passed or not, until he has made delivery. Usually the

proinise to dehver is inseparable from the promise to

pass title, and both promises form the single considera-

tion for the promise to pay. Therefore in cases arising
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between seller and buyer themselves courts usually

decide whether there is an obligation to deliver or not

(and whether, if there is, it has been accomplished) as a

condition precedent to recovery, and they do not pretend

to pass upon the question of title. That a seller who

has failed to deliver as agreed in the contract can not

recover the contract price is settled.*^*

Whatever be the rule as to the effect of a seller's

undertaking to deliver at a particular place, it must first

be determined whether the seller did assume such an

obligation. If there is doubt as to the terms of the

agreement the question should, of course, be left to the

34— Blakiston v. Davies, Turner Drug Co. v. Priesmeyer, 151 Mo.

& Co., 42 Pa. Sup. Ct., 390; Danne- App. 484; Westmoreland Coal Co.

miller V. Kirkpatrick, 201 Pa. 218; v. Syracuse Lt. Co., 145 N. Y. S.

Garvan v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 420, which case appears to have

210 Mass. 275. been decided on the issue of title,

35 — Braddock Glass Co. v. Irwin rather than on non-performance of

& Co., 153 Pa. 440; Devine v. a condition precedent; McLaugh-

Edwards, 101 111. 138; Hessig-Ellis lin v. Marston, 78 Wis. 675.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 5.

for themselves that an intent not to pass title is evidenced by an undertaking to deliver evidently feel that
a rule of inference has grown up in respect to it, just
as the prima f acie inference that intent to pass title is
evidenced by delivery to a carrier has become a rule of
law and is not left to the jury. 34
~
While the circumstance of a seller's agreement to
deliver to a particular place is frequently recurrent,
there is comparatively little precedent which shows the
judicial idea of its effect on title because the question of
title seldom arises. When a seller has contracted to
deliver at a certain place as an integral part of the consideration for the buyer's promise to pay, obviously he
can not recover the contract price, whether title has
passed or not, until he has made delivery. Usually the
promise to deliver is inseparable from the promise to
pass title, and both promises form the single consideration for the promise to pay. Therefore in cases arising
between seller and buyer themselves courts usually
decide whether there is an obligation to deliver or not
(and whether, if there is, it has been accomplished) as a
condition precedent to recovery, and they do not pretend
to pass upon the question of title. That a seller who
has failed to deliver as agreed in the contract can not
recover the contract price is settled. 36 *
Whatever be the rule as to the effect of a seller's
undertaking to deliver at a particular place, it must first
be determined whether the seller did assume such an
obligation. If there is doubt as to the terms of the
agreement the question should, of course, be left to the
34-Blakiston v. Davies, Turner
& Co., 42 Pa. Sup. Ct., 390; Dannemiller v. Kirkpatrick, 201 Pa. 218;
Garvan v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
210 Mass. 275.
35-Braddock Glass Co. v. Irwin
& Co., 153 Pa. 440; Devine v.
Edwards, 101 Ill. 138; Hessig-Ellis
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
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Drug Co. v. Priesmeyer, 151 Mo.
App. 484; Westmoreland Coal Co.
v. Syracuse Lt. Co., 145 N. Y. S.
420, which case appears to have
been decided on the issue of title,
rather than on non-performance o!
a condition precedent; McLaughlin v. Marston, 78 Wis. 675.
19, Rule 5.
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jury. When the question turns not on disputed terms of

an agreement, but on a construction of the meaning of

an admitted agreement, the issue is decided by the court.

A common expression in agreements is that the goods

are to be delivered **f. o. b." at a certain place. This is

interpreted to mean that freight is to be paid to that

place by the seller. As to what it means in respect to

the seller's obligation to make safe delivery to that place,

as a condition of the contract, courts are not at all

agreed. If the agreement is 'Ho deliver, f. o. b." it is

clearly an undertaking, as it reads, to deliver. But the

conflict is over agreements not so clear, as where the

contract is to ''sell" at a named price, "f. o. b. destina-

tion". Some courts have held that such an agreement

implies an obligation to deliver.'^ Others have decided

the contrarj^ and held that despite such a term in the con-

tract title passes on delivery to the carrier according to

the usual presumption.^'*

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Conditions Precedent to Passing of Title.— When the

agreement of sale clearly indicates, expressly or

impliedly, that payment is to be made "on delivery of

possession" there is much conflict as to whether it shall

be presumed that the parties intend payment as a condi-

tion precedent to passing of title as well as to the deliv-

ery of possession. As has already been noted, the fact

that delivery of possession has not been made, nor the

price paid, does not preclude the passing of title. On

the contrary, title is presumed to have passed if nothing

jury. When the question turns not on disputed terms of
an agreement, but on a construction of the meaning of
an admitted agreement, the issue is decided by the court.
A common expression in agreements is that the goods
are to be delivered "f. o. b." at a certain place. This is
interpreted to mean that freight is to be paid to that
place by the seller. As to what it means in respect to
the seller's obligation to make safe delivery to that place,
as a condition of the contract, courts are not at all
agreed. If the agreement is "to deliver, f. o. b." it is
clearly an undertaking, as it reads, to deliver. But the
conflict is over agreements not so clear, as where the
contract is to "sell" at a named price, "f. o. b. destination''. Some courts have held that such an agreement
implies an obligation to deliver. 36 Others have decided
the contrary and held that despite such a term in the contract title passes on delivery to the carrier according to
the usual presumpt.ion. 37 *

remains to be done by the seller, despite non-delivery

and non-payment. Even the fact that the buyer can not

36— Ala. Natl. Bk. V. Parker, 146 agreement that buyer might de-

Ala. 513 : Brown v. Adair, 104 Ala. duct cost of freight from purchase

652. price held not to prevent title

37 — Burton & Beard v. Naco- passing on shipment; Neimeyer

doches Co., — Tex. Civ. Ap. — , Lumber Co. v. Burlington R. R.,

161 S. W. 25; Twitchell-Chaplin 54 Neb. 321; U. S. v. Andrews &

Co. v. Radovsky, 207 Mass. 72, Co., 207 U. S. 229.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 5.

Conditions Precedent to Passing of Title.-When the
agreement of sale clearly indicates, expressly or
impliedly, that payment is to be made ''on delivery of
possession" there is much conflict as to whether it shall
be presumed that the parties intend payment as a condition precedent to passing of title as well as to the delivery of possession. As has already been noted, the fact
that delivery of possession has not been made, nor the
price paid, does not preclude the passing of title. On
the contrary, title is presumed to have passed if nothing
remains to be done by the seller, despite non-delivery
and non-payment. Even the fact that the buyer can not
36-Ala. Natl. Bk. v. Parker, 146
Ala. 513; Brown v. Adair, 104 Ala.
652.

37- Burton & Beard v. Nacodoches Co., - Tex. Civ. Ap. -,
161 S. W. 25 ; Twitch ell-Chaplin
Co. v. Radovsky, 207 Mass. 72,
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
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take possession until payment does not necessarily indi-

cate that title has not passed. But a stipulation for

"cash on delivery" may denote an intention not to pass

even title until payment. As one court puts it,^^ ''A

sale for cash is not necessarily a conditional sale. The

phrases 'terms cash' and 'cash down' may or may not

import that payment of the price is made a condition

precedent to the transfer of the title, according to the

intent of the parties. If by the use of these terms the

parties understand merely that no credit will be given,

and that the seller will insist on his right to maintain

possession of the goods until the payment of the price,

the sale is still so far completed and absolute that the

property passes; but if it is to be understood that the

goods are to remain the property of the seller until the

price is paid, the sale is conditional and the title does not

pass". This statement is, of course, in absolute accord

with all the authorities, i. e., that the intention of the
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parties governs.

''Cash Sales." — But the question still remains,

what intent is indicated by the stipulation for cash on

delivery. Does it mean "cash before delivery of title'*

or only "cash before delivery of possession"?

When the contract clearly calls for cash on delivery

and no delayed time for pajTnent has apparently been

contemplated, the preponderance of authority treats the

agreement as making payment a condition precedent to

delivery.'®*

38— Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H. pie's State Bk. v. Brown, Kan., 23

take possession until payment does not necessarily indicate that title has not passed. But a stipulation for
"cash on delivery" may denote an intention not to pass
even title until payment. As one court puts it, 38 "A
sale for cash is not necessarily a conditional sale. The
phrases 'terms cash' and 'cash down' may or may not
import that payment of the price is made a condition
precedent to the transfer of the title, according to the
intent of the parties. If by the use of these terms the
parties understand merely that no credit will be given,
and that the seller will insist on his right to maintain
possession of the goods until the payment of the price,
the sale is still so far completed and absolute that the
property passes; but if it is to be understood that the
goods are to remain the property of the seller until the
price is paid, the sale is conditional and the title does not
pass". This statement is, of course, in absolute accord
with all the authorities, i. e., that the intention of the
parties governs.

394. L. R. A. (n. s.) 824; Lentz v. Flint

39— Can. Nor. R. R. v. No. Miss. & P. M. Ry., 53 Mich. 444; Hamra

R. Co., 209 Fed. 758; Hirsch v. Bros. v. Herrell, Mo., 200 S. W.

-''Cash Sales.' '-But the question still remains,

Lumber Co., 69 N. J. L. 509; 776; Eaton v. State, 16 Ala. 405,

Hughes V. Knoth, 138 N. C. 105; 78 So. 321; Piano Co. v. Piano

Ocean S. S. Co. v. So. States Naval Co., 85 O. S. 196, "If in such an

Stores Co., Ga., 89 S. E. 383 ; Peo- agreement there is no mention

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 1. This is the only possible

reference to the subject in the act.

what intent is indicated by the stipulation for cash on
delivery. Does it mean "cash before delivery of title"
or only "cash before delivery of possession"?
When the contract clearly calls for cash on delivery
and no delayed time for payment has apparently been
contemplated, the preponderance of authority treats the
agreement as making payment a condition precedent to
delivery.au
38-Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H.
394.
39-Can. Nor. R. R. v. No. Miss.
R. Co., 209 Fed. 758; Hirsch v.
Lumber Co., 69 N. J. L. 509;
Hughes v. Knoth, 138 N. C. 105;
Ocean S. !3. Co. v. So. States Naval
Stores Co., Ga., 89 S. E. 383; Peo·

pie's State Bk. v. Brown, Kan., 23
L. R. A. (n. s.) 824; Lentz v. Flint
& P. M. Ry., 53 Mich. 444; Hamra
Bros. v. Herrell, Mo., 200 S. W.
776; Eaton v. State, 16 Ala. 405,
78 So. 321; Piano Co. v. Piano
Co., 85 0. S. 196, "If in such an
agreement there is no mention

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule l. This is the only possible
reference to the subject in the act.
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But when it is agreed that payment may be delayed

for a time after the date of the contract, then, even

though the contract stipulates for "payment on deliv-

ery", the tendency is to hold that title passed according

to the usual rules of presumption and only the buyer's

right to possession is held up till payment.

The term ''cash sale" is usually confined in its strictly

legal use to transactions in which the court beheves that

the parties intended payment to be a condition precedent

to the passing of title. But in common use, "cash sale"

may also refer to an intent of the seller merely to hold

possession till payment — to give no credit, although pass-

ing title. Because of this double meaning, the term itself

means nothing certain, and its use is apt to be misleading.

If it be decided that the parties did in fact intend pay-

ment to be a condition precedent to the passing of title,

then even the delivery of possession to the buyer does

not vest title in him until the expected payment is forth-
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coming. But the condition precedent of payment may

be waived by the seller, and his leaving the buyer in

possession for an undue length of time after failure of

payment will be looked upon as such a waiver.*"

of the terms of payment the pre- define "cash sale", but the courts

sumption is that it is a cash sale have taken it to mean a stipula-

and that delivery of the goods tion for cash on delivery. See

(i. e., delivery of title) and the Charleston R. R. Co. v. Pope, 122

payment of the price are to be Ga. 577; Flanney v. Harley, 117

simultaneous". Ga. 483.

Intent left to the jury as though 40 — Freeh v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141,

it were a question of fact, Richard- 11 L. R. A. (n. s.) 948. In this

son V. Insurance Co., 136 N. C. case the question of waiver was

314; Boyd v. Bank of Mercer, 174 held to be one of law for the court

Mo. Ap. 431; Skinner, etc., v. and not to be left to the jury.

Lemmert Furniture Co., 182 Mo. Compare, Manchester Loco. Wks.

Ap. 549. v. Tniesdale, 44 Minn. 115 (in

A statute of Georgia (Code of equity) ; Fishback v. Van Dusen &

But when it is agreed that payment may be delayed
for a time after the date of the contract, then, even
though the contract stipulates for "payment on delivery", the tendency is to hold that title passed according
to the usual rules of presumption and only the buyer's
right to possession is held up till payment.
The term "cash sale" is usually confined in its strictly
legal use to transactions in which the court believes that
the parties intended payment to be a condition precedent
to the passing of title. But in common use, "cash sale"
may also refer to an intent of the seller merely to hold
possession till payment-to give no credit, although passing title. Because of this double meaning, the term itself
means nothing certain, and its use is apt to be misleading.
If it be decided that the parties did in fact intend pay~
ment to be a condition precedent to the passing of title,,
then even the deli very of possession to the buyer does
not vest title in him until the expected payment is forthcoming. But the condition precedent of payment may
be waived by the seller, and his leaving the buyer in
possession for an undue length of time after failure of
payment will be looked upon as such a waiver. 40

.

1895, sec. 3546) provides that in a Co., 33 Minn. 111.

"cash sale" of certain goods title Whether there is a waiver or

shall be deemed not to have not is a question for the jury, Os-

passed till payment. It does not born v. Gantz, 60 N. Y. 540.

of the terms of payment the presumption is that it is a cash sale
and that delivery of the goods
(1. e., deli very of tit le) and the
payment of the price are to be
simultaneous" .
Intent left to the jury as though
it were a question of fact, Richardson v . Insurance Co., 136 N. C.
314; Boyd v. Bank of Mercer, 174
Mo. Ap . 431; Skinne r, etc., v.
Lemm ert Furniture Co., 182 Mo.
Ap . 549.
A s t a t u t e of Georg ia (Code of
J895, sec. 3546) provides tha t in a
"c.ash i;ale" of c: rtai n goods title
sh all be deem d not to have
passed till payment. It does not

define "cash sale", but the courts
have taken it to mean a stipulation for cash on delivery. See
Charleston R. R. Co. v. Pope, 122
Ga. 577; Flanney v. Harley, 117
Ga. 483.
40-Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141,
11 L. R. A. (n. s.) 948. In this
case the question of waiver was
held to be one of law for the court
and not to be left to the jury.
Compare, Manchester Loco. Wks.
v. Truesdale, 44 Minn. 115 (in
equity) ; Fishback v. Van Dusen &
Co., 33 Minn. 111.
Whether there is a waiver or
not is a question for the jury, OIY
born v. Gantz, 60 N. Y. 640.
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'*0. 0. D. " — At this place it must be noted that the pre-

sumption, that "cash on delivery" means "cash before

delivery of title", does not apply where the stipulation

does not appear at the time of making the contract itself,

but is stated only when the seller, in shipping the goods

to the buyer, has directed the carrier to collect' on

delivery. This is the usual "C. 0. D." shipment. In

general the letters C. 0. D. are interpreted as meaning

"collect on delivery", but sometimes as "cash on

delivery ' '.*^ In such case the preponderance of authority

treats the stipulation as a condition precedent to delivery

of possession only and as not affecting the title.

Two decisions in Missouri exemplify this important

difference between a sale for "cash on delivery" and a

shipment "C. 0. D." In State v. Rosenberger,*^ there

was a sale of goods unidentified at the time of contract

but subsequently appropriated by shipment to the buyer.

This shipment was "C. 0. D." Nevertheless the court
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held that only possession was intended to be conditioned

on payment and title passed at the time of shipment. In

Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Central Bank," the plaintiff

sold and delivered certain specified property to the

buyer. The conditions at the time of sale were "cash

on delivery". As the check given in payment turned

out worthless, the court held that there was no pay-

ment, that the intention was not to pass title until

payment, and therefore that title had not passed.

By what is probably the weight of authority numer-

ically, as well as logically, a C. 0. D. restriction on the

carrier is held not to rebut the intention to pass title

which is ordinarily presumed from the delivery to the

carrier. These courts give the C. 0. D. instruction an

effect consistent with the presumption of intent to pass

title, by treating it as a seller's retention of possession,

only, for the sake of his seller's lien. In State v. Mul-

41— Newhook v. Ryan, 9 Newf. 42 — 212 Mo. 648, approved in

220. State v. Brewing Co., 270 Mo. 100.

43—116 Mo. 556.

"C. 0. D. "-At this place it must be noted that the presumption, that "cash on delivery" means "cash before
delivery of title'', does not apply where the tipulation
does not appear at the time of making the contract itself,
but is stated only when the seller, in shipping the goods
to the buyer, has directed the carrier to collect ~on
delivery. This is the usual '' C. 0. D. '' shipment. In
general the letters C. 0. D. are interpreted as meaning
"collect on delivery", but sometimes as "ca h on
delivery ". 41 In such case the preponderance of authority
treats the stipulation as a condition precedent to delivery
of possession only and as not affecting the title.
Two decisions in Missouri exemplify this important
difference between a sale for ''cash on delivery'' and a
shipment '' C. 0. D. '' In State v. Rosenberger, 42 there
was a sale of goods unidentified at the time of contract
but subsequently appropriated by shipment to the buyer.
This shipment was "C. 0. D." Nevertheless the court
held that only possession was intended to be conditioned
on payment and title passed at the time of shipment. In
Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Central Bank, 43 the plaintiff
sold and delivered certain specified property to the
buyer. The conditions at the time of sale were ''cash
on delivery". As the check given in payment turned
out worthless, the court held that there was no payment, that the intention was not to pass title until
payment, and therefore that title had not passed.
By what is probably the weight of authority numerically, as well as logically, a C. 0. D. restriction on the
carrier is held not to rebut the intention to pass title
which is ordinarily presumed from the delivery to the
carrier. These courts give the C. 0. D. instruction an
effect consistent with the presumption of intent to pass
title, by treating it as a seller's retention of possession,
only, for the sake of his seller's lien. In State v. I\ful41-Newhook v. Ryan, 9 Newf.
220.
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len,** a resident of a county in which sale of liquor was

prohibited, ordered Mullen, a dealer living in a non-pro-

hibition territory, to ship him liquor C. 0. D. The de-

fendant did so ship it as ordered and was indicted for

making a sale of liquor in the dry county. The court

dismissed the charge, on the ground that title passed

when the liquor was delivered to the carrier, although

by the instruction to the carrier to collect on delivery

the seller's right of possession was retained. In Keller

V. Texas," the court went so far as to declare unconsti-

tutional a statute of the state which attempted to fix the

point of destination of C. 0. D. shipments of liquor as

the place of sale, on the ground that title really passed,

in such cases, at the delivery to the carrier and the

statute was an unauthorized interference with the right

of persons living in non-prohibition territory, to make

sales in that territory.*^

This holding that shipment * * C. 0. D. " is intended only
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to leave possession dependent on payment is, as a prac-

tical matter, wise, since it gives a very real meaning and

effect to the C. 0. D. instructions while at the same time

adhering to the fundamental proposition that delivery to

a carrier shows a prima facie intent to pass title.

Whether it is wholly consistent with the reasons on which

the latter presumption is founded depends upon what

those reasons are, and as the courts are anything but

explicit concerning the latter we are now practically con-

strained to accept the rule as one which is wholly reason-

44 — 78 O. S. 358, 125 Am. St. 710. that a shipment C. O. D. passes

45 — Tex., 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 474. title, but retains possession in the

46 — A similar statute of Mich- seller, are, Jones v. U. S., 170 Fed.

Igan, Sec. 5051, Howell's Statutes, 1, 24 L. R. A. (n. s.) 143; People v.

was upheld in People v. Brewing Converse, 157 Mich. 29; Pilgreen

Co., 166 Mich. 292, but the court v. State, 71 Ala. 368; State v. Ros-

said that, independent of the stat- enberger, 212 Mo. 648; State v.

ute, the sale, by the weight of Palmer, 170 Mo. App. 90; Keller v.

authority, would have taken place State, Tex. , 87 S. W. 669; Tex.

at the point of shipment. In ac- Seed, etc., Co. v. Schnoutze, 209

cord with the general proposition S. W. 495.

len," a resident of a county in which sale of liquor was
prohibited, ordered Mullen, a dealer living in a non-prohibition territory, to ship him liquor C. 0. D. The defendant did so ship it as ordered and was indicted for
making a sale of liquor in the dry county. The court
dismissed the charge, on the ground that title passed
when the liquor was delivered to the carrier, although
by the instruction to the carrier to collect on delivery
the seller's right of possession was retained. In Keller
v. Texas, 45 the court went so far as to declare unconstitutional a statute of the state which attempted to fix the
point of destination of C. 0. D. shipments of liquor as .
the place of sale, on the g-round that title really passed,
in such cases, at the delivery to the carrier and the
statute was an unauthorized interference with the right
of persons living in non-prohibition territory, to make
sales in that territory. 46
This holding that shipment" C. 0. D." is intended only
to leave possession dependent on payment is, as a practical matter, wise, since it gives a very real meaning and
effect to the C. 0. D. instructions while at the same time
adhering to the fundamental proposition that delivery to
a carrier shows a prima facie intent to pass title.
Whether it is wholly consistent with the reasons on which
the latter presumption is founded depends upon what
those reasons are, and as the courts are anything but
explicit concerning the latter we are now practically constrained to accept the rule as one which is wholly reason44-78 0. S. 358, 125 Am. St. 710.
45-Tex., 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 474.
46-A similar statute of Michigan, Sec. 5051, Howell's Statutes,
was upheld in People v. Brewing
Co., 166 Mich. 292, but the court
said that, independent of the statute, the sale, by the weight of
e.uthority, would have taken place
at the point of shipment. In ac·
cord with the general proposition
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that a shipment C. 0. D. passes
title, but retains possession in the
seller, are, Jones v. U. S., 170 Fed.
l, 24 L. R. A. (n. s.) 143; People v.
Converse, 157 Mich. 29; Pilgreen
v. State, 71 Ala. 368; State v. Rosenberger, 212 Mo. 648; State v.
Palmer, 170 Mo. App. 90; Keller v.
State, Tex. , 87 S. W. 669; Tex.
Seed, etc., Co. v. Schnoutze, 209
s. w. 495.
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able, but whose precise and original reason for being has
been lost. 47 ] urthermore, this rule that '' C. 0. D. ''
affects possession only gives a very real protection to
the seller. It throws on the buyer the risk of los , makes
him liable for the price and yet gives the seller complete
protection if the buyer fails to pay. It is precisely
what a wise seller ought to mean.
A minority of courts hold, despite the usual rule respecting delivery to a carrier, that an instruction to the
carrier to deliver only on payment rebuts the presumption that the shipper intended to pass title. Thus in
State v. 0 'N eil, 48 the facts were essentially identical with
those of State v. Mullen, supra, and the decision quite opposite. Liquor ordered by a resident of Vermont from a
firm in New York was shipped to the buyer with C. 0. D.
instructions. The issue was whether this constituted a
sale in New York or in Vermont. The court said that
passing of title was a question of intent, and determined
the intent in this case not so much as a matter of presumption as one of actuality which could be truly determined from the circumstances. "It is difficult", said
the court, ''to see how a seller could more positively and
unequivocally express his intention not to relinquish his
right of property or possession in goods until payment
of the purchase price than by this method of shipment.
We do not think the case is distinguishable in principle
from that of a vendor who sends his clerk or agent to
deliver the goods, or forwards them to, or makes them
deliverable upon the order of, his agent, with instructions
not to deliver them except on payment of the price, or
performance of some other specified condition precedent
1

able, but whose precise and original reason for being has

been lost.*''^ Furthermore, this rule that *'C. 0. D."

affects possession only gives a very real protection to

the seller. It throws on the buyer the risk of loss, makes

him liable for the price and yet gives the seller complete

protection if the buyer fails to pay. It is precisely

what a wise seller ought to mean.

A minority of courts hold, despite the usual rule re-

specting delivery to a carrier, that an instruction to the

carrier to deliver only on payment rebuts the presump-

tion that the shipper intended to pass title. Thus in

State v. O'Neil,*^ the facts were essentially identical with

those of State v. Mullen, supra, and the decision quite op-

posite. Liquor ordered by a resident of Vermont from a

firm in New York was shipped to the buyer with C. 0. D.

instructions. The issue was whether this constituted a

sale in New York or in Vermont. The court said that

passing of title was a question of intent, and determined
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the intent in this case not so much as a matter of pre-

sumption as one of actuality which could be truly de-

termined from the circumstances. ''It is difiScult", said

the court, * ' to see how a seller could more positively and

unequivocally express his intention not to relinquish his

right of property or possession in goods until payment

of the purchase price than by this method of shipment.

We do not think the case is distinguishable in principle

from that of a vendor who sends his clerk or agent to

deliver the goods, or forwards them to, or makes them

deliverable upon the order of, his agent, with instructions

not to deliver them except on payment of the price, or

performance of some other specified condition precedent

47— One court however seems to the point of shipment notwith-

bave gone unduly far and to have standing the seller had agreed

ignored the real and expressed in- that the buyer would not have to

tent of the parties in favor of the take the whiskey ordered unless

merely constructive presumption, he wanted to, and that it would

In Golightly v. State, 49 Tex. Grim. not be his whiskey until paid for.

Ap. 44, 2 L. R. A. (n. s.) 383, the 48—58 Vt 140

court held that title had passed at

47-0ne court however seems to
have gone unduly far and to have
ignored the real and expressed intent of the parties in favor of the
merely constructive presumption.
In Golightly v. State, 49 Tex. Crim.
Ap. 44, 2 L. R. A. (n. s.) 383, the
court held that title had passed at

the point of shipment notwithstanding the seller had agreed
that the buyer would not have to
take the whiskey ordered unless
he wanted to, and that it would
not be his whiskey until paid for.
48-58 Vt. 140.
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by the vendee. The vendors made the express company

their agent in the matter of the dehvery of the goods,

with instructions not to part with the possession of them

except upon prior or contemporaneous receipt of the

price. The contract of sale therefore remained inchoat or

executory while the goods were in transit, or in the hands

of the express company, and could only become executed

and complete by their delivery to the consignee. There

was a completed executory contract of sale in New York ;

but the completed sale was, or was to be, in this state. ' '*®

The answer of other courts to this reasoning is, as

has been said, that the illustrations given by the court are

all indicative of an intent to retain possession, but not

necessarily an intent to retain title. Since retention of

possession is in harmony with the usual effect of unre-

stricted delivery to a carrier, and retention of title is

not in harmony, the weight of authority is also the more

logical authority.*
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In at least one case the intention evinced by a shipment

C. 0. D. has been treated not as a matter of construction

for the court, but as a fact to be left to the jury.^°

Rebuttal of Presumptions. — As has already been

pointed out, these principles of decision are all rules of

presumption only, or what may better be called rules of

judicial custom, for construing a conventional intention

as to title in cases where no real intention is evident. As

the real intention, however, is the governing factor in

the passing of title, they all give way before any evidence

49— Accord, E. M. Brash Cigar Note; 2 Id. 383.

Co. V. Wilson, 32 Okla. 153; Lane It must be remembered that

V. Chadwick, 146 Mass. 68; Hen- even this minority of decisions

derson v. Lauer & Son, Cal., 181 does not apply to cases of sales of

Pac. 811, a decision undoubtedly specific property where there was

by the vendee. The vendors made the express company
their agent in the matter of the delivery of the goods,
with instructions not to part with the possession of them
except upon prior or contemporaneous receipt of the
price. The contract of sale therefore remained inchoat or
executory while the goods were in transit, or in the hands
of the express company, and could only become executed
and complete by their delivery to the consignee. There
was a completed executory contract of sale in New York;
but the completed sale was, or was to l)e, in this state.' ' 49
The answer of other courts to this reasoning is, as
has been said, that the illustrations given by the court are
all indicative of an intent to retain possession, but not
necessarily an intent to retain title. Since retention of
possession is in harmony with the usual effect of unrestricted delivery to a carrier, and retention of title is
not in harmony, the weight of authority is also the more
logical authority.*
In at least one case the intentjon evinced by a shipment
C. 0. D. has been treated not as a matter of construction
for the court, but as a fact to be left to the jury. 60

affected by other matters; Crabbe no provision for cash at the time

V. State, 88 Ga. 584; State v. Goss, of making the contract.

59 Vt. 266. See cases collected, 50 — Com. v. Tynnauer, 33 Pa.

both sides, 24 L. R. A. (n. s.) 143, Sup. Ct. 604.

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (2).

Rebuttal of Presumptions.-As has already been
pointed out, these principles of decision are all rules of
presumption only, or what may better be called rules of
judicial custom, for construing a conventional intention
as to title in cases where no real intention is evident. As
the real intention, however, is the governing factor in
the passing of title, they all give way before any evidence
49-Accord, E. M. Brash Cigar Note; 2 Id. 383.
Co. v. Wilson, 32 Okla. 153; Lane
It must be remembered that
v. Chadwick, 146 Mass. 68; Hen- even this minority of decisions
derson v. Lauer & Son, Cal., 181 does not apply to cases of sales of
Pac. 811, a decision undoubtedly specific property where there was
affected by other matters; Crabbe no provision for cash at the time
v. State, 88 Ga. 584; State v. Goss, of making the contract.
59 Vt. 266. See cases collected,
50-Com. v. Tynnauer, 33 Pa.
both sides, 24 L. R. A. (n. s.) 143, Sup. Ct. 604.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (2).
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of real intention. Such evidence may take any conceiv-

able form; it may be of any degree of persuasiveness.

The same piece of evidence that persuades the court not

to follow the conventional rule in one case, may be

treated by another court as quite insufficient. These

other matters of possible evidence are not, however,

sufficiently recurrent for any custom of decision based

on them to have grown up. "When, therefore, a par-

ticular case presents facts not precisely covered by the

few rules of presumption just discussed, the question

of title depends upon the influence of these facts, backed

by the persuasiveness of counsel, upon the particular

judge. If counsel can find some other case in which

similar facts have been judicially held to show a certain

intention, the later court may choose to follow the earlier

decision — or it may choose to form its o^\ai independent

conclusion of fact. Undoubtedly particular precedents

have some influence, but there is no rule, no established
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judicial custom, other than those few already stated.

Expressed Intent. — Whenever the parties have

expressed any intention in respect to the passing of title,

there is then no doubt of the matter and title will be held

to have passed, or not to have passed, strictly in accord

with such intention.

Conditional Sales. — Of this class are those agree-

ments commonly known as ' ' conditional sales ' '. These are

agreements in which the parties have clearly provided

that title shall not pass until the performance of some con-

dition upon the part of the buyer. Usually this condition

of real intention. Such evidence may take any conceivable form; it may be of any degree of persuasiveness.
The same piece of evidence that persuades the court not
to follow the conventional rule in one case, may be
treated by another court as quite insufficient. These
other matters of possible vidence are not, howe.ver,
sufficiently recurrent for any custom of decision based
on them to have grown up. When, therefore, a particular case presents facts not precisely covered by the
few rules of presumption just discussed, the question
of title depends upon the influence of these fact , backed
by the persuasiveness of counsel, upon the particular
judge. If counsel can find some other case in \vhich
similar facts have been judicially held to show a certain
intention, the later court may choo e to follow the earlier
decision-or it may choose to form its own independent
conclusion of fact. Undoubtedly particular precedents
have some influence, but there is no rule, no established
judicial custom, other than those few already stated.

is payment of the purchase price, but it may be anything.

As between the parties, at least, the courts consist-

ently hold that the legal title does not pass until the con-

dition has been performed. This is thoroughly settled.

The seller, however, may waive the performance of the

condition, and choose to pass title anyhow, or he may

lose his retained ownership in other ways. These mat-

Expressed Intent. - Whenever the parties have
expressed any intention in respect to the passing of title,
there is then no doubt of the matter and title will be held
to have passed, or not to have passed, strictly in accord
with such intention.
--Conditional Sales.-Of this class are those agreements commonly known as "conditional sales". These are
agreements in which the parties have clearly provided
that title shall not pass until the performance of some condition upon the part of the buyer. Usually this condition
is payment of the purchase price, but it may be anything.
As between the parties, at least, the courts consistently hold that the legal title does not pass until the condition has been performed. This is thoroughly settled.
The seller, however, may waive the performance of the
condition, and choose to pass title anyhow, or he may
lose his retained ownership in other ways. These matD1 1tize by
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ters, and the rights of the parties generally will be dis-

cussed under the subject of ''Seller's Remedies ".^^ The

rights of third persons toward the goods will be discussed

under that subject.^^ The point here pertinent, is simply

that, as between the parties, the intention to retain title

until performance of the condition will be given full effect.

Conversely, since title can not pass except by mutual

agreement, it follows that the buyer's intent must be

considered as well as that of the seller. If the facts show

clearly that the buyer has not intended to take title, it

will not be treated as having passed.^^

Identification of Property Sold

So far we have been considering the passing of title to

property which is identified by the terms of the agree-

ment at the time it is entered into. Many agreements

to sell and buy, however, relate to property having no

THE LAW OF SALES

ters, and the rights of the parties generally will be discussed under the subject of "Seller's Remedies". 61 The
rights of third persons toward the goods will be discussed
under that subject. 62 The point here pertinent, is simply
that, as between the parties, the intention to retain title
until performance of the condition will be given full effect.
Conversely, since title can not pass except by mutual
agreement, it follows that the buyer's intent must be
considered as well as that of the seller. If the facts show
clearly that the buyer has not intended to take title, it
will not be treated as having passed. 63

specific individuality at the time. Individuality, as here

IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY

used, must not be confused with description. A contract

SoLD
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to sell which does not describe the property it refers to

is of no effect at all as a binding agreement. No court

could determine what kind of property the parties had in

mind so as to be able to fix damages in case of its breach.

But a description of property, sufficiently clear and defi-

nite to give a contract vaUdity, does not necessarily point

out any particular property. Thus if A agrees to sell to

B the watch which he holds in his hand, or the wheat

which is in a certain bin, there is no vagueness as to the

specific piece of property considered.

Specification. — On the other hand, a promise by A to

sell and B to buy ''an Ingersoll watch", or "a thousand

bushels of A No. 1 hard, Minnesota grown winter wheat",

might be definite enough to form a binding contract.

51 — Post, p. 99 ff. the seller's right to sue for the

52 Post p 206. purchase price in case the buyer

refuses to take title as agreed.

53 — See also the discussion of p^^^ p^ tj2.

So far we have been considering the passing of title to
property which is identified by the terms of the agreement at the time it is entered into. Many agreements
to sell and buy, however, relate to property having no
specific individuality at the time. Individuality, as here
used, must not be confused with description. A contract
to sell which does not describe the property it refers to
is of no effect at all as a binding agreement. No court
could determine what kind of property the parties had in
mind so as to be able to fix damages in case of its breach.
But a description of property, sufficiently clear and definite to give a contract validity, does not necessarily point
out any particular property. Thus if A agrees to sell to
B the watch which he holds in his hand, or the wheat
which is in a certain bin, there is no vagueness as to the
specific piece of property considered.
Specification.-On the other hand, a promise by A to
sell and B to buy ''an Ingersoll watch'', or ''a thousand
hush ls of A No. l hard, Minnesota grown winter wheat",
might be definite enough to form a binding contract.
51-Post, p. 99 ff.
52-Post, p. 206.
63-See also the discussion of
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the seller's right to sue for the
purchase price in case the buyer
refuses to take title as agreed.
Post, p. 92.
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But the particular watch, or the particular mass of wheat,
in respect to which they intend to transfer title would
not be known. In a strict sen e, of course, a description
which tells some characteristics of a thing, but does not
give enough of its characteristics to delimit it from all
other things is not a complete description. Perhaps such
a thing is not, precisely speaking, "described". But, in
very common usage, to ''describe'' a thing is not necessarily to "particularly identify" it. Hence we may
properly speak here of "described", but not "particularized" or "identified" property. In the customary
law parlance this particular identification is called
"specification", and property described but not delimited
from all other property is "unspecified".
The concept of "ownership" requires not only a person in whom certain rights exist, but a definite and particular object, tangible or intangible, to which those
rights relate. There can not be an owner without a
thing owned. A thing which is not so described as to
have an individuality of its own, apart from all other
things of certain like characteristics, has no existence in
the eyes of the law. Until there is such a specification as
will create individuality of existence there can be no ownership. Consequently, no matter how clearly parties
may intend to pass the ownership of something which
they describe as ''an Ingersoll watch,'' there is no
"ownership" in existence to be passed until they have
somehow indicated the particular watch to which they
intend the rights of ownership to attach. 50

TRANSFER OF TITLE 41

But the particular watch, or the particular mass of wheat,

in respect to which they intend to transfer title would

not be known. In a strict sense, of course, a description

which tells some characteristics of a thing, but does not

give enough of its characteristics to dehmit it from all

other things is not a complete description. Perhaps &uch

a thing is not, precisely speaking, ''described". But, in

very common usage, to ''describe" a thing is not neces-

sarily to "particularly identify" it. Hence we may

properly speak here of "described", but not "particu-

larized" or "identified" property. In the customary

law parlance this particular identification is called

"specification", and property described but not delimited

from all other property is "unspecified".

The concept of ' ' ownership ' ' requires not only a per-

son in whom certain rights exist, but a definite and par-

ticular object, tangible or intangible, to which those

rights relate. There can not be an owner mthout a

thing owned. A thing which is not so described as to
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have an individuality of its own, apart from all other

things of certain like characteristics, has no existence in

the eyes of the law. Until there is such a specification as

will create individuality of existence there can be no own-

ership. Consequently, no matter how clearly parties

may intend to pass the ownership of something which

they describe as "an Ingersoll watch," there is no

"ownership" in existence to be passed until they have

somehow indicated the particular watch to which they

intend the rights of ownership to attach."*

54 — "That the subject thereof until the particular property which

must be specific is essential to the is the subject of the contract be-

validity of every contract of bar- comes ascertained. This is true

gain and sale. It inheres in the independently of the intention of

very nature of the transaction that the vendor or vendee." Ellis &

a bargain and sale can not be Myers Lumber Co. v. Hubbard,

made of chattels not yet identi- Va. 96 S. E. 754.

fied; the ownership cannot change Dunn v. Georgia, 82 Ga. 27, 3

the property or title can not pass, L. R. A. 199. Sale of liquor was

*See Uniform Sales Act. Section 17.

54-"That the subject thereof
must be specific is essential to the
validity of every contract of bargain and sale. It inheres in the
very nature of the transaction that
a bargain and sale can not be
made of chattels not yet identified; the ownership cannot change
the property or title can not pass,

until the particular property which
is the subject of the contract becomes ascertained. This is true
independently of the intention of
the vendor or vendee." Ellis &
Myers Lumber Co. v. Hubbard,
Va. 96 S. E. 754.
Dunn v. Georgia, 82 Ga. 27, 3
L . R. A. 199. Sale of liquor was

*See Uniform Sales Act. Section 17.
/
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It follows, therefore, that, under the frequent contracts

to buy and sell described, but not then specified, property,

no title can possibly pass until the parties shall particu-

larly point out the property in respect to which they are

dealing. It logically follows also that the parties must

agree in thus specifying the particular thing whose own-

ership one intends to sell and the other to receive.

The cases show a number of settled customs of the

courts in deciding whether there has been a specification

of property by the seller and an agreement in that speci-

fication by the buyer.

Specification as Passing Title. — When the parties

have agreed in specifying the particular property which

their contract of sale is to affect, there still remains the

question of when they intended title to pass. Whatever

their intention, it could not have passed until specifica-

It follows, therefore, that, under the frequent contracts
to buy and sell described, but not then specified, property,
no title can possibly pass until the parties shall particularly point out the property in respect to which they are
dealing. It logically follows also that the parties must
agree in thus specifying the particular thing whose ownership one intends to sell and the other to receive.
The cases show a number of settled customs of the
courts in deciding whether there has been a specification
of property by the seller and an agreement in that specification by the buyer.

tion. By making the specification did they intend it then

to pass? These are two distinct issues, subsequent one
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to the other, to be sure, but independent. Nevertheless

prohibited in D county, but not in seller, the sale is incomplete.

F county. The appellant, who had They must be ascertained, desig-

a stock of liquor in F county, nated or separated from the stock

agreed with a resident of D county, or quantity with which they are

while both parties were in D mixed, before the property can

county, to sell him a gallon of pass." Joseph v. Braudy, 112 Mich,

whiskey. No particular gallon 579; Mitchell v. Abemathy, L. R.

was specified. Appellant was pros- A. 1917 C. 6; First Natl. Bank

ecuted for selling whiskey in D v. Cazort & McGehee Co., 123 Ark.

county. The court held that the 605, 186 S. W. 86; Taylor v. Fall

transaction could be nothing but River Iron Works, 124 Fed. 826;

an "executory contract," and not Gardiner v. Suydam, 7 N. Y. 357;

--Specification as Passing Title.-When the parties
have agreed in specifying the particular property which
their contract of sale is to affect, there still r emains the
question of when they intended title to pass. Whatever
their intention, it could not have passed until specification. By making the specification did they intend it then
to pass? These are two distinct issues, subsequent one
to the other, to be sure, but independent. Nevertheless

a "sale," until the subject matter Conrad v. Penna. R. R. Co., 214 Pa.

of the agreement was identified 98; Cleveland v. Williams, 29 Tex.

and that as the identification did 204, 94 Am. Dec. 274; Cassiuelli v.

not take place in the prohibition Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208,

county the defendant was not 183 Pac. 523. "It is common sense

guilty of a sale therein. Warren that a man can not presently con-

V. Buckminster, 24 N. H. 336, vey title to property which is not

"Where the goods sold are mixed in existence," Gile v. Lasalle,

with others, and are not separated 89 Ore. 107, 171 Pac. 741.

Xrom the general stock of the

prohibited in D county, but not in
F county. The appellant, who had
a stock of liquor in F county,
agreed with a resident of D county,
while both parties were in D
county, to sell him a gallon of
whiskey. No particular gallon
was specified. Appellant was prosecuted for selling whiskey in D
county. The court held that the
transaction could be nothing but
an "executory contract," and not
a "sale," until the subject matter
ot the agreement was identified
and that as the identification did
not take place in the prohibition
county the defendant was not
guilty of a sale therein. Warren
v. Buckminster, 24 N. H. 336,
"Wher e the goods sold are mixed
with others, and are not separated
trom the general stock of the
DI iti.l
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seller, the sale is incomplete.
They must be ascertained, designated or separated from the stock
or quantity with which they are
mixed, before the property can
pass." Joseph v. Braudy, 112 Mich.
579; Mitchell v. Abernathy, L. R.
A. 1917 C. 6; First Natl. Bank
v. Cazort & McGehee Co., 123 Ark.
605, 186 S. W. 86; Taylor v. Fall
River Iron Works, 124 Fed. 826;
Gardiner v. Suydam, 7 N. Y. 357;
Conrad v. Penna. R.R. Co., 214 Pa.
98; Cleveland v. Williams, 29 Tex.
204, 94 Am. Dec. 274; Cassinelli v.
Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208,
183 Pac. 523. "It is common sense
that a man can not presently con·
vey title to property which is not
in existence," Gile v. Lasalle,
89 Ore. 107, 171 Pac. 741.
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the courts seldom made a distinction in utterance, and

"specification" as meaning ''particular delimitation"

is much confused with ''specification" as meaning "an

intent to pass title" to the property then pointed out.

As a broad proposition, it may be said that mutual speci-

fication of the property to which a contract of sale is

meant to apply is taken by the courts as showing a

mutual intention to pass title to it at the time of the

specification.*

We shall here discuss the matter of mutual specifica-

tion of the particular property which is to be affected by

the contract as a proposition quite apart from the mutual

intention to pass title. The former, necessarily, comes

first.

How Made. — The natural sequence of events is for

the seller to determine upon, and to demonstrate in some

way, the particular chattels to which he intends the con-

tract to apply and for the buyer then to express his con-
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sent that the contract shall apply to the goods so pointed

out. Hence it is usually said that the seller "specifies"

the goods and the buyer "assents" thereto. As we have

the courts seldom made a distinction in utterance, and
"specification" as meaning "particular delimitation"
is much confused with ''specification'' as meaning ''an
intent to pass title" to the property then pointed out.
As a broad proposition, it may be said that mutual specification of the property to which a contract of sale is
meant to apply is taken by the courts as showing a
mutual intention to pass title to it at the time of the
specification.*
We shall here discuss the matter of mutual specification of the particular property which is to be affected by
the contract as a proposition quite apart from the mutual
intention to pass title. The former, necessarily, comes
first.

already said, the specification and assent are both neces-

sary before the court can hold that title was intended

to pass. This mutuality of intent as to the property to

be affected by the contract, that is to say, this specifica-

tion and assent, together, are usually called the "appro-

priation" of the goods to the contract. In this sense of

the word, to say that goods have been "appropriated"

to the contract means that the seller and buyer have

agreed in the matter of identification. The word appro-

priation is, however, quite often used of the act of the

seller only, and leaves the assent of the buj^er still to

be ascertained.^^ It is necessary to know of this double

55 — Cyc. Sales; Andrews v. Du- Is used in botli senses; Wait v.

rant, 11 N. Y. 35; In Atkinson v. Baker, 2 Exch. Hep. 1.

Bell, 8 Barn. & Cress. 277, the term

•See "Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (1).

--How Made.-The natural sequence of events is for
the seller to determine upon, and to demonstrate in some
way, the particular chattels to which he intends the contract to apply and for the buyer then to express his consent that the contract shall apply to the goods so pointed
out. Hence it is usually said that the seller ''specifies''
the goods and the buyer "assents" thereto. As we have
already said, the specification and assent are both necessary before the court can hold that title was intended
to pass. This mutuality of intent as to the property to
be affected by the contract, that is to say, this specification and assent, together, are usually called the '' appropriation" of the goods to the contract. In this sense of
the word, to say that goods have been "appropriated"
to the contract means that the seller and buyer have
agreed in the matter of identification. The word appropriation is, however, quite often used of the act of the
seller only, and leaves the assent of the buyer still to
be ascertained. 66 It is necessary to know of this double
55-Cyc. Sales; Andrews v. Du- is used in both senses; Wait v.
rant, 11 N. Y. 35; In Atkinson v. Baker, 2 Exch. Rep. 1.
Bell, 8 Barn. & Cress. 277, the term
•see 'Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (1).
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meaning to understand some statements by the courts.

In this book ** appropriation" -will be used only of the

specification and assent together.

THE LAW OF SALES

meaning to understand some statements by the courts.
In this book "approprjation" will be used only of the
specification and assent together.

May be Implied. — It is not essential that the speci-

fication be in express words. It may be deduced by the

court as a clear implication from the circumstances.

Any act of the seller, or of the buyer if he is the one to

act first, which points out the particular goods to which

he intends the contract to apply will be accepted by the

courts as a sufficient specification on his part. No par-

ticular formality is required. It is the intention of the

party, that certain goods shall be the ones affected by

the contract, which counts. Anything that clearly demon-

strates such an intention is sufficient.

Thus, marking particular goods, conforming to the

description of the contract, with the buyer's name is

enough to show the seller's intent that those goods shall

be operated on by the contract.^® A tender to the buyer
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of certain goods will show it,*'' or putting goods in the

buyer's bottles or sacks.*^ More often than in any other

way, the specification is shown by the seller's delivering

certain goods conforming to the contract to a common

carrier for transportation to the buyer.*®*

Assent to Specification. — But, as has already been

said, the seller can not thrust upon the buyer title to

whichever goods he, the seller, may choose*. No title will

be held to have passed until the buyer has assented to

56 — Andrews v. Cheney, 62 N. It would hardly eeem to have

H. 404; Mitchell v. LeClair, 165 required a judicial decision to the

Mass. 308. effect that removal from a mass

57-Rider v. Kelley, 32 Vt. 268. °^ ^" S°°*^^ ^°^ ^°^^ specifies the

ones which were sold as clearly

58-Langton v. Higgins. 4 Hurl, ^g ^^^j^ removal from the mass

& Norm. 402. ^f ^.j^og^ which were sold. This

59 — See authorities in subse- was the decision in Valentine v.

quent paragraphs. Brown, 18 Pic. (Mass.) 549.

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4. (2).

--May be Implied.-It is not essential that the specification be in express words. It may be deduced by the
court as a clear implication from the circumstances.
Any act of the seller, or of the buyer if he is the one to
act first, which points out the particular goods to which
he intends the contract to apply will be accepted by the
courts as a sufficient specification on his part. No particular formality is required. It is the intention of the
party, that certain goods shall be the ones affected by
the contract, which counts. Anything that clearly demonstrates such an intention is sufficient.
Thus, marking particular goods, conforming to the
description of the contract, with the buyer's name is
enough to show the seller's intent that those goods shall
be operated on by the contract. 66 A tender to the buyer
of certain goods will show it, 67 or putting goods in the
buyer's bottles or sacks. 68 More often than in any other
way, the specification is shown by the seller's delivering
certain goods conforming to the contract to a common
carrier for transportation to the buyer. 6u
Assent to Specification.-But, as has already been
said, the seller can not thrust upon the buyer title to
whichever goods he, the seller, may choose: No title will
be held to have passed until the buyer has assented to
56-Andrews v. Cheney, 62 N.
H . 404; Mitchell v. LeClair, 165
Mass. 308.
57- Rider v. Kelley, 32 Vt. 268.
58- Langton v. Higgins, 4 Hurl.
& Norm. 402.
59- See authorities in subsequent par ag raphs.

It would hardly seem to have
required a judicial decision to the
effect that removal from a mass
of all goods not sold specifies the
ones which were sold as clearly
as would removal from the mass
of those which were sold. This
was the decision in Valentine v.
Brown, 18 Pie. (Mass.) 549.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (2) .
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the specification. The necessity of this assent is shown

by the case of Andrews v. Cheney.^*' The parties had

contracted for the sale of a certain quantity of goods

described as being Uke a sample. Subsequently the seller

set apart by themselves certain goods conforming to the

description and signified an intent to pass title to them

by marking them "svith the buyer's name. The buyer

did not call for them at the time agreed upon and they

were subsequently destroyed by fire. The buyer who

had paid for them in advance, sued to recover the amount

of his payment. The court denied a recovery, on the

ground that the seller might still perform his contract

by delivering to the buyer other goods conforming to

the contract. As to those of which the seller had there-

tofore shown his intention of passing the ownership

according to the contract, the court held title had not

passed. ''The property in the goods", said the court,

"did not pass to the plaintiff by virtue of the contract,
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for they were not then ascertained, and may not have

been in existence. The agreement on the part of the

defendant was executory. * * * A contract of sale is not

complete until the specific goods upon which it is to

operate are agreed upon. Until that is done the contract

is not a sale but an agreement to sell goods of a particu-

lar description. It is performed on the part of the

seller by furnishing goods which answer the description.

If, as in the case of a sale of goods by sample, the

specific goods are not ascertained by the agreement, the

property does not pass until an appropriation of specific

goods to the contract is made with the assent of both par-

ties. If the plaintiff authorized the defendant to make

the selection, the property immediately on the selection

vested in the plaintiff. It not appearing that the plaintiff

gave such authority, the goods at the time of the fire

were the property of the defendant and their destruction

was his loss."

60—62 N. H. 404.

the specification. The necessity of this assent is shown
by the case of Andrews v. Cheney. 60 The parties had
contracted for the sale of a certain quantity of goods
described as being like a sample. Subsequently the seller
set apart by themselves certain goods conforming to the
description and signified an intent to pass title to them
by marking them with the buyer's name. The buyer
did not call for them at the time agreed upon and they
were subsequently destroyed by fire. The buyer who
had paid for them in advance, sued to r ecover the amount
of his payment. The court denied a recovery, on the
ground that the seller might still perform his contract
by delivering to the buyer other goods conforming to
the contract. As to those of which the seller had theretofore shown his intention of passing the ownership
according to the contract, the court held title had not
passed. ''The property in the goods'', said the court,
"did not pass to the plaintiff by virtue o~ the contract,
for they were not then ascertained, and may not have
been in existence. The agreement on the part of the
defendant was executory. • * * A contract of sale is not
complete until the specific goods upon which it is to
operate are agreed upon. Until that is done the contract
is not a sale but an agreement to sell goods of a particular description. It is performed on the part of the
seller by furnishing goods which answer the description.
If, as in the case of a sale of goods by sample, the
specific goods are not ascertained by the agreement, the
property does not pass until an appropriation of specific
goods to the contract is made with the assent of both parties. If the plaintiff authorized the defendant to make
the selection, the property immediately on the selection
vested in the plaintiff. It not appearing that the plaintiff
gave such authority, the goods at the time of the fire
were the property of the defendant and their destruction
was his loss.''
60-62 N. H. 404.
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In another case®^ the defendant had agreed to buy from

the plaintiff a certain quantity of hops of a described

quality to be grown the following year. In due time the

hops were raised and tendered to the defendant in con-

formity with the agreement. He, however, refused to

accept them. The plaintiff stored them on the defendant's

account and sued to recover the contract price. The

court held that he might recover the amount of his dam-

age through the defendant's breach of contract in refus-

ing to accept, but that he could not recover the full

amount of the purchase price. On this latter point the

court said: "The (lower) court decided that the rule of

damages was the contract price which the defendants

were to pay for the hops. This rule of damages must

stand upon the principle that the vendor in this case, by

offering to deliver and tendering to the defendants the

hops contracted to be delivered, thereby passed the title

to the vendees, so that the hops so tendered became the
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property of the vendees, and the vendor's title to them

ceased, although the vendees refused to accept and did

not accept of them. It is to be observed that this is not

the case of the sale of the specific article and the tender

of it to the vendee. * * * But it is a contract to deliver

at a future day property not then in esse; property

which is to be thereafter produced by the cultivation

of the earth, and which is to be of a specified character

and description. It comes by analogy within the class

of contracts for the manufacture of goods, and for their

delivery at a future day. In such cases, the authorities

have abundantly established the general rule that the

article must not only be made and offered to the vendee,

but that he must accept of it, or it must be set apart for

him by his consent, before the title to it will vest in him. ' '

An even more severe application of the rule is illus-

trated by the case of Greenleaf v. Hamilton.®^ The

61— Rider v. Kelley, 32 Vt. 268, 62—94 Me. 118.

76 Am. Dec. 176.

THE LAW OF SALES

In another case61 the defendant had agreed to buy from
the plaintiff a certain quantity of hops of a described
quality to be grown the following year. In due time the
hops were raised and tendered to the defendant in conformity with the agreement. He, however, refused to
accept them. The plaintiff stored them on the defendant's
account and sued to recover the contract price. The
court held that he might recover the amount of his damage through the defendant's breach of contract in refusing to accept, but that he could not recover the full
amount of the purchase price. On this latter point the
court said: "The (lower) court decided that the rule of
damages was the contract price which the defendants
were to pay for the hops. This rule of damages must
stand upon the principle that the vendor in this case, by
offering to deliver and tendering to the defendants the
hops contracted to be delivered, thereby passed the title
to the vendees, so that the hops so tendered became the
property of the vendees, and the vendor's title to them
ceased, although the vendees refused to accept and did
not accept of them. It is to be observed that this is not
the case of the sale of the specific article and the tender
of it to the vendee. * * * But it is a contract to deliver
at a future day property not then in esse; property
which is to be thereafter produced by the cultivation
of the earth, and which is to be of a specified character
and description. It comes by analogy within the class
of contracts for the manufacture of goods, and for their
delivery at a future day. In such cases, the authorities
have abundantly established the general rule that the
article must not only be made and offered to the vendee,
but that he must accept of it, or it must be set apart for
him by his consent, before the title to it will vest in hiin. ''
An even more severe application of the rule is illustrated by the case of Greenleaf v. Hamilton. 62 The
61- Rid r v. Kelley, 32 Vt. 268,
76 Am. Dec. 176.
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defendant had ordered from the publishers one copy

of a book called "Men of Progress", for which he agreed

to pay $35. A copy was brought to his office by the pub-

lisher's agent and, the defendant being absent, was left

there for him. He refused to pay and the assignee of

the publisher brought suit for the agreed price. It was

held that the plaintiff could not recover the full contract

price unless there was an ** acceptance " of the book by

the defendant, which issue was ordered submitted to a

jury.«8

Implied Assent. — But the buyer's assent, like the

seller's specification, need not be express; it may be

implied from acts, or from the circumstances of the case.

If he has already seen a larger quantity of goods from

defendant had ordered from the pu~lishers one copy
of a book called" Men of Progress ", for which he agreed
to pay $35. A copy was brought to his office by the publisher's agent and, the defendant being absent, was left
there for him. He refused to pay and the assignee of
the publisher brought suit for the agreed price. It was
held that the plaintiff could not recover the full contract
price unless ther e was an ''acceptance'' of the book by
the defendant, which issue was ordered submitted to a
jury.6s

which' those sold are to be taken, it has been held that

he has assented to any selection which the seller may

make from that mass, or, in different words, to have made

the seller his agent to assent to his, the seller's, own
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selection.®* By sending containers for the seller to fill

63 — Buyer's acceptance of sell- Schneider v. O. P. R. R. Co., 20

er's specification is necessary to Ore. 172; Colorado Springs L. S.

the passing of title; Moody v. Co. v. Godding, 20 Colo. 249.

Brown, 34 Me. 107; Crowl v. Good- Some confusion has been caused

enburger, 112 Mich. 683; Green- by the holding of a number of

leaf V. Gallagher, 93 Me. 549; courts that upon tender of goods

River Spinning Co. v. Atlantic conforming to the contract the en-

Mills, 155 Fed. 466; Tufts v. tire contract price can be recov-

Grewer, 83 Me. 407, even though ered whether title has passed or

article was especially manufac- not. This subject is discussed

tured according to buyer's plans; P&st, p. 92 ff.

Am. Hide Co. v. Chalkley, 101 Vt. 64— Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El.

--Implied Assent.-But the buyer's assent, like the
seller's specification, need not be express; it may be
implied from acts, or from the circumstances of the case.
If he has already seen a larger quantity of goods from
which- those sold are to be taken, it has been held that
he has assented to any selection which the seller may
make from that inass, or, in different words, to have made
the seller his agent to assent to his, the seller's, own
selection. 64 By sending containers for the seller to fill

458; Johnson v. Hibbard, 29 Ore. & Bl. 885, "He (the buyer) had

184, 54 Am. St. 787; Lovell v. New- inspected and approved the barley

man & Son, 142 Fed. 753; Hoover in bulk. He sent his sacks to be

v. Maher, 51 Minn. 269; Jones v. filled out of that bulk. There can

Jennins, 168 Pa. 493. be no doubt of his assent to the

Contra: Title passes on appro- appropriation of such bulk as

priation and tender by the seller should have been put into the

without buyer's consent to accept sacks." Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N. Y,

it, Hyden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426; 489.

Brigham v. Hibbard, 28 Ore. 386;

63-Buyer' s acceptance of seller's specification is necessary to
the passing of title; Moody v.
Brown, 34 Me. 107; Crowl v. Good·
enburger, 112 Mich. 683; Green·
leaf v. Gallagher, 93 Me. 549;
River Spinning Co. v. Atlantic
Mills, 155 Fed. 466; Tufts v.
Grewer, 83 Me. 407, even though
article was especially manufac·
tured according to buyer's plans;
Am. Hide Co. v. Chalkley, 101 Vt.
458; Johnson v. Hibbard, 29 Ore.
184, 54 Am. St. 787; Lovell v. Newman & Son, 142 Fed. 753; Hoover
v. Maher, 51 Minn. 269; Jones v.
Jennins, 168 Pa. 493.
Oontra: Title passes on appropriation and t ender by the seller
without buyer's consent to accept
it, Hyden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426;
Brigham v. Hibbard, 28 Ore. 386;

Di itize by

IN E

ET A

CH~VE

Schneider v. 0. P. R. R. Co., 20
Ore. 172; Colorado Springs L. S.
Co. v. Godding, 20 Colo. 249.
Some confusion has been caused
by the holding of a number of
courts that upon tender of goods
conforming to the contract the entire contract price can be recovered whether title has passed or
not. This subject is discussed
P@st, p. 92 ff.
64-Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El.
& Bl. 885, "He (the buyer) had
inspected and approved the barley
in bulk. He sent his sacks to be
filled out of that bulk. There can
be no doubt of his assent to the
appropriation of such bulk as
should have been put into the
sacks." Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N. Y.
489.
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he has been held to have made the seller his agent to

assent to the seller's specification. Thus in Langton v.

Higgins,®^ the buyer of peppermint oil which was still

to be manufactured by the seller had sent his own bot-

tles to be filled with the oil as it should be made. The

court held that title passed when sufficient oil according

to the contract had been put into the bottles, saying, ' ' The

buyer in effect says, *I will trust you to deliver into my

bottles, and by that means to appropriate to me, the

article which I have bought of you. ' On the other hand,

the seller must be taken to say, 'You have sent your bot-

tles and I will put the article into them for you. ' ' '®®

Receipt by Carrier. — The receipt of goods by a car-

rier for transportation to the buyer is generally held to

constitute an assent by the buyer to the seller's specifica-

tion. The carrier, although it may have contracted for

carriage only with the seller, although it may be held

he has been held to have made the seller his agent to
assent to the seller's specification. Thus in Langton v.
, Higgins,6 6 the buyer of peppermint oil which was still
to be manufactured by the seller had sent his own bottles to be filled with the oil as it should be made. The
court held that title passed when sufficient oil according
to the contract had been put into the bottles, saying," The
buyer in effect says, 'I will trust you to deliver into my
bottles, and by that means to appropriate to me, the
article which I have bought of you.' On the other hand,
the seller must be taken to say, 'You have sent your bottles and I will put the article into them for you.' ''66

not the buyer's agent for purposes of possession, and
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although it is to be paid by the seller, is nevertheless con-

-Receipt by Carrier.-The receipt of goods by a carrier for transportation to the buyer is generally held to
constitute an assent by the buyer to the seller's specification. The carrier, although it may have contracted for
carriage only with the seller, although it may be held
not the buyer's agent for purposes of possession, and
although it is to be paid by the seller, is nevertheless consistently treated as the buyer's agent to assent to the
seller's specification, if that specification does in fact conform to the terms of the contract. It is obvious that there
is no real relation of agency between the buyer and the
carrier. Although the seller can usually sue for goods
sold and delivered, the carrier is not wholly the buyer's
agent for purposes of possession, because the seller's
right to stop in transitit still exists. The carrier is often
under contract only with the seller and is to be paid by the
seller. The rule is a purely arbitrary one, established
for the sake of convenience. In fact there is hardly
authority for speaking of agency even as a fiction.

sistently treated as the buyer's agent to assent to the

seller's specification, if that specification does in fact con-

form to the terms of the contract. It is obvious that there

is no real relation of agency between the buyer and the

carrier. Although the seller can usually sue for goods

sold and delivered, the carrier is not wholly the buyer's

agent for purposes of possession, because the seller's

right to stop in transitu still exists. The carrier is often

under contract only with the seller and is to be paid by the

seller. The rule is a purely arbitrary one, established

for the sake of convenience. In fact there is hardly

authority for speaking of agency even as a fiction.

65—4 Hurl. & Norm. 402. Greenleaf v. Hamilton, 94 Me. 118,

66 — The question whether or not but is in general decided by the

the buyer has consented to take court, like all other questions of

the particular thing which the intent in this subject, as a matter

seller has picked out is occasion- of accepted judicial custom,

ally left to the jury to decide.

65-4 Hurl. & Norm. 402.
66- The question whether or not
the buyer has consented to take
the particular thing which the
seller has picked ou t is occas ionally left to the jury to decide.
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Rather, the courts have simply decided that appropria-

tion is complete on delivery to a carrier and its accept-

ance of the goods for carriage, without bothering to

state just how the buyer's necessary assent to the speci-

fication is worked out.^''

Passing of Title. — As has already been said, the point-

49

Rather, the courts have simply decided that appropriation is complete on delivery to a carrier and its acceptance of the goods for carriage, without bothering to
state just how the buyer's necessary assent to the specification is worked out. 67
,

ing out of goods as the particular ones to which the con-

tract is to apply, and assent thereto by the other party,

has no necessary connection with an intent to pass title.

It may happen, and does sometimes happen in fact, that

the seller points out the particular goods to which he

intends eventually to pass title, mthout intending to pass

it at the time. It is possible also that the buyer may

consent to the seller's specification of the particular goods

that are to pass, without intending to take the title at

once.^'

But it is presumed as a matter of judicial custom

unless the contrary appear that by their specification and
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assent the parties do intend at the same time to pass

title. Hence it is said that title is presumed to pass at

the instant of complete appropriation. So invariable is

this presumption, that courts do not make any verbal dis-

tinction between specification and intent to pass title, or

between assent and intent to accept title, and frequently

use one in the sense of the other.

Delivery to Carrier.— The delivery of goods to a

carrier for transportation to the buyer, therefore, not

only constitutes an act of specification, but is presumed

also to show an intent to pass the title to the goods so

specified. Conversely, the receipt by the carrier demon-

67— See the authorities and dis- agreed that a certain article shall

cussion in the following para- be delivered in pursuance of the

graphs. contract, and yet the property may

68 — Wait V. Baker, 2 Exch. Rep. not pass in either case." Schreyer

1, "The word (appropriation) may v. Kimball Lumber Co., 54 Fed.

mean that both parties have 653.

Passing of Title.-As has already been said, the pointing out of goods as the particular ones to which the contract is to apply, and assent thereto by the other party,
has no necessary connection with an intent to pass title.
It may happen, and does sometimes happen in fact, that
the seller points out the particular goods to which he
intends eventually to pass title, without intending to pass
it at the time. It is possible also that the buyer may
consent to the seller's specification of the particular goods
that are to pass, without intending to take the title at
once. 68
But it is presumed as a matter of judicial custom
unless the contrary appear that by their specification and
assent the parties do intend at the same time to pass
title. Hence it is said that title is presumed to pass at
the instant of complete appropriation. So invariable is
this presumption, that courts do not make any verbal distinction between specification and intent to pass title, or
between assent and intent to accept title, and frequently
use one in the sense of the other.
-Delivery to Carrier.-The delivery of goods to a
carrier for transportation to the buyer, therefore, not
only constitutes an act of specification, but is presumed
also to show an intent to pass the title to the goods so
specified. Conversely, the receipt by the carrier demon67-See the authorities and discussion in the following paragraphs.
68-Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch. Rep.
1, "The word (appropriation) may
mean that both parties have

agreed that a certain article shall
be delivered in pursuance of the
contract, and yet the property may
not pass in either case." Schreyer
v. Kimball Lumber Co., 54 Fed.
653.
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strates both the buyer's assent to the specification and

his intent to receive the title.

The theory on which tliis holding is based is anything

but clear. The courts usually dismiss the proposition

with the simple statement that the carrier is the buyer's

agent to accept the goods, or that delivery to the carrier

is delivery to the buyer. If by "delivery" and "accept-

ance" in this connection the courts mean physical deliv-

ery, or acceptance of possession of the tangible chattel,

there is an obvious inconsistency with the proposition

that by a C. 0. D. shipment title passes to the buyer but

the possession is retained by the seller.®^ Neither does

the idea of possession in the buyer, through the carrier

as his agent for that purpose, conform to the holdings

that delivery to a carrier is not delivery to the buyer so

as to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of

Frauds.'"

If on the other hand they mean delivery of the title —
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the concept of OAvnership as distinct from the tangible

thing to which it applies — and its acceptance by the car-

rier as the buyer's agent, the inconsistency disappears.

It is perfectly conceivable that the carrier may be both

the buyer's agent to receive title and the seller's agent

to hold physical possession. This theory is not contra-

dicted by anything in the cases nor inconsistent with

their verbiage, and it comes nearer to harmonizing the

various holdings than any other, but it must be pointed

out that if it be the underlying principle it is not

expressly stated by the courts. The courts, as a matter

of fact, appear to accept the rule that receipt of the

goods by a carrier constitutes an acceptance of title by

the buyer, without feeling called upon to discuss the rea-

son. The case of Johnson v. Hibbard''^^ is characteristic.

The court says, "In the sale of articles or goods to be

69 — See discussion of C. O. D. See discussion under that subject,

shipments, (mte, p. 35. post, p. 269.

70— Gatiss v. Cyr, 134 Mich. 233. 71—29 Ore. 184. 54 Am. St. 787.

strates both the buyer's assent to the specification and
his intent to receive the title.
The theory on which this holding is based is anything
but clear. The courts usually dismiss the proposition
with the simple statement that the carrier is the buyer's
agent to accept the goods, or that delivery to the carrier
is deli very to the buyer. If by ' 'delivery'' and ''acceptance" in this connection the courts mean physical delivery, or acceptance of possession of the tangible chattel,
there is an obvious inconsistency with the proposition
that by a C. 0. D. shipment title passes to the buyer but
the possession is retained by the seller. 69 Neither does
the idea of possession in the buyer, through the carrier
as his agent for that purpose, conform to the holdings
that delivery to a carrier is not delivery to the buyer so
as to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. 70
If on the other hand they mean delivery of the titlethe concept of ownership as distinct from the tangible
thing to which it applies- and its acceptance by the carrier as the buyer's agent, the inconsistency disappears.
It is perfectly conceivable that the carrier nlay be both
the buyer's agent to receive title and the seller's agent
to hold physical possession. This theory is not contradicted by anything in the cases nor inconsistent with
their verbiage, and it comes nearer to harmonizing the
various holdings than any other, but it must be pointed
out that if it be the underlying principle it is not
expres ly stated by the courts. The courts, as a matter
of fact, appear to accept the rule that receipt of the
good · by a carrier constitutes an acceptance of title by
the buyer, without feeling called upon to discuss the reason. The case of Johnson v. Hibbard 71 is characteristic.
Th e court says, ''In the sale of articles or goods to be
69-See discussion of C. 0. D.
shipments, rmtP, p. 35.
70- atiss v. Cyr, 134 Mich. 233.
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manufactured, it is clear that no title passes until their

manufacture is completed, and they, by the understand-

ing and consent, express or implied, of the parties to the

sale, have been selected or designated, and set apart to

the purchaser." This statement that mutual consent is

necessary to the passing of title is followed by the simple

statement, without discussion, that title passed when

goods conforming to the contract were delivered to the

carrier. Just how delivery to the carrier shows the

buyer's necessary consent the court does not say.''^^*

In Harper v. State, ^'^ the facts were that a minor

living outside the state had written Harper, a resident

of Arkansas, to send him a gallon of whiskey. Harper

shipped it consigned to the buyer, who duly received it.

An Arkansas statute made it unlawful to sell liquor to

a minor and Harper was indicted thereunder. He de-

fended on the ground that there was no such statute in

the buyer's state and that title had not passed until
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delivery by the carrier to the buyer, which had occurred

outside of Arkansas. The court held the indictment to

be good because the sale had been executed, that is, title

72 — Title passes on delivery to Kleine v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253;

carrier. Dunn v. Georgia, 82 Ga. 27, Harper v. State, 91 Ark. 422, 25

3 I.. R. A. 199; Hill v. Fruita Mer- L. R. A. (n. s.) 669; State v. J. W.

cantile Co., 42 Colo. 491, 126 Am. Kelley & Co., 123 Tenn. 556, 36

St. 172; A. J. Neimeyer Co. v. L. R. A. (n. s.) 171; Loveland v.

Burlington R. R., 54 Neb. 321, 40 Dinunan, 81 Conn. Ill, 17 L. R. A.

L. R. A. 534; Sullivan v. Sullivan, (n. s.) 1119; Dentzel v. Island

70 Mich. 583; Branch Saw Co. v. Park Assn., 229 Pa. 403, 33 L. R.

Bryant, 174 N. C. 355, 93 S. E. 839; A. (n. s.) 54; Tyler Co. v. Ludlow

Third Natl. Bk. v. Smith, 107 Mo. Co., 236 U. S. 723; State v. Gruber,

178; Dr. A. P. Sawyer Medicine 116 Minn. 221, 45 L. R. A. (n. s.)

Co. V. Johnson, 178 Mass. 374; 591; Twitchell-Champlin Co. v.

Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis, etc. Radovsky, 207 Mass. 72; White v.

manufactured, it is clear that no title passes until th ir
manufacture is completed, and they, by the und r tanding and consent, express or implied, of the parti to th
sale, have been selected or designated, and set apart to
the purchaser.'' This statement that mutual consent i
necessary to the passing of title is followed by the simple
statement, without discussion, that title passed when
goods conforming to the contract were delivered to the
carrier. Just how delivery to the carrier shows the
buyer's necessary consent the court does not say. 72 *
In Harper v. State, 27 a the facts were that a minor
living outside the state had written Harper, a resident
of Arkansas, to send him a gallon of whiskey. Harper
shipped it consigned to the buyer, who duly received it.
An Arkansas statute made it unlawful to sell liquor to
a minor and Harper was indicted thereunder. He defended on the ground that there was no such statute in
the buyer's state and that title had not passed until
delivery by the carrier to the buyer, which had occurred
outside of Arkansas. The court held the indictment to
be good because the sale had been executed, that is, title

R.R., 130 Minn. 121, 153 N.V^. 115; Schweitzer, 132 N. Y. S. 644, 147

The Pennsylvania Co. v. Holder- App. Div. 544, citing Dutton v.

man, 69 Ind. 18; Congdon v. Ken- Solomonson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 582.

dall, 53 Neb. 282; Hawens v. Grand 72a— 91 Ark. 422, 25 L. R. A. (n.

Island L. & F. Co., 41 Neb. 153; s.) 669.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (2).

72-Title passes on delivery to
carrier. Dunn v. Georgia, 82 Ga. 27,
3 L. R. A. 199; Hill v. Fruita Mercantile Co., 42 Colo. 491, 126 Am.
St. 172; A. J. Neimeyer Co. v.
Burlington R. R., 54 Neb. 321, 40
L. R. A. 534; Sullivan v. Sullivan,
70 Mich. 583; Branch Saw Co. v.
Bryant, 174 N. C. 355, 93 S. E. 839;
Third Natl. Bk. v. Smith, 107 Mo.
178; Dr. A. P. Sawyer Medicine
Co. v. Johnson, 178 Mass. 374;
Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis, etc.
R.R., 130' Minn. 121, 153 N. W. 115;
The Pennsylvania Co. v. Holderman, 69 Ind. 18; Congdon v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 282; Ha wens v. Grand
Island L. & F. Co., 41 Neb. 153;

Kleine v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253;
Harper v. State, 91 Ark. 422, 25
L. R. A. (n. s.) 669; State v. J. W.
Kelley & Co., 123 Tenn. 556, 36
L. R. A. (n. s.) 171; Loveland v.
Dinunan, 81 Conn. 111, 17 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 1119; Dentzel v. Island
Park Assn., 229 Pa. 403, 33 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 54; Tyler Co. v. Ludlow
Co., 236 U. S. 723; State v. Gruber,
116 Minn. 221, 45 L. R. A. (n. s.)
591; Twitchell-Champlin Co. v.
Radovsky, 207 Mass. 72; White v.
Schweitzer, 132 N. Y. S. 644, 147
App. Div. 544, citing Dutton v.
Solomonson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 582.
72a-91 Ark. 422, 25 L. R. A. (n.
s.) 669.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 19, Rule 4, (2).
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had passed, when the liquor was shipped, consigned to

the buyer.''^^^

A repudiation of the contract by the buyer is held to

be a revocation of the carrier's authority to receive the

goods for him. Consequently a subsequent specification

of goods by the seller and delivery of them to a carrier

for transportation to the buyer does not vest title in the

buyer. As one court puts it'^ *'the direction not to ship

was a revocation of the carrier's agency to receive, and

the plaintiffs (sellers) thereby had notice of the revoca-

tion. The delivery of the goods to the carrier, therefore,

was unauthorized, and the carrier's receipt would not

charge the defendant".'*

72b — Hill V. Fruita Mercantile

Co., 42 Colo. 491, 126 Am. St. Rep.

172; A. J. Neimeyer Co. v. Burling-

ton R. R., 54 Neb. 321, 40 L. R. A.
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534 ; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 70 Mich.

THE LAW OF SALES

had passed, when the liquor was shipped, consigned to
the buyer. 72h
A repudiation of the contract by the buyer is held to
be a revocation of the carrier's authority to receive the
goods for him. Consequently a subsequent specification
of goods by the seller and delivery of them to a carrier
for transportation to the buyer does not vest title in the
buyer. As one court puts it 73 ''the direction not to ship
was a revocation of the carrier's agency to receive, and
the plaintiffs (sellers) thereby had notice of the revocation. The delivery of the goods to the carrier, therefore,
was unauthorized, and the carrier's receipt would not
charge the defendant' '. 74

583; Branch Saw Co. v. Bryant,

N. C, 93 S. E. 839; Third Natl.

Bk. V. Smith, 107 Mo. 178; Kleine

V. Baker, 99 Mass. 253; State v.

J. W. Kelley & Co., 123 Tenn. 556,

36 L. R. A. (n. s.) 171; Loveland

V. Dinnan, 81 Conn. Ill, 17 L. R. A.

(n. s.) 1119; Dentzel v. Island

Park Assn., 229 Pa. 403, 33 L. R. A.

(n. s.) 54, in the absence of any

countervailing evidence trial court

should give binding instructions to

this effect to jury. Tyler Co. v.

Ludlow Co., 236 U. S. 723, infringe-

ment of patent by sale of articles

occurs in the district in which the

articles are shipped to buyer and

in no other; State v. Gruber, 116

Minn. 221, 45 L. R. A. (n. s.) 591.

The presumption has been

changed by statute in South Caro-

lina so far as shipments of intoxi-

cating liquor are concerned and an

arbitrary rule as to the place of

sales substituted for it. Sec. 2080,

Revisal of 1905. This statute sim-

ply provides that the place of

delivery of intoxicating liquor

within the state "shall be con-

strued and held to be the place of

sale thereof". A similar statute

was enacted in Texas — Acts of

1901, p. 262 — providing that when

intoxicating liquor was shipped

with a collection on delivery pro-

vision the sale should be deemed

to have occurred at the place of

destination. This act was held

unconstitutional on the ground

that by the common law presump-

tion the sale took place at point

72b-Hill v. Fruita Mercantile
Co., 42 Colo. 491, 126 Am. St. Rep.
172; A. J. Neimeyer Co. v. Burlington R. R., 54 Neb. 321, 40 L. R. A.
534; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 70 Mich.
583; Branch Saw Co. v. Bryant,
N. C., 93 S. E. 839; Third Natl.
Bk. v. Smith, 107 Mo. 178; Kleine
v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253; State v.
J. W. Kelley & Co., 123 Tenn. 556,
36 L. R. A. (n. s.) 171; Loveland
v. Dinnan, 81 Conn. 111, 17 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 1119; Dentzel v. Island
Park Assn., 229 Pa. 403, 33 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 54, in the absence of any
countervailing evidence trial court
should give binding instructions to
this effect to jury. Tyler Co. v.
Ludlow Co., 236 U. S. 723, infringe·
ment of patent by sale of articles
occurs in the district in which the
articles are shipped to buyer and
in no other; State v. Gruber, 116
Minn. 221, 45 L. R. A. (n. s.) 591.
The presumption h a s b e e n
changed by statute in South Carolina so far as shipments of intoxi·
eating liquor are concerned and an
arbitrary rule as to the place of
sales substituted for it. Sec. 2080,
Revisal of 1905. This statute aim·

ply provides that the place of
delivery of intoxicating liquor
within the state "shall be construed and held to be the place of
sale thereof". A similar statute
was enacted in Texas-Acts of
1901, p. 262-providing that when
intoxicating liquor was shipped
with a collection on delivery provision the sale should be deemed
to have occurred at the place of
destination. This act was held
unconstitutional on the ground
that by the common law presumption the sale took place at point
of shipment and the legislature
could not, even indirectly, prevent
the owner from bringing into a
dry county liquor of which he had
acquired title in another county.
Keller v. State, Tex. Crim. Ap., 1
L. R. A. (n. s.) 489.
73-Unexcelled Fire-works Co.
v. Polites, 130 Pa. 536.
74-Lincoln v. Chas. Alshuler
Mfg. Co., 142 Wis. 475; Lipper
Mfg. Co. v. Morris & Co., 58 Pa.
Superior Court 611, bnt holding
that buyer's ac eptanc
f them
from the carrier and unexplained

of shipment and the legislature

could not, even indirectly, prevent

the owner from bringing into a

dry county liquor of which he had

Di 'ti e b

acquired title in another county.

Keller v. State, Tex. Crim. Ap., 1

L. R. A. (n. s.) 489.

73 — Unexcelled Fire-works Co.

v. Pontes, 130 Pa. 536.
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The authority of the carrier or other agent to assent

for the buyer to the passing of title, or to accept delivery

of the goods so as to pass the title (whichever theory be

chosen) is limited to cases where goods conforming to

the contract are offered. This ''agency" of the carrier

to receive the goods or the title is of course a mere fic-

tion. As a matter of fact a carrier would receive any

goods that the seller might deliver to it for transporta-

tion to the buyer. There is no pretense that the carrier

examines them to see whether they conform or not to

the terms of some contract of sale. The agency of the

carrier is merely a legal construction apparently based

on expediency and operating to avoid conflict with the

rule that title can not be forced upon the buyer without

his consent to accept title in the particular chattel to

which the seller has chosen to pass title.

This constructive agency, however, extends only to

the acceptance of goods which conform to the contract.
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Delivery by the seller to a carrier and its receipt of

goods which do not conform to the terms of the contract

do not suffice to pass the title. Before title will pass

in such case there must be some further evidence of

acceptance by the buyer of the particular goods pre-

sented.'^^*

The delivery to a carrier of goods which the seller

asserts conformed to the description in the contract is

prima facie evidence of specification and assent and con-

sequent passing of title. The burden is then upon the

retention amounted in itself to livery to carrier of a greater quan-

acceptance of title; Acme Food tity than called for by the con-

Co. V. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 17 tract; but same case, 6 Hill 208, to

L. R. A. (n. s.) 807. effect that an actually intended

75 — Johnson v. Hibbard, 29 Ore. gift of the excess would pass title

184^ 54 Am. St. 787; Nomordust to the whole; compare, The Iron

Co. V. Eberts & Co., 59 Pa. Sup. Cliffs Co. v. Buhl, 42 Mich. 86.

Ct. 295; Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. Hoover v. Maher, 51 Minn. 269,

7; Skinner v. Griffiths, 80 Wash. delivery to carrier before the time

291, 141 Pac. 693 ; Downer v. stipulated by the buyer for ship-

Thompson, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 137, de- ment does not pass the title.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 44, (1), (2), (3), (4).

The authority of the carrier or other agent to assent
for the buyer to the passing of title, or to accept delivery
of the goods so as to pass the title (whichever theory be
chosen) is limited to cases where goods conforming to
the contract are offered. This "agency" of the carrier
to receive the goods or the title is of course a mer;e :fiction. As a n1atter of fact a carrier would receive any
goods that the seller might deliver to it for transportation to the buyer. There is no pretense that the carrier
examines them to see whether they conform or not to
the terms of some contract of sale. The agency of the
carrier is mer ely a legal construction apparently based
on expediency and operating to avoid conflict with the
rule that title can not be forced upon the buyer without
his consent to accept title in the particular chattel to
which the seller has chosen to pass title.
This constructive agency, ho-\vever, extends only to
the acceptance of goods which conform to the contract.
Delivery by the seller to a carrier and its receipt of
goods which do n ot conform to the terms of the contract
do not suffice to pass the title. Before title will pass
in such case ther e must be some further evidence of
acceptance by the buyer of the particular goods presen ted.75*
The delivery to a carrier of goods which the seller
asserts conformed to the description in the contract is
prima facie evidence of specification and assent and consequent passing of title. The burden is then upon the
retention amounted in itself to
livery to carrier of a greater quanacceptance of title; Acme Food
tity than called for by the contract; but same case, 6 Hill 208, to
Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 17
L. R. A. (n. s.) 807.
effect that an actually intended
75-Johnson v. Hibbard, 29 Ore. gift of the excess would pass title
184~ 54 Am. St. 787; Nomordust
to the whole; compare, The Iron
Co. v. Eberts & Co., 59 Pa. Sup. Cliffs Co. v. Buhl, 42 Mich. 86.
Ct. 295; Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa.
Hoover v. Maher, 51 Minn. 269,
7; Skinner v. Griffiths, 80 Wash.
delivery to carrier before the time
291, 141 Pac. 693; Downer v.
stipulated by the buyer for shipThom pson, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 137, de- ment does not pass the title.
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 44, (1), (2), (3), (4) .

Digitize- by

Oriyiral from

I TERNET ARCHIVE

UNIVERS TY OF CA IFOR IA

THE LAW OF SALES

54

54 THE LAW OF SALES

buyer to prove that the goods so specified by the seller

did not in fact conform to the terms of the agreement.

If the goods had been destroyed while in the carrier's

hands this proof would of course be difficult to make and

it is probable that the seller's prima facie proof would

remain unrebutted.'®

Other Circumstances. — Various other circum-

buyer to prove that the goods so specified by the seller
did not in fact conform to the terms of the agreement.
If the goods had been destroyed while in the carrier's
hands this proof would of course be difficult to make and
it is probable that the seller's prima f acie proof would
remain unrebutted. 76

stances have, by particular courts, been held presump-

tively to show an intent to pass title. The circumstances

are not sufficiently recurrent to give rise to a rule of

presumption and the cases are therefore of value only as

showing the general trend of judicial idea as to what

indicates intent to pass title. This intent has been pre-

sumed from the manufacture of goods and their delivery

to a particular storage house agreed upon by the parties,'^'

from the seller's putting property conforming to the

contract into the buyer's sacks ''^ or into bottles belonging

to the buyer.'^ The delivery of goods conforming to the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

contract to persons, other than a common carrier, to

whom dehvery has been authorized by the buyer has been

held to pass the title, although the buyer had not in any

other way signified his acceptance of those particular

goods.^°

These conclusions are only inferences of intent based

upon the facts, and this judicial assumption of probable

intent may be overthrown by any evidence of a real

intent in conflict therewith. That is to say, no facts are

conclusive, as a matter of law, in showing the intent of

the parties. Even the rule that delivery to a carrier

shows a probable and presumptive intent to pass title is

76 — Nomordust Co. v. Eberts 78 — Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El.

Co.. 59 Pa. Sup. Ct. 295; Skinner & Bl. 885.

V. Griffiths, 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 79— Langton v. Higgins, 4 Hurl.

693; Levy v. Radkay, 233 Mass. & Nor. 402.

29, 123 N. E. 97. 80 — Stewart v. Henningsen

77 — Stewart v. Henningsen Pro- Produce Co., 88 Kan. 521, 50 L. R.

duce Co., 88 Kan. 521, 50 L. R. A. A. (n. s.) Ill; Skinner v. Griffiths,

(n. 8.) 111. 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 693.

--Other Circumstances.-Various other circumstances have, by particular courts, been held presumptively to show an intent to pass title. The circumstances
are not sufficiently recurrent to givG rise to a rule of
presumption and the cases are the ref ore of value only as
showing the general trend of judicial idea as to what
indicates intent to pass title. This intent has been presumed from the manufacture of goods and their delivery
to a particular storage house agreed upon by the parties,77
from the seller's putting property conforming to the
contract into the buyer's sacks 78 or into bottles belonging
to the buyer. 79 The delivery of goods conforming to the
contract to persons, other than a common carrier, to
whom delivery has been authorized by the buyer has been
held to pass the title, although the buyer had not in any
other way signified his acceptance of those particular
goods. 80
These conclusions are only inferences of inten: based
upon the facts, and this judicial assumption of probable
intent may be overthrown by any evidence of a real
intent in conflict therewith. That is to say, no facts are
conclusive, as a matter of law, in showing the intent of
the parties. Even the rule that delivery to a carrier
shows a probable and presumptive intent to pass title is
76-Nomordust Co. v. Eberts
Co., 69 Pa. Sup. Ct. 295; Skinner
v. Griffiths, 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac.
693; Levy v. Radkay, 233 Mass.
29, 123 N. E. 97.
77-Stewart v. Henningsen Produce o., 88 Kan. 521, 50 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 111.

78-Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El.
& Bl. 885.

79-Langton v. Higgins, 4 Hurl.
& Nor. 402.
80-Stewart
v.
Henningsen
Produce Co., 88 Kan. 521, 50 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 111; Skinner v. Griffiths,
80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 693.
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rebuttable by any evidence that sufiSciently clearly shows

an intent not to pass title. The counter evidence may, of

course, take as many forms as the circumstances of the

case are capable of assuming.

Taking Out Bill of Lading. — Anything showiilg for

rebuttable by any evidence that sufficiently clearly shows
an intent not to pass title. The counter evidence may, of
course, take as many forms as the circumstances of the
case are capable of assuming.

which party the carrier is expected to act as bailee would

logically be .indicative of intent as to title. That is to

say, a seller desiring to retain ownership would not nat-

urally make the carrier bailee for the buyer. But if he

intended to pass title he would naturally make the carrier

the buyer's bailee rather than his own. Whether this

be the reason on which courts have decided or not, the

fact is that when, on shipment, a bill of lading is taken

from the carrier by the seller, the fact that he takes it

in his own name, so that the carrier becomes his o^vn

bailee, is treated by the courts as strong evidence that

he intended to retain title despite the shipment.*

If the seller takes the bill in his own name as bailor,
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that fact in itself is held enough to rebut the presumption

that in shipping the goods he intended to pass title.*^

Taking a bill of lading in the name of an agent of the

seller, or consigning to an agent instead of to the buyer

also logically indicates an intent not to pass title to the

81 — W. T. Wilson Co. v. Central be paid by the buyer; Wigton v.

Natl. Bk., Tex. Civ. Ap. , 139 Bowley, 130 Mass. 252; Emery's

S. W. 996; Dows v. National Exch. Sons v. Irving Bk., 25 O. S. 360;

Bk., 91 U. S. 618; Rylance v. Douglas v. People's Bk., 86 Ky. 176;

Walker Co., 129 Md. 475; Jenkyns Security State Bk. v. O'Connell

V. Brown, 14 Q. B. Rep. 496; Den- Lumber Co., 64 Wash. 506, 117

field Onion Co. v. N. Y., N. H. & Pac. 271; Ward v. Taylor, 56 111.

H. R. R., 222 Mass. 535; Alderman 494; Gilbert v. Ayoob, 71 Pa. Sup.

V. Eastern R. R., 115 Mass. 233; Ct. 336; a bill of lading in the

Armstrong v. Coyne, 64 Kan. 75, shipper's own name "is inconsis-

67 Pac. 537; Willman Merc. Co. tent with an intent to pass the

V. Fussy, 15 Mont. 511, 39 Pac. 738; ownership of the cargo", Render-

Sheperd v. Harrison, L. R. 5 H. L. son v. Lauer & Son, 40 Cal. Ap.

116; Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch. Rep. 696, 181 Pac. 811.

1, even though freight was to

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 20, (1), (2), (3).

--Taking Out Bill of Lading.-Anything showirtg for
which party the carrier is expected to act as bailee would
logically be .indicative of intent as to title. That is to
say, a seller desiring to retain ownership would not naturally make the carrier bailee for the buyer. But if he
intended to pass title he would naturally make the carrier
the buyer's bailee rather than his own. Whether this
be the reason on which courts have decided or not, the
fact is that when, on shipment, a bill of lading is taken
from the carrier by the seller, the fact that he takes it
in his own name, so that the carrier becomes his own
bailee, is treated by the courts as strong evidence that
he intended to retain title despite the shipment.*
If the seller takes the bill in his own name as bailor,
that fact in itself is held enough to rebut the presumption
that in shipping the goods he intended to pass title. 81
Taking a bill of lading in the name of an agent of the
seller, or consigning to an agent instead of to the buyer
also logically indicates an intent not to pass title to the
81-W. T. Wilson Co. v. Central
Natl. Bk.,
Tex. Civ . Ap.
, 139
S. W. 996; Dows v. National Exch.
Bk., 91 U. S. 618; Ry lance v.
Walker Co., 129 Md. 475; Jenkyns
v. Brown, 14 Q. B. Rep. 496; Den·
field Onion Co. v. N. Y., N. H. &
H. R. R., 222 Mass. 535; Alderman
v. Eastern R. R., 115 Mass. 233;
Armstrong v. Coyne, 64 Kan. 75,
67 Pac. 537; Willman Mere. Co.
v. Fussy, 15 Mont. 511, 39 Pac. 738;
Sheperd v. Harrison, L. R. 5 H. L.
116; Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch. Rep.
1, even though freight was to
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
D1gitiz
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be paid by the buyer; Wigton v.
Bowley, 130 Mass. 252; Emery's
Sons v. Irving Bk., 25 0. S. 360;
Douglas v. People's Bk., 86 Ky. 176;
Security State Bk. v. O'Connell
Lumber Co., 64 Wash. 506, 117
Pac. 271; Ward v. Taylor, 56 Ill.
494; Gilbert v. Ayoob, 71 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 336; a bill of lading in the
shipper's own name "is inconsistent with an intent to pass the
ownership of the cargo'', Henderson v. Lauer & Son, 40 Cal. Ap.
696, 181 Pac. 811.
20, (1), (2), (3).
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buyer and has been so held. In Berger v. State,^^ Berger

while in a county where sale of liquor was prohibited

took an order for liquor from C. He transmitted this to

L, a dealer in a wet county, who packed liquor conform-

ing to the order and put C's name on the bottle, but

shipped it by carrier to Berger. The latter delivered it

to C and was thereafter prosecuted for selling liquor

within the dry territory. The court said that if the

shipment had been direct to C title would have passed

on delivery to the carrier outside the dry territory, but

that by consigning it to his agent the seller evinced an

intent to retain title and that, therefore, the sale took

place when Berger delivered the liquor to C.®^

Taking out a bill in the name of the buyer would not,

of course, have this effect, but tends rather to strengthen

the presumption that by delivery to the carrier the seller

intended to pass the title.®*

The courts have gone so far in giving consideration to
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the indication of intent shown by the bill of lading as

to hold that even shipment on the buyer's own vessel

with a statement that, as to payment of freight, the goods

were buyer's property did not show an intent to pass

title to the buyer when the bill of lading had been taken

out in the seller's name.*^

82—50 Ark. 20. fer the title to the defendant",

Edelstone v. Schimmel, 233 Mass.

83 — Accd., Zimmern's Coal Co.

V. L. & N. R. R., 6 Ala. Ap. 475,

60 So. 598.

45, 123 N. E. 333.

85 — Turner v. Trustees, 6 Exch.

Rep. 543; EUershaw v. Magniac,

84 — Georgia Marble Works v. 6 Exch. Rep. 569; In Gabarron v.

Minor, Ark., 193 S. W. 498; Bailey Kreeft, L. R. 10 Exch. 274, the

V. H. R. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70; seller was under contract to de-

Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. V. Mathe- liver to the buyer the particular

son, 89 S. E. 478; Bk. of Litchfield goods shipped, and the vessel had

V. Elliott, 83 Minn. 469, 86 N. W. been chartered for the purpose of

454; "Delivery of the goods to the carrying them to the buyer. Never-

THE LAW OF SALES

buyer and has been so held. In Berger v. State,811 Berger
while in a county where sale of liquor was prohibited
took an order for liquor from 0. He transmitted this to
L, a dealer in a wet county, who packed liquor conforming to the order and put 0 's name on the bottle, but
shipped it by carrier to Berger. The latter delivered it
to 0 and was thereafter prosecuted for selling liquor
within the dry territory. The court said that if the
shipment had been direct to 0 title would have passed
on delivery to the carrier outside the dry territory, but
that by consigning it to his agent the seller evinced an
intent to retain title and that, therefore, the sale took
place when Berger delivered the liquor to 0. 83
Taking out a bill in the name of the buyer would not,
of course, have this effect, but tends rather to strengthen
the presumption that by delivery to the carrier the seller
intended to pass the title. 84
The courts have gone so far in giving consideration to
the indication of intent shown by the bill of lading as
to hold that even shipment on the buyer's own vessel
with a statement that, as to payment of freight, the goods
were buyer's property did not show an intent to pass
title to the buyer when the bill of lading had been taken
out in the seller's name. 85

carrier together with the taking theless it was held that title did

82-50 Ark. 20.

of a non-negotiable bill of lading not pass to the buyer on shipment

in the name of the defendant because the bill of lading was

(buyer) was strong proof of in- taken in the name of a fictitious

tentlon by the plaintiffs to trans- agent of the seller.

83-Accd., Zimmern's Coal Co.
v. L. & N. R. R., 6 Ala. Ap. 475,
60 So. 598.
84-Georgia Marble Works v.
Minor, Ark., 193 S. W. 498; Bailey
v. H. R. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70;
Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Matheson, 89 S. E. 478; Bk. of Litchfield
v. Elliott, 83 Minn. 469, 86 N. W.
454; "Delivery of the goods to the
carrier together with the taking
of a non-negotiable bill of lading
in the name of the defendant
(buyer) was strong proof of in·
tention by the plaintiffs to transD1 1tize by
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fer the title to the defendant".
Edelstone v. Schimmel, 233 Mass.
45, 123 N. E. 333.
85-Turner v. Trustees, 6 Exch.
Rep. 543; Ellershaw v. Magniac,
6 Exch. Rep. 569; In Gabarron v.
Kreeft, L. R. 10 Exch. 274, the
seller was under contract to deliver to the buyer the particular
goods shipped, and the vessel had
been chartered for the purpose of
carrying them to the buyer. Nevertheless it was held that title did
not pass to the buyer on shipment
because the bill of lading was
taken in the name of a fictitiow~
agent of the seller.
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While the majority of cases indicate clearly that the

seller in taking the bill of lading in his own name is pre-

sumed to have retained title, there are occasional deci-

sions holding apparently that he retains a lien, a right

of possession, only.* Thus in Mirabita v. Imperial Otto-

man Bank^^ the buyer was allowed to bring an action in

damages, based on title rather than contract, despite the

fact that the bill of lading was in the seller's name and

he had thereby retained a ''jus disponendi". The court,

however, avoided discussion of whether the seller's right

was really title or not. In effect, therefore, it is con-

fusing.*''

A seller's consignment to himself, without bill of lading,

makes the carrier bailee of the seller and has been held

not to indicate any intent to pass title.** And a consign-

ment to one who has never agreed to buy can not, of

course, whatever be the shipper's intent, pass the title

to him, for the reason that he has never consented to
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receive title and the carrier is not even by a fiction his

agent to receive it.*^

In Falk v. Fletcher,^" goods had been delivered to a

carrier for transportation with expectation of taking a

bill of lading of some sort. Before a bill could be taken

out the master of the vessel sailed away with the goods.

The court left it to the jury to determine what the ship-

per's intention as to title was.

Rebuttal of Evidence of Bill of Lading. — The re-

buttal of presumptive intent to pass title by delivery to a

86—3 Exch. Div. 164. 88— Newcomb v. Boston &

87-Cf., Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N. ^°^^" ^- ^^ ^^^ ^^^'^- ^^^' ^"^-

Y. 469; but in Ullman v. Wormer ™^^ ^- ^''- ^^^^ ^- ^- ^°- ^^^

Mach. Co., 210 N. Y. 41, where ^^- ^- ^'^^' ^"^ '^ ^°^^ °°^ ^PP®^^

previously unspecific goods were definitely that there was even a

shipped to the seller's own order, contract to sell in this case,

the court said, "The title to the 89-Allen v. Williams, 12 Pick.

machine never vested in the de- ^^^^^"^ ^^^- °^"^ ^- ^^^*^' ^^

fendant (buyer)." Tex. Crim. 107, 122 Am. St. 734.

90—34 L. J. R. C. P. 146.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 20, (1), (2), (3).
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carrier, which follows from taking the bill of lading in the

seller 's own name, is itself rebuttable if other facts war-

rant a different conclusion. It must be borne in mind that

the real intent of the parties governs the passing of title.

It passes when they so intend and not until they intend.

The various presumptions which the courts have estab-

lished are not rules of title, but presumptions pure and

simple, which will prevail in the absence of any other

evidence of intent, but which will give way at once to any

evidence whatever which is sufficient to convince the

particular court or jury that the real intent of the par-

ties was not in accord with the presumption.

A good illustration is found in the case of Lovell v.

Newman & Son.®^ K. & Co. having contracted to sell

cotton to a certain spinning company, forged bills of

lading made out in their own name for a pretended ship-

ment of cotton conforming to the contract. These bills

of lading they sent to the spinning company and col-
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lected the agreed price of the cotton. Later they did

actually ship cotton, the genuine bills for which were also

in the shippers ' name and were identical vn.th. the forged

ones. K. & Co. were adjudged bankrupt and these bills

of lading were found among its papers by the trustee

in bankruptcy. He brought suit against the bondsman

of the carrier, claiming the title to be in him as trustee.

The court held that taking the bills of lading in the sell-

er's own name gave rise to a presumption that they

intended to retain title, but that this presumption was

rebutted by the circumstance that the real bills were

taken out in form identical with the forged ones by

delivering which K. & Co. had pretended to pass title to

the buyers.

In Valley v. Montgomery,®'' the bill of lading had been

taken out in the seller's name. Lord Ellenborough said

he would have been inclined to hold that title had not

91—188 Fed. 534, 113 C. C. A. 92—3 East 585.

39; afiirmed VJ2 Fed. 753.

carrier, which follows from taking the bill of lading in the
seller's own name, is itself rebuttable if other fact s warrant a different conclusion. It must be borne in mind that
the real intent of the parties governs the passing of title.
It passes when they so intend and not until they intend.
The various presumptions which the courts have est ablished are not rules of title, but presumptions pure and
simple, which will prevail in the absence of any other
evidence of intent, but which will give way at once to any
evidence whatever which is sufficient to convince the
particular court or jury that the real intent of the parties was not in accord with the presumption.
A good illustration is found in the case of Lovell v.
Newman & Son.91 K. & Co. having contracted to sell
cotton to a certain spinning company, forged bills of
lading made out in their own name for a pretended shipment of cotton conforming to the contract. These bills
of lading they sent to the spinning company and collected the agreed price of the cotton. Later they did
actually ship cotton, the genuine bills for which were also
in the shippers' name and were identical with the forg ed
ones. K. & Co. were adjudged bankrupt and these bills
of lading were found among its papers by the trustee
in bankruptcy. He brought suit against the bondsman
of the carrier, claiming the title to be in him as trustee.
The court held that taking the bills of lading in the seller's own name gave rise to a presumption that they
intended to retain title, but that this presumption was
r ebutted by the circumstance that the real bills were
taken out in form identical with the forged ones by
deliv ring which K. & Co. had pretended to pass title to
the buy r s.
In Valley v. Montgomery,92 the bill of lading had been
tak n out in the seller's nam . Lord Ell nbor ugh said
he w uld have b en inclin d t hold that title had not
91-188 Fed. 534, 113
39; affirme d 1n F d . 753.

. A.

92- 3 East 585 .
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passed to the buyer except for the fact that an invoice

for the goods had been sent to the buyer stating that the

goods were shipped at his risk and tliat the throwing of

the risk on the buyer indicated an intent to pass the

title to him. By way of illustrating the effect of evidence

on different courts and demonstrating that the decision

is one of individual conclusion, not a rule, in Martineau

V. Kitching,^^ where the question of intent as to passing of

title was in issue, there was an express stipulation that the

risk of loss should remain in the seller. The court held

this to indicate an intent that title should be in the

buyer because if the seller had been intended to retain

title the risk would have been in him without stipulation.

In Dows v. Natl. Ex. Bk.^* the sending of an invoice to

the buyer, mthout any provision in it as to risk, was held

not to rebut the ''almost conclusive presumption" of

intent to retain title raised by taking the bill of lading

in the shipper's o^\^i name.^^
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Subsequent dealing mth the bill of lading itself as

passing the title is discussed hereafter.

Other Circumstances. — Just as the presumption,

that intent to pass title is evidenced by delivery of goods

to a carrier, may be rebutted by the taking of a bill of

lading in the shipper's own name, so it may be rebutted by

other circumstances. It would be of no purpose to point

out many of the various circumstances Avhich have been

held in one case or another to rebut such presumption of

intent, but for particular precedents which may possibly

93 — L. R. 7 Q. B. 436. actions on the part of the seller

94-91 U. S. 618, 630. "° indicating. In Golightly v.

Texas, 49 Tex. Cr. Ap. 44, 2 L.

95 — In Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Tau- R. A. (n. s.) 383, an oral stipula-

passed to the buyer except for the fact that an invoice
for the goods had been sent to the buyer stating that the
good were shipped at his ri k and that the throwing of
the risk on the buyer indicated an intent to pass the
title to him. By way of illustrating the effect of evidence
on different courts and demonstrating that the decision
is one of individual conclusion, not a rule, in nlartineau
v. Kitching, 93 where the question of intent as to passing of
title was in issue, there was an express stipulation that the
risk of loss should r emain in the seller. The court held
this to indicate an intent that title should bo in the
buyer because if the seller had been intended to retain
title the risk would have been in hin1 without stipulation.
In Dows v. Natl. Ex. Bk. 94 the sending of an invoice to
the buyer, without any provision in it as to risk, was held
not to rebut the ''almost conclusive presumption'' of
intent to retain title raised by taking the bill of lading
in the shipper's own name. 95
Subsequent dealing with the bill of lading itself as
passing the title is discussed hereafter.

ton 759, it was held that title tion that buyer should assume no

passed on delivery to the carrier, risk of loss in transit was held not

despite the fact that the bill of to rebut presumption that title

lading was taken in the seller's passed on shipment,

name, because of statements and

--Other Circumstances.-J ust as the presumption,
that intent to pass title is evidenced by delivery of goods
to a carrier, may be rebutted by the taking of a bill of
lading in the shipper's own name, so it may be rebutted by
other circumstances. It would be of no purpose to point
out many of the various circumstances which have been
held in one case or another to rebut such presumption of
intent, but for particular precedents which may possibly
93-L. R. 7 Q. B. 436.
94-91

u. s.

618, 630.

95-In Ogle v. Atkinson, 5 Tauton 759, it was held that title
passed on delivery to the carrier,
despite the fact that the bill of
lading was taken in the seller's
name, because of statements and
D1gitiz
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actions on the part of the seller
so indicating.
In Golightly v.
Texas, 49 Tex. Cr. Ap. 44, 2 L.
R. A. (n. s.) 383, an oral stipulation that buyer should assume no
risk of loss in transit was held not
to rebut presumption that title
passed on shipment.
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have persuasive effect upon a court reference must be

made to the digests.^^
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have persw:isive effect upon a court reference rnust bP
made to the digests. 96

Conflicting Intents. — The rule of evidence that a

presumption of intent existing at the time of certain acts

can not be rebutted by a showing of subsequent acts or

declarations, or other subsequent evidence, prevails of

course in this relation. The delivery of goods to a carrier

and the taking out of a bill of lading, or giving other

directions as to shipment, are all a part of the one trans-

action of shipment. It is not the deposit of goods in the

carrier's freight house that demonstrates the parties'

intent as to title, but the "shipment" which shows it.

But when the presumptive intent has been shoA\Ti by

this shipment, it can not thereafter be rebutted by the

subsequent acts of the parties, although, of course, they

may if they choose actually alter their prior intent.®^

It follows also that if title has already presumptively

passed to a specific chattel, the way in which the seller
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deals with it on shipment will not serve to revest title in

him nor to rebut the already existing presumption.

Partial Delivery. — In cases where the contract is

for the sale of a quantity of unspecified goods and a part

of them have been specified and accepted by the buyer the

question sometimes arises whether title has passed to so

much as has been specified. If the contract is decided to

be a "severable" one, so that title to the various parts

and amounts of the goods contracted for may be treated

separately from that of the whole, the issue would prop-

erly be determined just as it would be in any contract

96 — Moakes v. Nicholson, 34 L. A contrary dictum is found in

J. R. C. P. 273 ; not rebutted by Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis, etc.

bill "on account of whom it may R. R., 130 Minn. 121, 153 N. W. 115,

concern" but invoice to buyer, to the effect that seller's retention

--Conflicting lntents.-The rule of evidence that a
presumption of intent existing at the time of certain acts
can not be rebutted by a showing of subsequent acts or
declarations, or other subsequent evidence, prevails of
course in this relation. The delivery of goods to a carrier
and the taking out of a bill of lading, or giving other
directions as to shipment, are all a part of the one transaction of shipment. It is not the deposit of goods in the
carrier's freight house that demonstrates the parties'
intent as to title, but the "shipment" which shows it.
But when the presumptive intent has been shown by
this shipment, it can not thereafter be rebutted by the
subsequent acts of the parties, although, of course, they
may if they choose actually alter their prior intent.97
It follows also that if title has already presumptively
passed to a specific chattel, the way in which the seller
deals with it on shipment will not serve to revest title in
him nor to rebut the already existing presumption.

The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S. of a bill of lading in the buyer's

655, 662. name might show an intent to re-

97— Alderman Bros. Co. v. West- tain title,

inghouse, etc., Co., 92 Conn. 419.

--Partial Delivery.-In cases where the contract is
for the sale of a quantity of unspecified goods and a part
o.f them have been specified and accepted by the buyer the
question sometimes arises whether title has passed to so
much as has been specified. If the con tract is decided to
be a "severable" one, so that title to the various parts
and amounts of the goods contracted for may be treated
separately from that of the whole, the issue would properly be determined just as it. would be in any contract
96-Moakes v. Nicholson, 34 L.
J. R. C. P. 273; not rebutted by
bill "on account of whom it may
concern" but invoice to buyer.
The Carlos F . Roses, 177 U. S.
655, 662.
97-Ald erm a n Bros. Co. v. Westinghouse, etc., Co., 92 Conn. 419.

A contrary dictum is found in
Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis, etc.
R. R., 130 Minn. 121, 153 N. W. 115,
to the effect that sell r 's r et e ntion
of a bill of lading in t he buyer's
name might show an intent to re·
tain title.
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for the sale of the particular goods actually delivered,

without considering- the fact that they were part of a

larger amount. But if the contract be looked upon as an

entirety, a different state of facts is present. It is highly

probable that the buyer and seller did not contemplate

the passing of tirtle to part only, but rather that no real

ownership to any part should pass until the ownership

of the whole should be transferred. The authority on

this point is extremely limited. In Thompson v. Con-

over,^^ it was explicitly held that title would pass. Con-

over had sold to Petty certain corn, to be shelled by the

seller and dehvered. A part of it was so delivered and

accepted, and the rest, upon subsequent delivery, was

refused by the buyer. That which had been delivered

was levied upon by the sheriff as the property of the

buyer. Conover then rescinded the contract and brought

his action in trover. The court held the contract to be

entire and the seller to have a right to rescind for the
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buyer's non-performance. But it held also that the

action of trover could not be maintained because the title

had passed from Conover to the buyer.®^

On the other hand, it has been intimated, without the

necessity of so holding, that title to part delivered under

a contract for an entire quantity would not pass until

the whole amount had been appropriated."" Other cases,

without discussing whether title to the part did pass or

not, have held thai it is in the seller after rescission at

any rate.^°^ Of course the facts of the case may be such

as to show that the parties intended the risk of loss of so

much as had been appropriated to be upon the buyer,

regardless of whether or not title had passed to him."'^

98 — 32 N. J. L. 466. 100— Stewart v. Henningsen

99-HolIand v. Cincinnati Co.. P^°*^"^^ ^°- ^^ ^^^ ^^L 129 Pac.

97 Ky. 454. title held to have ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^- ^^^^' ^^^ ^^^- ^24-

passed and not to revert upon

rescission, but it was not defin-

itely held that the contract was

entire.

116 Pac. 963.

101— Pope V. Porter, 102 N. Y.

366.

102 — Anderson v. Morice, L. R.

10 C. P. 609.

for the sale of the particular goods actually delivered,
without considering the fact that they were part of a
larger amount. But if the contract be looked upon as an
entirety, a different state of facts is present. It is highly
probable that the buyer and seller did not contemplate
the passing of title to part only, but rather that no real
ownership to any part should pass until the ownership
of the whole should be transferred. The authority on
this point is extremely limited. In Thompson v. Conover,98 it was explicitly held that title would pass. Conover had sold to Petty certain corn, to be shelled by the
seller and delivered. A part of it was so delivered and
accepted, and the rest, upon subsequent delivery, was
refused by the buyer. That which had been delivered
was levied upon by the sheriff as the property of the
buyer. Conover then rescinded the contract and brought
his action in trover. The court held the contract to be
entire and the seller to have a right to rescind for the
buyer's non-performance. But it held also that the
action of trover could not be maintained because the title
had passed from Conover to the buyer. 99
On the other hand, it has been intimated, without the
neces.s ity of so holding, that title to part delivered under
a contract for an entire quantity would not pass until
the whole amount had been appropriated. 100 Other cases,
without discussing whether title to the part did pass or
not, have held tha1 it is in the seller after rescission at
any rate. 101 Of course the facts of the case may be such
as to show that the parties intended the risk of loss of so
much as had been appropriated to be upon the buyer,
regardless of whether or not title had passed to him. 102
98-32 N. J. L. 466.
99-Holland v. Cincinnati Co.,
97 Ky. 454, title held to have
passed and not to revert upon
rescission, but it was not definitely held that the contract was
entire.
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Produce Co., 88 Kan. 521, 129 Pac.
181; Walti v. Gaba, 160 Cal. 324,
116 Pac. 963.
101-Pope v. Porter, 102 N. Y.
366.
102-Anderson v. Morice, L. R.
10 C. P. 609.
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Dealing with a Bill of Lading. — Although the fact

that by taking a bill of lading in the seller's, name the

carrier is made bailee for the seller raises a presumption

that title was not intended to pass, this bill of lading itself

may later be so dealt with as to show an intent to pass

title to the goods represented by it to the buyer. Dealing "^

mth the bill of lading has the same effect that dealing

with the goods themselves would have. Therefore when --

the seller indicates an intent to pass the ownership of

the bill of lading to the buyer he manifests also an

intent to pass title to the goods represented by the bill

of lading. The usual case is an indorsement of the bill of

lading and its delivery to the buyer. The fundamental

case upon this point is Lickbarrow v. Mason, decided

in 1793."^ This case arose out of a sale of unspecified

goods by Turing & Son to Freeman. Pursuant to the

contract, Turing shipped corn consigned to Freeman and

took the bills of lading in his own name. Two of these
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bills, which were in quadruplicate, Turing indorsed in

blank and sent to Freeman. The latter transferred them

to the plaintiff as security for an obligation. Freeman

having become insolvent before arrival of the goods,

Turing, through the defendant as his agent, attempted to

retake possession as an unpaid seller. The Exchequer

Chamber held that the title to the goods remained in the

seller; that the buyer Freeman, having no title, could

convey nothing to the plaintiff, even by endorsing to him

a bill of lading. On review by the House of Lords it

was held thatfby the assignment of the bill of lading the

legal title had passed to Freeman and from him to the

plaintiff, and that the plaintiff having an equity in addi-

tion to his legal title, the seller's merely equitable right

could not prevail.) It was further specifically held that

the transfer of the bill of lading by an indorsement in

blank had the same effect of transferring the legal title,

103—2 T. R. 63; 1 II. Black-

stone 357, 2 Id. 211; 5 T. R. 683.

--Dealing with a Bill of Lading.-Although the fact
that by taking a bill of lading in the seller's name the
carrier is made bailee for the seller raises a presumption
that title was not intended to pass, this bill of lading itself
may later be so dealt with as to show an intent to pass
title to the goods represented by it to the buyer. Dealing /
with the bill of lading has the same effect that dealing
with the goods themselves would have. Therefore when
the seller indicates an intent to pass the ownership of
the bill of lading to the buyer he manifests also an
intent to pass title to the goods represented by the bill
of lading. The usual case is an indorsement of the bill of
lading and its delivery to the buyer. The fundamental
case upon this point is Lickbarrow v. Mason, decided
in 1793. 103 This case arose out of a sale of unspecified
goods by Turing & Son to Freeman. Pursuant to the
contract, Turing shipped corn consigned to Freeman and
took the bills of lading in his own name. Two of these
bills, which were in quadruplicate, Turing indorsed in
blank and sent to Freeman. The latter transferred them
to the plaintiff as security for an obligation. Freeman
having become insolvent before arrival of the goods,
Turing, through the defendant as his agent, attempted to
retake possession as an unpaid seller. The Exchequer
Chamber held that the title to the goods remained in the
seller; that the buyer Freeman, having no title, could
convey nothing to the plaintiff, even by endorsing to him
a bill of lading. On review by the House of Lords it
was held that(by the assignment of the bill of lading the
legal title had passed to Freeman and from him to tho
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff having an equity in addition to his legal title, the seller's merely equitable right
could not prevail. It was further specifically held that
the transfer of the bill of lading by an indorsen1ent in
blan;.c had the same ffect of transf rring the legal title,
103-2 T . R. 63; 1 I I. Bla ckst one 357, 2 Id. 211 ; 5 T . R. 683.
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if so intended, as by indorsement to a particular person

named. So, it is now consistently held that(transf er of a

bill of lading has the same effect as transfer of the goods

represented by it would have.^°* )

This transfer of the bill of lading, like the delivery of

goods, may be made upon condition. ( If it is transf'crred

upon condition and the seller, i. e., the tranferor, does

not intend title to pass until the condition is fulfilled, title

does not pass — as between the parties — until then."^*)

Unspecified Part of Specified Mass. — An agreement to

sell property which is itself unidentified, but which is

described as part of a definite and specified larger mass

of goods, is a common transaction. The question then

if so intended, as by indorsement to a particular person
named. So, it is now consistently held tha transfer of a
bill of lading has the same effect as transfer of the goods
represented by it would have. 104
This transfer of the bill of lading, like the delivery of
goods, may be made upon condition. { If it is transferred
upon condition and the seller, i. e., the tranferor, does
not intend title to pass until the condition is fulfilled, title
does not pass-as between the parties-until then. 105

:.J

arises whether the buyer has any of the privileges and

liabilities of ownership in respect to the mass before

some particular part has been designated. It is obvious,

of course, that he can not be the o^vner of any physically

limited or separated part until such particular part has
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been specified. Even if by the agreement he is bound to

accept, or if he has authority to select for himself what

part he will take, until such selection has actually been

made he is not the owner of any particular part, but has

only a legal right to become the owner of some particular

part. As we have already pointed out, ownership is not

a mere idea, but is the legal connection of certain ideal

rights and duties with some particular, definite thing.

Until there is a definite thing to be the object of owner-

ship there is no ownership. And while the thing

described as sold is still an undetermined part of some-

thing else, there is no definite thing to be o^\^led.

It is, however, a legal concept that several persons may

have certain rights and duties of ownership in respect to

the same one particular thing. "When the legal rights

104— See post, p. 219, 221, for 5 H. of L. 116; Godts v. Rose, 25

full discussion. I.. J. R.. C. P. 61; Wait v. Baker,

105 — Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R. 2 Exch. Kep. 1.

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 34.

Unspecified Part of Specified Mass.-An agreement to
sell property which is itself unidentified, but which is
described as part of a definite and specified larger mass
of goods, is a common transaction. The question then
arises whether the buyer has any of the privileges and
liabilities of ownership in respect to the mass before
some particular part has been designated. It is obvious,
of course, that he can not be the owner of any physically
limited or separated part until such particular part has
been specified. Even if by the agreement he is bound to
accept, or if he has authority to select for himself what
part he will take, until such selection has actually been
made he is not the owner of any particular part, but ha~
only a legal right to becorne the owner of some particular
part. As we have already pointed out, ownership is not
a mere idea, but is the legal connection of certain ideal
rights and duties with some particular, definite thing.
Until ·there is a definite thing to be the object of ownership there is no ownership. And while the thing
described as sold is still an undetermined part of something else, there is no definite thing to be owned.
It is, however, a legal concept that several persons may
have certain rights and duties of ownership in respect to
the same one particular thing. When the legal rights
5 H. of L. 116; God ts v. Rose, 25
104-See post, p. 219, 22'1, for
full discussion.
L. J. R., C. P. 61; Wait v. Baker,
105-Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R. 2 Exch. Rep. 1.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 34.
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which go to make up the concept of ownership were

predicated upon the fact of physical possession, it is

true that "ownership" by more than one person of a

single chattel would have been more or less paradoxical.

Philosophically it is perhaps demonstrable that two per-

sons can not simultaneously "possess" a single thing any

more than two spaces can be simultaneously occupied

by it.^**^ But rights and obligations are no longer

founded on actual physical possession. The history of

the change would be out of place in a work of this type

and it is sufficient to say that several persons may have

a co-ownership, an "ownership in common" in a single

thing.

Although one who owns a thing obviously can not

invest another with rights in respect to a particular part

of that thing until he indicates in some way the part to

which the new rights shall apply, nevertheless the owner

of a thing can invest another with rights in respect to
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the entire thing without thereby necessarily divesting

himself of all rights. So long as we know with what

rights and liabilities he has invested the second person,

it is immaterial by what name they be collectively called.

Usually the courts do speak of them as rights of ' ' owner-

ship in common". The transaction is usually called a

"sale" and the buyer is said to become an o^vner or

tenant in common.^"''*

106 — For a discussion of the v. Stowell, 51 N. Y. 70, something

difference of ideas as to concur- more than tenancy in common,

rent possession and ownership of As to the rights themselves, re-

land and of chattels see Pollock & gardless of their name as owner-

Maitland, Vol. 2, p. 180 ft. ship, or otherwise, it has been

107 — Loomis v. O'Neal, 73 Mich, held that one in whom the owner

582; In Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 has created an interest in an un-

N. Y. 330, the court held that the specified part of a mass of grain, or

buyer of an undistinguished num- other fungible goods, may main-

ber of bushels of a larger mass of tain assumpsit against the original

wheat acquired an ownership, but owner. Loomis v. O'Neal, 73

said that it was something more Mich. 582, "The refusal to recog-

than a tenancy in common; Lobdell nize the right of the co-tenant

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 6, (1), (2), 76, "Fungible goods."

which go to make up the concept of ownership were
predicated upon the fact of physical possession, it is
true that ''ownership'' by more than one person of a
single chattel would have been more or less paradoxical.
Philosophically it is perhaps demonstrable that two p ersons can not simultaneously ''possess'' a single thing any
more than two spaces can be simultaneously occupied
by it. 106• But rights and obligations are no longer
founded on actual physical possession. The history of
the change would be out of place in a work of this type
and it is sufficient to say that several persons may have
a co-ownership, an "ownership in common" in a single
thing.
Although one who owns a thing obviously can not
invest another with rights in respect to a particular part
of that thing until he indicates in some way the part to
which the new rights shall apply, nevertheless the owner
of a thing can invest another with rights in respect to
the entire thing without thereby necessarily divesting
himself of all rights. So long as we know with what
rights and liabilities he has invested the second person,
it is immaterial by what name they be collectively called.
Usually the courts do speak of them as rights of ''ownership in common". The transaction is usually called a
''sale'' and the buyer is said to become an owner or
tenant in common. 107 *
106-For a discussion of the
difference of ideas as to concurrent possession and ownership of
land and of chattels see Pollock &
Maitland, Vol. 2, p. 180 ff.
107-Loomis v. O'Neal, 73 Mich.
582; In Kimberly v. Patchin, 19
N. Y. 330, the court held that the
buyer of an undistinguished number of bushels of a larger mass of
wheat acquired an ownership, but
said th at it was something more
than a tenancy in common; Lobdell

v. Stowell, 51 N. Y. 70, something
more than tenancy in common.
As to the rights themselves, regardless of their name as ownership, or otherwise, it has been
held that one in whom the owner
has created an interest in an unspecified part of a mass of grain. or
other fungible goods, may maintain as-sumpsit against the original
owner.
Loomis v. O'Neal. 73
Mich. 582, "The r efusal to recognize th e right of the co-tenant

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 6, (1), (2), 76, "Fungible goods."
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Intent of Parties. — It thus appears that the law

recognizes a possibility that rights or liabilities such as

usually connote ownership may exist coincidentally in

two or more persons in respect to a single undivided

mass of property. The only question to be solved, there-

fore, is whether the sale of a certain quantity of a larger

mass is intended by the parties to transfer such an ** undi-

vided ownership" in the whole mass.

It does not matter what the rights should be called, the

question is whether the parties have intended that the

buyer shall have rights in respect to the whole mass

amounts to a conversion. The

tort may be waived, and assump-

sit brought"; or may have an ac-

tion against the other for damages

recognizes a possibility that rights or liabilities such as
usually connote ownership may exist coincidentally in
two or more persons in respect to a single undivided
mass of property. The only question to be solved, therefore, is whether the sale of a certain quantity of a huger
mass is intended by the parties to transfer such an "undivided ownership'' in the whole mass.
It does not matter what the rights should be called, the
question is whether the parties have intended that the
buyer shall have rights in respect to the whole mass

for conversion, Lobdell v. Stowell,

51 N. Y. 70; Kimberly v. Patchin,
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19 N. Y. 330; or an action of tro-

ver, Stall V. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158.

It has even been held that a

"tenant in common" may bring re-

plevin for his own part, the court

saying, "It has been quite gener-

ally held that tenants in common

or persons who are separate own-

ers of articles stored in mass, such

as corn, wheat, coal, logs, etc.,

each article being of like nature

and quality with the others, may

have replevin for his proportion-

ate part of the intermixed chat-

tels if the same is wrongfully de-

tained and the action is necessary

for the maintenance of his rights,

subject to deductions for any loss

or waste properly falling to his

share while the property remained

in mass." Manti City Savings

Bank v. Peterson, 33 Utah 209,

126 Am. St. 817, 93 Pac. 566; Piaz-

zek V. White, 23 Kan. 621, 33 Am.

Rep. 211; Halsey v. Simmons, 85

Ore. 324, 166 Pac. 944.

As recognizing the possibility

of rights in respect to one partic-

ular thiijg in two persons simul-

taneously, see Gardiner v. Suy-

dam, 7 N. Y. 357; Seldomridge v.

Bank, 87 Neb. 531, 127 N. W. 871;

30 L. R. A. (n. s.) 337; Brownfield

V. Johnson, 128 Pa. 254, 6 L. R.

A. 48, dictum. "The weight of

American authority supports the

proposition that when property

sold to be taken out of a specific

mass of uniform quality, title will

pass at once upon the making of

the contract, if such appears to be

amounts to a conversion. The
tort may be waived, and assurnpsit brought"; or may have an action against the other for damages
for conversion, Lobdell v. Stowell,
51 N. Y. 70; Kimberly v. Patchin,
19 N. Y. 330; or an action of trover, Stall v. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158.
It has even been held that a
"tenant in common" may bring replevin for his own part, the court
saying, "It has been quite generally held that tenants in common
or persons who are separate owners of articles stored in mass, such
as corn, wheat, coal, logs, etc.,
each article being of like nature
and quality with the others, may
have replevin for his proportionate part of the intermixed chattels if the same is wrongfully detained and the action is necessary
for the maintenance of his rights,
subject to deductions for any loss
or waste properly falling to his
share while the property remained
in mass." Manti City Savings
Bank v. Peterson, 33 Utah 209,
126 Am. St. 817, 93 Pac. 566; Piazzek v. White, 23 Kan. 621, 33 Am.
Rep. 211; Halsey v. Simmons, 85
Ore. 324, 166 Pac. 944.

the intent." Kimberly v. Patchin,

As recognizing the possibility
of rights in respect to one particular thiIJ.g in two persons simultaneously, see Gardiner v. Suydam, 7 N. Y. 357; Seldomridge v.
Bank, 87 Neb. 531, 127 N. W. 871;
30 L. R. A. (n. s.) 337; Brownfield
v. Johnson, 128 Pa. 254, 6 L. R.
A. 48, dictum. "The weight of
American authority supports the
proposition that when property
sold to be taken out of a specific
mass of uniform quality, title will
pass at once upon the making of
the contract, if such appears to be
the intent." Kimberly v. Patchin,
19 N. Y. 330, "None of (the decisions) go to the extent of holding
that a man cannot, if he wishes
and intends so to do, make a perfect sale of a quantity without
actual separation, where the mass
is ascertained by the contract and
all :Jarts are of the same value and
undistinguishable from each
other.'' Tobin v. Portland Mills
Co., 41 Ore. 265, depositors of
wheat in a warehouse called "tenante in common thereof. having
such an undivided interest therein
as the quantity stored by each
bore to the amount deposited."
Bretz v. Diehl. 117 Pa. 589.

19 N. Y. 330, "None of (the deci-

sions) go to the extent of holding

that a man cannot, if he wishes

and intends so to do, make a per-
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itself, as distinct from mere rights of action against the
seller personally. 108

itself, as distinct from mere rights of action against the

seller personally.^^^

Presumption of Intent. — The intention to create

rights to the property itself need not be expressed. The

courts may conclude sucli to have been the intention from

an examination of the circumstances. In Hurff v. Hires^**^

it appeared that Hurff had bought from Heritage 200

bushels of corn which was part of a mass of 400 or 500

bushels belonging to Heritage. Nothing whatever

appears to have been said in regard to legal rights or

liabilities. Before there was any separation of the corn

sold from the mass, Hires, a sheriff, levied upon the

whole mass as being the property of Heritage. Despite

the levy Heritage separated 200 bushels from the mass

and delivered it to Hurff, and Hires brought an action

of trover. The lower court decided in favor of the sheriff

"on the theory that though the purchaser bought the

corn and paid the price, the title did not pass to him,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

because the quantity sold was not separated from the

original bulk until after levy, and that therefore the

whole still remained liable to seizure as the property of

the vendor. ' ' This holding was reversed by the Supreme

Court, which said, ''It is the general rule that the prop-

erty in goods and chattels passes under the contract of

sale according to the intention of the parties. The diffi-

culty in the application of this rule is in determining

under what circumstances the parties shall be considered

as having evinced an intention that property in the sub-

ject-matter of sale should pass from the vendor to the

108 — It must be borne in mind mass itself is known. Many cases

that If the sale is merely of cer- turn in reality upon lack of iden

tain property, described, but not tity of even a larger mass >om

identified even to the extent of which property sold is to be taken,

being part of a larger definite although they appear on casual

mass, no title, even an undivided reading to hold that title in corn-

one, can pass. It is impossible to mon could not pass,

conceive of even an ownership in 109 — 11 Vroom (N. J. L.) 581,29

common in a mass unless the Am. Rep. 282.

--Presumption of lntent.-The intention to create
rights to the property itself need not be expressed. The
courts may conclude such to have been the intention from
an examination of the circumstances. In Hurff v. Hires 10G
it appeared that Hurff had bought from Heritage 200
bushels of corn which was part of a mass of 400 or 500
bushels belonging to Heritage. Nothing whatever
appears to have been said in regard to legal rights or
liabilities. Before there was any separation of the corn
sold from the mass, Hires, a sheriff, levied upon the
whole mass as being the property of Heritage. Despite
the levy Heritage separated 200 bushels from the mass
and delivered it to Hurff, and Hires brought an action
of trover. The lower court decided in favor of the sheriff
"on the theory that though the purchaser bought the
corn and paid the price, the title did not pass to him,
because the quantity sold was not separated from the
original bulk until after levy, and that therefore the
whole still remained liable to seizure as the property of
the vendor:.'' This holding was reversed by the Supreme
Court, which said, "It is the general rule that the property in goods and chattels passes under the contract of
sale according to the intention of the parties. The difficulty in the application of this rule is in determining
under what circumstances the parties shall be considered
as having evinced an intention that property in the subject-matter of sale should pass from the vendor to the
108-lt must be borne in mind
that if the sale is merely or certain property, described. but not
identified even to the extent of
being part of a larger definite
mass, no title, even an undivided
one, can pass. It is impossible to
conceive of even an ownership in
common in a mass unless the
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although they appear on casual
reading to hold that title in common could not pass.
109-11 Vroom (N. J. L.) 681, 29
Am. Rep. 282.
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purchaser." After pointing out that intention to pass

title is found readily or reluctantly according to the

degree of protection thought due the seller, the court

continued, ''The tendency of modern decisions is to give

effect to contracts of sale according to the intention of

the parties to a greater extent than is found in the, older

cases, and to engraft upon the rule that property passes

by the contract of sale, if such be the intention, fewer

exceptions, and those only which are founded upon sub-

stantial considerations affecting the interest of parties."

The court held accordingly that there was no legal reason

why an ownership of the corn itself could not have passed

to the buyer even before separation of the mass and that

the question as to whether the parties so intended should

have been left to the jury.

In Kimberly v. Patchin, ^^^ an intent to pass an actual

ownership by the sale of 6,000 bushels of grain out of a

mass of 6,240 was deduced by the court — mthout refer-
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ence to a jury — from the fact that the owner not only

gave a bill of sale for 6,000 bushels but thereafter stated

in writing that he held 6,000 bushels of grain as bailee of

the buyer.

"Where there are no particularly indicative facts,

except the fact that the sale is of part of a mass, the

courts are in disagreement as to what conclusion of intent

they will draw. In England it is the consistent policy to

presume that there was no intent to create any OA\Tier-

ship in the undivided mass. An early case, much referred

to in American decisions,^^^ did hold that a sale of 10 tons

of oil, to be taken from a tank containing 40 tons, gave

the buyer a right of action in trover against the seller,

despite the fact that the part sold had never been in any

way distinguished from the whole. This case, however,

has not been followed in England."^

110—19 N. Y. 330. 530 dictum; Aldridge v. Johnson,

111— Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 7 El. & Bl. 885 (sale of grain);

East 614. Knights v. Whiffen, L. R. 5 Q. B.

112— Gillett V. HiU, 2 C. & M. 660 (sale of graiu); Wallace v.
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purchaser.'' After pointing out that intention to pass
title is found readily or reluctantly according to the
degree of protection thought due the seller, the court
continued, ''The tendency of modern decisions is to give
effect to contracts of sale according to the intention of
the parties to a greater extent than is found in the.. older
cases, and to engraft upon the rule that property passes
by the contract of sale, if such be the intention, fewer
exceptions, and those only which are founded upon substantial considerations affecting the interest of parties."
The court held accordingly that there was no legal reason
why an ownership of the corn itself could not have passed
to the buyer even before separation of the mass and that
the question as to whether the parties so intended should
have been left to the jury.
In Kimberly v. Patchin, 110 an intent to pass an actual
ownership by the sale of 6,000 bushels of grain out of a
mass of 6,240 was deduced by the court-without reference to a jury-from the fact that the owner not only
gave a bill of sale for 6,000 bushels but thereafter stated
in writing that he held 6,000 bushels of grain as bailee of
the buyer.
Where there are no particularly indicative facts,
except the fact that the sale is of part of a mass, the
courts are in disagreement as to what conclusion of intent
they will draw. In England it is the consistent policy to
presume that there was no intent to create any ownership in the undivided mass. An early case, much referred
to in American decisions, 111 did hold that a sale of 10 tons
of oil, to be taken from a tank containing· 40 tons, gave
the buyer a right of action in trover against the seller,
despite the fact that the part sold had never been in any
way distinguished from the whole. This case, however,
has not been followed in England. 112
110-19 N. Y. 330.
111-Whitehouse v. Frost, 12
East 614.
112-Gillett v. HW, 2 C. & M.
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7 El. & Bl. 885 (sale of grain);
Knights v. Whiffen, L. R. 5 Q. B.
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Estoppel. — But, nevertheless, when the action is

by the buyer of an unseparated part of a mass against

the possessor of the whole, even the English courts show

a readiness to allow recovery on the ground that the

possessor has done something, however slight it may be,

to estop himself from denying that the goods sold have

actually been separated.^^^

Fungible Goods. — In America a distinction is made

between sales of part of ''fungible" goods and those

which are not fungible. By ''fungible" or "homoge-

neous" is meant goods which are generally considered

in terms of measurement rather than of individual units.

Grain, for instance, is thought of in bushels rather than

in numbers of kernels, and is considered as fungible.

Hams and automobiles, however, are sold by numbers

of individual units, not by measures-full, and bricks by

numbers of bricks, not by tons. Such masses are not

fungible. In case of sale of part of a mass of fungible
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goods there is, in America, a tendency to presume that

an undivided ownership was intended to pass."*

Breeds, 15 East 522, 12 Rev. R. 114— Gushing v. Breed, 14 Allen

423, 50 tons oil out of 90 tons in (Mass.) 376, 92 Am. Dec. 777;

various casks — distinguished from Chapman v. Shepard, 39 Conn. 413,

Whitehouse v. Frost on ground sacks of meal; Welch v. Spies, 103

that it was custom for seller to Iowa 389; Cloke v. Shafroth, 137

measure water and "foot-dirt" and 111. 393; McReynolds v. People, 230

fill up casks; White v. Wilks, 5 111. 623 dictum; Mchts. Bk. v.

Taunt 176, 14 Rev. R. 735, 20 tons Hibbard, 48 Mich. 118; Waldron v.

oil out of "vendor's stock" which Chase, 37 Me. 414; Kaufman v.

was in various casks, notes that Schilling, 58 Mo. 218; Halsey v.

oil was not in single container; Simmonds, 85 Ore. 324, 166 Pac.

Bush V. Davis, 2 M. & S. 397, 15 944; Seldomridge v. Bank, 87 Neb.

Rev. R. 288, 10 out of 18 tons of 531, 127 N. W. 871, 30 L. R. A.

flax in mats; Shepley v. Davis, 5 (n. s.) 337; Brownfield v. John-

Taunt 617, 15 Rev. R. 598, 10 out son, 128 Pa. 254, 6L. R. A. 48; Rus-

of 30 tons of hemp. sell v. Carrington, 42 N. Y. 118;

113-Gillett V. Hill, 2 C. & M. Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply

530; Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El. & C«- ^^ ^^^^ ^^^' ^^^ ^^^^ ^23. ex-

Bl. 885: Knights v. Whiffen, L. R. ^^""^^^ ^^ ^^'® "^ P^""* "^ ^ '^^^®^

BOB 660 mass of hay; The Iron Cliff Co. v.

Buhl, 42 Mich. 86, iron ore.
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Some cases, however, are in flat conflict with this presumption of intent and hold that title cloo ·not pass unless
the intent is clearly evinced. 116 A distinction must be
noted between these conflicting cases and those in which
some other rule of presumption than that r eferring
to separation prevents a holding that title passe'd, as
for instance the rule that where the seller is to put the
goods in a deliverable condition title is presumed not
to have passed until that is done. 116 There is also a possibility of confusion in the fact already referred to, that
some cases appear to hold that title to part of a mass
will not pass when, in fact, in the particular case, there
is not even a mass identified from which the property
described is to be taken. 117
·
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Some cases, however, are in fiat conflict with this pre-

sumption of intent and hold that title does not pass unless

the intent is clearly evinced.^^^ A distinction must be

noted between these confiicting cases and those in which

some other rule of presumption than that referring

to separation prevents a holding that title passed, as

for instance the rule that where the seller is to put the

goods in a deliverable condition title is presumed not

to have passed until that is done.^^^ There is also a pos-

sibility of confusion in the fact already referred to, that

some cases appear to hold that title to part of a mass

will not pass when, in fact, in the particular case, there

is not even a mass identified from which the property

described is to be taken.^"

Non-Fungible Goods. — When the mass is not

"fungible", even though all the individual components

of it may be of probably equal value, the judicial custom

is to hold that a mere sale of a part thereof pre-
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sumptively indicates no intent to pass title in the mass

itself."^

But it is not impossible that parties should create coin-

cident rights of 0A\'nership in the same mass, even though

it be not fungible, and when the circumstances are such

--Non-Fungible Goods.-When the mass is not
''fungible'', even though all the individual components
of it may be of probably equal value, the judicial custom
is to hold that a mere sale of a part thereof presumptively indicates no intent to pass title in the mass
itself .118
But it is not impossible that parties should create coincident rights of ownership in the same mass, even though
it be not fungible, and when the circumstances are such
as clearly to demonstrate that they did so intend, even

as clearly to demonstrate that they did so intend, even

115 — Wood & Co. V. Roach, 52 defendant had a seller's lien on

111. Ap. 388, the same result might the property.

have been reached upon the Illi- 116— Backhaus v. Buells, 43 Ore.

nois doctrine that change of pos- ^^^' ^^ ^ie v. Crosby, 43 Ore. 612;

. e 1. Bailey v. Long, 24 Kan. 90.

session is necessary to perfect ^^J ^^ „ *' „ , . , ""

. ^ , ^ 177— Kellog V. Frolich, 139 Mich,

title as against subsequent pur- ...

Chasers; Mercer Natl. Bk. v. Haw- n8_Gardner v. Suydam, 7 N.

kins & Co.. 104 Ky. 171; Lawry v. ^ 357^ ^^^^ ^^ A^^^.. commercial

Ellis, 85 Me. 500, hay from a mow; ^atl. Bk. v. Gillette, 90 Ind. 268;

Jeraulds v. Brown, 64 N. H. 006; Fordice v. Gibson, 129 Ind. 7; Gro-

Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490, cer Co. v. Clements, 69 Mo. Ap.

decision also put on the ground 446; Ferguson v. Northern Bk. of

that plaintiff's action for conver- Ky., 14 Bush. (Ky.) 555, 29 Am.

sion was precluded by fact that Dec. 418, hams.

115-Wood & Co. v. Roach, 52
Ill. Ap. 388, the same result might
have been reached upon the Illinois doctrine that change of possession is necessary to perfect
title as against subsequent purchasers; Mercer Natl. Bk. v. Hawkins & Co., 104 Ky. 171; Lawry v.
Ellis, 85 Me. 500, hay from a mow;
Jeraulds v. Brown, 64 N. H. 606;
Keeler v. Goodwin, 111 Mass. 490,
decision also put on the ground
that plaintiff's action for conversion was precluded by fact that
D1 1tize by
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defendant had a seller's lien on
property.
116-Backhaus v. Buells, 43 Ore.
558; La Vie v. Crosby, 43 Ore. 612;
Bailey v. Long, 24 Kan. 90.
177-Kellog v. Frolich, 139 Mich.
612.
118-Gardner v. Suydam, 7 N.
Y. 357, bbls. of flour; Commercial
Natl. Bk. v. Gillette, 90 Ind. 268;
Fordice v. Gibson, 129 Ind. 7; Gro·
cer Co. v. Clements, 69 Mo. Ap.
446; Ferguson v. Northern Bk. or
Ky., 14 Bush. (Ky.) 555, 29 Am.
Dec. 418, hams.
~he
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without express statement, the courts will hold that such

without express statement, the courts will hold that such
an ownership in common is created. 119

an ownership in common is created."®

Specified Part of Larger Mass. — Attention may be

called to the distinction between the need of separation

from a larger mass for purpose of identification and sep-

aration of already identified goods merely for the sake of

physical possession. In the latter case there is of course

no reason, from the point of view of identification, why

title should not pass. Thus in the case of a sale of a

stated number of tons of hay to be taken in a layer from

the top of a hay-mow, there is nothing indefinite about

the identification of the property sold. It is clearly

identified as the top layer of the mow to a depth of the

number of feet or inches required to weigh the stated

amount. Other things, such as an undertaking of the

seller to bale it, may raise a presumption that title was

not intended to pass, but the identification is sufficient to

constitute it a sale of specific property. So also, if one
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having on hand a quantity of barrels of mackerel sells

* ' all he has ' ' of grades ' ' numbers 1 , 2 and 3 ' ', the descrip-

tion is sufficiently definite to allow the usual presumption

of intent as to the passing of title of specific property

to apply.^^"

Goods Not in Existence. — Parties sometimes contract

for the sale of goods which may be specified, or merely

described, but which the seller does not then o^vn, or

which are not even in existence. In such case it is quite

obvious that no title can pass at the time the contract is

119 — Hall V. Boston, etc., R. R. Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply

Co., 14 Allen (Mass.) 439, 92 Am. Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523, hay.

Dec. 783. 50 bbls. of flour out of a 120-Ropes v. Lane, 9 Allen

(Mass.) 502; Lamprey v. Sargent,

larger number; Kingman v. Holm- ^g j^ ^ 241, sale of all the "hard"

quiet, 36 Kan. 735; Mertz v. Put- bricks from a certain mass of hard

nam, 117 Ind. 392; MacKellar v. and soft ones; Dunkart v. Rine-

Pillsbury, 48 Minn. 396; State v. heart, 89 N. C. 354, all of seller's

Wharton, 117 Wis. 558, lumber; trees of a stated girth.

Specified Part of Larger Mass.-Attention may be
called to the distinction between the need of separation
from a larger mass for purpose of identification and separation of already identified goods merely for the sake of
physical possession. In the latter case there is of course
no reason, from the point of view of identification, why
title should not pass. Thus in the case of a sale of a
stated number of tons of hay to be taken in a layer from
the top of a hay-mow, there is nothing indefinite about
the identification of the property sold. It is clearly
identified as the top layer of the mow to a depth of the
number of feet or inches required to weigh the stated
an1ount. Other things, such as an undertaking of the
seller to bale it, may raise a presumption that title was
not intended to pass, but the identification is sufficient to
constitute it a sale of specific property. So also, if one
having on hand a quantity of barrels of mackerel sells
"all he has" of grades "numbers 1, 2 and 3 ",the description is sufficiently definite to allow the usual presumption
of intent as to the passing of title of specific property
to apply. 120
Goods Not in Existence.-Parties sometimes contract
for the sale of goods which may be specified, or merely
described, but which the seller does not then own, or
which are not even in existence. In such case it is quite
obvious that no title can pass at the time the contract is
119-Hall v. Boston, etc., R. R.
Co., 14 Allen (Mass.) 439, 92 Am.
Dec. 783, 50 bbls. of flour out of a
larger number; Kingman v. Holm·
quist, 36 Kan. 735; Mertz v. Putnam, 117 Ind. 392; MacKellar v.
Pillsbury, 48 Minn. 396; State v.
Wharton, 117 Wis. 558, lumber;

Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply
Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523, hay.
120-Ropes v. Lane, 9 Allen
(Mass.) 502; Lamprey v. Sargent,
58 N. H. 241, sale of all the "hard"
bricks from a certain mass of hard
and soft ones; Dunkart v. Rine·
heart, 89 N. C. 354, all of seller's
trees of a stated girth.
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entered into. If the seller docs not own the goods, or

if there are no goods in existence to be owned, he has

nothing in the way of a title — there are no rights of

ownership belonging to him — to be transferred. The

transfer, if it is to be recognized at all by the courts,

can only occur at a time after the seller has acquired

an ownership by bringing the goods into existence, or

otherwise. ^^^

The same logic applies in the case where something

that had been in existence has gone out of objective exist-

ence at the time the agreement is made. There being

nothing in existence for ownership to apply to, there is

no ownership. If, for instance, one person sells to

another something which has passed out of existence,

the buyer is allowed to recover his money on the ground

that he received nothing from the seller.^^^*

Contracts to Sell. — Such an agreement, however, is

not wholly void. Persons can enter into an agreement to
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transfer ownership of anything which is capable of being

described. If such an agreement conforms to the legal

requisites of contracts generally, it will not be void

merely because the person agreeing to sell does not in

fact own the thing described, or because the thing is not

even in existence. Such a contract is valid and the par-

71

entered into. If the seller docs not own the goods, or
if there are no goods in existence to be owned, he has
nothing in the way of a title-there are no rights of
ownership belonging to hin1-to be transferred. The
transfer, if it is to be recognized at all by the courts,
can only occur at a time after the seller has acqYired
an ownership by bringing the goods into existence, or
otherwise. 121
The same logic applies in the case where something
that had been in existence has gone out of objective existence at the time the agreement is made. There being
nothing in existence for ownership to apply to, there is
no ownership. If, for instance, one person sells to
another something which has passed out of existence,
the buyer is allowed to recover his money on the ground
that he received nothing from the seller. 122 *

121 — Low V. Pew, 108 Mass. 347; nient. Sheriffs or other designat-

Gibson v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380; ed court officers, in making sale

Emerson v. European etc. R. R. of property of judgment creditors,

Co., 67 Me. 387, 24 Am. Rep. 39; if they act in accord with law, can

Taylor v. Barton-Child Co., 228 transfer ownership from the

Mass. 126, 117 N. E. 43. judgment debtor to the purchaser,

122 — Martin v. McCormick, 8 although they themselves have no

N. Y. 331; Allen v. Hammond, 11 title. As a matter of fact, how-

Peters (U. S.) 63; Gibson V. Pelkie, ever, such officers act as agents

37 Mich. 380. of the real owner and, hence, are

There is an apparent exception not really within the rule.

to the rule, that one who has no Persons acting in the capacity

title himself can not give one, in of agent for an owner can, of

the case of sales by order of court course, make legally effective

or in pursuance of legal enact- transfers of his ownership.

--Contracts to Sell.-Such an agreement) however, is
not wholly void. Persons can enter into an agreement to
transfer ownership of anything which is capable of being
described. If such an agreement conforms to the legal
requisites of contracts generally, it will not be void
merely because the person agreeing to sell does not in
fact own the thing described, or because the thing is not
even in existence. Such a contract is valid and the par-

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 7, (1), (2).

121-Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347;
Gibson v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380;
Emerson v. European etc. R. R.
Co., 67 Me. 387, 24 Am. Rep. 39;
Taylor v. Barton-Child Co., 228
Mass. 126, 117 N. E. 43.
122-Martin v. McCormick, 8
N. Y. 331; Allen v. Hammond, 11
Peters (U.S.) 63; Gibson v. Pelkie,
37 Mich. 380.
There is an apparent exception
to the rule, that one who has no
title himself can not give one, in
the case of sales by order of court
or in pursuance of legal enact*See Uniform Sales Act, Section

Di "ti

rnent. Sheriffs or other designated court officers, in making sale
of property of judgment creditors,
if they act in accord with law, can
transfer ownership from the
judgment debtor to the purchaser,
although they themselves have no
title. As a matter of fact, how·
ever, such officers act as agents
of the real owner and, hence, are
not really within the rule.
Persons acting in the capacity
of agent for an owner can, of
course, make legally effective
transfers of his ownership.
7, (1), (2).
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ties are liable for its breach as in any other contract.

Contracts of sale of wheat, as made on the various

exchanges, often before the wheat described is grown,

and sales of cotton not yet ready for the picking, are

very frequent instances of contracts to pass title to

something not even in existence at the time. These con-

tracts are universally upheld as valid.^^' Even if the

agreement is in form a present transfer, rather than a

contract to transfer title in the future, the courts mil

nevertheless give it effect as a contract to transfer when

possible.^^**

Acquisition of Goods. — The question then arises,

what is necessary to accomplish the transfer of title when

the seller does become owner and, hence, able to pass it?

If it is clear that the parties had in mind that it should

pass the moment the seller himself acquired it, there

ties are liable for its breach as in any other contract.
Contracts of sale of wheat, as made on the various
exchanges, often before the wheat described is grown,
and sales of cotton not yet ready for the picking, are
very frequent instances of contracts to pass title to
something not even in existence at the time. These contracts are universally upheld as valid. 123 Even if the
agreement is in form a present transfer, rather than a
contract to transfer title in the future, the courts will
nevertheless give it effect as a contract to transfer when
possible. 120

seems to be no reason why that intent should not be given

legal effect. There is very little authority on this par-
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ticular point. There is plenty of authority that it does

not in fact pass coincidently with the seller's becoming

able to pass it. But this practically all turns on the as-

sumption that the parties did not intend it to pass then.

It does not settle the question whether it could pass then

if they clearly so intended. The case of Low v. Pew^*^ is

treated by commentators as authority for the proposition

that title can not pass by virtue of the seller's mere ac-

quisition of it, even if the parties so desire. In that case

the facts were that the parties had entered into a contract

reading, ''We, John Low & Son, hereby sell, assign and

set over unto Alfred Low & Co. all the halibut that may

123— Hamil v. Flowers, 184 Ala. hurst, 127 Ga. 298; Forsythe Mfg.

301, 63 So. 994; Robinson v. Hirsch- Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199.

felder, 59 Ala. 503; Baker v. Leh- 124— Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich,

man, Weil & Co.; 186 Ala. 493, 65 347; Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347.

So. 321 ; Wright v. Vaughn, 137 Ga. 125-IO8 Mass. 347.

52, 72S. E. 412; Watson v. Hazel-

•8ee Uniform Sales Act, Section 5, (1), (2), (3), 76, "Future goods".

--Acquisition of Goods.-The question then arises,
what is necessary to accomplish the tran.3fer of title when
the seller does become owner and, hence, able to pass it~
If it is clear that the parties had in mind that it should
pass the moment the seller himself acquired it, there
seems to be no reason why that intent should not be given
legal effect. There is very little authority on this particular point. There is plenty of authority that it does
not in fact pass coincidently with the seller's becoming
able to pass it. But this practically all turns on the assumption that the parties did not intend it to pass then.
It does not settle the question whether it could pass then
if they clearly so intended. The case of Low v. Pew125 is
treated by commentators as authority for the proposition
that title cau not pass by virtue of the seller's mere acquisition of it, even if the parties so desire. In that case
the facts were that the parties had entered into a contract
reading, "We, John Low & Son, hereby sell, assign and
et over unto Alfred Low & Co. all the halibut that may
123-Hamil v. Flowers, 184 Ala.
hurst, 127 Ga. 298; Forsythe Mfg.
Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199.
301, 63 So. 994; Robinson v. Hirschfelder, 59 Ala. 503; Baker v. Leh124-Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich.
man, Weil & Co. ; 186 Ala. 493, 65
347; Low v. Pew,· 108 Mass. 347.
125-108 Mass. 347.
So. 321; Wright v. Vaughn, 137 Ga.
52, 72 S. E. 412; Watson v. Hazel*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 5, (1), (2), (3), 76, "Future goods".
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be caught by the master and crew of the schooner Flor-

ence Reed, on the voyage upon which she is about to pro-

ceed * * * at the rate of five cents and a quarter per

pound for flitchod halibut, to be delivered to said Alfred

Low & Co. as soon as said schooner arrived * * *."

The buyer paid $1,500 on account. Before the vessol got

back from her voyage the sellers had become bankrupt

and their assignee took possession of the schooner's cargo

when she did arrive. A large part of her cargo, however,

must have been caught before the bankruptcy. The buy-

ers brought an action of replevin on the ground that title

was in them. The court said that title could not have

passed when the contract was entered into because there

was then no title existing, and that if the contract were

to be valid at all it must be considered as an agreement

to pass title at a later date. The court then held simply

that title had not passed to the buyers. As it seems a

fair presumption from the form of the contract that the
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parties intended to pass title as soon as it should be pos-

sible, the interpretation of the decision is that such in-

tention mil not be given effect by the courts. It is often

said that there must be a fresh demonstration of intent

to pass title after the seller has become able, by acquisi-

tion, or manufacturer, to pass it.^^^

126 — In Mucklow v. Mangles, 1 held, had not passed. "A trades-

Taunt. 518, however, is given a man", said the court, "often fin-

very practical reason which indi- ishes goods, which he is making

Gates that the rule is based on in pursuance of an order given by

the seller's probable lack of intent one person, and sells them to an-

te pass title by merely manufac- other. If the first customer has

turing goods according to the con- other goods made for him within

tract. In this case the seller had the stipulated time, he has no

practically completed a boat right to complain; he could not

which accorded with the specifica- bring trover against the purchaser

tions of his contract of sale, had for the goods so sold. The paint-

received money from the buyer ing of the name on the stern in

on account of the work and had this case makes no difference."

even gone so far as to paint the Inasmuch as, in this particular

buyer's name upon the boat. case, the seller, who had become a

be caught by the master and crew of the schooner Florence Reed, on the voyage upon which he is about to proceed * * * at the rate of five c nts and a quarter per
pound for ft.itched halibut, to bo deliv red to said Alfred
Low & Co. as soon as said chooner arrived * * * ''
The buyer paid $1,500 on account. Before the vess&l got
back from her voyage the seller s had become bankrupt
and their assignee took possession of the schooner's cargo
when she did arrive. A large part of her cargo, however,
must have been caught before the bankruptcy. The buyers brought an action of replevin on the ground that title
was in them. The court said that title could not have
passed when the contract was entered into because there
was then no title existing, and that if the contract were
to be valid at all it must be considered as an agreement
to pass title at a later date. The court then held sin1ply
that title had not passed to the buyers. As it seems a
\fair presumption fron1 the form of the contract that the
parties intended to pass title as soon as it should be possible, the interpret ation of the decision is that such intention v.rill not be given effect by the courts. It is often
said that there must be a fresh de1nonstration of intent
to pass title after the seller has become able, by acquisition, or manufacturer, to pass it. 126

Nevertheless the title, so the court bankrupt, could not have built an-

126-ln Mucklow Y. Mangles, 1
Taunt. 518, however, is given a
very practical reason which indicates that the rule is based on
the seller's probable lack of intent
to pass title by merely manufacturing goods according to the contract. In this case the seller had
practically completed a boat
which accorded with the specifications of his contract of sale, had
received money from the buyer
on account of the work and had
even gone so far as to paint the
buyer's name upon the boat.
Nevertheless the title, so the court
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held, had not passed. "A tradesman", said the court, "often finishes goods, which he is making
in pursuance of an order given by
one person, and sells them to another. If the first customer has
other goods :i;nade for him within
the stipulated time, he has no
right to complain; he could not
bring trover against the purchaser
for the goods so sold. The painting of the name on the stern in
this case makes no difference."
Inasmuch as, in this particular
case, the seller, who had become a
bankrupt, could not have built an-
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But, at any rate, whether it be because title can not be

passed by the seller's mere acquisition of it, even though

the parties so intend, or because it will not be assumed

that the parties did so intend, the overwhelming weight

of authority is that title does not pass merely as a result

of the seller's acquisition of the property. The reason

is not at all clear, but the rule is settled."''

other boat lor the buyer, the rea-

But, at any rate, whether it be because title can not be
passed by the seller's mere acquisition of it, even though
the parties so intend, or because it will not be assumed
that the parties did so intend, the overwhelming weight
of authority is that title does not pass merely as a result
of the seller's acquisition of the property. The reason
is not at all clear, but the rule is settled. 127

soning seems to be a statement of

general principle.

The whole matter of reason is

complicated by the fact that as

'between the parties themselves,

the legal result of the agreement

is sometimes the same as though

title had passed upon mere manu-

facture or acquisition. The rights

other boat for the buyer, the reasoning seems to be a statement of
general principle.
The whole matter of reason is
complicated by the fact that as
between the

parties

themselves,
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which the buyer acquires, as be-

tween him and the seller, are the

same as those of legal ownership,

but the courts say the buyer has

those rights not because he is

really owner in the eyes of the

law, but because the seller, who is

still the legal owner, will not be

permitted to deny or object to the

buyer's pretense of ownership.

Thus in Littlefield v. Perry, 21

Wall. (U. S.) 205, 226, it appeared

that Littlefield had transferred to

Perry the ownership of the patent

monopoly of a certain invention

together with all the "improve-

ments" which he should make in

respect to the invention. The title

to a monopoly of these improve-

ments could not pass at time of

the agreement because they were

not in existence. Later Littlefield

did make "improvements" and be-

gan using them himself. Perry

♦ sued him, for infringement, on the

allegation that he, Perry, owned

the monopoly of them. Littlefield

defended on the ground that Perry

was not owner and therefore

could not sue as such. The court

admitted that the legal title was

still in Littlefield but allowed the

suit to continue nevertheless, say-

ing, "Littlefield took the legal title

in trust for them (Perry) and

should convey. Courts of equity

in proper cases consider that as

done which should be. If there

exists an obligation to convey at

once, such courts will sometimes

proceed as if it had actually been

made." This case, like Low v. Pew,

indicates that although the parties

the legal result of the a greement
is sometimes the same as though
title had passed upon mere manufacture or acquisition. The rights
which the buyer acquires, as between him and the seller, are the
same as those of legal ownership,
but the courts say the buyer has
those rights not because he is
really owner in the eyes of the
law, but because the seller, who is
still the legal owner, will not be
permitted to deny or object to the
buyer's pretense of ownership.
Thus in Littlefield v. Perry, 21
Wall. (U. S.) 205, 226, it appeared
that Littlefield had transferred to
Perry the ownership of the patent
mono poly of a certain invention
togethe r with all the "improvements" which he should make in
respect to the invention. The title
to a monopoly of these improvements could not pass at time of
the a gr eem ent because the y were
not in exist e nce. Later Littlefield
did make "imp rovem ents" and b egan using th em himself. Perry
sued him, f or in fringement, on the
all egation tha t h e, Perr y, owned
the mon opoly of them. Littlefi eld
defended on the ground tha t Perry
was not owner and therefore

could not sue as such. The court
admitted that the legal title was
still in Littlefield but allowed the
suit to continue nevertheless, saying, "Littlefield took the legal title
in trust for them (Perry) and
should convey. Courts of equity
in proper cases consider that as
done which should be. If there
exists an obligation to convey at
once, such courts will sometimes
proceed as if it had actually been
made." This case, like Low v. Pew,
indicates that although the parties
really intended that title should
pass on its a cquisition by the
seller, yet it could not l egally do
so. Curran v. Burdsall, 20 Fed.
835; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.
(Mass.) 307; Clark v. Slaughter,
34 Miss. 65; Hickman v. Dill, 39
Mo. Ap. 246; Sherman v. Champlain Transportation Co., 31 Vt.
162; Harvey v. Harvey, 13 R. I.
598; Thrall v. Hill, 110 Mass. 328.
Even this right of the buyer,
through estoppel of the seller to
deny it, does not exist if the seller
has not even by implication warranted his title.
127-In Wheeler's Exrs. v.
Wheeler, 59 Ky. 474, 74 Am. Dec.
421, the plaintiff, who was a son
of the deceased t estator, sought to
compel his father's executors to
distribute to him the property to
which h e was entitled by the will.
The E xecutors answered that it
was claimed by one X who had

really intended that title should

pass on its acquisition by the

Di 1tize by

seller, yet it could not legally do
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so. Curran v. Burdsall, 20 Fed.

835; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.

(Mass.) 307; Clark v. Slaughter,

34 Miss. 65; Hickman v. Dill, 39

Mo. Ap. 246; Sherman v. Cham-
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Manufacture. — Neither, for one reason or another,

will title be held to have passed because of mere manufac-

ture of goods according to the contract by the seller."'

75

--Manufacture.-N either, for one reason or another,
will title be held to have passed because of mer e manufacture of goods according to the contract by the seller. 128

bought it from young Wheeler be-

fore the father's death, though

after the will had been made. The

plaintiff did not deny that he had

made an agreement whereby he

had "sold all my individual inter-

est of all the personal property

now in the possession of my said

father." The court, however, held

that nothing could be sold which

the seller did not own and the

buyer in this case had acquired

no title to anything by his pur-

chase.
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Again, in Welter v. Hill, 65

Minn. 273, it appeared that X had

made what purported to be a pres-

ent sale to plaintiff of flax which

X expected to grow upon a partic-

ular field, but for which the seed

had not even been sown at the

time. When the crop had been

raised as agreed, it was seized by

a creditor of the seller, X. The

plaintiff, as buyer, claimed title

in himself but the court rejected

the contention, saying, "When did

the title to the property pass? It

did not pass when the bill of sale

was made, because it was not then

in existence." As nothing subse-

quent had been done to pass it, it

had not passed when the creditor's

levy was made.

McCall V. Hampton, 98 Ky. 166,

56 Am. St. 335; Elliott v. Leslie,

124 Ky. 553, 124 Am. St. 418; Skip-

per V. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am.

Dec. 646; Herbert v. Bronson, 125

Mass. 475 (future wages) ; Farm-

er's National Bk. v. Coyner, 44

Ind. Ap. 335 dictum; Gile v. La

Salle, 89 Ore. 107, 171 Pac. 741.

In Wheeler v. Becker, 68 la.

723, 28 N. W. 40, however, a mort-

gagee of property not in existence

at the time was allowed to bring

an action of replevin against at-

taching creditors, on the ground

that the mortgage took effect

when the property came into the

seller's ownership. Accord, Morris

v. Hix, 74 la. 526, 38 N. W. 395;

approved, though not in point, Mc-

Master v. Emerson, 109 la. 284, 80

N. W. 389; In Maskelinski v. Wazi-

nenski, 20 N. Y. Supp. 533, the

buyer of property not owned by

bought it from young Wheeler before the father's death, though
after the will had been made. The
plaintiff did not deny that he had
made an agreement whereby he
had "sold all my individual interest of all the personal property
now in the possession of my said
father." The court, however, held
tha t nothing could be sold which
the seller did not own and the
buyer in this case had acquired
no title to anything by his purchase.
Again, in Welter v. Hill, 65
Minn. 273, it appeared that X had
made what purported to be a prese nt sale to plaintiff of flax which
X expected to grow upon a particular field, but for which the seed
ha d not even been sown at the
time. When the crop had been
raised as agreed, it was seized by
a creditor of the seller, X. The
plaintiff, as buyer, claimed title
in himself but the court rejected
the contention, saying, "When did
the title to the property pass? It
did not pass when the bill of sale
was ma de, because it was not t hen
in existence." As nothing subsequent had been done to pas s it, it
had not passed when the creditor's
levy was made.
McCall v . Ham pton, 98 Ky. 166,
56 Am. St. 335; Elliott v. Leslie,
124 Ky. 553, 124 Am. St. 418 ; Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am.
Dec. 646; Herbert v. Bronson, 125
Mass. 475 (future wages); Farmer's National Bk. v. Coyner, 44
Ind. Ap. 335 cLict u 11i ; Gile v. La
Salle, 89 Ore. 107, 171 Pac. 741.
In Wheeler v. Becker, 68 la.

723, 28 N. W. 40, however, a mortgagee of property not in existence
at the time was allowed to bring
an action of replevin against attaching creditors, on the ground
that the mortgage took effect
when the property came into the
seller 's own ership. Accord, Morris
v. Hix, 74 Ia. 526, 38 N. W. 395 ;
approved, though not in point, McMaster v. Emerson, 109 Ia. 284, 80
N. W. 389; In Maskelinski v. Wazinenski, 20 N. Y. Supp. 533, the
buyer of property not owned by
the seller was allowed to set up
title to the property as against
the selle r, when the latter did acquire it, without any other pretense of title's having been transferred . This was put upon the
ground that title had passed, or
at any rate the seller had waived
his right to deny it.
128-Fordice v. Gibson, 129 Ind.
7, "No title passes until the thing
is completely done and notice given to the vendee, or some a ct done
by the vendor designating it as
the article sold, either by setting
it apar t , marking it or some other
similar act." Robbins v. Chipman,
1 Utah 335 di ctum; Heiser v.
Mears, 120 N. C. 443 dictum,; Updike v. Henry, 14 Ill. 378; ·west
Jersey R. R. Co. v. T renton Ca r
Works, 32 N. J. L. 517, e ven
though payment be made in advance; Edwards v. Elliott, 36 N. J.
L. 449, payment for vessel in installments; First Natl. Bk. of Marquette v. Crowley, 24 Mich. 492;
Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Capital City Ins. Co. , 81 Ala. 320, 60
Am. Rep. 162; Rev. Cutter #2, Fed.
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When the goods contracted to be sold are the entire
output of a factory it does seem that their manufacture
indicates an intent to pass the title to them under the contract more certainly than in cases where the manufacturer
could dispose of the particular thing manufactured and
then make another one to satisfy his contract with the
buyer. In Williams v. Chapman, 129 the seller had contracted to sell the entire output of his mill for a certain
time and the court held, without any discussion of the
matter, that title passed to the goods produced during
that time as soon as they were completed. On the other
hand, in Gabarron v. Kreeft, 130 the seller had contracted
to sell all the ore produced by a certain mine. Payment
had been made in advance for the particular cargo of ore
in question. The court held, again without discussion, that
the title did not pass when the ore was produced. This
very conflict, however, indicates that in such cases at
least the title can pass on acquisition, or manufacture,
if the parties do in fact so intend.

76 THE LAW OF SALES

When the goods contracted to be sold are the entire

output of a factory it does seem that their manufacture

indicates an intent to pass the title to them under the con-

tract more certainly than in cases where the manufacturer

could dispose of the particular thing manufactured and

then make another one to satisfy his contract with the

buyer. In Williams v. Chapman/^® the seller had con-

tracted to sell the entire output of his mill for a certain

time and the court held, without any discussion of the

matter, that title passed to the goods produced during

that time as soon as they were completed. On the other

hand, in Gabarron v. Kreeft,^^** the seller had contracted

to sell all the ore produced by a certain mine. Payment

had been made in advance for the particular cargo of ore

in question. The court held, again without discussion, that

the title did not pass when the ore was produced. This

very conflict, however, indicates that in such cases at

least the title can pass on acquisition, or manufacture,
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if the parties do in fact so intend.

Payment During Course of Manufacture. — Another

field of conflict is the question whether, when goods to

be manufactured are to be paid for in instalments, such

payment effectuates a passing of title to so much of the

goods, or of the particular chattel, as has been manu-

factured at the time. A much cited authority on this

point is Woods v. Russell.^^^ In this case it appeared that

one Paton had contracted to build a ship for defendant,

who was to pay in instalments at certain points of

progress. After three payments had been made and

before the ship was finished a question of title arose.

There was very clear evidence, other than the mere pay-

ments, that the builder had intended to pass title to so

--Payment During Course of Manufacture.-Another
field of conflict is the question whether, when goods to
be manufactured are to be paid for in instalments, such
payment effectuates a passing of title to so much of the
goods, or of the particular chattel, as has been manufactured at the time. A much cited authority on this
point is Woods v. Russell. 131 In this case it appeared that
one Paton had contracted to build a ship for defendant,
who was to pay in instalments at certain points of
progress. After three payments had been made and
befor the ship was finished a question of title arose.
There was very clear evidence, other than the mere payments, that the builder had intended to pass title to so
much as was done at the time and the court accordingly

much as was done at the time and the court accordingly

Cas. JJ111714; Gabarron v. Kreeft, 129—118 N. C. 943.

L. R. 10 Exch. 274, all ore to be 130 L. R. 10 Exch. 274.

produced during certain time; ^^^_^ ^^^^ ^ ^,^ 9^2.

Haynes v. Quay, 134 Mich. 229.

Cas. #111714; Gabarron v. Kreeft,
L. R. 10 Exch. 274, all ore to be
produced during certain time;
Haynes v. Quay, 134 Mich. 229.
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129-118 N. C. 943.
130-L. R. 10 Exch. 274.
131-5 Barn. & Ald. 942.
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held that title had passed. But the court said also, in

regard to the payments, "The payment of these instal-

ments appears to us to appropriate specihcally to the

defendant the very ship in progress, and to vest in the

defendant a property in that ship, and that, as between

him and the builder, he is entitled to insist upon the

completion of that very ship, and that the builder is not

entitled to require him to accept any other."

The holding that title to so much as is done passes as

it comes into existence, and, consequently, that title to

the goods is in the buyer at the time of completion is

nevertheless only a legal presumption from the circum-

stances. The fact that title is thus held to have passed

when work is paid for m instalments and not to have

passed in cases where there is no partial payment, is

not due to any peculiar legal effect of part payment, but

to the belief of some courts, particularly those of Eng-

land, that paym^ent and its acceptance indicates a real
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intent that so much of the work as has been done shall

belong to the buyer.

This is clearly indicated in Wood v. Bell.^^^ One Joyce

had agreed to build for plaintiff a ship of a certain

description, for which plaintiff w^as to make payment in

instalments at various times, regardless of the actual

stage of completion of the work. Before the ship was

completed, or in any way expressly indicated as belong-

ing to plaintiff, Joyce became bankrupt and the question

of title arose. The court said, ''The property does not

pass merely by its being manufactured, but only when

it- is the intention of the parties that it shall pass." It

held that title was in the plaintiff, not because the work

was to be paid for in instalments, nor because the ship

was of a peculiar construction particularly required by

plaintiff, nor because plaintiff's name had been punched

in the keel, but because all the circumstances of the

132—5 El. & Bl. 772, 119 Eng.

Rep. 669, Affd. 6 El. & Bl. 355, 119

Eng. Rep. 897.
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held that title had passed. But the court said al o, in
regard to the payments, ''The payment of those instalments appears to us to appropriate specifically to the
defendant the very ship in pr gr s , and to vest in the
defendant a property in that ship, and that, as between
him and the builder, he is entitled to insi t upo:q. the
completion of that very ship, and that the builder is not
entitled to require him to accept any other.''
The holding that title to so much as is done passes as
it comes into existence, and, consequently, that title to
the goods is in the buyer at the time of completion is
nevertheless only a legal presumption from the circumstances. The fact that title is thus held to have passed
when work is paid for irr instalments and not to have
passed in cases where there is no partial payment, is
not due to any peculiar legal effect of part payment, but
to the belief of some courts, particularly those of England, that payment and its acceptance indicates a real
intent that so much of the work as has been done shall
belong to the buyer.
This is clearly indicated in Wood v. Bell. 132 One Joyce
had agreed to build for plaintiff a ship of a certain
description, for which plaintiff was to make payment in
instalments at various times, regardless of the actual
stage of completion of the work. Before the ship was
completed, or in any way expressly indicated as belonging to plaintiff, Joyce became bankrupt and the question
of title arose. The court said, ''The property does not
pass merely by its being manufactured,- but only when
it· is the intention of the parties that it shall pass.'' It
held that title was in the plaintiff, not because the work
was to be paid for in instalments, nor because the ship
was of a peculiar construction particularly required by
plaintiff, nor because plaintiff's name had been punched
in the keel, but because all the circumstances of the
132-5 EL & Bl. 772, 119 Eng.
Rep. 669, Affd. 6 EL & BL 355, 119
Eng. Rep. 897.
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transaction, as a whole, indicated that such had been the

intent of the parties. ^^^

In America the fact that work is to be paid for in

installments as it progresses, or that it is under the super-

vision of the seller, or other like circumstances, is not,

as a general rule, held to indicate any intent to pass title

as the work is completed. In Clarkson v. Stevens,^^* the

Supreme Court decided that title to a certain vessel to be

manufactured for the United States government had

not passed to the government on completion. In reach-

ing this conclusion the court said, "The courts of this

country have not adopted any arbitrary rule of construc-

tion as controlling such agreements, but consider the

question of intent, open in every case, to be determined

upon the terms of the contract, and the circumstances

attending the transaction. And such seems to us to be

the true principle. According, we are of opinion, that

the fact that advances were made out of the purchase
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money, according to the contract, for the cost of the work

as it progressed, and that the government was authorized

to require the presence of an agent to join in certifying

to the accounts, are not conclusive evidence of an intent

that the property in the ship should vest in the United

States prior to final delivery. ' '^^^

133— Moody V. Brown, 34 Me. L. 449 ; Re Revenue Cutter ft2, Fed.

107; Butterworth v. McKinley, 11 Cas. $11714; The Poconoket, 67

Humph. (Tenn.) 206; Sandford v. Fed. 265; The Yukon River Co. v.

Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 522; Grotto, 136 Cal. 538; Andrews v.

Scudden v. Calais Steamboat Co., Durant, 11 N. Y. 35.

1 Cliff. 370; Clark v. Spence, 4 Ad. In the case of The John B.

& E. 448; Carruthers v. Paine, 5 Ketcham, 97 Fed. 872, the court,

Bing. 270; Laidler v. Burlinson, 2 while admitting that intention

M. & W. 602. would govern, held that the parties

,„. ,n/. TT o rnr ^^.d uo intentiou to pass title at

1^4 — lUb U. b. oOo. ,, 4. « • i ,, J.

the payment of installments even

135 — Williams v. Jackman, 16 though engines belonging to the

Gray (Mass.) 514, even though an buyer had been worked into the

transaction, as a whole, indicated that such had been the
intent of the parties.133
In America the fact that work is to be paid for in
installments as it p rogresses, or that it is under the supervision of the seller, or other like circumstances, is not,
as a general rule, held to indicate any intent to pass title
as the work is completed. In Clarkson v. Stevens,134 the
Supreme Court decided that title to a certain vessel to be
manufactured for the United States government had
not passed to the government on completion. In reaching this conclusion the court said, ''The courts of this
country have not adopted any arbitrary rule of construction as controlling such agreements, but consider the
question of intent, open in every case, to be determined
upon the t erms of the contract, and the circumstances
attending the transaction. And such seems to us to be
the true principle. According, we are of opinion, that
the fact that advances were made out of the purchase
money, according to the contract, for the cost of the work
as it progressed, and that the government was authorized
to require the presence of an agent to join in certifying
to the accounts, are not conclusive evidence of an intent
that the prop~rty in the ship should vest in the United
States prior to final delivery.' 1185

agent of the buyer had been per- ship. For the manufacturer to In-

mitted to supervise the construe- corporate property of the buyer

tion; Edwards v. Elliott, 36 N. J. in something which fits the de-

133-Moody v. Brown, 34 Me .
107 ; Butterworth v. McKinley, 11
Hum ph. (Tenn.) 206; Sandford v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 522;
Scudden v. Calais Steamboat Co.,
1 Cliff. ;) 70; Clark v. Spence, 4 Ad.
& E . 448 ; Carruthers v. Paine, 5
Bing. 270; Laidler v. Burlinson, 2
M. & W. 602.
134-106

u. s. 505.

135-Williams v. Jackman, 16
Gray (Mass.) 514, even though an
agent of the buyer bad been permitted t o supervise the construction; E dwards v. E lliott, 36 N. J .
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L. 449; Re Revenue Cutter #2, Fed.
Cas. #11714; The Poconoket, 67
Fed. 265; The Yukon River Co. v.
Grotto, 136 Cal. 538; Andrews v.
Durant, 11 N. Y. 35.
In the case of The John B.
Ketcham, 97 Fed. 872, the court,
while admitting that intention
would govern, held that the parties
had no intention to pass title at
the payment of installments even
though engines belonging to the
buyer h a d b een wor ked into the
ship. For the manufacturer to in·
corporat e property of the buyer
in something which fits the de-
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-Rule in Equity.-The rule that ownership will not
be treated as having passed unless there is something
more to show intent than mere manufacture or acquisition, is not altogether adhered to by courts of equity. It
is frequently held that whatever powers or privileges the
parties intended should eventually pass to the buyer will
be given effect by courts of equity, even as against third
persons who have secured intervening rights, as soon
as they are capable of passing. In Kribbs v. Alford 136
plaintiff was the mortgagee of certain property already
owned by the mortgagor and of other described property to be acquired. This latter property was subsequently acquired by the mortgagor, but before any
further demonstration of intent to pass an interest in
it to the mortgagee was made, the mortgagor sold it
to the defendants, who took possession. These purchasers did not actually know of the mortgage, but were
held to have had constructive notice of it because it had
been recorded. The court held the plaintiff's interest
to be paramount to that of the defendants. It admitted
that the plaintiff's claim would be invalid at law, but
said, ''Invalidity at law imports nothing more than that
a mortgage of property thereafter to be acquired is ineffectual as a grant to pass the legal title. A court of
equity, in giving effect to such a provision, does not put
itself in conflict with that principle. It does not hold
that a conveyance of that which does not exist operates
as a present transfer in equity, any more than it does in
law. But it construes the instrument as operating by
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Rule in Equity. — The rule that ownership will not
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more to show intent than mere manufacture or acquisi-
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parties intended should eventually pass to the buyer will
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plaintiff was the mortgagee of certain property already

owned by the mortgagor and of other described prop-
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further demonstration of intent to pass an interest in
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been recorded. The court held the plaintiff's interest

to be paramount to that of the defendants. It admitted

that the plaintiff's claim would be invalid at law, but

said, ' ' Invalidity at law imports nothing more than that

a mortgage of property thereafter to be acquired is inef-

fectual as a grant to pass the legal title. A court of

equity, in giving effect to such a provision, does not put

itself in conflict with that principle. It does not hold

that a conveyance of that which does not exist operates

as a present transfer in equity, any more than it does in

law. But it construes the instrument as operating by

scription in the contract of sale contract has been pointed out,

seems clearly to indicate that he price ascertained, etc., title will be

intends, at least, that the contract presumed to have passed regard-

shall apply to that particular prop- less of delivery. In Re McDonald,

erty. The holding of the court, 138 Fed. 666, title to uncompleted

that despite this fact he did not ships was held to have passed be-

intend title to pass, is quite out of cause the parties had expressed

harmony with the general prin- an intent that it should.

ciple already pointed out that 135 120 N. Y. 519.

when the property subject to the

scription in the contract of sale
seems clearly to indicate that he
intends, at least, that the contract
shall apply to that particular property. The holding of the court,
that despite this fact he did not
intend title to pass, is quite out of
harmony with the general principle already pointed out that
when the property subject to the
Digitize- by
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contract has been pointed out,
price ascertained, etc., title will be
presumed to have passed regardless of delivery. In Re McDonald,
138 Fed. 666, title to uncompleted
ships was held to have passed because the parties had expressed
an intent t!:J.at it should.
136-120 N. Y. 519.
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way of present contract to give a lien, which as between

the parties takes effect and attaches to the subject of it

as soon as it comes into the ownership of the party.

Such we deem the rule to be in equity in this state."

The principle behind such holdings is expressed as being

that, ' ' Equity treats a mortgage of property to be after-

ward acquired as a contract, binding in conscience, to

execute a mortgage upon it at the very instant it comes

into being, and will enforce specific performance. It

does more : It considers it as already done if no specific

performance be requested; and then, by virtue of the

equitable doctrine of notice, binds everybody to respect

the equitable lien who knows of it, or, without knowing

of it, has got the property without valuable considera-

tion.""?

Many courts have held, however, that even in equity a

buyer gets no rights in the property itself by a mere sale

of property to be acquired in the future."^
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But even of these cases a number hold that if posses-

sion is actually taken it will be treated as a transfer as

of the date of the mortgage, so far as concerns prefer-

ences under bankruptcy and insolvency acts."^

Potential Interests.— Sales of "potential interests*'

do not fall within the foregoing discussion. They are

137— From Little Rock, etc. Lighting Co. v. Rust, 117 Ala. 680;

R. R. Co. V. Page, 35 Ark. 304. Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 117; Butt

Accd. Phillips v. Winslow, 18 B. v. Ellett, 19 Wall. 544.

Monroe (Ky.) 431, 68 Am. Dec. The subject is discussed at

729; Pierce v. Milwaukee, etc. length in 19 Harvard L. R. 557.

R. R., 24 Wis. 551, 1 Am. Rep. 203; 138— Gittings v. Nelson, 86 III.

Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458, 96 591; Redd v. Burrus, 58 Ga. 574;

Am. Dec. 486; Apperson v. Moore, Mchts. Bk. v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis,

30 Ark. 56, 21 Am. Rep. 170; Hurst 601; Chase v. Denny, i;;o Mass.

& McWhorter v. Bell & Co., 72 566; Orcutt v. Moore, IM Mass.

Ala. 336; Grant v. Steiner, 65 Ala. 48; Cooke v. Blanchard, 144 Mass.

way of present contract to give a lien, which as between
the parties takes effect and attaches to the subject of it
as soon as it comes into the ownership of the party.
Such we deem the rule to be in equity in this state."
The principle behind such holdings is expressed as being
that, ''Equity treats a mortgage of property to be afterward acquired as a contract, binding in conscience, to
execute a mortgage upon it at the very instant it comes
into being, and will enforce specific performance. It
does more: It considers it as already done if no specific
performance be requested; and then, by virtue of the
equitable doctrine of notice, binds everybody to respect
the equitable lien who knows of it, or, without knowing
of it, has got the property without valuable consideration.' '1s7
Many courts have held, however, that even in equity a
buyer gets no rights in the property itself by a mere sale
of property to be acquired in the future. 138
But even of these cases a number hold that if possession is actually taken it will be treated as a transfer as
of the date of the mortgage, so far as concerns preferences under bankruptcy and insolvency acts. 139

499; Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. of 207.

L. Cas. 191, the leading English 139— Chase v. Denny, 130 Mass.

case. But, contra, Burns v. 566; Mower v. McCarty, 79 Vt. 142,

Campbell, 71 Ala. 271, 288; Elec. 7 L. R. A. (n. s.) 418, annotated.

Potential lnterests.-Sales of "potential interests"
do not fall within the foregoing discussion. They are
137-From . Little Rock,_ etc.
R. R. Co. v. Page, 35 Ark. 304.
Aced. Phillips v. Winslow, 18 B.
Monroe (Ky.) 431, 68 Am. Dec.
729; Pierce v. Milwaukee, etc.
R. R., 24 Wis. 551, 1 Am. Rep. 203;
Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458, 96
Am. Dec. 486; Apperson v. Moore,
30 Ark. 56, 21 Am. Rep. 170 ; Hurst
& McWhorter v. Bell & Co., 72
Ala. 336; Grant v. Steiner, 65 Ala.
499; Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. of
L . Cas. 191, the leading English
case.
But, contra, Burns v.
Campbell, 71 Ala. 271, 288; Elec.
D1 1t1z
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Lighting Co. v. Rust, 117 Ala. 680:
Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 117; Butt
v. Ellett, 19 Wall. 544.
The subject is discussed at
length in 19 Harvard L. R. 557.
138-Gittings v. Nelson, 86 Ill.
591; Redd v. Burrus, 58 Ga. 574;
Mchts. Bk. v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis.
601; Chase v. Denny, 130 Mass.
566; Orcutt v. Moore, 134 Mass.
48; Cooke v. Blanchard, 144 Mass.
207.
139-Chase v. Denny, 130 Mass.
566; Mower v. McCarty, 79 Vt. 142,
7 L. R. A. (n. s.) 418, annotated.
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treated by both equity and law courts either as though

the *' potential interest" were a thing capable of sale

and in actual existence at the date of the contract, or

as though acquisition of ownership alone passed the title.

There is no inherent or practical reason for this distinc-

tion. The ''potentiality" may have a separate existence

metaphysically, but it can not be so distinguished really.

The practical reasons that might apply in the preceding

cases would apply also to cases of sales of a potentiality.

Nevertheless, the legal distinction does exist.

In those cases where the thing sold is the future

natural increase or natural production of something

already owned by the seller it is generally held that a

present demonstration of intent to transfer ownership

will be recognized by the courts as having transferred

it when the thing does come into existence, without any

further demonstration of intent. As was just pointed

out, a buyer of something not in existence at the time of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

sale, to whom there has been no subsequent transfer,

has no legal rights against a third person who acquired

an ownership after the thing came into existence. But

where the thing sold is to come into existence as the

natural increase or product of something already o"s\Tied

by the seller, such a buyer's rights are treated as

superior to those of another who purchased after the

thing came into existence.

For instance, in one case^*° it appeared that Rogers

had allowed his stallion to cover Buler's mare, on Buler's

agreement that the resulting colt should be the property

of Blevins. Nothing was done thereafter to effectuate

or demonstrate a transfer. When the colt was born,

Buler, in breach of his agreement, sold it to McCarty.

Blevins, however, was allowed to recover it in replevin

on the ground that he had title. This holding differs

140 — McCarty v. Blevins, 5

Yerger (Tenn.) 195, 26 Am. Dec.

262,
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treated by both equity and law courts either as though
the "potential interest" were a thing capable of sale
and in actual existence at the date of the contract, or
as _though acquisition of ownership alone passed the title.
There is no inherent or practical reason for this distinction. The "potentiality" may have a separate exisU:mce
metaphysically, but it can not be so distinguished really.
The practical reasons that might apply in the preceding
cases would apply also to cases of sales of a potentiality.
Nevertheless, the legal distinction does exist.
In those cases where the thing sold is the future
natural increase or natural production of something
already ovvned by the seller it is generally held that a
present demonstration of intent to transfer ownership
will be recognized by the courts as having transferred
it when the thing does come into existence, without any
further demonstration of intent. As was just pointed
out, a buyer of something not in existence at the time of
sale, to whom there has been no subsequent transfer,
has no legal rights against a third person who acquired
an ownership after the thing came into existence. But
where the thing sold is to come into existence as the
natiiral increase or product of something already owned
by the seller, such a buyer's rights are treated as
superior to those of another who purchased after the
thing came into existence.
For instance, in one case 140 it appeared that Rogers
had allowed his stallion to cover Euler's mare, on Euler's
agreernent that the resulting colt should be the property
of Blevins. Nothing was done thereafter to effectuate
or demonstrate a transfer. When the colt was born,
Buler, in breach of his agreement, sold it to :McCarty.
Blevins, however, was allowed to recover it in replevin
on the ground that he had title. This holding differs
140-McCarty v. Blevins, 5
Yerger (Tenn.) 195, 26 Am. Dec.
262.
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from the customary ones, which support the third par-

ties' rights as against one who had bought before the

chattel was in existence, because of the fact that the colt

was ' * potentiallj'' " in existence at the time of the agree-

ment.^*^

It does not appear with certainty from the cases, and

does not particularly matter, whether the title to the

potentiality is considered as passing, so that the colt, or

the crop, or whatever the thing may be, belongs to the

buyer as the product of the potentiality of which he had

already become owner, or whether the courts simply make

such sales an exception to the general rule and hold that

title to the colt, etc., transfers to the buyer when it comes

into existence because of the previous agreement that it

should do so and without any concurrent act. The result

is the same on either theory.

Some cases support the former theory and indicate

that the *' potentiality" is something capable of an own-
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ership separate and apart from the ow^iership of the

thing of which it is physically an indivisible part. Thus,

one person may be o^vner of a mare and another owner

of her reproductive power, although the two things can

not be physically separated. In Fonville v. Casey ^*^

defendant had contracted that the first female colt to

be born from his mare should belong to plaintiff. When

a female colt was born defendant refused to let plaintiff

have her. The court permitted plaintiff to recover in

trover as owner of the colt. The reason given was that

*' although it be uncertain whether the thing granted

will ever exist, and it consequently can not be actually

in the grantor, or certain, yet it is in him potentially, as

141 — Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70 Me. Mitchell v. Abernathy, 194 Ala.

254, 25 Am. Rep. 323; Watkins v. 698, L. R. A. 1917 C 6; Nestell v.

Wyati, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 250, 40 Am. Hewitt, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 282,

Rep. 90; Booker v. Jones Admx., crop from roots already in ground.

55 Ala. 266; Fonville v. Casey, 1 142—1 Murphey (N. C.) 389, 4

Murphey (N. C.) 389, 4 Am. Dec. Am. Dec. 559.

559; Hull V. Hull, 48 Conn. 250;

from the customary ones, which support the third parties' rights as against one who had bought before the
chattel was in existence, because of the fact that the colt
was "potentially" in existence at the time of the agreement.141
It does not appear with certainty from the cases, and
does not particularly matter, whether the title to the
potentiality is considered as passing, so that the colt, or
the crop, or whatever the thing may be, belongs to the
buyer as the product of the potentiality of which he had
already become owner, or whether the courts siinply make
such sales an exception to the general rule and hold that
title to the colt, etc., transfers to the buyer when it comes
into existence because of the previous agreement that it
should do so and without any concurrent act. The result
is the same on either theory.
Some cases support the former theory and indicate
that the "potentiality" is something capable of an ownership separate and apart from the ownership of the
thing of which it is physically an indivisible part. Thus,
one person may be owner of a mare and another owner
of her reproductive power, although the two things can
not be physically separated. In Fonville v. Casey 142
defendant had contracted that the first female colt to
be born from his mare should belong to plaintiff. When
a female colt was born defendant refused to let plaintiff
have her. The court permitted plaintiff to recover in
trover as owner of the colt. The reason given was that
"although it be uncertain whether the thing granted
will ever exist, and it consequently can not be actually
in the grantor, or certain, yet it is in him potentially, as
141-Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70 Me.
254, 25 Am. Rep . 323; Watkins v.
Wyati, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 250, 40 Am .
Rep. 90; Book r v. Jones Ad mx.,
55 Ala. 266; Fonvme v. Casey, ~
Murphey (N. .) 389, 4 Am. Dec.
G5!'J; Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250;
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Mitchell v. Abernathy, 194 Ala.
698, L. R. A. 1917 C 6; Nestell v.
Hewitt, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 282,
crop from roots al ready in ground.
142-1 Murphey (N. C.) 389, 4
Am. Dec. 559.
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being a thing accessory to something which he actually

has in him, for such potential property may be the sub-

ject, of a contract executed, as a grant or the like." This

indicates that a present title to the potentiality passed

being a thing accessory to sornething which he actually
has in hirn, for such potential property may be the subject, of a contract executed, as a grant or the like.'' This
indicates that a present title to the potentiality passed. 143

143

What is a Potential Interest. — This rule, that, title

to the tangible thing sold is in the buyer as soon as it

comes into existence, applies only when the thing was

** potentially " in existence at the time of the contract.

Generally speaking, it may be said that nothing has

potential existence which is not the natural increase or

product of something in tangible existence. The young

of animals, crops produced by the earth, and wool

grown upon animals are all natural products and have

all been held to have a potential existence. Only such

things are natural products, and, Avith some notable

exceptions, nothing else has been held to have a potential

existence. A probability, or expectation, that because of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

one's possession of certain things one can acquire or

create other things by his own exertions, and not as the

result of the action of nature, is not a potential interest.

In Low V. Pew,^** there was a probability that the crew

of a fishing schooner would catch fish, but the fish would

not be the natural production of the vessel, and it was

held that they had no potential existence. So, too, in

Orcutt V. Moore,^" the owner of land had leased it to a

tenant for half the crop which the tenant should raise.

The owner then sold his half of the prospective

crop to the plaintiff, but before plaintiff could take

possession of it, after its eventual maturity, defend-

ant seized it for an execution creditor. The court

143 — Losecco v. Gregory, 108 Hawley, Hobart 132, to which

La. 648, "Hope of a future crop, most cases on potential interest

as an incorporeal thing, separate go back for authority does not in-

from the crop itself" is made mer- dicate either theory,

chantable by Civ. Code, sec. 2450, 144—108 Mass. 347.

2451. 145—134 Mass. 48.

The early case of Grantham v.

--What is a Potential Interest.-This rule, that ..title
to the tangible thing sold is in tho buyer as soon as it
comes into existence, applies only when the thing· wa ·
"potentially" in existence at the time of the contract.
Generally speakiug, it may be said that nothing has
potential existence which is not the natural increase or
product of something in tangible existence. The young
of animals, crops produced by the earth, and wool
grown upon animals are all natural products and have
all been held to have a potential existence. Only such
things are natural products, and, -with some notabL.
exceptions, nothing else has been h eld to have a potential
existence. A probability, or expectation, that because of
one's possession of certain things one can acquire or
create other things by his own exertions, and not as the
result of the action of nature, is not a potential interest.
In Low v. Pew, 144 there was a probability that the crew
of a fishing schooner would catch fish, but the fish would
not be the natural production of the vessel, and it was
held that they had no potential existence. So, too, in
Orcutt v. Moore, 145 the owner of land had leased it to a
tenant for half the crop which the tenant should raise.
The owner then sold his half of the prospective
crop to the plaintiff, but before plaintiff could take
possession of it, after its eventual maturity, defendant seized it for an execution creditor. The court
143-Losecco v. Gregory, 108
La. 648, "Hope of a future crop,
as an incorporeal thing, separate
from the crop itself" is made merchantable by Civ. Code, sec. 245(),
2451.
The early case of Grantham v.

Hawley, Hobart 132, to which
most cases on potential interest
go back for authority does not indicate either theory.
144-108 Mass. 347.
145-134 Mass. 48.
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said the rights of the parties depended upon a find-

ing by the jury as to whether tlie owner of the land

had retained a potential interest in half of the crop or

had sold his entire potential interest to the tenant and

was merely to be repaid with half of the crop. If he had

retained an ownership in the future crop, and had con-

veyed to the tenant ownership in only half of what

should be raised, his sale of his potential interest to

plaintiff gave plaintiff title to the half of what had been

raised. But if the lessor had intended to transfer owner-

ship of all the crop to the lessee and take back half of it

as pay, he had not a potential interest but only an

expectancy of payment. This expectancy he could not

transfer like a potential interest and defendant's rights

would be superior to plaintiff's. This illustrates well

the difference in rules between sale of what one does

not o^vn, but expects to acquire, and the sale of a poten-

tiality out of which some tangible thing is expected to
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spring. In the former case title does not pass without

some demonstration of intent to pass it after the seller

has acquired it ; in the latter the title to the tangible thing

vests in the purchaser immediately on its coming into

existence as a result of the sale of the potentiality."®

146 — Sortie cases take a con- ment lien against all of H's prop-

trary view and hold that there erty. The issue was as to re-

may be a potential interest which spective rights of K. and plaintiff

will pass title in futuro in things in this excess. The court called

which are the expected but not H's right to the excess a "poten-

the natural product of property tial interest" in it and declared

already owned. In Wiant v. K's title therefore superior to that

Hayes, 38 W. Va. 681, one H. of plaintiff.

owned certain land which was In Dargin v. Hewlett, 115 Ala.

about to be sold for taxes. By 510, the owner of a race track was

the law any excess from the sale said, as a matter of dictuvi, to

over the amount of taxes would have a "potential interest" in the

•

said the rights of the parties depended upon a finding by the jury as to whether the owner of the land
had retained a potential interest in half of the crop or
had sold his entire potential interest to the tenant and
was merely to be repaid with half of the crop. If he had
retained an ownership in the future crop, and had conveyed to the tenant ownership in only half of what
should be raised, his sale of his potential interest to
plaintiff gave plaintiff title to the half of what had been
raised. But if the lessor had intended to transfer ownership of all the crop to the lessee and take back half of it
as pay, he had not a potential interest but only an
expectancy of payment. This expectancy he could not
transfer like a potential interest and defendant's rights
would be superior to plaintiff's. This illustrates well
the difference in rules between sale of what one does
not own, but expects to acquire, and the sale of a potentiality out of which some tangible thing is expected to
spring. In the former case title does not pass without
some demonstration of intent to pass it after the seller
has acquired it; in the latter the title to the tangible thing
vests in the purchaser immediately on its coming into
existence as a result of the sale of the potentiality. 146

belong to H. Before the tax sale profits of its operation which

H. sold to K. his right to any could be the subject of sale so as

possible excess. The excess not to pass title without further act.

being in existence K. could have As the action was between the

no title at that time. Subsequent parties for an accounting in

to this, plaintiff acquired a judg- equity, the statement was unre-

146-Some cases take a contrary view and hold that there
may be a potential interest which
will pass title in futuro in things
which are the expected but not
the natural product of property
already owned.
In Wiant v.
Hayes, 38 W. Va. 681, one H.
owned certain land which was
about to be sold for taxes. By
the law any excess from the sale
over the amount of taxes would
belong to H. Before the tax sale
H. sold to K. his right to any
po ssible excess. The excess not
being in exist ence K. could have
n o title at tha t tim e. Subsequent
to this, plaintiff acquired a judg-
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ment lien against all of H's property. The issue was as to respective rights of K. and plaintiff
in this excess. The court called
H's right to the excess a "potential interest" in it and declared
K's title therefore superior to that
of plaintiff.
In Dargin v. Hewlett, 115 Ala.
510, the owner of a race track was
said, as a matter of dictum, to
have a "potential interest" in the
profits of its operation which
could be the subject of sale so as
to pass title without further act.
As the action was between the
parties for an accounting in
equity, the statement was unre·
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There is some question whether the doctrine of poten-

tial interest is broad enough to pass title, without fur-

ther act, to crops which are not even planted at the time

of sale. Some courts have held that even in such case

title passes as soon as the crop comes into existence.**''

The general rule, however, appears to be that there is

no potential interest in crops for which the seed has not

been soAvn.**^ It has even been said that title would not

pass until the crop was threshed and ready for

dehvery.**^

There is a similar conflict as to whether there is a

potential interest in the young of animals before the dam

has actually been covered by the sire. Some cases recog-

nize that there is such an interest prior to impregna-

tion.*^° Other cases hold that no title passes by the

agreement, without some subsequent act, unless the off-

spring was in foetu at the time.*^*

lated to any issue. Kerr v. Crane, 109; Miller v. Chapel, 35 Minn.
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212 Mass. 224, 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 399, 29 N. W. 52; but, compare

692. As to whether the assignment Welton v. Hill, 65 Minn. 273;

of a debt due or to become due Patch v. Tutin, 15 M. & W. 110.

creates in the assignee a title or 143 — Farmers Natl. Bk. v.

mere personal right, see the con- Coyner, 44 Ind. Ap. 335; Hutchin-

troversial articles by Messrs. Cook son v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.) 318, 15

and Williston in the Harvard Law Am. Rep. 711 ; Apperson v. Moore,

Review. 30 Ark. 56, 21 Am. Rep. 170; Hurst

There is some question whether the doctrine of potential interest is broad enough to pass title, without further act, to crops which are not even planted at the time
of sale. Some courts have held that even in such case
title passes as soon as the crop comes into existence.147
The general rule, however, appears to be that thePe is
no potential interest in crops for which the seed has not
been sown. 148 It has even been said that title would not
pass until the crop was threshed and ready for
delivery. 149
There is a similar conflict as to whether there is a
potential interest in the young of animals before the dam
has actually been covered by the sire. Some cases recognize that there is such an interest prior to impregnation.150 Other cases hold that no title passes by the
agreement, without some subsequent act, unless the offspring was inf oetu at the time. 151

Many cases hold that an assign- v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336, dictum;

ment of rights of action, to be- Grant v. Steiner, 65 Ala. 499; Wel-

come effective in futuro, Is valid, ton v. Hill, 65 Minn. 273.

but this does not involve question 149 — Welton v. Hill, 65 Minn,

of title and should not be con- 273.

^^^^^- 150— McCarty v. Blevins, 5

147— Dickey v. Waldo, 97 Mich. Yerger (Tenn.) 195, 26 Am. Dec.

255, holds that the buyer could 262; Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250;

bring an action for conversion Fonville v. Casey, 1 Murphey (N.

against the seller; Argues v. C.) 389, 4 Am. Dec. 559.

Wasson, 57 Cal. 620, 21 Am. Rep. 151— Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich.

718; Jones v. Webster, 48 Ala. 347.

lated to any issue. Kerr v. Crane,
212 Mass. 224, 40 L. R. A. (n. s.)
692. As to whether the assignment
of a debt due or to become due
creates in the assignee a title or
mere personal right, see the controversial articles by Messrs. Cook
and Williston in the Harvard Law
Review.
Many cases hold that an assignment of rights of action, to become effective in futuro, is valid,
but this does not involve question
of title and should not be confused.
147-Dickey v. Waldo, 97 Mich.
255, holds that the buyer could
bring an action for conversion
against the seller; Argues v.
Wasson, 57 Cal. 620, 21 Am. Rep.
718; Jones v. Webster, 48 Ala.

109; Miller v. Chapel, 35 Minn.
399, 29 N. W. 52; but, compare
Welton v. Hill, 65 Minn. 273;
Patch v. Tutin, 15 M. & W. 110.
148-Farmers, Natl. Bk. v.
Coyner, 44 Ind. Ap. 335; Hutchinson v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.) 318, 15
Am. Rep. 711; Apperson v. Moore,
30 Ark. 56, 21 Am. Rep. 170; Hurst
v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336, dictum;
Grant v. Steiner, 65 Ala. 499; Welton v. Hill, 65 Minn. 273.
149-Welton v. Hill, 65 Minn.
273.
150-McCarty v. Blevins, 5
Yerger (Tenn.) 195, 26 Am. Dec.
262; Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250;
Fonville v. Casey, 1 Murphey (N.
C.) 389, 4 Am. Dec. 559.
151-Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich.
347.
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CHAPTER III

Seller's Remedies and Rights

1. Both Title and Possession Retained

Thus far we have discussed the question whether, in

CHAPTER

the particular case, title has passed to the buyer or not.

III

We now assume, without further discussion, that it has

passed or has not passed as the fact may be in the par-

SELLER'S REMEDIES AND RIGHTS

ticular case, and consider the seller's remedies upon that

assumption.

1.

Breach of Contract. — As was before pointed out, every

transfer of title must be preceded or accompanied by

BOTH TITLE AND POSSESSION RETAINED

an agreement to pass title, which agreement is in effect

a contract, either express or tacit. Until there is at

least a contract to buy and sell there is of course no

*' seller" to claim any remedy — there is at most only a

would-be seller. But after a contract has been entered

into, and before title has been passed, the seller has the

same rights and remedies that any promisee under a

contract has. The buyer has promised to take the title
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to certain described property and to pay a certain price

in exchange therefor. Failure so to do has the same

effect, and no more, as any breach of contract. It would

Thus far we have discussed the question whether, in
the particular case, title has passed to the buyer or not.
We now assume, without further discussion, that it has
passed or has not passed as the fact may be in the particular case, and consider the seller's remedies upon that
assumption.

be out of place to discuss the rights in respect to a con-

tract and the remedies for its breach in this work. They

involve too general a knowledge of contracts to be briefly

discussed and reference must be made to works treating

of contract law especially.

In general, it may be said mthout discussion, that

under certain circumstances of failure by the buyer to

perform his promise, the seller may treat the contract

86

Breach of Contract.-As was before pointed out, every
transfer of title must be preceded or accompanied by
an agreement to pass title, which agreement is in effect
a contract, either express or tacit. Until there is at
least a contract to buy and sell there is of course no
''seller'' to claim any remedy-there is at most only a
would-be seller. But after a contract has been entered
into, and before title has been passed, the seller has the
same rights and remedies that any promisee under a
contract has. The buyer has promised to take the title
to certain described property and to pay a certain price
in exchange therefor. Failure so to do has the same
effect, and no more, as any breach of contract. It would
be out of place to discuss the rights in respect to a contract and the remedies for its breach in this work. They
involve too general a knowledge of contracts to be briefly
discussed and reference must be made to works treating
of contract law especially.
In gener al, it may be said without discussion, that
under certain ircum tanc s of failure by the buyer to
p er form hi promise, the s Iler may treat the contract
86
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as rescinded and as though it had never existed.* In

any event, if there has been a breach by the buyer the

seller may treat his own contract liability as being at an

end and need do nothing more under the agreement. He

may have received nothing from the buyer, but, con-

versely, he has parted with no title and may not even

have parted with possession.

If the buyer breaks his contract, the seller, regardless

of his other remedies, may always sue for damages.

It is not the purpose of this book to discuss what consti-

tutes a breach of contract by a party thereto. Neither

can the things which the other party must do, or the posi-

tion he must assume, before he can sue because of the

breach, be here gone into. It may be said, however, that,

broadly speaking, the seller must himself be mlling and

able to carry out his side of the bargain, and must have

done everything necessary according to the contract to

entitle him to performance by the buyer.f
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Damages. — If the buyer 's breach occurs before the

seller has parted with either title, or possession, it is

obvious that the seller's loss, his damage, is only the

difference between what he could get immediately from

some other buyer and what the defaulting buyer agreed

to pay. Since he still has the chattel, he is not damaged

to the full extent of the agreed price, but only to the

extent of the difference in realizable value of the chattel

and the agreed price. This is the clearly settled rule.^

1— Bigelow V. Legg, 102 N. Y. 173; Mayo v. Lathern, 159 Mich.

652; Unexcelled V. Pontes, 130 Pa. 136; Moffat v. Davitt, 200 Mass.

as rescinded and as though it had never existed. • In
any event, if there has been a breach by the buyer the
seller may treat his own contract liability as being at an
end and need do nothing more under the agreement. He
may have received nothing from the buyer, but, conversely, he has parted with no title and may not" even
have parted with possession.
If the buyer breaks his contract, the seller, regardless
of his other remedies, may always sue for damages.
It is not the purpose of this book to discuss what constitutes a breach of contract by a party thereto. Neither
can the things which the other party must do, or the position he must assume, before he can sue because of the
breach, be here gone into. It may be said, however, that,
broadly speaking, the seller must himself be willing and
able to carry out his side of the bargain, and must have
done everything necessary according to the contract to
entitle him to performance by the buyer.t

536; Murray v. Doud, 167 HI. 368; 452; Rickey v. Tenbroeck, 63 Mo.

Cohen v. Piatt, 69 N. Y. 348; 563; Poel v. Brunswick-Balke Co.,

Pittsburgh etc. R. R. v. Aeck, 50 159 N. Y. App. Div. 365; Peters v.

Ind. 303; Tufts v. Bennett, 163 Cooper, 95 Mich. 191; Mohr Hard-

Mass. 398; Manhattan, etc. Ry. ware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677,

Co. V. Genl. Elec. Co., 226 Fed. difference between contract and

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 65.

tSee Uniform Sales Act, Section 41, 42, 43, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),

44, (1). (2), (3), (4), 45, (1), (2), 46, (1), (2), (3).

--Damages.-If the buyer's breach occurs before the
seller has parted with either title. or possession, it i s
obvious that the seller's loss, his damage, is only the
difference between what he could get immediately fron1
some other buyer and what the defaulting buyer agreed
to pay. Since he still has the chattel, he is not damaged
to the full extent of the agreed price, but only to the
extent of the difference in realizable value of the chattel
and the agreed price. This is the clearly settled rule. 1
1-Bigelow v. Legg, 102 N. Y.
652; Unexcelled v. Polites, 130 Pa.
536; Murray v. Doud, 167 Ill. 368;
Cohen v. Platt, 69 N. Y. 348;
Pittsburgh etc. R. R. v. Aeck, 50
Ind. 303; Tufts v. Bennett, 163
Mass. 398; Manhattan, etc. Ry.
Co. v. Genl. Elec. Co., 226 Fed.

173: Mayo v. Lathern, 159 Mich.
136; Moffat v. Davitt, 200 Mass.
452; Rickey v. Tenbroeck, 63 Mo.
563; Poel v. Brunswick-Balke Co .,
159 N. Y. App. Div. 365; Peters v.
Cooper, 95 Mich. 191; Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677,
difference between contract and

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 65.
tSee Uniform Sales Act, Section 41, 42, 43, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
44, (1), (2), (3), (4), 45, (1), (2), 46, (1), (2), (3).
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This value to the seller of the chattel which he still

owns should logically be the largest amount which he

could get from someone else — that is to say, its market

^alue — as soon after the buyer 's refusal as he could rea-

sonably be expected to re-sell it. There is very much

loose statement in the decisions, but this rule is the basis

on which the courts strive to ascertain the damages

fairly.**

Of course, if the seller would be put to extra expense

in finding another purchaser and selling to him, the value

of the chattel to the seller would not be the gross price

of the resale, but that price less the cost of making the

second sale. The courts therefore allow this expense to

be deducted from the possible resale value in order to

fix the actual value to the seller of the chattel left in his

hands by the defaulting buyer.^

On the other hand, if the seller could get rid of the
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goods to another without certain expenses which he

cost to seller rejected as measure

of damage; Cole v. Zucarello, 104

Tenn. 64; Krebs Hop Co. v. Lives-

ley, 59 Ore. 574, not limited to

difference between contract price

and price, higher than market

value, which defendant later of-

fered; Schramm v. Boston Sugar

Co., 146 Mass. 211. This common

law rule has been declared by

This value to the seller of the chattel which he still
owns should logically be the largest amount which he
could get from someone else-that is to say, its market
value-as soon after the buyer's refusal as he could reasonably be expected to re-sell it. There is very much
loose statement in the decisions, but this rule is the basis
on which the courts strive to ascertain the damages
fairly. 2
Of course, if the seller would be put to extra expense
in finding another purchaser and selling to him, the value
of the chattel to the seller would not be the gross price
of the resale, but that price less the cost of making the
second sale. The courts therefore allow this expense to
be deducted from the possible resale value in order to
fix the actual value to the seller of the chattel left in his
hands by the defaulting buyer. 3
On the other hand, if the seller could get rid of the
goods to another without certain expenses which he

statute in some states.

2 — It has even been held that

this difference between the con-

tract price and the market value

must be stated in the petition,

Ridgley v. Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap.

362; Dill v. Mumford, 19 Ind. Ap.

609.

3 — Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich.

191; Am. Hide Co. v. Chalkley,

101 Va. 458; Holliday v. Lesh, 85

Mo. Ap. 285; Tufts v. Grewer, 83

Me. 407; Piowaty v. Sheldon. 167

Mich. 218; Woods v. Cramer, 34

S. C. 508; Slaughter v. Marlow, 3

Arizona 429; Hill v. McKay, 94

Cal. 5, cost of transportation to

nearest market; McCracken v.

Webb. 36 la. 551, cost of keeping

till market could be found; Red-

head Bros. V. Investment Co., 126

la. 410, Id; Lewis v. Greider, 51

N. Y. 231, insurance; Best Mer-

cantile Co. V. Brewer, 50 Colo. 455,

seller's traveling expenses; but

of. Penn. v. Smith, 93 Ala. 476;

Texas Lumber Co. v. Rose (Tex.)

103 S. W. 444, but not expenses of

attempted collection; Zimmeister

V. Rock Island Canning Co., 145

Ky. 25, nor unnecessary expenses;

Chapman v. Ingram, 30 Wis. 290,

cost to seller rejected as measure
of damage; Cole v. ZucareUo, 104
Tenn. 64; Krebs Hop Co. v. Livesley, 59 Ore. 574, not limited to
difference between contract price
and price, higher than market
value, which defendant later offered; Schramm v. Boston Sugar
Co., 146 Mass. 211. This common
law rule has been declared by
statute in some states.
2-It bas even been held that
this difference between the contract price and the market value
must be stated in the petition,
Ridgley v. Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap.
362; Dill v. Mumford, 19 Ind. Ap.
609.
3-Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich.
191; Am. Hide Co. v. Chalkley,
101 Va. 45 8; Holliday v. Lesh, 85
Mo. Ap. 285; Tufts v. Grewer, 83
Me. 407; Piowaty v. Sheldon, 167
Mich . 218; Woods v. Cramer, 34

S. C. 508; Slaughter v. Marlow, 3
Arizona 429; Hill v. McKay, 94
Cal. 5, cost of transportation to
nearest market; McCracken v.
Webb. 36 Ia. 551, cost of keeping
till market could be found; Redhead Bros. v. Investment Co., 126
Ia. 410, Id; Lewis v. Greider, 51
N. Y. 231, insurance; Best Mer·
cantile Co. v. Brewer, 50 Colo. 455,
seller's traveling expenses; but
cf. Penn. v. Smith, 93 Ala. 476;
Texas Lumber Co. v. Rose (Tex.)
103 S. W. 444, but not expenses of
attempted collection; Zimmeister
v. Rock Island Canning Co., 145
Ky. 25, nor unnecessary expenses;
Chapman v. Ingram, 30 Wis. 290,
Id; Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce
Co., 105 Wis. 573, Id; Thurman v.
Wilson, 7 Ill. Ap. 312, Id; Arms by
Co. v . Raymond Bros. Co., 90 Neb.
553, necessity depends on facts
of each case.

Id; Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce

Co., 105 Wis. 573, Id; Thurman v.

Wilson, 7 111. Ap. 312, Id; Armsby
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would have been put to had the buyer not broken the

contract, in such case the seller is not damaged by the

breach to the full amount of the difference between the

contract price and the resale value, but to that amount

less the expense saved. This saving of expense should

be deducted from the difference.*

Ascertaining Damage. — It being established that

the seller's damage is the difference between the agreed

would have been put to had the buyer not broken the
contract, in such case the seller is not damaged by the
breach to the full amount of the difference between the
contract price and the resale value, but to that amount
less the expense saved. This saving of expense should
'
be deducted from the difference.4

price and the amount he can get for the chattel otherwise,

the question is how the latter amount shall be ascertained.

This is a matter of evidence. Anything that reasonably

and properly tends to show the market value may be

given in evidence.

If no evidence at all is given, the presumption is that

the market value and the contract value are the same and

the damage awarded will, therefore, be merely nominal —

six cents, or any other small sum awarded for the sake

of carrying costs in the suit in the plaintiff's favor.^
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On the other hand it might be that the chattel con-

tracted for has no monetary value, no saleability to

anyone else at all. In such a case the actual loss to the

seller through the buyer's breach of contract, being the

difference between what the buyer agreed to pay and

the monetary value of the chattel to the seller, which is

nothing, would be the full amount of the contract price.^

If it happens that the market value at the time of

breach was in fact higher than the contract price, and

the seller has elected to treat the contract as broken,

and has resold at the higher price, the buyer is, of course,

not entitled to the surplus. The goods were not his — ^he

having refused to accept the title — so that he would have

no right to any part of the resale price on that ground,

4 — Newark City Ice Co. v. S. 867; International Textbook

Fisher, 76 Fed. 427. Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149.

6 — Manhattan City, etc. Ry. Co.

5— Tufts V. Bennett, 163 Mass. v. Genl. Elec. Co., 226 Fed. 173;

398; Petigor v. Ward, 74 N. Y. Wells v. Maley. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 77.

-Ascertaining Damage.-It being established that
the seller's damage is the difference between the agreed
price and the amount he can get for the chattel otherwise,
the question is how the latter amount shall be ascertained.
This is a matter of evidence. Anything that reasonably
and properly tends to show the market value may be
given in evidence.
If no evidence at all is given, the presumption is that
the market value and the contract value are the same and
the damage awarded will, therefore, be merely nominalsix cents, or any other small sum awarded for the sake
of carrying costs in the suit in the plaintiff's favor. 5
On the other hand it might be that the chattel contracted for has no monetary value, no saleability to
anyone else at all. In such a case the actual loss to the
seller through the buyer's breach of contract, being the
difference between -what the buyer agreed to pay and
the monetary value of the chattel to the seller, which is
nothing, would be the full amount of the contract price. 6
If it happens that the market value at the time of
breach was in fact higher than the contract price, and
the seller has elected to treat the contract as broken,
and has resold at the higher price, the buyer is, of course,
not entitled to the surplus. The goods were not his-he
having refused to accept the title-so that he would have
no right to any part of the resale price on that ground,
4-Newark City
Fisher, 76 Fed. 427.

Ice

Co.

v.

6-Tufts v. Bennett, 163 Mass.
398; Petigor v. Ward, 74 N. Y.

oy
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S. 867; International Textbook
Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149.
6-Manhattan City, etc. Ry. Co.
v. Genl. Elec. Co., 226 Fed. 173;
Wells v. Maley, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 77.
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and, having broken the contract, he can not thereafter

elect to enforce it.'

It is not obligatory for the seller to resell the chattel

if he can furnish satisfactory proof of its actual mone-

tary value at the time of breach in some other way.'

Indeed, in the case of a contract of sale of goods to be

manufactured and a repudiation by the buyer before

their completion the seller is not expected to continue

the work.® It is not even permissible for him to do so.^°

If the seller does elect to retain the goods as his own

and to prove their market value in some other way, the

fact that he subsequently resells the goods will not in

any way affect his recovery of the difference between

the contract price and the market value at the time of

breach. If, for instance, the market value at the time

of his eventual resale should be higher than the contract

price, he would still be entitled to the difference between

the market value at the time of breach and the contract
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price.^*

— -Resale to Demonstrate Damage. — ^If he does choose

to make a resale, and if he makes it within a reasonable

time after breach, at the nearest available market, by

public auction, and after actual or constructive notice

to the buyer, so that the latter may protect himself by

being present, then the amount realized at such sale will

be accepted by the courts as conclusive evidence of the

market value.^*

7 — Warren v. Buckminster, 24 S. W. 188; Bridgeford v. Crocker,

N. H. 336. 60 N. Y. 627.

8— Barrett v, Verdey, 93 Ga. 12— Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v.

and, having broken the contract, he can not thereafter
elect to enforce it. 7
It is not obligatory for the seller to resell the chattel
if he can furnish satisfactory proof of its actual monetary value at the time of breach in some other way. 8
Indeed, in the case of a con tract of sale of goods to be
manufactured and a repudiation by the buyer before
their completion the seller is not expected to continue
the work. 9 It is not even permissible for him to do so. 10
If the seller does elect to retain the goods as his own
and to prove their market value in some other way, the
fact that he subsequently resells the goods will not in
any way affect his recovery of the difference between
the contract price and the market value at the time of
breach. If, for instance, the market value at the time
of his eventual resale should be higher than the contract
price, he would still be entitled to the difference between
the market value at the time of breach and the contract
price. 11

526; Hewes v. Germain Fruit Co., Atlantic Co., 109 Ga. 607; Hewes

106 Cal. 441; Kellog v. Frolich, v. Germain Fruit Co., 106 Cal. 441;

139 Mich. 612. Carriage Co. v. Gilmore, 123 Mo.

9— Gardner v. Deeds, 116 Tenn. Ap. 19; Fox v. Woods, 96 N. Y.

128, 4 L. R. A. (n. s.) 740. S. 117, even though the resale

10 — Heiser v. Mears, 120 N. C. was private instead of at public

443. auction; Van Brocklen v. Smeal-

11— Sour Lake Townsite Co. v. lie, 140 N. Y. 70, private sale;

Deutser Furniture Co., (Tex.) 94 Pollen v. LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549,

--Resale to Demonstrate Damage.-If he does choose
to make a resale, and if he makes it within a reasonable
time after breach, at the nearest available market, by
public auction, and after actual or constructive notice
to the buyer, so that the latter may protect himself by
being present, then the amount realized at such sale will
be accepted by the courts as conclusive evidence of the
market value.12
7-Warren v. Buckminster, 24
N. H. 336.
8- Ba rrett v. Verdey, 93 Ga.
526; H ew es v. Germain Fruit Co.,
106 Cal. 441; K ellog v. Frolich,
139 Mich. 612.
9- Gardner v. Deeds, 116 Tenn.
128, 4 L. R. A. (n. s .) 740.
10-Heiser v. Mear s, 120 N. C.
443.
11-Sour L ake Town site Co. v.
Deut ser F urniture Co., (Tex.) 94
DI itii:

S. W. 188; Bridgeford v. Crocker,
60 N. Y. 627.
12-Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v.
Atlantic Co., 109 Ga. 607; Hewes
v. Germain Fruit Co., 106 Cal. 441;
Carriage Co. v. Gilmore, 123 Mo.
Ap. 19; Fox v. Woods, 96 N. Y.
S. 117, even though the resale
was private instead of at public
auction; Van Brocklen v. Smeallfe, 140 N. Y. 70, private sale;
Pollen v. LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549,
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But even if the seller does not give notice of resale, or

otherwise observe all the strict requirements, the price

actually secured by the resale is not absolutely rejected

as evidence. Only its weight is aifected. Inasmuch as

the seller does not need to make a resale at all in order

to fix his damages, if he can furnish other evidence', it

naturally follows that he can resell or otherwise dispose

of his property in any way he, as owner, sees fit. The

only limitation upon this right of disposal is the obviously

fitting one that the amount secured by the resale will not

be accepted as conclusive evidence of the real market

value unless the resale was made under such circum-

stances as to indicate that the amount received was in

fact the market value. As one court put it, ''The sale,

in such circumstances, is but a method, as before indi-

cated, of enforcing a right to damages for breach of con-

tract, and of making evidence of the precise amount of

such damages. * * * If he sues for his damages without
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selling the property or without selling the same with

proper regard to the rights of the executory vendee, he

takes upon himself the burden of establishing the fair

market value of the goods at the time of the breach. So

it is said that notice to the vendee of the vendor's inten-

tion to make the sale, and the sale, with proper regard to

the interests of the former, merely create definite and

conclusive evidence of such market value. ' '^' The courts,

therefore, do not refuse to receive the results of a resale

as evidence of the market value merely because it was

made mthout notice, or was a private sale instead of a

public one, or was in any respect not conventional. They

receive it in evidence, just as any other evidence is

without notice to buyer; Wrigley reasonable time; Black River

V. Cornelius, 162 111. 92, without Lumber Co. v. Warner, 93 Mo. 374,

notice; Aclcerman v. Rubens, 167 accd.; Magnes v. Sioux City Co.,

N. Y. 405, although seller himself 14 Colo. Ap. 219; McDonald Cot-

was purchaser at public sale; ton Co. Mayo, — Miss. — , 38

Nelson v. Hirsch & Sons Co., 102 So. 372.

Mo. Ap. 498, resale made some 13 — Pratt v. S. Freeman & Sons

time after breach, but within a Co., 115 Wis. 648.

But even if the seller does not give notice of resale, or
otherwise observe all the strict requirements, the price
actually secured by the resale is not absolutely rejected
as evidence. Only its weight is affected. Inasmuch as
the seller does not need to make a resale at all in order
to fix his damages, if he can furnish other evidence, it
naturally follows that he can resell or otherwise dispose
of his property in any way he, as owner, sees fit. The
only limitation upon this right of disposal is the obviously
fitting one that the amount secured by the resale will not
be accepted as conclusive evidence of the real market
value unless the resale was made under such circumstances as to indicate that the amount received was in
fact the market value. As one court put it, ''The sale,
in such circumstances, is but a method, as before indicated, of enforcing a right to damages for breach of contract, and of making evidence of the precise amount of
such damages. • * * If he sues for his damages without
sell.lng the property or without selling the same with
proper regard to the rights of the executory vendee, he
takes upon himself the burden of establishing the fair
market value of the goods at the time of the breach. So
it is said that notice to the vendee of the vendor's intention to make the sale, and the sale, with proper regard to
the interests of the former, merely create definite and
conclusive evidence of such market value. ''18 The courts,
therefore, do not refuse to receive the results of a resale
as evidence of the market value merely because it was
made without notice, or was a private sale instead of a
public one, or was in any respect not conventional. They
receive it in evidence, just as any other evidence is
without notice to buyer; Wrigley

v. Cornelius, 162 Ill. 92, without
notice; Ackerman v. Rubens, 167
N. Y. 405, although seller himself
was purchaser at public sale;
Nelson v. Hirsch & Sons Co., 102
Mo. Ap. 498, resale made some
time after breach, but within a
DI iti.l
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reasonable time; Black River
Lumber Co. v. Warner, 93 Mo. 374,
aced.; Magnes v. Sioux City Co.,
14 Colo. Ap. 219; McDonald Cotton Co. Mayo, - Miss. -, 38
So. 372.
13-Pratt v. S. Freeman & Sons
Co., 115 Wis. 648.
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received, and subject to the general rules of materiality,
relevancy, competency, etc. 14 But it will not be received
as conclusive evidence unless it appears to have been a
fair demonstration, from the point of view of both parties, of the real market value. 15 •
It must be borne in mind that the foregoing discussion
is applied to resales to fix the market value in cases
where title is still in the seller. When title has passed
from the seller, and he resells, as agent of the buyer, to
enforce his seller's lien, other principles apply. 16
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received, and subject to the general rules of materiality,

relevancy, competency, etc.^* But it will not be received

as conclusive evidence unless it appears to have been a

fair demonstration, from the point of view of both par-

ties, of the real market value.^^*

It must be borne in mind that the foregoing discussion

is applied to resales to fix the market value in cases

where title is still in the seller. When title has passed

from the seller, and he resells, as agent of the buyer, to

enforce his seller's lien, other principles apply."

Recovery of Purchase Price. — A seller who still retains

title and possession is hmited to this action for damages

for breach of contract. He can not sue to recover the

amount of the purchase price, as such." Various writers

14 — Gehl V. Milwaukee Produce

Co., 105 Wis. 573; Carriage

Recovery of Purchase Price.-A seller who still retains

Co. V. Gilmore, 123 Mo. Ap.
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19; Anderson v. Frank, 45 Mo.

title and possession is limited to this action for damages
for breach of contract. He can not sue to recover the
amount of the purchase price, as such. 17 Various writers

Ap. 482; Moore v. Potter, 155

N. Y. 481; A resale made after

suit commenced will not be re-

ceived in evidence, Hardwick v.

Can Co., 113 Tenn. 657;Brownlee

V. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218; Pollen v.

14-Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce
Co., 105 Wis. 573; Carriage
Co. v. Gilmore, 123 Mo. Ap.
19; Anderson v. Frank, 45 Mo.
Ap. 482; Moore v. Potter, 155
N. Y. 481; A resale made after
suit commenced will not be received in evidence, Hardwick v.
Can Co., 113 Tenn. 657; Brownlee
v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218; Pollen v.
LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549; Am. Hide Co.
v. Chalkley, 101 Va. 458, notice of
intent to resale is mere evidence
relating to market value.
Some distinction is made be·
tween notice of int,ention to sell
and notice of time and place. Some
cases hold specifically that even
the former is not necessary,
Leeper v. Schroeder, 24 Colo. Ap.
164; Wallace v. Coons, 48 Ind. Ap.
511; Clore v. Robinson, 18 Ky. L.
R. 851; Kellogg v. Frolich, 139
Mich. 312; and it is generally held
that the buyer's refusal puts him
on notice that a resale may be
made, Wrigley v. Cornelius, 162
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section

LeRoy, 30 N. Y. 549; Am. Hide Co.

V. Chalkley, 101 Va. 458, notice of

Intent to resale is mere evidence

relating to market value.

Some distinction is made be-

tween notice of intention to sell

and notice of time and place. Some

cases hold specifically that even

the former is not necessary,

Leeper v. Schroeder, 24 Colo. Ap.

164; Wallace v. Coons, 48 Ind. Ap.

511; Clore v. Robinson, 18 Ky. L.

R. 851; Kellogg v. Frolich, 139

Mich. 312; and it is generally held

that the buyer's refusal puts him

on notice that a resale may be

made, Wrigley v. Cornelius, 162

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section

111. 92; Ullman v. Kent, 60 111. 271;

McDonald Cotton Co. v. Mayo, —

Miss. — , 38 So. 372.

But other cases require notice

of an intention to resell at least,

Winslow V. Harriman Co., 42 S.

W. 698, semhle, as title had

passed; Pillsbury Flour Co. v.

Walsh, 60 Ind. Ap. 76, 110 N. E. 96;

Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. Atlanta

Co., 109 Ga. 607.

15 — Case v. Simonds, 7 N. Y.

Supp. 253; Bigelow v. Legg, 102

N. Y. 652.

16— See p. 129.

17 — Although, as noted above,

the damages may happen to equal

the purchase price.

The retention of title should not

Ill. 92; Ullman v. Kent, 60 Ill. 271;
McDonald Cotton Co. v. Mayo, Miss. -, 38 So. 372.
But other cases require . notice
of an intention to resell at least,
Winslow v. Harriman Co., 42 S.
W. 698, semble, as title had
passed; Pillsbury Flour Co. v.
Walsh, 60 Ind. Ap. 76, 110 N. E. 96;
Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. Atlanta
Co., 109 Ga. 607.
15-Case v. Simonds, 7 N. Y.
Supp. 253; Bigelow v. Legg, 102
N. Y. 652.
16-See p. 129.
17-Although, as noted above,
the damages may happen to equal
the purchase price.
The retention of title should not
be confused with retention of pos·
session. As we have already
seen, title may be transferred, and
usually is, before possession is
passed and even though the buyer
has no right to possession till payment. In such case the buyer's
refusal to accept the possession of
64, (1), (2), (3), (4).

be confused with retention of pos-
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have pointed out that while an action will lie to recover

damages for breach of a contract, even though the con-

sideration for the contract be only a reciprocal promise,

an action in debt for a specific sum owing to the plaintiff

from the defendant can not be maintained unless the

defendant has received something more than a mere

promise from the plaintiff." Until the seller has passed

the title to the buyer, therefore, the latter has received

only the seller's promise and the seller is not the owner

of the sum agreed to be paid. The broad rule is indubi-

tably that a seller who has not in fact passed the title to

the buyer can not sue for any sum which the buyer agreed

to pay for the title, but only for damages resulting from

the buyer's refusal to perform his promise. One position

of the courts appears to be that no debt on the buyer's

part is implied by law in return for the seller's mere

promise without other quid pro quo; that the seller does

not become the owner of the purchase price and the buyer

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

does not hold it as a debt due the seller until the seller has

performed the consideration for which the buyer has

promised to pay; that is, until the buyer has become

the owner of the property contracted about. Another

position is that the buyer has not even undertaken to

pay the purchase price until he shall have acquired the

title.

Mr. Justice Holmes has expressed the latter idea as a

dictum, thus :^^ "In an ordinary contract of sale the

payment and the transfer of the goods are to be con-

current acts, and if the buyer refuses to accept the goods,

even wrongfully, he can not be sued for the price, because

the event on which he undertook to pay the price has not

happened; and although the fact that it has not hap-

the goods will not necessarily af- of this whole matter see the

feet the title, which is already in article in 17 Mich. L. R. 283.

him. The seller is entitled to the 18— Ames, 8 Harvard L. R. 252;

purchase price regardless of the Street, Foundation of Legal Li-

buyer's refusal to accept posses- ability. Vol. II, ch. 11.

sion of the goods themselves. 19 — White v. Solomon, 164 Mass.

For a more detailed discussion 516,
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have pointed out that while an action will lie to recover
damages for breach of a contract, even though the consideration for the contract be only a reciprocal promise,
an action in debt for a specific sum owing to the plaintiff
from the defendant can not be maintained unless the
defendant has received something more than a mere
promise from the plaintiff. 18 Until the seller has passed
the title to the buyer, therefore, the latter has received
only the seller's promise and the seller is not the owner
of the sum agreed to be paid. The broad rule is indubitably that a seller who has not in fact passed the title to
the buyer can not sue for any sum which the buyer agreed
to pay for the title, but only for damages resulting from
the buyer's refusal to perform his promise. One position
of the courts appears to be that no debt on the buyer's
part is implied by law in return for the seller's mere
promise without other quid pro quo; that the seller does
not become the owner of the purchase price and the buyer
does not hold it as a debt due the seller until the seller has
perfonned the consideration for which the buyer has
promised to pay; that is, until the buyer has become
the owner of the property contracted about. Another
position is that the buyer has not even undertaken to
pay the purchase price until he shall have acquired the
title.
Mr. Justice Holmes has expressed the latter idea as a
dictum, thus :19 "In an ordinary contract of sale the
payment and the transfer of the goods are to be concurrent acts, and if the buyer refuses to accept the goods,
even wrongfully, he can not be sued for the price, because
the event on which he undertook to pay the price has not
happened; and although the fact that it has not hapthe goods will not necessarily affect the title, which is already in
him. The seller is entitled to the
purchase price regardless of the
buyer's refusal to accept possession of the goods themselves.
For a more detailed discussion

of this whole matter see the
article in 17 Mich. L. R. 283.
18-Ames, 8 Harvard L . R. 252;
Street, Foundation of Legal Liability, Vol. II, ch. 11.
19-White v. Solomon, 164 Mass.
516.
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pened is due to his own wrong, still he has not promised
to pay the price in the present situation, but must be
sued for his breach of contract in preventing the event
on which the price would be due from coming to pass.
The damages for such a breach would necessarily be
diminished by the fact that the vendor still had the title
to the goods.''
A seller, therefore, who still has title to the goods is
not himself entitled to the purchase price. He can sue
only for damages for breach of contract, and in such
case his damage is not necessarily the agreed price, but
is the difference between that price and the market value
of the chattel which he still owns. Thus in Acme Food
Co. v. Older, 20 the defendant had contracted to buy of
the plaintiff 6,000 pounds of a certain prepared poultry
food. The plaintiff set aside a proper amount for
the defendant, but before. he could ship it to the defendant-which would, under the established rules, have
passed title-the defendant repudiated his agreement.
The plaintiff shipped nevertheless, but it was held too
late then to pass title and although, on defendant's
refusal to r eceive the goods or to pay for them, plaintiff
sued for the whole agreed price, his recovery was limited
to the differ ence between the purchase price and the
market value. 21

94 THE LAW OF SALES

pened is due to his own wrong, still he has not promised

to pay the price in the present situation, but must be

sued for his breach of contract in preventing the event

on which the price would be due from coming to pass.

The damages for such a breach would necessarily be

diminished by the fact that the vendor still had the title

to the goods."

A seller, therefore, who still has title to the goods is

not himself entitled to the purchase price. He can sue

only for damages for breach of contract, and in such

case his damage is not necessarily the agreed price, but

is the difference between that price and the market value

of the chattel which he still ovms. Thus in Acme Food

Co. V. Older,'^" the defendant had contracted to buy of

the plaintiff 6,000 pounds of a certain prepared poultry

food. The plaintiff set aside a proper amount for

the defendant, but before he could ship it to the defend-

ant — which would, under the established rules, have

passed title — the defendant repudiated his agreement.
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The plaintiff shipped nevertheless, but it was held too

late then to pass title and although, on defendant's

refusal to receive the goods or to pay for them, plaintiff

sued for the whole agreed price, his recovery was limited

to the difference between the purchase price and the

market value.''*

20—64 W. Va. 255, 17 L. R. A. v. Grewer, 83 Me. 407; Jones v.

(n. s.) 807. Jennings Bros., 168 Pa. 493; Ridg-

21— Bary v. Quimby, 206 Mass. ley v. Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap. 362;

259; Internatl. Textbook v. Mar- Massman v. Steiger, 79 N. J. L.

tin, 166 Mich. 660; Manhattan 442, 75 Atl. 746; Atkinson v. Bell,

City R. R. Co. v. Genl. Elec. Co., 8 Barn. & Cr. 277; Girard v. Tag-

226 Fed. 173; Gammage v. Texas, gart, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 19, "The

14 Tex. 413; Funke v. Allen, 54 damages recovered are not the

Neb. 407, overruling a contrary price of the goods sold, but a com-

dictum in Lincoln Shoe Co. v. Shel- pensation for the disaflBrmance of

don, 44 Neb. 249; McCormick Har- the contract — Properly speaking,

vesting Co. v. Balfany, 78 Minn, the seller can not recover the price

370, 74 Am. St. 373; Deere v. Gor- — he recovers damages for the

man, 9 Kan. App. G7.^>; Singer Mfg. breach of a contract which was en-

Co. V. Cheney, 21 Ky. L. R. H.^'jO; tirely executory when it was

Moody V. Brown, 34 Me. 107; Tufts broken."

20-64 W. Va. 255, 17 L. R. A.
s.) 807.
21-Bary v. Quimby, 206 Mass.
259; Interna tl. Textbook v. Martin, 166 Mich . 660; Manhattan
City R. R. Co. v. Genl. Elec. Co.,
226 Fed. 173 ; Gammage v. Texas,
14 Tex. 413; F unke v. Allen, 54
Neb. 407, overruling a contrary
di ctum in Lincoln Shoe Co. v. Sheldon, 44 Neb. 249; McCormick Har·
v est ing Co. v. Balfa n y, 78 Minn.
370, 71 Am . St. 373; Deer e v. Gorman, 9 Kan . App. 675; Singer Mfg.
o. v. ( h 11 11 y, 21 K y. L. R. fi5 0;
Moody v. Drown , 34 l\1e. 107 ; Tufts
(n.
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v. Grewer, 83 Me. 407; Jones v.
Jennings Bros., 168 Pa. 493; Ridgley v. Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap. 362;
Massman v. Steiger, 79 N. J. L.
442, 75 AU. 746; Atkinson v. Bell,
8 Barn. & Cr. 277; Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 19, "The
damages recovered are not the
price of the goods sold, but a compensation for the disaffirmance of
the contract-Properly speaking,
the seller can not r ecover the price
- he recovers damages for the
breach of a contract which was entirely executory when it was
broken."
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But even assuming that the seller's mere promise to

pass the title does not create a debt on the buyer's part,

a question at once arises as to whether after the

buyer's refusal to proceed with the contract, the seller

can thrust the title upon liim nevertheless, and thus by

his o'svn act make himself entitled to the whole sum wliich

the buyer has promised for the title. There is much con-

flict upon this point, although the best supported rule

and the soundest logically is that he can not do so, but

is only entitled to recover the damage he has suffered

because of the buyer's refusal to take the title.

Thus, in the case of Acme Food Co. v. Older, just

referred to,^^* the court said of the conflict, '*It is some-

times said that the vendor in an executory contract of

sale, has, on the refusal of the vendee to accept the

property, an election as to whether he Avill treat it as

his o^Ti and sue for damages for the breach, or treat it

as that of the purchaser and sue for the price. * * * The

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

classification of cases made by the text-writers is, in

some instances, inaccurate. The writers seem not to

have observed in all instances the distinctions and tests

above mentioned. In other words, they have frequently

classed cases in which the title had passed, or in wliich

there was evidence from which the jury might have

found the fact, as cases in which it had not passed. In

other instances they have failed to observe that the

executory contract had become executed so as to pass the

title before any renunciation was made by the vendee.

Indeed, there are very few cases in which the seller has

been allowed to recover the purchase price when the title

to the property had not passed to the buyer. The doc-

trine of election, when the title has not passed, seems

to have groA\Ti out of an unfortunate and inaccurate inter-

pretation of certain cases made by Mr. Sedgwick in his

work on Damages."^*

21a — 64 W. Va. 255, 17 L. R. A. ity, the cases cited under note

(n. s.) 807. 21. "To allow the seller to re-

22 — See, for supporting autlior- cover the full purchase price of an

But even assuming that the seller's mere promise to
pass the title does not create a debt on the buyer's part,
a question at once arises as to whether after the
buyer's refusal to proceed ·with the contract, the seller
can thrust the title upon him neverthele , and thus by
his own act make himself entitled to the whole um which
the buyer has promised for the title. There is much conflict upon this point, although the best supported rule
and the soundest logically is that he can not do so, but
is only entitled to recover the damage he has suffered
because of the buyer's refusal to take the title.
_ Thus, in the case of Acme Food Co. v. Older, just
ref erred to, 21 a the court said of the conflict, "It is ometimes said that the vendor in an executory contract of
sale, has, on the refusal of the vendee to accept the
property, an election as to whether he will treat it as
his own and sue for damages for the breach, or treat it
as that of the purchaser and sue for the price. • • • The
classification of cases made by the text-writers is, in
some instances, inaccurate. The writers seem not to
have observed in all instances the distinctions and tests
above mentioned. In other words, they have frequently
classed cases in which the title had passed, or in which
there was evidence from which the jury might have
found the fact, as cases in which it had not passed. In
other instances they have failed to observe that the
executory contract had become executed so as to pass the
title before any renunciation was made by the vendee.
Indeed, there are very few cases in which the seller has
been allowed to recover the purchase price vvhen the title
to the property had not passed to the bu er. The doctrine of election, when the title has not pa ed, seems
to have gro'vn out of an unfortunate and inaccurate interpretation of certain cases made by l\1:r. Sedg·wick in his
work on Damages.' ' 22
21a-64 W. Va. 255, 17 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 807.

22-See, for supporting author-

ity, the cases cited under note
21. "To allow the seller to recover the full purchase price of an
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The doctrine of election which the court criticizes and

denies, whereby the seller may, if he choose, thrust the

title upon the buyer against his will, is, however, widely

supported by dicta at least. These authorities declare

that a seller who has done all that he is obligated to do

by the contract may sue for the purchase price even

though the buyer has refused to accept the title. They

do not indicate with any certainty whether the seller is

allowed to sue on the theory that title has passed to the

buyer despite his refusal of it, or on the theory that

title need not be in the buyer in such cases. The evi-

dence seems to point to the former.

Very little of this dictum, however, is real authority;

that is to say, it is dictum simply. The proposition is

usually expressed in some form of the words formu-

lated originally in Dustan v. McAndrew,^^ namely, ' ' The

vendor of personal property in a suit against the vendee

for not taking and paying for the property has the choice
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ordinarily of either one of three methods to indemnify

himself. (1) He may store or retain the property for

the vendee, and sue him for the entire purchase price,

(2) He may sell the property, acting as the agent for

this purpose of the vendee, and recover the difference

between the contract price and the price obtained on such

resale; or, (3) he may keep the property as his own, and

recover the difference between the market price at the

time and place of delivery, and the contract price."

This statement is widely quoted. As a matter of fact,

however, it is seldom the basis of a holding that the

seller can sue for the purchase price when the buyer

has refused to accept the title. The case in which it was

article, and compel the buyer to the buyer. This is against the

accept it whether he wants it or well established doctrines of

not, is to grant specific perform- courts of equity," from Manhat-

ance of a contract for the sale of tan City Ry. v. Genl. Elec. Co., 226

personal property in favor of the Fed. 173.

seller, when no such relief could 23 44 n. Y. 72.

or would be granted in favor of

THE LAW OF SALES

The doctrine of election which the court criticizes and
denies, whereby the seller may, if he choose, thrust the
title upon the buyer against his will, is, however, widely
supported by dicta at least. These authorities declare
that a seller who has done all that he is obligated to do
by the contract may sue for the purchase price even
though the buyer has refused to accept the title. They
do not indicate with any certainty whether the seller is
allowed to sue on the theory that title has passed to the
buyer despite his refusal of it, or on the theory that
title need not be in the buyer in such cases. The evidence seems to point to the former.
Very little of this dictum, however, is real authority;
that is to say, it is dictum simply. The proposition is
usually expressed in some form of the words formulated originally in Dustan v. McAndrew, 23 namely, ''The
vendor of personal property in a suit against the vendee
for not taking and paying for the property has the choice
ordinarily of either one of three methods to indemnify
himself. (1) He may store or retain the property for
the vendee, and sue him for the entire purchase price,
(2) He may sell the property, acting as the agent for
this purpose of the vendee, and recover the difference
between the contract price and the price obtained on such
resale; or, (3) he may keep the property as his own, and
recover the difference between the market price at the
time and place of delivery, and the contract price."
This statement is widely quoted. As a matter of fact,
however, it is seldom the basis of a holding that the
seller can sue for the purchase price when the buyer
has refused to accept the title. The case in which it was
article, and compel the buyer to
accept it whether he wants it or
not, is to grant specific performance of a contract for the sale of
personal property in favor of the
seller, when no such r elief could
or would be granted in favor of
D1 1tize by

N E JET A CHI E

the buyer. This is against the
well established doctrines of
courts of equity,'' from Manhattan City Ry. v. Genl. Elec. Co., 226
Fed. 173.
23-44 N. Y. 72.
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thus first stated was not, itself, a suit for the purchase

price; it was only an action for damages for breach of

contract. Of the two cases cited as authority, one was

an action for damages only, and in the other the title had

clearly passed, in accordance with the established rules

of presumption, and the buyer's refusal was not a refusal

to take the title, but to pay the price. This statement

of the three possible remedies in cases where it is wholly

unrelated to the decision, because the suit is actually

for damages for refusal to accept and not for the pur-

chase price, is common.'^*

The statement, as wholly extraneous and immaterial

matter, is found also in cases in which title has passed

according to the established rules, and the buyer's

refusal is to receive the goods themselves, not the title,

and to pay the price.^^

In other cases the extraneous statement is made that

recovery of the purchase price ivould have been allowed,
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despite the buyer's refusal to accept the title, if some-

thing else, such as the seller's failure to make tender,

had not been present to prevent it.^^

In some cases, however, the statement is actually the

principle of the holding, and a seller has been permitted

to recover the purchase price for goods sold although

title has been refused by the buyer. In other words, he

has been allowed to thrust the title upon the buyer and

thus entitle himself to the amount of the price.'^'*

24— Habeler v. Rogers, 131 Fed. 25— Ames v. Moir, 130 HI. 582.

43; Kinkead v. Lynch, 132 Fed.

26 — Moline Scale Co. v. Beed,

52 Iowa 307.

692; Krebs Hop Co. v. Livesley, 59

Ore. 574; Range Co. v. Mercantile

Co., 120 Mo. Ap. 438; Van Brock- 27— Crown Vinegar & Spice Co.

len V. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Com- v. Wehrs, 59 Mo. Ap. 493; Walker

stock V. Price, 103 111. Ap. 19; v. Nixon, 65 Mo. Ap. 326.

Magnes v. Sioux City Co., 14 Colo. Walker Bros. v. Daggett, 115

Ap. 219; Trunkey v. Hedstrom, Miss. 657, 76 So. 569.

131 111. 204, action in damages by Osgood v. Skinner, 211 IH. 229;

buyer for seller's failure to de- Resetter v. Reynolds, 160 Ind. 133;

liver. McCornrick Co. V. Market, 107

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 63, (2), (3), 64, (4).
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thus first stated was not, itself, a suit for the purchase
price; it was only an action for damage for breach of
contract. Of the two cases cited as authority, one was
an action for damages only, and in the other the title had
clearly passed, in accordance with the e tabli hed rules
of pre. umpti.on, and the buy r's refusal was not a re~usal
to take the title, but to pay the price. This tatement
of the three possible remedies in ca e where 1t is wholly
unrelated to the decision, because the suit is actually
for damages for refusal to accept and not for the purchase price, is common. 24
The statement, as wholly extraneous and in1material
matter, is found also in cases in which title has passed
according to the established rules, and the buyer's
refusal is to receive the goods theinselves, not the title,
and to pay the price. 25
In other cases the extraneous statement is made that
recovery of the purchase price woitld have been allowed,
despite the buyer's refusal to accept the title, if something else, such as the seller's failure to make tender,
had not been present to prevent it. 26
In some cases, however, the statement i s actually the
principle of the holding, and a seller has been permitted
to recover the purchase price for goods sold although
title has been refused by the buyer. In other words, he
has been allowed to thrust the title upon the buyer and
thus entitle himself to the amount of the price. 27 *
24-Habeler v. Rogers, 131 Fed.
43; Kinkead v. Lynch, 132 Fed.
692; Krebs Hop Co. v. Livesley, 59
Ore. 574; Range Co. v. Mercantile
Co., 120 Mo. Ap. 438; Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70; Comstock v. Price, 103 Ill. Ap. 19;
Magnes v. Sioux City Co., 14 Colo.
Ap. 219; Trunkey v. Hedstrom,
131 Ill. 204, action in damages by
buyer for seller's failure to deliver.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section

25-Ames v. Moir, 130. Ill. 582.
2~-Moline

Scale Co. v. Beed,

52 Iowa 307.
27-Crown Vinegar & Spice Co.
v. Wehrs, 59 Mo. Ap. 493; Walker
v. Nixon, 65 Mo. Ap. 326.
Walker Bros. v. Daggett, 115
Miss. 657, 76 So. 569.
Osgood v. Skinner, 211 Ill. 229;
Rosetter v. Reynolds, 160 Ind. 133;
McCormick Co. v'. Market, 107
63, (2), (3), 64, (4).
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From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the

right of a seller, who has not passed title, to sue for the

purchase price in case the buyer refuses to take title is

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the
right of a seller, who has not passed title, to sue for the
purchase price in case the buyer refuses to take title is
not settled either way.

not settled either way.

Iowa 340; Busch v. Stromberg-

Carlson Co., 226 Fed. 200.

It is so provided by statute in

some states.

The cases of Frisch v. Wells,

200 Mass. 429; Bond v. Bourk, 54

Colo. 51, and Smith v. Aldrich, 180

Mass. 367, seem to have been de-

cided on the principle that the

seller could treat title as being in

the buyer without his consent. The

same result might have been

reached, however, more harmoni-
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ously upon the principle of a

promise to pay before title passed,

as set out below.

The cases of Bement v. Smith,

15 Wend. 493 and Shawhan v. Van

Nest, 25 O. S. 490, 18 Am. Rep.

313, are often treated as author-

ities for the proposition that a

seller may sue for the purchase

price even though the buyer has

refused to accept the title. In the

former case (and the latter is sub-

stantially the same) plaintiff con-

tracted to build for the defendant

a sulky according to certain de-

scription, for a price of $80. When

the work was done and the sulky

offered to the defendant he re-

fused to receive it. The plaintiff

thereupon stored it with a neigh-

bor for the defendant, and brought

suit for the $80.00. His declara-

tion contained a count for work

and labor and one for goods sold.

The defense was that he was en-

titled to damages only. The posi-

tion taken by the court was simply

that the plaintiff had agreed to

make and deliver a certain thing

and that he had made it and tend-

ered delivery; and that the offer

to deliver was tantamount to de-

livery. The contract, being an

agreement for a thing not yet in

existence, was, the court said, in

accord with the New York rule,

not a contract of sale but one for

work and labor. The work and

labor having been performed the

plaintiff was entitled to the con-

tract price. It was not necessary,

the court added, for the plaintiff

to have declared for goods bar-

Iowa 340; Busch v. StrombergCarlson Co., 226 Fed. 200.
It is so provided by statute in
some states.
The cases of Frisch v. Wells,
200 Mass. 429; Bond v. Bourk, 54
Colo. 51, and Smith v. Aldrich, 180
Mass. 367, seem to have been decided on the principle that the
seller could treat title as being in
the buyer without his consent. The
same result might have been
reached, however, more harmoniously upon the principle of a
promise to pay before title passed,
as set out below.
The cases of Bement v. Smith,
15 Wend. 493 and Shawhan v. Van
Nest, 25 o. · S. 490, 18 Am. Rep.
313, are often treated as authorities for the proposition that a
seller may sue for the purchase
price even though the buyer has
refused to accept the title. In the
former case (and the latter is substantially the same) plaintiff cont racted to build for the defendant
a sulky a ccording to certain description, for a price of $80. When
the work w as done and the sulky
offere d to the defendant he refused to receive it. The plaintiff
thereupon stored it with a neighbor for the defendant, a nd brought
suit fo r the $80.00. His declarat ion conta ined a count for work
and labor and one for goods sold.
The defen~e was that he was entitled to damages only. Th e position taken by the court was simply
that the plaintiff had agreed to
mak and deliver a certai n thing
and that he had made it and tend-

ered delivery; and that the off er
to deliver was tantamount to delivery. The contract, being an
agreement for a thing not yet in
existence, was, the court said, in
accord with the New York rule,
not a contract of sale but one for
work and labor. The work and
labor having been performed the
plaintiff was entitled to the contract price. It was not necessary,
the court added, for the plaintiff
to have declared for goods bargained and sold. It is only after
this ruling that the court remarks
that "where there has been a valid
contract of sale, the vendor is entitled to the full price, whether the
vendee receive the goods or not.
I can not see why the same principle is not applicable in this
case." The quid pro quo which
entitled the plaintiff to the debt
was thus obviously not the transfer of the title, but the actual performance of agreed labor. This
interpretation is strengthened by
Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252.
This was a contract to manufacture circus tents. When they were
completed and offered to defendant he refused to accept them.
The maker sued to recover the
price. ( 4 Hun. 565) The court
held the contract to be one for
work and labor (which would,
therefore, be a qui d pro quo for
the debt ) and that, consequently,
the right to r ecover the price "did
not" depend on where the technical title is, as "in the sale of
goods."

gained and sold. It is only after

this ruling that the court remarks

that "where there has been a valid
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vendee receive the goods or not.

1 can not see why the same prin-

ciple is not applicable in this
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2. Title Retained, but Possession Passed

Breach of Contract. — Where the seller has passed the

possession to the buyer, even though it is agreed that

title shall not pass to the buyer until payment has been

made, the seller can still sue for damages for breach of

contract in case the buyer fails to pay as agreed.

Recovery of Purchase Price. — But in such cases he

may also sue the buyer for the agreed price itself, as dis-

Breach of Contract.-Where the seller has passed the
possession to the buyer, even though it is agreed that
title shall not pass to the buyer until payment ha been
made, the seller can still sue for damages for breach of
contract in case the buyer fails to pay as agreed.

tinct from suing to recover damages. This is different

from the majority rule in cases where the seller has

parted with neither possession nor title, as just dis-

cussed. The reason for this difference — that is, the rea-

son why he can sue for the price despite his retention of

title if he has given possession, but can not sue for it if

he has not given possession — is not clear.

The logical reason would be that the seller in giving

possession to the buyer has given him a quid pro quo by
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whith the debt of the buyer is created. This is the

theory which the courts have expressly stated in many

instances.^'

28— This is very obvious in the fault of either party. The seller

case of Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss, sued to recover the unpaid part

48. Tufts had sold to Burnley a of the purchase price and was held

soda water apparatus, with the ex- entitled to the money. The court's

press stipulation that title should opinion shows that possession was

not pass until the price had been the consideration for the buyer's

paid, and that if the payment were promise to pay, and not title, and

not made at the times the install- that this consideration had been

ments were stated to be due the executed. "Burnley," said the

seller might retake possession of court, "unconditionally and abso-

the apparatus. It does not appear lutely promised to pay a certain

that there was any stipulation that sum for the property, the posses-

the buyer should have possession sion of which he received from

till payment or default, but that Tufts. The fact that the property

Recovery of Purchase Price.-But in such cases he
may also sue the buyer for the agreed price itself, as distinct from suing to recover damages. This is different
from the majority rule in cases where the seller has
parted with neither possession nor title, as just dis-·
cussed. The reason for this difference-that is, the reason why he can sue for the price despite his retention of
title if he bas given possession, but can not sue for it if
he has not given possession-is not clear.
The logical reason would be that the seller in giving
possession to the buyer has given him a quid pro quo by
whi6h the debt of the buyer is created. This is the
theory which the courts have expressly stated in many
instances. 28

was obviously the intent of the has been destroyed while in his

parties. The apparatus was de- custody and before the time for

stroyed by fire, after several pay- the payment of the last note due,

ments had been made, while in on payment of which only his

the buyer's possession but without right to the legal title of the prop-

28-This is very obvious in the
case of Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss.
48. Tufts had sold to Burnley a
soda water apparatus, with the express stipulation that title should
not pass until the price had been
paid, and that if the payment were
not made at the times the installments were stated to be due the
seller might retake possession of
the apparatus. It does not appear
that there was any stipulation that
the buyer should have possession
till payment or default, but that
was obviously the intent of the
parties. The apparatus was destroyed by fire, after several payments had been made, while in
the buyer's possession but without
D1 1tize by
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fault of either party.

The seller
sued to recover the unpaid part
of the purchase price and was held
entitled to the money. The court's
opinion shows that possession was
the consideration for the buyer's
promise to pay, and not title, and
that this consideration had been
executed.
"Burnley," said the
court, "unconditionally and absolutely promised to pay a certain
sum for the property, the possession of which he received from
Tufts. The fact that the property
has been destroyed while in his
custody and before the time for
the payment of the last note due,
on payment of which only his
right to the legal title of the prop·
Origi al from
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In other instances the seller has maintained his suit

for the price without the court's having indicated any

reason why he could do so. It may be that these courts

have felt simply that the promise to pay, itself, created a

debt and no executed consideration, or quid pro quo, was

necessary. Or it may have been that inasmuch as pos-

erty would have occurred does not

THE LAW OF SALES

In other instances the seller has maintained his suit
for the price without the court's having indicated any
reason why he could do so. It may be that these courts
have felt simply that the promise to pay, itself, created a
debt and no executed consideration, or quid pro quo, was
necessary. Or it may have been that inasmuch as pos-

relieve him of payment of the

price agreed upon. He got ex-

actly what he contracted for, viz.,

the possession of the property and

the right to acquire an absolute

title by payment of the agreed

price. The transaction was some-

thing more than an executory con-

ditional sale. The seller had done

all that he was to do except to re-
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ceive the purchase price; the pur-

chaser had received all that he

was to receive as the considera-

tion of his promise to pay." In

White V. Solomon, 164 Mass. 516,

the buyer had even refused to take

possession of the chattel. Before

his refusal, however, the seller

had delivered it to an express

company for carriage to the buyer.

The buyer's contract provided that

"in consideration of its delivery

for me, freight prepaid, at the ex-

press office specified below, I

promise to pay the sum of (the

purchase price)." The court

stated the general rule, that a

seller who still retains title, even

though only because of the buyer's

refusal to accept it, is not entitled

to the purchase price but only to

damages. But it then went on to

decide that "in the case at bar the

buyer has said in terms, that al-

though the title does not pass by

the delivery to the Express Com-

pany, if it does not, delivery shall

be the whole consideration for an

Immediate debt (partly solvendum.

in futuro) of the whole value of

the manikin, and that the passing

of the title shall come as a future

advantage to him when he has

paid the whole. The words (in the

contract) 'in consideration of its

delivery' are not accidental nor

insignificant. * * * if a man is

willing to contract that he shall be

liable for the whole value of a

chattel before the title passes,

there is nothing to prevent his do-

ing so, and thereby binding him-

self to pay the whole sum. * * *

erty would have occurred does not
relieve him of payment of the
price agreed upon. He got exactly what he contracted for, viz.,
the possession of the property and
the right to acquire an absolute
title by payment of the agreed
price. The transaction was something more than an executory conditional sale. The seller had done
all that he was to do except to receive the purchase price; the purchaser had received all that he
was to receive as the consideration of his promise to pay." In
White v. Solomon, 164 Mass. 516,
the buyer had even refused to take
possession of the chattel. Before
his refusal, however, the seller
had delivered it to an express
company for carriage to the buyer.
The buyer's contract provided that
"in consideration of its delivery
for me, freight prepaid, at the express office specified below, I
promise to pay the sum of (the
purchase price)."
The court
stated the general rule, that a
seller who still retains title, even
though only because of the buyer's
refusal to accept it, is not entitled
to the purchase price but only to
damages. But it then went on to
decide that "in the case at bar the
buyer has said in terms, that althou gh the title does not pass by
the delivery to the E xpress Company, if it does n ot, delivery shall
be th e whol e consideration for an
immediate debt (partly solvendum

in futuro) of the whole value of
the manikin, and that the passing
of the title shall come as a future
advantage to him when he has
paid the whole. The words (in the
contract) 'in consideration o! its
delivery' are not accidental nor
insignificant. • • • If a man is
willing to contract that he shall be
liable for the whole value of a
chattel before the title passes,
there is nothing to prevent his doing so, and thereby binding himself to pay the whole sum. • • •
When, as here, all the conditions
have been complied with the performance of which by the terms of
the contract entitles the vendors
to the whole sum, if the vendors
afterward have not either broken
the contract or done any act
diminishing the rights given them
in express words, the buyer can
not by an act of his own repudiating the title gain a right of recoupment, or otherwise diminish
his obligation to pay the whole
sum which he has promised."
Aced., Natl. Cash Register Co. v.
Hill, 136 N. C. 272, 68 L . R. A.
100, similar to White v. Solomon,
and quoting it with approval;
Tufts v. Griffin, 107 N. C. 47, fol·
lowing Tufts v. Burnley; Natl.
Cash Register Co. v. Dehn, 139
Mich. 406; Bierce v. Hutchins, 205
U. S. 340; Gray v. Booth, 64 N. Y.
App. Div. 231 ; Amer . Soda Fountain Co. v. Vau ghn, 69 N. J. L. 582,
"The question to be determined

When, as here, all the conditions

have been complied with the per-

by
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session was already with the buyer the seller could, by

bringing his suit for the price, elect to pass the title to

the buyer and that the buyer by not actively rejecting it

would be presumed to have consented to it. This passage

of title would then, of course, be the necessary executed

consideration.*®

is: What was the consideration

session was already with the buyer the seller could, by
bringing his suit for the price, elect to pass the title to
the buyer and that the buyer by not actively rejecting it
would be presumed to have consented to it. This passage
of title would then, of course, be the necessary executed
consideration. 29

of the note? If the passing of the

title to the apparatus was the con-

sideration, the defense must pre-

vail. If the delivery of the appar-

atus, with the right to acquire

title, was the consideration the

plaintiff must prevail. We think

the consideration for the note was

the delivery of the apparatus with

the right to acquire title." Lan-
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caster V. Southern Insurance Co.,

153 N. C. 285; Harley v. Stanley,

25 Okla. 89; Roach v. Whitfield,

94 Ark. 448; Lavalley v. Ravenna,

78 Vt. 152; Dunlap v. Grote, 2 C.

& K. 153; Boyer v. Ausburn, 64

Ga. 271, express agreement to pay

In event of loss; Dederick v.

Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500; Hollenberg

V. Barron, 100 Ark. 403, even

though seller had retaken posses-

sion at time of the sale; Marion

Mfg. Co. v. Buchanon, 118 Tenn.

238; Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber

Co., 145 N. C. 120, 12 L. R. A.

(n. s.) 1214; Kilmer v. Money-

Weight Scale Co., 36 Ind. Ap. 568.

29 — A number of courts, appar-

ently considering that the promise

to pass title is the real considera-

tion, refuse to allow the seller to

recover the purchase price after

the goods have been destroyed.

Bishop V. Minderhout, 128 Ala.

162, predicated upon the principle

that the risk of loss follows title;

Randle v. Stone, 77 Ga. 501;

Swaney v. Alstott, 134 Iowa 63, 7

L. R. A. (n. s.) 1032; Glisson v.

Heggie Bros., 105 Ga. 30; Tabbut

V. American Insurance Co., 185

Mass. 419, allowing the conditional

buyer to recover from an insur-

ance company only the value of

his interest in the chattel and not

the full value. Sloan v. McCarty,

134 Mass. 245. Worden Grocery

Co. V. Blanding, 161 Mich. 254, 126

N. W. 212, holding a note given

for the price, on a conditional sale,

not negotiable because the buyer

would not be liable if the seller

could not pass title; Fleming v.

is: What was the consideration
ol'. the note? If the passing of the
title to the apparatus was the consideration, the defense must prevail. If the delivery of the apparatus, with the right to acquire
title, was the consideration the
plaintiff must prevail. We think
the consideration for the note was
the delivery of the apparatus with
the right to acquire title." Lancaster v. Southern Insurance Co.,
153 N. C. 285; Harley v. Stanley,
25 Okla. 89; Roach v. Whitfield,
94 Ark. 448; Lavalley v. Ravenna,
78 Vt. 152; Dunlap v. Grote, 2 C.
& K. 153; Boyer v. Ausburn, 64
Ga. 271, express agreement to pay
in event of loss; Dederick v.
Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500; Hollenberg
v. Barron, 100 Ark. 403, even
though seller had retaken possession at time of the sale; Marion
Mfg. Co. v. Buchanon, 118 Tenn.
238; Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber
Co., 145 N. C. 120, 12 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 1214; Kilmer v. MoneyWeight Scale Co., 36 Ind. Ap. 568.
29-A number of courts, apparently considering that the promise
to pass title is the real consideration, refuse to allow the seller to
recover the purchase price after
the goods have been destroyed.
Bishop v. Minderhout, 128 Ala.
162, predicated upon the principle
that the risk of loss follows title;
Randle v. Stone, 77 Ga. 501;
Swaney v. Alstott, 134 Iowa 63, 7
L. R. A. (n. s.) 1032; Glisson v.

Heggie Bros., 105 Ga. 30: Tabbut
v. American Insurance Co., 185
Mass. 419, allowing the conditional
buyer to recover from an insur·
ance company only the value of
his interest in the chattel and not
the full value. Sloan v. McCarty,
134 Mass. 245. Worden Grocery
Co. v. Blanding, 161 Mich. 254, 126
N. W. 212, holding a note given
for the price, on a conditional sale,
not negotiable because the buyer
would not be liable if the seller
could not pass title; Fleming v.
Sherwood, 24 N. D. 144, 43 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 945, idem.

Some courts have held that
notes given for the contract price
in conditional sale agreements are
not negotiable because of uncertainty in the obligation of payment. This uncertainty of obligation is not, however, clearly predicated upon possibility that the
buyer might not be liable. Rather,
it seems to be based on the fact
that the seller may not choose to
hold him to payment, but may
elect to retake the chattel. So
long as the seller has the option,
to demand payment on default or
to retake the property, it is clear
that the obligation to pay is not
certain; the buyer may have to
pay or not as the seller chooses.
These cases do not, therefore, indicate that the buyer is not liable
for the full purchase price regardless of title.
Bannister v. Rouse, 44 Mich.

Sherwood, 24 N. D. 144, 43 L. R.

A. (n. s.) 945, idem.

Some courts have held that

Di ·tiz
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But whatever the reason, it seems clear that a seller

who has given possession to the buyer is not restricted

to a recovery of damage for the buyer's failure to pay,

but can bring suit for the whole agreed price.

Titular Actions. — Despite the fact that he can thus

THE LAW OF SALES

But whatever the reason, it seems clear that a seller
who has given possession to the buyer is not restricted
to a recovery of damage for the buyer ~s failure to pay,
but can bring suit for the whole agreed price.

sue for the purchase price, and although he has parted

with possession, the seller, because he has retained title,

is still the owner in practically every respect. So long

as the buyer has possession the seller can not prevent

title from passing to him on performance of the condi-

tion. In this respect the seller's absolutism of owner-

ship is limited.^®

In other respects the seller is the owner of the prop-

erty. He can sell or otherwise transfer his right in the

goods to others.^^ He can himself maintain a titular

action against a third person.^^

Recovery of Possession. — Being owner, he can retake

possession from the buyer or anyone holding under him.
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If the buyer's contract provides that he shall have pos-

session so long as he is not in default, the seller can not

retake possession before default.^' But if ,the buyer is

in default the seller can retake possession, whether the

contract expressly gives him that right or not.^*

428; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Merchants 481, 51 Am. St. 37; see other

Bank, 136 U. S. 268; but cf. Third authorities cited in re the rights

Natl. Bk. V. Armstrong, 25 Minn of third persons.

Titular Actions.-Despite the fact that he can thus
sue for the purchase price, and although he has parted
with possession, the seller, because he has retained title,
is still the owner in practically every respect. So long
as the buyer has possession the seller can not prevent
title from passing to him on performance of the condition. In this respect the seller's · absolutism of ownership is limited. 30
In other respects the seller is the owner of the property. He can sell or otherwise transfer his right in the
goods to others. 31 He can himself maintain a titular
action against a third person. 32

530; Iron Wks. v. Paddock, 37 33— Post, p. 176.

Kan. 510. 34— Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich.

30 — See discussion of Buyer's 476, even without such provision

Rights, post, p. 176. in the contract; Ryan v. Wayson,

31— Everett v. Hale, 67 Me. 497, 108 Mich. 519, idem; Tufts v.

payments by buyer to the seller D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 24 Am.

are ineffective after notice that St. 79; Hegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal.

seller has transferred the title to 579; Gerow v. Castello, 11 Colo,

another; BumeU v. Marvin, 44 Vt. 560, 7 Am. St. 260; Smith v. Guf-

277, transferee can maintain a ford, 36 Fla. 481, 51 Am. St. 37,

trover action; Foundry Co. V. Pas- 18 So. 717; Perkins v. Grobben,

cagoula Co., 72 Miss. 608. 116 Mich. 172; Turk v. Carnahan,

32— Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 25 Ind. Ap. 125; Crompton V.

Recovery of Possession.-Being owner, he can retake
possession from the buyer or anyone holding under him.
If the buyer's contract provides that he shall have possession so long as he is not in default, the seller can not
retake possession before default. 33 But if the buyer is
in default the seller can retake possession, whether the
contract expressly gives him that right or not. 84
1

428; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Merchants
Bank, 136 U. S. 268; but cf. Third
Natl. Bk. v. Armstrong, 25 Minn
530; Iron Wks. v. Paddock, 37
Kan. 510.
30-See discussion of Buyer's
Rights, post, p. 176.
31-Everett v. Hale, 67 Me. 497,
payments by buyer to the seller
are ineffective after notice that
seller has transferred the title to
another; Burnell v. Marvin, 44 Vt.
271, transferee can maintain a
trover action; Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula Co., 72 Miss. 608.
32-Smith v . Gufford, 36 Fla.
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481, 51 Am. St. 37; see other
authorities cited in re the rights
of third persons.
33-Post, p. 176.
34-Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich.
476, even without such provision
in the contract; Ryan v. Wayson,
108 Mich. 519, idem,· Tufts v.
D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 24 Am.
St. 79; Hegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal.
579; Gerow v. Castello, 11 Colo.
560, 7 Am. St. 260; Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 51 Am. St. 37,
18 So. 717; Perkins v. Grobben,
116 Mich. 172; Turk v. Carnahan,
25 Ind. Ap. 125; Crompton v.
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There is strong authority that the seller may even use

such force as is necessary to retake possession, subject,

however, to criminal liability for breach of the peace.

There is conflict in this regard, however.®^

Furthermore, where the contract provides, either

expressly or by implication, that the seller may retake

possession in case of default, he may do so without first

giving back what he has received from the buyer.^^

After Suit for the Purchase Price. — This ris:ht

of the seller to retake possession if the conditional buyer

makes default may, or may not, be affected by his having

There is strong authority that the seller may even use
such force as is necessary to retake possession, subject,
however, to criminal liability for breach of the peace.
There is conflict in this regard, however. 36
Furthermore, where the contract provides, either
expressly or by implication, that the seller may retake
possession in case of default, he may do so without first
giving back what he has received from the buyer. 36

Beach, 62 Conn. 25; Segrist v.

Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287; Seanor

V. McLaughin, 165 Pa. 150; Walsh

V. Taylor, 39 Md. 598; Palmer v.

Kelly, 56 N. Y. 637, buyer had

failed to keep property insured as

--After Suit for the Purchase Price.-This right
of the seller to retake possession if the conditional buyer
makes default may, or may not, be affected by his having
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contract provided.

35— W. T. Walker Furniture Co.

V. Dyson, 32 App. D. C. 606, 19

L. R. A. (n. s.) 606, annotated.

36— Tufts V. D'Arcambal, 85

Mich. 185, 24 Am. St. 79; Perkins

V. Grobben, 116 Mich. 172; Cromp-

ton V. Beach, 62 Conn. 25; Lippin-

cott V. Rich, 22 Utah, 195; Duke

V. Shackleford, 56 Miss. 552;

Pfeifer v. Norman, 22 N. D. 168,

38 L. R. A. (n. s.) 891; Raymond

Co. V. Kahn, 124 Minn. 426; Fair-

banks V. Malloy, 16 111. Ap. 277,

because the retaking is not

strictly a rescission. Fleck v.

Warner, 25 Kan. 492; Hawkins v.

Hersey, 86 Me. 394, even in an ac-

tion for trover. Even in an action

for conversion by a third person,

in privity with the buyer, the de-

fendant can not set off payments

made and the seller is entitled to

the full value of the chattel,

Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk, etc.

Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500.

Contra, Hays v. Jordan, 85 Ga.

741.

Seller need not give up notes

received for future payments,

Kirby v. Tompkins, 48 Ark. 273;

Hoe V. Rex Mfg. Co., 205 Mass.

214.

This right to retake possession

without returning what the buyer

has paid has been changed by

statute in some states.

By thus retaking possession

without refunding money paid the

seller does not necessarily put an

end to the contract. Tufts v.

D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 24 Am.

St. 79.

Beach, 62 Conn. 25: Segrist v.
Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287; Seanor
v. McLaughin, 165 Pa. 150; Walsh
v. Taylor, 39 Md. 598; Palmer v.
Kelly, 56 N. Y. 637, buyer had
failed to keep property insured as
contract provided.
35-W. T. Walker Furniture Co.
v. Dyson, 32 App. D. C. 606, 19
L. R. A. (n. s.) 606, annotated.
36-Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85
Mich. 185, 24 Am. St. 79; Perkins
v. Grobben, 116 Mich. 172; Crompton v. Beach, 62 Conn. 25; Lippincott v. Rich, 22 Utah, 195; Duke
v. Shackleford, 56 Miss. 552;
Pfeifer v. Norman, 22 N. D. 168,
38 L. R. A. (n. s.) 891; Raymond
Co. v. Kahn, 124 Minn. 426; Fairbanks v. Malloy, 16 Ill. Ap. 277,
because the retaking is not
strictly a rescission. Fleck v.
Warner, 25 Kan. 492; Hawkins v.
Hersey, 86 Me. 394, even in an action for trover. Even in an action
for conversion by a third person,
in privity with the buyer, the defendant can not set off payments
made and the seller is entitled to
the full value of the chattel,
Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk, etc.
Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500.

Contra, Hays v. Jordan, 85 Ga.
741.
Seller need not give up notes
received for future payments,
Kirby v. Tompkins, 48 Ark. 273;
Hoe v. Rex Mfg. Co., 205 Mass.
214.
This right to retake possession
without returning what the buyer
has paid has been changed by
statute in some states.
By thus retaking possession
without refunding money paid the
seller does not necessarily put an
end to the contract. Tufts v.
D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 24 Am.
St. 79.
If the seller does intend by his
retaking of possession to rescind
the contract, it appears foat the
buyer may then sue to recover the
money he has paid. Miller v.
Steen, 30 Cal. 402, "If the contract has been rescinded, the
plaintiffs (buyers) are entitled to
recover the money paid. If the
contract was not rescinded, the
vendees became entitled to the
possession upon payment of the
full amount due."
See further, post, p. 103.

If the seller does intend by his

retaking of possession to rescind

the contract, it appears that the
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first brought suit for tlie purchase price. The courts

are anything but harmonious in regard to it. If the

right to sue for the purchase price is itself based, as

we have seen that many courts do base it, on the

assumption that possession until default is the quid

pro quo for the promise to pay the price, and that title

was not to pass till after payment, then title should not

pass merely because a suit for the price has been started,

or a judgment secured. Title, then, being still in the seller

and the condition on which the buyer's possession

depends having been broken, there is no logical reason

why the seller should not be allowed to retake possession.

Many courts do hold, for one reason or another, that the

seller is not precluded from retaking possession merely

because he has started a suit, or even secured a judg-

ment, for the purchase price.*''

Courts which put the seller 's right to sue for the price,

as such, instead of for damages, on the theory that he
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has elected to pass title to the buyer, do not, as a rule,

allow the seller to retake possession after such a suit,

even though the judgment has not been satisfied. Logi-

cally, having passed title, the seller has lost his right to

repossession.*^

37— Matthews v. Lucia, 55 Vt. Co., 244 Fed. 730, holding that

308; Fuller v. Byrne, 102 Mich, right to possession had not been

461; Canadian Co. v. Macgurn, lost by prior action in equity for

119 Mich. 533; Campbell, etc. Co. declaration of a lien in seller's

V. Rockaway Co., 56 N. J. L. 676, favor; Ratchford v. Cuyahoga, etc.

distinguishing Heller v. Elliott, 44 Co., 145 N. Y. S. 83, seller not pre-

N. J. L. 467, on the point that in eluded by suit for part of price

the latter case the seller had from setting up title as against a

levied upon the goods, under his mortgagee of the buyer; Hobart

judgment, as being the buyer's Elec. Co. v. Rooder, 121 N. Y. S.

property; Forbes Co. v. Wilson, 274, suit for part of price does not

144 Ala. 586, overruling a contrary preclude action in conversion

dictum In Davis v. Millings, 141 against buyer.

first brought suit for the purchase price. The courts
a re anything but harmonious in regai:d to it. If the
right to sue for the purchase price is itself based, as
we have seen that many courts do base it, on the
assumption that possession until default is the quid
pro quo for the promise to pay the price, and that title
was not to pass till after payment, then title should not
pass mer ely because a suit for the price has been started,
er a judgment secured. Title, then, being still in the seller
and the condition on which the buyer's possession
depends having been broken, there is no logical reason
why the seller should not be allowed to retake possession.
Many courts do hold, for one reason or another, that the
seller is not precluded from retaking possession merely
because he has started a suit, or even secured a judgment, for the purchase price. 87
Courts which put the seller's right to sue for the price,
as such, instead of for damages, on the theory that he
has elected to pass title to the buyer, do not, as a rule,
allow the seller to retake possession after such a suit,
even though the judgment has not been satisfied. Logically, having passed title, the seller has lost his right to
repossession. 88

Ala. 378; Thomason v. Lewis, 103 38— Turk v. Carnahan, 25 Ind.

Ala. 426; Rossiter v. Merriman, App. 125; Crompton v. Beach, 62

80 Kan. 738, analogy of suit on a Conn. 25; Frisch v. Ells, 200 Mass.

note as not releasing a mortgage. 429; Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass.

Cf. Meyer v. Pacific Machinery 172; Francis v. Bohart, — Ore.

37-Matthews v. Lucia, 55 Vt.
308 ; Fuller v . Byrne, 102 Mich.
461 ; Ca nadian Co. v. Macgurn,
119 Mich. 533 ; Ca mpbell, etc. Co.
v. Rock awa y Co., 56 N. J. L. 676,
distinguishing Helle r v . Elliott, 44
N. J. L . 467, on the point that in
the la tter case the seller had
levied upon t he goods, under his
j udgm ent , as being the buyer's
p roperty; Forbes Co. v. Wilson,
144 Ala . 586, overruling a contrary
aictum in Davis v. Millings, 141
Ala . 378; Thomason v. Lewis, 103
Ala. 426; Rossiter v. Merriman,
80 Kan. 738, analogy of su it on a
note as not releasing a mortgage.
Cf. Meyer v. Pacifi c Machinery
Di

·u~e

Co., 244 Fed. 730, holding that
right to possession had not been
lost by prior action in equity for
declaration of a lien in seller's
favor; Ratchford v. Cuyahoga, etc.
Co., 145 N. Y. S. 83, seller not precluded by suit for part, of price
from setting up title as against a
mortga gee of the buyer; Hobart
Elec. Co. v. Rooder, 121 N. Y. S.
274, suit for part of price does not
preclude a ction in conversion
against buyer.
38-Turk v . Carnahan, 25 Ind.
App. 125; Crompton v. Beach, 62
Conn. 25; Frisch v. Ells, 200 Mass.
42 9; Bail e y v. H e rvey, 135 Mass.
172 ; Francis v. Bohart, - Ore.
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In other cases repossession by the seller, after suit for

the price, is denied without statement of any definite

theory.*®

A way of escape for the seller from this proposition

that if he brings suit for the price he forfeits his right

to retake possession even though the judgment is not sat-

isfied, is suggested in Fuller v. Byrne.*'' The contract

In other cases repossession by the seller, after suit for
the price, is denied without statement of any definite
theory. 89
A way of escape for the seller from this proposition
that if he brings suit for the price he forfeits his right
to retake possession even though the judgment is not satisfied, is suggested in Fuller v. Byrne. 40 The contract
there provided that title should not pass to the buyer
until payment or until satisfaction of any judgment recovered. The court held that suit for the price and an unsatisfied judgment did not preclude the seller from retaking
possession. 41 The decision must mean that this court
considers the passing of title to be an effect of the suit,
but not a condition precedent to suit for the price.
A suit to recover installments due does not have the
same effect as a suit to recover the whole price, and the
seller does not, in most jurisdictions, lose his right to
retake possession because of a suit to recover installments.42
~

there provided that title should not pass to the buyer

until pajTuent or until satisfaction of any judgment recov-

ered. The court held that suit for the price and an unsat-

isfied judgment did not preclude the seller from retaking

possession.*^ The decision must mean that this court

considers the passing of title to be an effect of the suit,

but not a condition precedent to suit for the price.

A suit to recover installments due does not have the

same effect as a suit to recover the whole price, and the

seller does not, in most jurisdictions, lose his right to

retake possession because of a suit to recover install-
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ments.*^

L. R. A. 1916 A 922, "An action Mchts. etc. Bk. v. Thomas, 62 Tex.

for the purchase price of the prop- 237.

erty is an action on the contract, 40 — 102 Mich. 461.

and necessarily proceeds upon the ^^_^^ ^^^ ^^3^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^

theory that the title has been provision, an unsatisfied judgment

waived by the seller and vested ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^3 ^^1^ ^^ preclude

in the buyer"; Parke Co. v. White repossession by the seller in Bui-

River Co., 101 Cal. 37, suit is "a ^^^ ^ ^j,^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ 296.

ratification of the sale"; Holt 42_Haynes v. Temple, 198

Mfg. Co. V. Ewing, 109 Cal. 353, ^^^^_ ^^^. ^^^^^^^ ^^.^ ^.^^

an "election to treat the transac- ^^.^^^^ ^ ^^j^^^ 200 Mass. 429, 23

tion as an absolute sale." ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^44^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^

39 — Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165 that suit for the whole price does

Pa. 150; Manson v. Dayton, 153 end the right of repossession.

Fed. 258; Ramey v. Smith, 56 Ratchfield v. Cayuga, etc. Co., 145

Wash. 604; Chase v. Kelly, 125 N. Y. S. 83, affirmed 217 N. Y.

Minn. 317, dictum; Bell v. Old, 88 565; Silverstein v. Kohler, 58 Cal.

Ark. 99; Elwood State Bank v. Dec. 138. 183 Pac. 451.

Mock, 40 Ind. Ap. 685; Button v. Contra. Eilers Music House v.

Trader, 75 Mich. 295; Dowagiac Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, L. R. A.

Mfg. Co. V. Mahon, 13 N. D. 516; 1916 E. 613.

L. R. A. 1916 A 922, "An action
for the purchase price of the property is an action on the contract,
and necessarily proceeds upon the
theory tha t the title has been
waived by the seller and vested
in the buyer" ; Parke Co. v. White
River Co., 101 Cal. 37, suit is "a
ratification of the sale" ; Holt
Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal. 353,
an "election to treat the transaction as an absolute sale."
39-Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165
Pa. 150; Manson v. Dayton, 153
Fed. 258; Ramey v. Smith, 56
Wash. 604; Chase v . Kelly, 125
Minn. 317, dictum; Bell v. Old, 88
Ark. 99; Elwood State Bank v.
Mock, 40 Ind. Ap. 685; Button v.
Trader, 75 Mich. 295; Dowagiac
Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 13 N. D. 516;
Digitize by
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Mchts. etc. Bk. v. Thomas, 62 Tex.
237.
40-102 Mich. 461.
41-ln the absence of such a
provision, an unsatisfied judgment
for the price was held to preclude
repossession by the seller in Bulton v. Trader, 75 Mich. 296.
42-Haynes v. Temple, 198
Mass. 372; compare tu.is with
Frisch v. Wells, 200 Mass. 429, 23
L. R. A. (n. s.) 144, to the effect
that suit for the whole price does
end the right of repossession.
Ratchfield v. Cayuga, etc. Co., 145 N. Y. S. 83, affirmed 217 N. Y.
565; Silverstein v. Kohler, 58 Cal.
Dec. 138, 183 Pac. 451.
Oontra. Eilers Music House v.
Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, L. R. A.
1916 E. 613.
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After Other Acts. — Even in jurisdictions where

suit for the price is not held to indicate a passing of

title to the buyer, the seller's intent to treat it as having

passed may be shown in other ways, as by attaching the

goods, or levjdng upon them as the property of the buyer.

When he has so elected to treat them as the property of

the buyer he can not afterward repudiate that election

and retake possession.*^

Suit for Price After Retaking Possession. — If the

seller, instead of suing for the price, chooses to retake

possession, the cases are well agreed that he loses his

THE LAW OF SALES

--After Other Acts.-Even in jurisdictions where
suit for the price is not held to indicate a passing of
title to the buyer, the seller's intent to treat it as having
passed may be sho\\rn in other ways, as by attaching the
goods, or levying upon them as the property of the buyer.
When he has so elected to treat them as the property of
the buyer he can not afterward repudiate that election
and retake possession. 43

right to sue for the price. The theory on which this for-

feiture of the price is based is not so well settled, how-

ever. A number of courts put it on the ground that the

seller's right to retake the goods is by way of rescinding

the contract. Accordingly, if he has so retaken posses-

sion, he must have rescinded and there is in consequence

no contract on which he can bring a suit. They apply this
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even when the suit is on a promissory note given for the

price.** This theory is hardly consistent with the rule

43 — Elson V. Moore, 11 Cal. Ap. title in case of non-payment or to

377, suit and attachment; HeUer affirm it in the buyer. In such

V. Elliott, 44 N. J. L. 467, case, it was held, suit for the price

levy; Ramey v. Smith, 56 Wash, was an affirmance of the buyer's

604, levy; Orcutt v. Ricken- existing but voidable title.

brodt, 59 N. Y. S. 1008, accept- 44— Glisson v. Heggie Bros., 105

ance of a promissory note as pay- Ga. 30. In Turk v. Carnahan, 25

ment of the price; Fuller v. Ind. Ap. 125, the court expresses

Eames, 108 Ala. 464, attachment; the matter thus:— "The contract

Albright v. Meredith, 58 O. S. 194, sued on is a conditional one. The

levy. condition is that the title to the

Other cases may be distin- property sold, as described in the

gulshed on various grounds. Thus note, shall remain in the vendors

Suit for Price After Retaking Possession.-If the
seller, instead of suing for the price, chooses to retake
possession, the cases are well agreed that he loses his
right to sue for the price. The theory on which this forfeiture of the price is based is not so well settled, however. A number of courts put it on the ground that the
seller's right to retake the goods is by way of rescinding
the contract. Accordingly, if he has so retaken possession, he must have rescinded and there is in consequence
no contract on which he can bring a suit. They apply this
even when the suit is on a promissory note given for the
price. 44 This theory is hardly consistent with the rule

Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers, 53 (appellees) until the purchase

Kan. 743, 37 Pac. Ill, appears to money is fully paid. The title to

be a case in point. As a matter the property never passed from

of fact the court held, as regards appellees, and therefore never

part of the goods in controversy, vested in appellant. * ♦ • Upon

that the title to the goods had default of the vendee to pay, as

passed by mutual agreement with provided in the contract, the ven-

an option in the seller to retake dor has two remedies: 1. He may

43-Elson v. Moore, 11 Cal. Ap.
377, suit and attachment; Heller
v. Elliott, 44 N. J. L. 467,
levy; Ramey v. Smith, 56 Wash.
604, levy; Orcutt v. Rickenbrodt, 59 N. Y. S. 1008, acceptance of a promissory note as payment of the price; Fuller v.
Eames, 108 Ala. 464, attachment;
Albright v. Meredith, 58 0. S. 194,
levy.
Other cases may be distinguished on various grounds. Thus
Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers, 53
Kan. 743, 37 Pac. 111, appears to
be a case in point. As a matter
of fact the court held, as regards
part of the goods in controversy,
that the title to the goods had
passed by mutual agr em ent with
an option in the seller to retake
Di itiL
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title in case of non-payment or to
affirm it in the buyer. In such
case, it was held, suit for the price
was an affirmance of the buyer's
existing but voidable title.
44-Glisson v. Heggie Bros., 105
Ga. 30. In Turk v. Carnahan, 25
Ind. Ap. 125, the court expresses
the matter thus :-"The contract
sued on is a conditional one. The
condition is that the title to the
property sold, as described in the
note, shall remain in the vendors
(appellees) until the purchase
money is fully paid. The title to
the property never passed from
a.ppellees, and therefore never
vested in appellant. * • • Upon
default of the vendee to pay, as
provid d in the con tract, the vendor has two remedies: 1. He may
Ori ·r-al f r 1
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that the seller can retake without first giving back what

he has received, as he should do were it a true rescission.

Other courts follow a theory harmonious with the idea

that possession by the buyer is the real consideration

for his promise to pay. They hold that the seller can not

recover the price after he has retaken the goods because

through termination of the buyer's possession there has

occurred a failure of consideration.*^

Still other courts say, mthout any express reason, that

the remedies are inconsistent and retaking precludes suit

for the price.*"^

Underlying Theory. — From all this conflict of author-

ity no one, clear cut dispute of principle, much less any

established principle, can be deduced. The decisions are,

many of them, too vague for it to be sho^vn conclusively

that those on the one side hold to one definite, clear

107

that the seller can retake without first giving back what
he has received, as he should do were it a true rescission.
Other courts follow a theory harmonious vlith the idea
that possession by the buyer is the real consideration
for his promise to pay. They hold that the seller can not
recover the price after he has retaken the goods because
through termination of the buyer's possession there has
occurred a failure of consideration.45
Still other courts say, without any express reason, that
the remedies are inconsistent and retaking precludes suit
for the price. 46

retake the property, which is a
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disaffirmance of the sale; or 2.

He may treat the sale as absolute

and bring an action for the price.

The undisputed facts in this case

show that the appellees elected to

disaffirm the contract, and took

possession of the property de-

scribed in the note. Having as-

serted their right to disaffirm the

Underlying Theory.-From all this conflict of authority no one, clear cut dispute of principle, much less any
established principle, can be deduced. The decisions are,
many of them, too vague for it to be shown conclusively
that those on the one side hold to one definite, clear

contract, and having taken posses-

sion of the property under such

disaffirmance, appellees thereby

abandoned their right to treat the

sale as absolute and sue for the

price. The law will not permit a

vendor of property who retains

the legal title in himself to take

possession of it upon default of

payment, sell, or otherwise dis-

pose of it, and then sue the vendee

for the balance of the purchase

price."

45 — McBryan v. Universal Ele-

vator Co., 130 Mich. Ill; Perkins

V. Grobben, 116 Mich. 172; Minne-

sota Harvester Works v. Holly, 27

Minn. 495; Aultman & Co. v. Olson,

43 Minn. 409; Keystone Mfg. Co.,

74 Minn. 115; Earle v. Robinson,

36 N. Y. S. 176.

But, in accord with this theory,

if the buyer has had possession for

the agreed time before it was

taken from him, the seller can

recover. Equitable etc. Co. v. Pot-

ter, 48 N. Y. S. 647.

46 — Crompton v. Beach, 62

Conn. 25; Loomis v. Bragg, 50

Conn. 228; Seanor v. McLaughlin.

165 Pa. 150; Edmead v. Anderson,

103 N. Y. S. 369; Campbell Press

Co. V. Henkle, 19 D. C. 95; Green

V. Sinker, Davis & Co., 135 Ind.

434.

retake the property, which is a
disaffirmance of the sale; or 2.
He may treat the sale as absolute
and bring an action for the price.
The undisputed facts in this case
show that the appellees elected to
disaffirm the contract, and took
possession of the property described in the note. Having asserted their right to disaffirm the
contract, and having taken possession of the property under such
disaffirmance, appellees thereby
abandoned their right to treat the
sale as absolute and sue for the
price. The law will not permit a
vendor of property who retains
the legal title in himself to take
possession of it upon default of
payment, sell, or otherwise dispose of it, and then sue the vendee
for the balance of the purchase
price."
45-McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., 130 Mich. 111; Perkins
v. Grobben, 116 Mich. 172; Minn~·

sota Harvester Works v. Holly, 27
Minn. 495; Aultman & Co. v. Olson,
43 Minn. 409; Keystone Mfg. Co.,
74 Minn. 115; Earle v. Robinson,
36 N. Y. S. 176.
But, in accord with this theory,
if the buyer has had possession for
the agreed time before it was
taken from him, the seller can
recover, Equitable etc. Co. v. Potter, 48 N. Y. S. 647.
46-Crompton v. Beach, 62
Conn. 25; Loomis v. Bragg, 50
Conn. 228; Seanor v. McLaughlin,
165 Pa. 150; Edmead v. Anderson,
103 N. Y. S. 369; Campbell Press
Co. v. Henkle, 19 D. C. 95; Green
v. Sinker, Davis & Co., 135 Ind.
434.
Contra. Dederick v. Wolfe, 68
Miss. 500, on theory that retaking
was not a rescission, but merely a
taking of possession by way of
security; McDaniel v. Chiaramonte, 61 Ore. 403, idem.

Contra. Dederick v. Wolfe, 68

Miss. 500, on theory that retaking
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was not a rescission, but merely a

taking of possession by way of

security; McDaniel v. Chiara-

monte, 61 Ore. 403, idem.
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theory and those on the other side believe positively

in a converse of that theory. But from a general survey

of the whole there is little doubt that the division is •

caused, however vague the motivating idea may be in

any particular case, by disagreement as to whether the

transfer of title is the consideration for the promise

to pay, even though the transfer is to be made only

after pajnuent, or whether something else, such as the

possession of the property, is the consideration for the

price and the transfer of title merely a condition sub-

sequent. If possession, for instance, is the consideration,

the seller ought logically, when he has executed that

consideration, to be permitted to sue for the price,

whether he has passed title, or can pass it, or not.

Correlatively, if he has sued for the price, such suit

should not necessarily indicate that he thereby passed

title, and he ought still to be allowed to retake posses-

sion. On the other hand, if title is the consideration
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for the price, he could not logically sue for the price

without having passed title, with or without the buyer's

assent. Having so sued, and thus shown an election

to treat title as passed, he could not logically be there-

after allowed to retake possession by asserting title in

himself.

The real conflict appears to be, therefore, whether, in

the absence of any clear expression, the courts will treat

the possession or the title as the real consideration and

will assume the buyer's agreement to be a promise to

pay in consideration of the possession, mth passing of

title as a condition subsequent, or a promise to pay in

consideration of the title, with possession as a condition

precedent.

Some, at least, of the apparent conflict within jurisdic-

tions may be due to the fact that in a particular case there

is enough evidence of a 7~eal intent to overcome the cus-

tomary judicial presumption.*"'

47— Thus in Massachusetts it has been held that a conditional

THE LAW OF SALES

theory and those on the other side believe positively
in a converse of that theory. But from a general survey
of the whole there is little doubt that the division is
caused, however vague the nlotivating idea may be in
any particular case, by disagreement as to whether the
transfer of title is the consideration for the promise
to pay, even though the transfer is to be made only
after payment, or whether something else, such as the
possession of the property, is the consideration for the
price and the transfer of title merely a condition subsequent. If possession, for instance, is the consideration,
the seller ought logically, when he has executed that
consideration, to be permitted to sue for the price,
whether he has passed title, or can pass it, or not.
Correlatively, if he has sued for the price, such suit
should not necessarily indicate that he thereby passed
title, and he ought still to be allowed to retake possession. On the other hand, if title is the consideration
for the price, he could not logically sue for the price
without having passed title, with or without the buyer's
assent. Having so sued, and thus shown an election
to treat title as passed, he could not logically be thereafter allowed to retake possession by asserting title in
himself.
The real conflict appears to be, therefore, whether, in
the absence of any clear expression, the courts will treat
the possession or the title as the real consideration and
will assume the buyer's agreement to be a promise to
pay in consideration of the possession, with passing of
title as a condition subsequent, or a pr01nise to pay in
consideration of the title, with possession as a condition
precedent.
Some, at least, of the apparent conflict within jurisdictions may be due to the fact that in a particular case there
i · nou h vidence of a real intent to overcome the customary judicial presumption. 47
47-Thus in Massachusetts it
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POSSESSION RETAINED, BUT TITLE P ASSED

3. Possession Retained, but Title Passed

Recovery of Price.— A seller who has parted with title

is himself entitled to the purchase price, and may sue

for it, in an action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit,

accordingly.* This action can not be maintained, how-

ever, if the seller has given credit, until the period

of credit has expired. Until that time the seller is not

entitled to payment of the sum, as a debt, and there is

no breach of contract on the part of the buyer in failing

to pay it. Even the refusal of the buyer to accept the

goods as tendered, or his becoming insolvent, obviously

can not advance the date at which the seller Y\^as to be-

come entitled to the purchase price and he can not there-

fore sue for it before that time.*^

But if the credit was obtained by fraud it is sometimes

held that the seller is allowed to rescind so much of

the contract as appertains to the credit, while treating

that part which pertains particularly to the transfer of
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title and the price as still in force. In such case he may

sue for the price just as though no credit had been

seller who had brought suit for rier was expressly stated to be the

the purchase price could not there- consideration. Compare also, Hel-

after retake possession, Bailey v. ler v. Elliott, 44 N. J. L. 467 and

Hervey, 135 Mass. 172, and that Campbell etc. Co. v. Rockaway

such a seller could not recover Co., 56 N. J. L. 676; Holt Mfg. Co.

the purchase price after destrue- v. Ewing, 109 Cal. 353, and Matte-

tion of the property, Tobbut v. son v. Equitable Mining Co., 143

Amer. Ins. Co., 185 Mass. 419. Yet Cal. 436; Forbes Co. v. Wilson,

the same court has held that a 144 Ala. 586; Alexander v. Mobile

conditional seller could recover Auto Co., 200 Ala. 586, 76 So. 944.

the full amount of the purchase 48 — Tatum v. Ackerman, 148

price without having passed title, Cal. 357, 113 Am. St. 276; Brady

Recovery of Price.·-A seller who has parted ·w ith title
is himself entitled to the purchase price, and may sue
for it, in an action of debt or indebitatus assum psit,
accordingly.* This action can not be maintained, however, if the seller has given credit, until the period
of credit has expired. Until that time the seller is not
entitled to payment of the sum, as a debt, and there is
no breach of contract on the part of the buyer in failing
to pay it. Even the refusal of the buyer to accept the
goods as tendered, or his becoming insolvent, obviously
can not advance the date at which the seller was to become entitled to the purchase price and he can not therefore sue for it before that time. 48
But if the credit was obtained by fraud it is sometimes
held that the seller is allowed to rescind so much of
the contract as appertains to the credit, while treating
that part which pertains particularly to the transfer of
title and the price as still in force. In such case he may
sue for the price just as though no credit had been

White v. Solomon, 164 Mass. 516. v. Isler, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 356; Brad-

This may well be explained on the ford v. Marbury, 12 Ala. 520;

ground that the courts of Massa- Keller v. Strasburger, 90 N. Y.

chusetts will not presume that in 379; Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serge &

an ordinary conditional sale the Rawle (Pa.) 19; Button v. Solo-

possession is the consideration monson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 582; Mus-

for the price, but that in White v. sen v. Price, 4 East. 147.

Solomon the delivery to the car-

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 63, (1).

seller who had brought suit for
rier was expressly stated to be the
the purchase price could not there- consideration. Compare also, Rel·
after retake possession, Bailey v. ler v. Elliott, 44 N. J. L. 467 and
Hervey, 135 Mass. 172, and that Campbell etc. Co. v. Rockaway
such a seller could not recover Co., 56 N. J. L. 676; Holt Mfg. Co.
the purchase price after destruc- v. Ewing, 109 Cal. 353, and Matte·
tion of the property, Tobbut v. son v. Equitable Mining Co., 143
Amer. Ins. Co., 185 Mass. 419. Yet Cal. 436; Forbes Co. v. Wilson,
the same court has held that a 144 Ala. 586; Alexand er v. Mobile
conditional seller could recover Auto Co., 200 Ala. 586, 76 So. 944.
the full amount of the purchase
48-Tatum v. Ackerman, 148
price without having passed title, Cal. 357, 113 Am . St. 276; Brady
White v. Solomon, 164 Mass. 516. v. Isler, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 356; BradThis may well be explained on the ford v. Marbury, 12 Ala. 520;
ground that the courts of Massa- Keller v. Strasburger, 90 N. Y.
chusetts will not presume that in 379; Girard v. Taggart, 5 Serge &
an ordinary conditional sale the Rawle (Pa.) 19; Dutton v. Solopossession is the consideration monson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 582; l\1us·
for the price, but that in White v. sen v. Price, 4 East. 147.
Solomon the delivery to the car*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 63, (1).
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given.*^ Other courts, however, more logically, hold that

the matter of credit is an intrinsic part of the contract

of sale and that the contract must be rescinded as a

whole, or not at all, and that therefore the seller can not

sue for the purchase price before the period of credit has

expired, even in cases of fraud.^''

Breach of Contract. — Of course, if the buyer refuses

given. 49 Other courts, however, more logically, hold that
the matter of credit is an intrinsic part of the contract
of sale and that the contract must be rescinded as a
whole, or not at all, and that therefore the seller can not
sue for the purchase price before the period of credit has
expired, even in cases of fraud. 60

to pay the price when due, the seller can, if he chooses,

sue to recover damages for breach of the contract instead

of suing in debt for the price itself.

Breach of Contract.-Of course, if the buyer refuses

But where title has already passed and the buyer

merely refuses to receive the possession, the damage

to the seller from that refusal itself is slight, if any-

thing. This refusal, however, may and presumably does

indicate an intent on the buyer's part not to pay

when payment becomes due. It may amount, therefore,

to an anticipatory breach. The buyer can not be said

to have broken his promise to pay, since the time for pay-
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ment has not arrived. He may be said, however, to have

impliedly announced that he will not pay when the time

does come ; in other words, to have committed an antici-

patory breach of the contract. If this is the fair impli-

cation, he may be sued at once for damages resulting

from his breach, in most jurisdictions.®**

49 — Heillbronn v. Herzog, 165 might at once sue for damages for

N. Y. 98; Willson v. Force, 6 breach of the agreement to give

Johns. (N. Y.) 110; Joffray v. "security," i. e., the notes. It was

Wolf, 4 Okla. 303. further held that the damage from

50 — Jones v. Brown, 167 Pa. 395. thi^ failure to give the notes was

51 — Nichols V. Scranton Steel "the whole damages equal to the

Co., 137 N. Y. 471; Engesett v. value of the security had it been

McGilvray, 63 111. Ap. 461; in given, prima facie the amount of

Orr V. Leathers, 27 Ind. Ap. 572, the sum secured." (Author's

it was held that on the buyer's re- italics). Citing 2 Sutherland on

fusal to give promissory notes as Damages (2d Ed.) sec. 644.

agreed, the seller need not wait Cook v. Stevenson, 30 Mich. 242;

for the expiration of the credit but Hanna v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. Y.)

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 51.

to pay the price when due, the seller can, if he chooses,
sue to recover damages for breach of the contract instead
of suing in debt for the price itself.
But where title has already passed and the buyer
merely refuses to receive the possession, the damage
to the seller from that refusal itself is slight, if anything. This refusal, however, may and presumably does
indicate an intent on the buyer's part not to pay
when payment becomes due. It may amount, therefore,
to an anticipatory breach. The buyer can not be said
to have broken his promise to pay, since the time for payment has not arrived. He may be said, however, to have
impliedly announced that he will not pay when the time
does come; in other words, to have committed an anticipatory breach of the contract. If this is the fair implication, he may be sued at once for damages resulting
from his breach, in most jurisdictions. 6u

,,

49-Heillbronn v. Herzog, 165
might at once sue for damages for
N. Y. 98; Willson v. Force, 6 breach of the agreement to give
Johns. (N. Y.) 110; Joffray v.
"security," i. e., the notes. It was
Wolf, 4 Okla. 303 .
further held that the damage from
50-Jones v. Brown, 167 Pa. 395. thi~ failure to give the notes was
51-Nichols v. Scranton Steel
"the whole damages equal to the
Co., 137 N. Y. 471; Engesett v.
value of the security had it been
McGilvray, 63 Ill. Ap . 461; in
given, pri m.a facie the amoun t of
Orr v. L eathe r s, 27 Ind. Ap . 572, the sum secured."
(Author's
italics). Citing 2 Sutherland on
it was h eld t hat on the b uyer's refu sal to give pr omissory notes as Da mages (2d Ed.) sec. 644.
Cook v. Stevenson, 30 Mich. 242;
agr eed, the sell r need not wait
for th e exp ira tion of the cr edit but H anna v. Mills, 21 Wend. (N. Y.)
*See Uniform Sales Act , Section 51.
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Seller's Lien.-When the title has passed to the buyer,
but the seller has r etained posses ion, he, the seller, has
a right, unless he has given credit to the buyer, to keep
that possession till payment.
This right to retain pos ession till p ayment is called
a seller's, or vendor's, lien. 62 * It has nothing to d~ with
the right of an owner to retain po ssession of his own
goods. It is independent of title. Indeed a seller's lien
exists only when title has passed out of the seller. Its existence "always presupposes that title to the goods ha&
passed to the vendee ; since it would be an incongruous
conception that a vendor might have a lien on his own
goods. '' 68
The seller's right of continued possession, until payment, is effective even against a purchaser for value
from the original buyer. 64
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Seller's Lien. — When the title has passed to the buyer,

but the seller has retained possession, he, the seller, has

a right, unless he has given credit to the buyer, to keep

that possession till payment.

This right to retain possession till payment is called

a seller's, or vendor's, lien}^* It has nothing to do with

the right of an owner to retain possession of his own

goods. It is independent of title. Indeed a seller's lien

exists only when title has passed out of the seller. Its ex-

istence ''always presupposes that title to the goods has

passed to the vendee; since it would be an incongruous

conception that a vendor might have a lien on his own

goods. "^*

The seller's right of continued possession, until pay-

ment, is effective even against a purchaser for value

from the original buyer.^*

90; Manufacturing Co. v. Cereal

Co., 124 Iowa 737.
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As analogous issues in cases

not involving sales, Wolf v. Marsh,

54 Cal. 228; Hosmer v. Wilson, 7

Mich. 294; Chapman v. Kansas

City R. R., 146 Mo. 481; Burtis

V. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246; Frost

V. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. Ill; Inch-

90; Manufacturing Co. v. Cereal
Co., 124 Iowa 737.
As analogous issues in cases
not involving sales, Wolf v. Marsh,
54 Cal. 22 8 ; Hosmer v. Wilson, 7
Mich. 294; Chapman v. Kansas
City R. R., 146 Mo. 481; Burtis
v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246; Frost
v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111; Inchbold v. Western etc. Co., 17 C. B.
(n. s.) 733; Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. &
Co. 325.
Contra, Daniels v. Newton, 114
Mass. 530; King v. Waterman, 55
Neb. 324.
52-Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.
Ap. 353, 382; Burke v. Dunn, 117
Mich. 430; Hoskins v. Warren,
115 Mass. 514 ; Perrine v. Barnard,
142 Ind. 44 8; Sparger v. Huffman,
15 Ky. L. R. 848 ; Cragin v. O'Connell, 63 N. Y. 1071.
53- Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.
Ap. 352, 8 L. R. A. 147; Perrine
v. Barnard, 142 Ind. 448 ; Arnold
v. Delano, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33,
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section

bold V. Western etc. Co., 17 C. B.

(n. s.) 733; Ford v. Tiley, 6 B. &

Co. 325.

Contra, Daniels v. Newton, 114

Mass. 530; King v. Waterman, 55

Neb. 324.

52 — Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.

Ap. 353, 382; Burke v. Dunn, 117

Mich. 430; Hoskins v. Warren,

115 Mass. 514; Perrine v. Barnard,

142 Ind. 448; Sparger v. Huffman,

15 Ky. L. R. 848; Cragin v. O'Con-

nell, 63 N. Y. 1071.

53 — Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.

Ap. 352, 8 L. R. A. 147; Perrine

V. Barnard, 142 Ind. 448; Arnold

V. Delano, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33,

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section

"The term lien Imports, that by

the contract of sale, and a formal

symbolical or constructive deliv-

ery, the property has vested in the

vendee; because no man can have

a lien on his own goods. The very

definition of a lien is, a right to

hold goods, the property of an-

other in security for some debt,

duty or other obligation. If the

holder is the owner the right to

retain is a right incident to the

right of property * * * ."

This is not, however, always

kept clearly in mind by some

courts, with a resultant confusion

of idea. See Post, p. 114.

"The term lien imports, that by
the contract of sale, and a formal
symbolical or constructive delivery, the property has vested in the
vendee; because no man can have
a lien on his own goods. The very
definition of a lien is, a right to
hold goods, the property of another in security for some debt,
duty or other obligation. If the
holder is the owner the right to
retain is a right incident to the
right of property * * * ."
This is not, however, always
kept clearly in mind by some
courts, with a resultant confusion
of idea. See Post, p. 114.
54-McElwee v. Metropolitan
Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Robinson
v. Morgan, 65 Vt. 37; Vogelsang's
Admr. v. Fisher, 128 Mo. 386;
Ware River R. R. Co. v. Vibbard,
114 Mass. 447; R. R. Co. v. Plant,
45 Mo. 517; Perrine v. Barnard,
142 Ind. 448; Dixon v. Yates, 5
B. & Ad. 313.
54, (1).

54 — McElwee v. Metropolitan

Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Robinson
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--Effect of Loss of Possession.-There is no seller's
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Effect of Loss of Possession. — There is no seller's

lien, however, unless the title has passed to the buyer

without a transfer of possession. That is to say, the

right to keep possession of the goods until payment

depends upon the fact that the seller has already stead-

fastly retained possession despite the change of title.

By delivering actual possession of the goods to the buyer

the seller loses his right to any further possession,

whether he has been paid or not.*^

But delivery of mere constructive possession to the

buyer does not affect the seller's lien. If he has retained

the actual possession, his right to continue in possession

is not impaired. In Woodland Co. v. Mendenhall,^^ for

instance, the seller sold copper wire to the defendant

and strung the wire on the defendant's poles. The

seller Company, however, was operating the defendant 's

railroad at the time and therefore had physical posses-

sion of the defendant's poles and other property. The
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court accordingly said that while constructive possession

of the wire might have passed to the buyer by virtue of

attachment to its poles, yet as the poles themselves were

in the actual possession of the seller, the actual posses-

sion of the wire had also been retained by the seller

and therefore its seller's lien still existed. In another

case" the plaintiff had sold to one Dewey a number of

barrels of whiskey then stored in a bonded warehouse.

As part of the contract plaintiff was obliged to ship

the whiskey to the buyer when and as ordered. Notice

of the sale was given to the warehouse man and he

55 — Haskins v. Warren, 115 the lien has attached, he is de-

Mass. 514; Sparger v. Huffman, vested of the lien."

15 Ky. L. R. 848; Meyers v. Statutes in some states provide

McAllister, 94 Minn. 510; Pickett for certain rights of repossession

V. Bullock, 52 N. H. 254, "Posses- by the seller even after he has

sion is not only essential to the transferred possession. See Jones,

creation, but also to the continu- Liens,

ance of a lien; and when the party 56 — 82 Minn. 483.

vohintarily parts with the posses- 57 — Mohr v. Boston & Albany

Blon of the property upon which R. R. Co., 106 Mass. 67.

lien, however, unless the title has passed to the buyer
without a transfer of possession. That is to say, the
right to keep possession of the goods until payment
depends upon the fact that the seller has already st eadfastly retained possession despite the change of title.
By delivering actual possession of the goods to the buyer
the seller loses his right to any further possession,
whether he has been paid or not. 55
But delivery of mere constructive possession to the
buyer does not affect the seller's lien. If he has retaine<l
the actual possession, his right to continue in possession
is not impaired. In Woodland Co. v. l\1endenhall, 56 for
instance, the seller sold copper wire to the defendant
and strung the wire on the defendant's poles. The
seller Company, however, was operating the defendant's
railroad at the time and therefore had physical possession of the defendant's poles and other property. The
court accordingly said that while constructive possession
of the wire might have passed to the buyer by virtue of
attachment to its poles, yet as the ·p oles themselves were
in the actual possession of the seller, the actual possession of the wire had also been retained by the seller
and therefore its seller's lien still existed. In another
case 57 the plaintiff had sold to one Dewey a number of
barrels of whiskey then stored in a bonded warehouse.
As part of the contract plaintiff was obliged to ship
the whiskey to the buyer when and as ordered. Notice
of the sale was given to the warehouse man and he
55-Haskins v. Warren, 115
Mass. 514; Sparger v. Huffman,
15 Ky. L. R. 848; Meyers v.
McAllister, 94 Minn. 510; Pickett
v. Bullock, 52 N. H . 254, "Possession is not only essent1 al to the
creation, b ut also to the continuance of a Hen ; and when the party
voluntarily parts with the possession of the property upon which
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the lien has attached, he is devested of the lien."
Statutes in some states provide
for certain rights of re possession
by the seller even after he has
transferred possession. See Jones,
Liens.
56-82 Minn . 483.
57-Mohr v. Boston & Albany
R.R. Co., 106 Mass. 67.
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thereupon certified that he held the whiskey for the
buyer, Dewey, as owner. The court held that even under
these circumstances Dewey had acquired only a constructive possession and not an actual one. 68 *
Whether or not there has been an actual delivery of
possession to the buyer, as distinct from a merely .constructive one, has been said to be a question of fact for
the jury if the facts from which it is to be determined
are themselves uncertain. 59 The great majority of courts,
however, treat it, without comment, as a question to be
decided by the court itself.
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thereupon certified that he held the whiskey for the

buyer, Dewey, as owner. The court held that even under

those circumstances Dewey had acquired only a con-

structive possession and not an actual one.^®*

Whether or not there has been an actual delivery of

possession to the buyer, as distinct from a merely 'Con-

structive one, has been said to be a question of fact for

the jury if the facts from which it is to be determined

are themselves uncertain. ^^ The great majority of courts,

however, treat it, without comment, as a question to be

decided by the court itself.

Delivery to Carrier. — Since a carrier to whom

goods have been given for transportation is treated as the

agent of the buyer in so many ways, such as to assent

to the passing of title and as to make the buyer liable

for goods sold and delivered, it is a logical assumption

that by delivery to a carrier, without express restric-

tion, the seller loses hisi lien. The seller would have

--Delivery to Carrier.-Since a carrier to whom
goods have been given for transportation is treated as the
agent of the buyer in so many ways, such as to assent
to the passing of title and as to make the buyer liable
for goods sold and delivered, it is a logical assumption
that by delivery to a carrier, without express restriction, the seller loses his , lien. The seller would have
parted with possessio;n, not merely constructively, but
actually, to an agent of the ·b uyer. The case would rarely
arise in practice, however. The fact that goods were
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parted with possession, not merely constructively, but

actually, to an agent of the buyer. The case would rarely

arise in practice, however. The fact that goods were

58 — The seller's lien is not lost dee, it is only because of the mani-

"by any species of constructive fest intention of the vendor utter-

delivery, so long as he (the seller) ly to abandon all claim and right

retains the actual custody of the of possession, taken in connection

goods, either by himself, or by with the difficulty or impossibility

his own agent or servant", Con- of making an actual and manual

rad V. Fisher, 37 Mo. Ap. 352, 8 transfer, that such a delivery is

L. R. A. 147, citing many author- considered as sufficient to annul

Ities. McElwee v. Metropolitan the lien of the vendor." Miles v.

Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Arnold Gorton, 2 C. & M. 504, goods stored

V. Delano, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33; by seller at buyer's cost.

Vogelsang's Admr. v. Fisher, 128 Delivery of negotiable ware-

Mo. 386; Thompson v. Baltimore house receipts so far passes pos-

& Ohio R. R., 28 Md. 396, 407, "In session to the buyer as to preclude

all cases of symbolical delivery, a lien in the seller, Rummel v.

58-The seller's lien is not lost dee, it is only because of the mani"by any species of constructive fest intention of the vendor utterdelivery, so long as he (the seller)
ly to abandon all claim and ri ght
retains the actual custody of the of possession, taken in connection
go9ds, either by himself, or by with the difficulty or impossibility
his own agent or servant", Con- of making an actual and manual
rad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. Ap. 352, 8 transfer, that such a delivery is
L. R. A. 147, citing many author- considered as sufficient to annul
ities. McElwee v. Metropolitan the lien of the vendor." Miles v.
Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Arnold Gorton, 2 C. & M. 504, goods stored
v. Delano, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33;
by seller at buyer's cost.
Vogelsang's Admr. v. Fisher, 128
Delivery of negotiable wareMo. 386; Thompson v. Baltimore house receipts so far passes pos& Ohio R. R., 28 Md. 396, 407, "In session to the buyer as to preclude
all cases of symbolical delivery, a lien in the seller, Rummel v.
which is the only species of con- Blanchard, 216 N. Y. 348.
structive delivery sufficient to
59-Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.
give a final possession to the ven- Ap. 352.
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 54, (2).

which is the only species of con- Blanchard, 216 N. Y. 348.

structive delivery sufficient to 59 — Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo.

give a final possession to the ven- Ap. 352.

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 54, (2).
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shipped without payment would indicate that credit had

been given. This credit would be a defense to a claim

of lien, without raising any issue of possession. On the

other hand, if the credit had been lost by insolvency, a

right of s.toppage in transitu would exist and it would be

unnecessary to assert any claim of a lien.

Of course, if the goods have been delivered to a carrier

with directions not to give possession to the buyer until

pajTnent — the ordinary ''C. 0. D." shipment — the lien

would not be lost, as the carrier would clearly not be

the buyer's agent for possession.

Loss of Possession Due to Fraud. — It is said by

some writers upon the subject that a seller's lien is not

lost, as between the parties at least, even though the buyer

has obtained possession of the goods, if the possession

was secured by fraud. This appears reasonable, but the

shipped without payment would indicate that credit had
been given. This credit would be a defense to a claim
of lien, without raising any issue of possession. On the
other hand, if the credit had been lost by insolvency, a
right of stoppage in transitu would exist and it would be
unnecessary to assert any claim of a lien.
Of course, if the goods have been delivered to a carrier
with directions not to give possession to the buyer until
payment-the ordinary '' C. 0. D. '' shipment-the lien
would not be lost, as the carrier would clearly not be
the .b uyer's agent for possession.

cases cited to support these statements do not actually

bear them out. In each case there is a confusion between
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the ideas of title and of seller's lien, and it appears that

the seller's right to regain possession was based upon

the retention of title till payment, rather than upon a

true lien.®°*

Loss of Possession for a Special Purpose. — ^It is

also said that the lien is not lost by mere delivery of pos-

session to the buyer for some specific purpose, such as

60 — Jones on Liens, sec. 830; strongly implied that fiiZe had not

Williston on Sales, sec. 511; passed from the seller, the court

Meechem Sales, sec. 1488; Wool- saying, "It is very clear that until

sey V. Axton & Son, 192 Pa. 526; the (buyer) had the right of pos-

Bush V. Bender, 113 Pa. 94. In session it could not communicate

McGill V. Chilhowee Lumber Co., a title to any purchaser." How-

Ill Tenn. 552, 82 S. W. 210, it is ever, as the court had held, in an-

said specifically that the seller's other connection, that the risk of

lien was not lost merely because loss was not vipon the seller, as

the buyer had wrongfully dispos- owner, this case does support the

eessed him of the property, proposition.

--Loss of Possession Due to Fraud.-It is said by
some writers upon the subject that a seller's lien is not
lost, as between the parties at least, eve:ri though the buyer
has obtained possession of the goods, if the possession
was secured by fraud. This appears reasonable, but the
cases cited to support these statements do not actually
bear them out. In each case there is a confusion between
the ideas of title and of seller's lien, and it appears that
the seller's right to regain possession was based upon
the retention of title till payment, rather than upon a
true lien. 60 *

Almost in the next breath it is

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 56, (1).

--Loss of Possession for a Special Purpose.-It is
also said that the lien is not lost by mere delivery of possession to the buyer for some specific purpose, such as
60-Jones on Liens, sec. 830;
Williston on Sales, sec. 511;
Meechem Sales, sec. 1488; Woolsey v. Axton & Son, 192 Pa. 526;
Bush v. Bender, 113 Pa. 94. In
McGill v. Chilhowee Lumber Co.,
111 Tenn. 552, 82 S. W. 210, it is
said specifically that the seller's
lien was not lost merely because
the buyer had wronr;fully dispo~
sessed hlm of the property.
Almost in the next breath it is
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
D1giti.l
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strongly implied that title had not
passed from the seller, the court
saying, "It is very clear that until
the (buyer) had the right of possession it could not communicate
a title to any purchaser." However, as the court had held, in another connection, that the risk of
loss was not upon the seller, as
owner, this case does support the
proposition.
56, (1).
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inspection. But here a^jain the cases are confused in

their stated ideas of a lien, and indicate that the seller's

light to repossession is really based upon the fact that

he retained title until payment. And as we have already

seen, title, if retained till payment, is in no Avise affected

by delivery of posession to the buyer. It is therefore

at least somewhat doubtful if a seller who has really

parted mth title has any right to a seller's Uen after he

has deliberately parted with possession to the buyer, for

any purpose.^^

Loss of Possession of Part of the Goods. — Delivery

of possession of part of the goods terminates the lien

upon that part, but the lien on the part retained is valid to

the extent of the entire purchase price due. Again, how-

inspection. But here again the cases are confused in
their stated ideas of a lien, and indicate that the seller's
right to repossession is really based upon the fact that
he retained title until payment. And as we have already
seen, title, if retained till payment, i in no wise affected
by delivery of posession to the buyer. It is there{ore
at least somewhat doubtful if a seller who has r eally
parted with title has any right to a seller's lien after he
has deliberately parted with possession to the buyer, for
any purpose.62

ever, the authority is scanty .^^*

Effect of Giving Credit. — The seller's lien is predi-

cated upon the assumption that, though the parties

intended to pass title at once, they also intended that
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delivery of possession should be concurrent with pay-

ment. Since the lien thus depends on intention, there

will be no lien if the parties appear to have intended that

62 — Palmer v. Hand, 13 Johns, lien upon the property." Morris

(N. Y.) 432, "Where no credit is v, Rexford, 18 N. Y. 555; Ames v.

stipulated for, the vendor has a Moir, 130 111. 582; Haskins v. War-

--Loss of Possession of Part of the Goods.-Delivery
of possession of part of the goods terminates the lien
upon that part, but the lien on the part retained is valid to
the extent of the entire purchase price due. Again, however, the authority is scanty.63 *

lien, so that if the goods be ac- ren, 115 Mass. 514; Lamb v. Utley,

tually delivered to the vendee, 146 Mich. 654; Caldwell v. Tutt,

and upon demand then made he 10 Lea (Tenn.) 258.

refuses to pay, the property is not 63-Williams v. Moore, 5 N. H.

changed, and the vendor may law- 335; Wanamaker v. Yerkes, 70 Pa.

fully take the goods as his own, ^43^ confuses title and lien; Mc-

because the delivery was condi- ^^^^^ ^ Metropolitan Lumber Co.,

tional." Russell V. Minor, 22 Wend, gg p^^ 3^2 . McFarland v. Wheel-

(N. Y.) 662, "the delivery is con- ^^^ 36 Wend. (N. Y.) 467; Dixon v.

ditional and does not become com- Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313, 341; Bolton

plete so as to change the right of vL&YRRCoLRlCP

--Effect of Giving Credit.-The seller's lien is predicated upon the assumption that, though the parties
intended to pass title at once, they also intended that
delivery of possession should be concurrent with payment. Since the lien thus depends on intention, there
will be no lien if the parties appear to h.a ve intended that

property until the condition Is

complied with, * * * and the ven-

dor does not thereby part with his

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 55,

62-Palmer v. Hand, 13 Johns.
(N. Y.) 432, "Where no credit is

431; Ex parte Cooper, 11 Ch. Div.

68.

lien upon the property." Morris
v. Rexford, 18 N. Y. 555; Ames v.
Moir, 130 Ill. 582; Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Lamb v. Utley,
146 Mich. 654; Caldwell v. Tutt,
10 Lea (Tenn.) 258.

stipulated for, the vendor has a
lien, so that if the goods be actually delivered to the vendee,
and upon demand then made he
refuses to pay, the property is not
63-Williams v. Moore, 5 N. H.
changed, and the vendor may law- 235; Wanamaker v. Yerkes, 70 Pa.
fully take the goods as his own, 443, confuses title and lien; Mcbecause the delivery was condi- Elwee v. Metropolitan Lumber Co.,
tional." Russell v. Minor, 22 Wend. 69 Fed. 302; McFarland v. Wheel(N. Y.) 662, "the delivery is coner, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467; Dixon v.
ditional and does not become com- Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313, 341; Bolton
plete so as to change the right of v. L. & Y. R. R. Co., L. R. 1 C. P.
property until the condition is
431; Ex parte Cooper, 11 Ch. Div.
complied with, * * * and the ven68.
dor does not thereby part with hls
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 5i~
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possession should pass before payment. So, if the seller

has given the buyer credit, without expressly stipulating

for retention of possession, it is presumed that he

intended the buyer to have possession without concur-

rent payment. As Chief Justice Shaw put it, *'A lien

for the price is incident to the contract of sale, when

there is no stipulation therein to the contrary, because

a man is not required to part with his goods until he is

paid for them. But conventio legem vincit; and when a

credit is given by agreement, the vendee has a right to

the custody and actual possession, on a promise to pay at

a future time. He may then take the goods away, and into

his own actual possession; and if he does so, the lien

of the vendor is gone, it being a right incident to the

possession."^*

Expiration of Credit. — If the buyer does not take

advantage of his right of possession, but leaves the seller

in possession until the period of credit has expired, then
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a seller's lien arises and payment becomes a condition

precedent to the buyer's right of possession.^^

Insolvency of Buyer. — The lien arises likewise.

even before the period of credit has expired, if the buyer

possession should pass before payment. So, if the seller
has given the buyer credit, without expressly stipulating
for retention of possession, it is presumed that he
intended the buyer to have possession without concurrent payment. As Chief Justice Shaw put it, "A lien
for the price is incident to the contract of sale, when
there is no stipulation therein to the contrary, because
a man is not required to part ·with his goods until he is
paid for them. But conventio le gem vincit; and when a
credit is given by agreement, the vendee has a right to
the custody and actual possession, on a promise to pay at
a future time. He may then take the goods away, and into
his own actual possession; and if he does so, the lien
of the vendor is gone, it being a right incident to the
possession.' '64

64 — Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush. occur before the actual possession

(Mass.) 33; Robinson v. Morgan, was surrendered, namely, insol-

65 Vt. 37; Cutler v. Pope, 13 Me. vency of the buyer or non-payment

377; Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. Ap. of the price when the credit ex-

352, 382; Pickett v. Bullock, 52 plred. In the case of the happen-

N. H. 354, "The right of lien is to ing of either of these contingen-

be deemed to be waived when the cies before the actual possession

party enters into a special agree- of the lumber passed from the

ment inconsistent with the exist- seller to the buyer, the vendor's

ence of the lien or from which a lien which had been waived by a

--Expiration of Credit.-If the buyer does not take
advantage of his right of possession, but leaves the seller
in possession until the period of credit has expired, then
a seller's lien arises and payment becomes a condition
precedent to the buyer's right of possession.65

waiver of it may be fairly in- sale on credit, would revive, and

ferred." the vendor might lawfully retain

65 — Robinson v. Morgan, 65 Vt. his possession until the price was

37; McElwee v. Metropolitan Lum- paid." This case even went so

ber Co., 69 Fed. 302, "Delivery (by far as to say, if not to hold, that

--Insolvency of Buyer.-The lien arises likewise,
even before the period of credit has expired, if the buyer

the seller) could not be refused the revived lien was not in turn

unless one of two things should waived by a fresh term of credit.

64-Arnold v. Delano, 4 Cush.
(Mass.) 33; Robinson v. Morgan,
65 Vt. 37; Cutler v. Pope, 13 Me.
377; Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. Ap .
352, 382; Pickett v. Bullock, 52
N. H. 354, "The right of lien is to
be deemed to be waived when the
party enters into a special agreement inconsistent with the e xistence of the lien or from which a
waiver of it may be fairly inferred."
65-Robinson v. Morgan, 65 Vt.
37; McElwee v. Metropolitan Lumber o., 69 Feel. 302, "Delivery (by
the seller) could not be refused
unless one of two things should

occur before the actual possession
was surrendered, namely, insolvency of the buyer or non-payment
of the price when the credit expired. In the case of the happening of either of these contingencies before the actual possession
of the lumber passed from the
seller to the buyer, the vendor's
lien which had been waived by a
sale on credit, would revive, and
the vendor might lawfully retain
his possession until the price was
paid." This case even went so
far as to say, if not to hold, that
the revived lien was not in turn
waived by a fresh term of credit.
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becomes insolvent before he has taken actual possession.

Hence a buyer who has become insolvent can not have

possession, against the seller's will, even though he

demands it before the original period of credit has

expired. In the words of one court,®^ ''When the sale is

upon credit, it is one of the implied conditions of the con-

tract that the vendee shall keep his credit good ; his prom-

ise to pay at a future day, involving an engagement on

his part that he \yiU. remain, and then be, able to pay;

which engagement is broken when he becomes insolvent,

and unable to pay, and hence the right of the vendor to

stop performance of the contract on his part. * * * It is

true that, at that time (when payment is due) the vendee

may again be solvent, and able to pay. There is no pre-

sumption, or assurance, that he will. If any presumption

arises, it is rather, that the insolvency will continue,

which is more in accordance with the experience of the

commercial world. "^''^ It makes no difference that the
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seller has accepted the buyer's notes or other evidences

of indebtedness for the purchase price. It is a general

principle that notes given and received are merely a

form of evidencing the debt and are intended as such

rather than as payment. In such case the obligation of

the buyer to keep his credit good is unchanged, and his

becoming insolvent entitles the seller to retain posses-

sion of the goods until actual pajTuent.^^ If the notes

66 — Diem v. Koblitz, 49 O. S. 41. gone, notwithstanding his insol-

67 — Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hynes, 83 vency." Thompson v. Baltimore

Wis. 388, "Although, generally, & Ohio R. R. Co., 28 Md. 396;

the purchaser of goods on credit White v. Welsh, 38 Pa. 396; Vogel-

is entitled to the immediate pos- sang's Admr. v. Fisher, 128 Mo.

session of them, that right is de- 386; Tuthill v. Skidmore, 1 N. Y.

feated if he becomes insolvent be- S. 445; Pratt v. S. Freeman &

fore he obtains actual possession; Sons Co., 115 Wis. 648, and fact

in such case the vendor may re- that buyer again becomes solvent

tain the goods and enforce his does not reinstate his credit, sell-

lien thereon for the unpaid pur- er's lien continues; Dixon v.

chase money. If, however, the Yates, 5 B. «S; Ad. 313.

purchaser obtains the actual pos- 68 — Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hynes, 83

session of the goods, the lien is Wis. 388; Thompson v. Baltimore

becomes insolvent before he ha. taken actual possession.
I-Ience a buyer who has become insolvent can not have
possession, against the seller's will, even though he
demands it before the original period of credit ha
expired. In the words of one ourt,66 "When the sale is
upon credit, it is one of the implied conditions of the eontract that the vendee shall keep his credit good; his promise to pay at a future day, involving an engagement on
his part that he vvill remain, and then be, able to pay;
which engagement is broken when he becomes insolvent,
and unable to pay, and hence the right of the vendor to
stop performance of the contract on his part. * * "" It is
true that, at that time (when payment is due) the vendee
may again be solvent, and able to pay. There is no presumption, or assurance, that he will. If any presumption
arises, it is rather, that the insolvency will continue,
which is more in accordance with the experience of the
commercial world.' ' 67 It makes no difference that the
seller has accepted the buyer's notes or other evidences
of indebtedness for the purchase price. It is a general
principle that notes given and received are merely a
form of evidencing the debt and are intended as such
rather than as payment. In such case the obligation of
the buyer to keep his credit good is unchanged, and his
becoming insolvent entitles the seller to retain possession of the goods until actual payment. 68 If the notes
66-Diem v. Koblitz, 49 O. S. 41.
67-Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hynes, 83
Wis. 388, "Although, generally,
the purchaser of goods on credit
is entitled to the immediate possession of them, that right is defeated if he becomes insolvent before he obtains actual possession;
in such case the vendor may retain the goods and enforce his
lien thereon for the unpaid purchase money. If, however, the
purchaser obtair.s the actual possession of the goods, the lien is
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gone, notwithstanding his insolvency." Thompson v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R. Co., 28 Md. 396;
White v. Welsh, 38 Pa. 396; Vogelsang's Admr. v. Fisher, 128 Mo.
386; Tuthill v. Skidmore, 1 N. Y.
S. 445; Pratt v. S. Freeman &
Sons Co., 115 Wis. 648, and fact
that buyer again becomes solvent
does not reinstate his credit, seller's lien continues; Dixon v.
Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313.
68-Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hynes, 83
Wis. 388; Thompson v. Baltimore
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or other instruments have in fact been accepted in payment of the indebtedness there will of course be no lien
in case of insolvency. The buyer having paid the seller,
the latter has no claim against him under the contract
of sale. 69 *
The fact that the buyer's insolvency existed before the
contract of sale was entered into does not affect the
seller's lien, if he did not know of the insolvency. "If
there be a want of ability to pay, it can make no difference, in justice or good sense, whether it was produced
by causes, or shown by acts, at a period before or after
the sale. " 70 But if the seller knew of the buyer's
insolvency at the time of the contract he would be held
to have made the contract with that in mind and, by
giving credit nevertheless, to have waived any right to
possession.

118 THE LAW OF SALES

or other instruments have in fact been accepted in pay-

ment of the indebtedness there will of course be no lien

in case of insolvency. The buyer having paid the seller,

the latter has no claim against him under the contract

of sale.^^*

The fact that the buyer's insolvency existed before the

contract of sale was entered into does not affect the

seller's lien, if he did not know of the insolvency. *'If

there be a want of ability to pay, it can make no differ-

ence, in justice or good sense, whether it was produced

by causes, or sho^\^l by acts, at a period before or after

the sale. ""''^ But if the seller knew of the buyer's

insolvency at the time of the contract he would be held

to have made the contract with that in mind and, by

giving credit nevertheless, to have waived any right to

possession.

Evidence of Insolvency. — To prove a buyer's in-

solvency "it is not necessary that he should have been
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declared a bankrupt or insolvent by a judicial tribunal,

nor that he should have made an assignment of his prop-

erty. If the fact exist, no matter how proved, if suffi-

ciently and satisfactorily proved, the law requires no

more.''^ Insolvency "means a general inability to pay,

evidenced by the stoppage of payment, ' ^''^ and it may be

proved by circumstances, such as the disappearance of

the buyer and the protest or mere non-payment of his

& Ohio R.R., 28 Md. 396; Vogel- road, 43 N. H. 580, Crummey v

--Evidence of Insolvency.-To prove a buyer's insolvency "it is not necessary that he should have been
declared a bankrupt or insolvent by a judicial tribunal,
nor that he should have made an assignment of his property. If the fact exist, no matter how proved, if sufficiently and satisfactorily proved, the law requires no
more. 71 Insolvency ''means a general inability to pay,
evidenced by the stoppage of payment, " 72 and it may be
proved by circumstances, such as the disappearance of
the buyer and the protest or mere non-payment of his

Bang's Admr. v. Fisher, 128 Mo. Raudenbush, 55 Minn. 426; Lan-

386; Tuthill v. Skidmore, 1 N. Y. caster Co. Bank v. Huver, 114 Pa,

S. 445; Diem v. Koblitz, 49 O. S. 216.

41- 71— Benedict v. Schaettle, 12

69— Wisconsin Ins. Co. v. Filer, q. S. 515, 523, quoting from Hays

83 Mich. 496. v. Morille, 14 Pa. 48.

70-Loeb & Bro. v. Peters, 63 72_Chandler v. Fulton, 10

Ala. 243, 248; Benedict v. Schaet- rp^^ g

tie, 12 O. S. 515: Reynolds v. Rail-

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 52, (1), (2).

& Ohio R.R., 28 Md. 396; Vogelsang's Admr. v. Fisher, 128 Mo.
386; Tuthill v. Skidmore, 1 N. Y.
S. 445; Diem v. Ko blitz, 49 0. S.
41.

69-Wisconsin Ins. Co. v. Filer,
83 Mich. 496.
70-Loeb & Bro. v. Peters, 63
Ala. 243, 248; Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 0 . S. 515; Reynolds v. Rail-

road, 43 N. H. 580; Crummey v
Raudenbush, 55 Minn. 426; Lancaster Co. Bank v. Huver, 114 Pa.
216.
71-Benedict v. Scbaettle, 12
O. S. 515, 523, quoting from Hays
v. Morille, 14 Pa. 48.
72-Chandler v. Fulton, 10
Tex. 2.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 52, (1), (2).
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notes. '^ Indeed, it is said that ''Actual insolvency of

the vendee is not essential. It is sufficient if before the

stoppage in transitu, he was either in fact insolvent, or

had, by his conduct in business, afforded the ordinary

apparent evidences of insolvency."'''*

But a mere doubt of the buyer's solvency, though

based on adverse reports from a credit agency, will not

justify a refusal to deliver possession during the term

of credit.'^

— — Effect on Lien of Suit for Price. — The lien is not

lost by a seller 's efforts to enforce payment of the price as

agreed. Thus he may receive a part payment,'^ or secure

a judgment,"'"'^ or even satisfy in part a judgment for the

notes. 73 Indeed, it is said that ''Actual insolvency of
the vendee is not essential. It is sufficient if before the
stoppage in transitu, he was either in fact insolvent, or
had, by his conduct in business, afforded the ordinary
apparent evidences of in olvency. '" 4
But a mere doubt of the buyer's solvency, though
based on adverse reports from a credit agency, will not
justify a refusal to deliver possession during the term
of credit. 75

price,'''^ without destroying his right to retain possession

till paid the whole price. The judgment is not a settle-

ment of the contract obligation, but a mere change in its

form. The right to possession is not lost by proving

a claim for the purchase price with the buyer's assignee
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in bankruptcy,''® nor with the administrator of his

estate.^"*

Effect of Receiving Security. — Neither is the lien

lost because the seller has received other, additional,

73— TuthiU V. Skidmore, 1 N. Y. Co., 19 Weekly Rep. 388, A sold

S. 445; Reynolds v. Railroad, 43 goods to B and shipped them to

N. H. 580; Crummey v. Rauden- him by carrier, C. O. D. B refused

bush, 65 Minn. 426. to accept and A recovered a judg-

74 Diem v. Koblitz 49 O. S. ment for the price which was paid

41_ In part. B then claimed posses-

75— Jewett Pub. Co. v. Butler,

159 Mass. 517; Kavanaugh Mfg.

Co. V. Rosen, 132 Mich. 44, 92

N. W. 788.

sion from the carrier and sued in

-Effect on Lien of Suit for Price.-The lien is not
lost by a seller's efforts to enforce payment of the price as
agreed. Thus he may receive a part payment, 76 or ecure
a judgment, 77 or even satisfy in part a judgment for the
price, 78 without destroying his right to retain possession
till paid the whole price. The judgment is not a settlement of the contract obligation, but a mere change in its
form. The right to possession is not lost by proving
a claim for the purchase price with the buyer's assignee
in bankruptcy,79 nor with the administrator of his
estate. 80 *

detinue. The carrier was held to

be A's agent and, as such, entitled

to possession by virtue of A's lien

which had not been destroyed.

76— Ante, p. 115. 79— Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. Ap.

--Effect of Receiving Security.-N either is the lien
lost because the seller has received other, additional,

77— Rhodes v. Mooney. 43 O. S. 352; Rhodes v. Mooney. 43 O. S.

421; Waschow v. Waschow, 155 III. 421.

Ap. 167. 80— Waschow v. Waschow, 155

78— Schrivener v. Gt. No. R. R. 111. Ap. 167.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 56, (2).

Co., 19 Weekly Rep. 388, A sold
13-Tuthill v. Skidmore, 1 N. Y.
goods to B and shipped them to
S. 445; Reynolds v. Railroad, 43
N. H. 580; Crummey v. Rauden· him by carrier, C. 0. D. B refused
to accept and A recovered a judgbush, 65 Minn. 426.
ment
for the price which was paid
74-Diem v. Koblitz, 49 0. S.
in
part.
B then claimed posses41.
sion from the carrier and sued in
75-Jewett Pub. Co. v. Butler,
detinue. The carrier was held to
159 Mass. 617; Kavanaugh Mfg.
be A's agent and, as such, entitled
Co. v. Rosen, 132 Mich. 44, 92
to possession by virtue of A's lien
N. W. 788.
which had not been destroyed.
76-Ante, p. 115.
79-Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. Ap.
77-Rhodes v. Mooney, 43 0. S . 352; Rhodes v. Mooney, 43 0 . S.
421; Waschow v. Waschow, 155 Ill. 421.
Ap. 167.
80-Waschow v. Waschow, 155
Ill.
Ap. 167.
78-Schrivener v. Gt. No. R. R.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 56, (2).
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security for the debt, unless the facts are such as to show

that acceptance of the other security was inconsistent

with the idea of a lien.^^

Effect of Seller's Attaching the Goods. — It seems

security for the debt, unless the facts are such as to show
that acceptance of the other security was inconsistent
with the idea of a lien. 81

probable that the seller will lose his lien if he attaches the

goods or levies a judgment against them. There is, how-

ever, a conflict of opinion upon this. His loss of the lien

is placed on the ground that, "A lien is destroyed if the

party entitled to it gives up his right to the possession

of the goods. If another person had sued out execution,

the defendant might have insisted on his lien. But

Messer (the lienor) himself called on the sheriff to sell;

he set up no lien against the sale; on the contrary, he

thought his best title was by virtue of that sale. Now,

in order to sell, the sheriff must have had possession;

but after he had possession from Messer, and with his

assent, Messer 's subsequent possession must have been

acquired under the sale, and not by virtue of his lien."*^
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This case was reviewed, with, others, in Lambert v. Nick-

lass,®' and a contrary decision reached, on the theory

that a lienor might properly hold possession by an agent

and that the sheriff was to be looked upon as an agent

of the lienor so far as concerned possession.®*

General Principles. — These cases, holding that

where title has passed a suit or judgment for the price

does not affect the seller's right to possession, must be

kept distinct from the holding that where possession has

passed, but title has been retained till payment, a suit for

81 — Smith V. Greenop, 60 Mich. 84 — Lien lost by attachment,

61; Kimball v. Costa, 76 Vt. 289; Lawrence v. McKenzie, 88 Iowa

Angus V, MacLachlan, 23 Ch. Div. 432; City National Bank v. Cra-

330; In re Taylor [1891], 1 Ch. han, 135 Iowa 230; Evans v. War-

Dlv. 590. ren, 122 Mass. 303; Wingard v.

^ , ^ rM Banning, 39 Cal. 543, because the

82— Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. ,. , . . , «5j •*

attachment required an affidavit

130

that the demand was not secured

83—45 W. Va. 527. by any lien.

-Effect of Seller's Attaching the Goods.-It seems
probable that the seller will lose his lien if he attaches the
goods or levies a judgment against them. There is, however, a conflict of opinion upon this. His loss of the lien
is placed on the ground that, ''A lien is destroyed if the
party entitled to it gives up his right to the possession
of the goods. If another person had sued out execution,
the defendant might have insisted on his lien. But
Messer (the lienor) himself called on the sheriff to sell;
he set up no lien against the sale; on the contrary, he
thought his best title was by virtue of that sale. Now,
in order to sell, the sheriff must have had possession;
but after he had possession from Messer, and with his
assent, Messer 's subsequent possession must have been
acquired under the sale, and not by virtue of his lien.' ' 82
This case was reviewed, with others, in Lambert v. Nicklass,83 and a contrary decision reached, on the theory
that a lienor might properly hold possession by an agent
and that the sheriff was to be looked upon as an agent
of the lienor so far as concerned possession.84
-General Principles.-These cases, holding that
where title has passed a suit or judgmen~ for the price
does not affect the seller's right to possession, must be
kept distinct from the holding that where possession has
passed, but title has been retained till payment, a suit for
81-Smith v. Greenop, 60 Mich.
61; Kimball v. Costa, 76 Vt. 289;
Angus v . MacLachlan, 23 Ch. Div.
330 ; In re Taylor [1891], 1 Ch.
Dtv. 590.
82- Jacobs v . Latour, 5 Bing.
130.
83-45 W . Va. 527.
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84-Lien lost by attachment,
Lawrence v. McKenzie, 88 Iowa
432; City National Bank v. Cra·
han, 135 Iowa 230; Evans v. War·
ren, 122 Mass. 303; Wingard v.
Banning, 39 Cal. 543, because the
a ttachment required an affidavit
that the demand was not secured
by any lien.
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the purchase price has the effect of passing title.^^ The

bases of the two propositions are entirely different, but

one does occasionally find a tendency even in judicial

utterance to confuse them.

Since recovery of a judgment does not divest the sejler

of his lien it conversely follows that he need not deliver

possession to the buyer, nor even tender it, in order to

bring his suit for the price, although he must be able

and willing to do so. And this is, of course, consequent

on the assumption that title may pass without change of

possession, and that title, not possession, is the quid pro

quo for the buyer's grant of the price.®^

The lien is not lost by mere failure to set it up as a

reason for not delivering possession. "An examination

of the authorities on the subject, from the early case of

Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410, down, satisfies us that they

all proceed upon principles essentially of equitable

estoppel, and limit the application of the doctrine invoked
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by counsel to cases where the refusal to deliver the prop-

erty was put on grounds inconsistent Avith the existence

of a lien, or on grounds entirely independent of it, with-

out mentioning a lien. Thus it has been repeatedly held

that a lien is not waived by mere omission to assert it as

the ground of refusal, or by a general refusal to sur-

render the goods, without specifying the grounds of it,

except in certain cases, where the hen was unknoAvn to

the person making the demand, and that fact was known

to the person on whom the demand was made. In such

85. — See ante, p. 103. think as the sale was perfect be-

86 — "But it would seem they, tween the Moffetts and Wade, the

(the sellers), could not have an Moffetts could sue for the price

action against Wade for the price, after the credit expired, without,

even after the term of credit had a delivery or offer to deliver, be-

expired, according to the rule in cause the law giving them a lien

Noy's Maxims, until they had de- on the mule, it would be unreason-

livered the mule to Wade, or tend- able to require them to relinquish

ered him; and the case of Potter it before they were paid the price

V. Cowand, Meigs, 26, above re- agreed." Wade v. Moffett, 21 III.

ferred to, proceeds on this ground. 110.

The other cases do not, and we

the purchase price has the effect of passing title. 85 The
bases of the two propositions are entirely different, but
one does occasionally find a tendency even in judicial
utterance to confuse them.
Since recovery of a judgment does not divest the seJler
of his lien it conversely follows that he need not deliver
possession to the buyer, nor even tender it, in order to
bring his suit for the price, although he must be able
and willing to do so. And this is, of course, consequent
on the assumption that title may pass without change of
possession, and that title, not possession, is the quid pro
quo for the buyer's grant of the price.86
The lien is not lost by mere failure to set it up as a
reason for not delivering possession. ''An examination
of the authorities on the subject, from the early case of
Boardman v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410, down, satisfies us that they
all proceed upon principles essentially of equitable
estoppel, and limit the application of the doctrine invoked
by counsel to cases where the refusal to deliver the property was put on grounds inconsistent with the existence
of a lien, or on grounds entirely independent of it, without mentioning a lien. Thus it has been repeatedly held
that a lien is not waived by n1ere omission to assert it as
the ground of refusal, or by a general refusal to surrender the goods, without specifying the grounds of it,
except in certain cases, where the lien was unknown to
the person making the demand, and that fact was known
to the person on whom the demand was made. In such
85:-See ante, p. 103.
86-"But it would seem they,
(the sellers), could not have an
action against Wade for the price,
even after the term of credit had
expired, according to the rule in
Noy's Maxims, until they had delivered the mule to Wade, or tendered him; and the case of Potter
v. Oowa.nd, Meigs, 26, above referred to, proceeds on this ground.
The other cases do not, and we

think as the sale was perfect between the Moffetts and Wade, the
Moffetts could sue for the price
after the credit expired, without.
a delivery or offer to deliver, because the law giving them a lien
on the mule, it would be unreasonable to require them to relinquish
it before they were paid the price
agreed." Wade v. Moffett, 21 Ill.
110.
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cases, if the ground of the refusal is one that can be

removed, the other party ought in fairness to have an

opportunity to do so. But no such state of facts exists

in this case. While the defendant did not specify his

vendor's lien by reason of plaintiff's insolvency, as the

ground of his refusal, yet he never placed his refusal

on any ground inconsistent with or independent of it. ' '^"^

Enforcement of Lien. — Resale. — A lien in its origin, as

the derivation of the term from the root word meaning

a *'tie" or "bond" indicates, gave no right to sell the

cases, if the ground of the refusal is one that can be
removed, the other party ought in fairness to have an
opportunity to do so. But no such state of facts exists
in this case. While the defendant did not specify his
vendor's lien by reason of plaintiff's insolvency, as the
ground of his refusal, yet he never placed his ref us al
on any ground inconsistent with or independent of it.' ' 87

goods subject to it. It was a right of possession merely.

**The very notion of a lien is, that if the person who is

entitled to the lien, for his own benefit parts with the

chattel over which he claims to exercise it, he is guilty of

a tortious act. He must not dispose of the chattel so as

to give some one else a right of possession as against

himself. The lien is the right of the creditor to retain

the goods until the debt is paid."®^ If a ''seller's lien"
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were in fact a lien only, the only benefit it could be to him

would be whatever he might find in the power of retain-

ing possession of goods actually owned by another per-

son — a dubious benefit in some circumstances.

But the right of an unpaid seller who is still in posses-

sion, while it is almost invariably called a lien, is in fact

much more than a mere right of continued possession. He

has a thoroughly recognized right to resell the property in

case of an essential breach of the contract by the buyer.

This right to resell was recognized as early as 1704 in

Langfort v. Admx. of Tiler,^^ when the court said, ''After

earnest given, the vendor cannot sell the goods to an-

87 — Crummey v. Raudenbush, and one who has claimed title

55 Minn. 426; Everett v. Coffin, 6 thereby loses his lien; Boardman

Wend. (N. Y.) 603; Fowler v. Par- v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410, claim of title

sons, 143 Mass. 401; White v. is inconsistent with that of a lien;

Gainer, 2 Bing. 23; contra, Hanna of. Lord v. Jones, 24 Me. 439.

V. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21; Hudson v. 88 — MuUiner v. Florence, 3

Swan, 83 N. Y. 552, a claim of title Q. B. Div. 484.

Is Inconsistent with that of a Hen 89 — 1 Salkeld 113.

Enforcement of Lien.-Resale.-A lien in its origin, as
the derivation of the term from the root word meaning
a "tie" or "bond" indicates, gave no right to sell the
goods subject to it. It was a right of possession merely.
''The very notion of a lien is, that if the person who is
entitled to the lien, for his own benefit parts with the
chattel over which he claims to exercise it, he is guilty of
a tortious act. He must not dispose of the chattel so as
to give some one else a right of possession as against
himself. The lien is the right of the creditor to retain
the goods until the debt is paid. " 88 If a "seller's lien"
were in fact a lien only, the only benefit it could be to him
would be whatever he might find in the power of retaining possession of goods actually owned by another person-a dubious benefit in some circumstances.
But the right of an unpaid seller who is still in possession, while it is almost invl(lriably called a lien, is in fact
much more than a mere right of continued possession. He
has a thoroughly recognized right to resell the property in
case of an essential breach of the contract by the buyer.
This right to resell was recognized as early as 1704 in
Langfort v. Admx. of Tiler, 89 when the court said," After
earnest given, the vendor cannot sell the goods to an87-Crummey v. Raudenbush,
55 Minn. 426; Everett v. Coffin, 6
Wend. (N. Y.) 603; Fowler v. Parsons, 143 Mass. 401; White v.
Gainer, 2 Bing. 23; contra, Hanna
v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21; Hudson v.
Swan, 83 N. Y. 552, a claim of title
is inconsistent with that of a lien
D1gitiz
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and one who has claimed title
thereby loses his lien; Boardman
v. Sill, 1 Camp. 410, claim of title
is inconsistent with that of a lien;
cf. Lord v. Jones, 24 Me. 439.
88- Mulliner v. Florence, 3
Q . B. Div. 484.
89-1 Salkeld 113.
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other, without default in the vendee ; and therefore if the

vendee does not come and pay and take the goods, the

vendor ought to go and request him ; and then if he does

not come and pay, and take away the goods in convenient

time, the agreement is dissolved, and he is at liberty to

sell them to any other person. ' '

This statement of the court indicates that the resale,

if made, is indication of a dissolution of the contract, and

many other courts have spoken of the right of resale as

founded on a ''rescission" of the contract. The actual

decisions, however, do not bear out the idea. For the

seller to dissolve, or rescind, the contract, in a proper

sense of those terms, would put an end to its existence.

He could not be sued, thereafter, but neither, the agree-

ment having been rescinded, could he sue the ►buyer in

assumpsit. Yet the decisions invariably recognize the

right of a seller to sue the buyer on the contract despite

his having enforced the lien by a resale of the goods.
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The theory on which resale is based, therefore, cannot

really be that of a rescission of the contract and a revest-

ing of title in the seller, who may thereupon resell his own

property. It is rather, that the seller resells property of

the buyer, which his lien gives him legal authority and

power to do. ' ' His right is very nearly that of a pledgee,

with power to sell at private sale in case of default. "^°

In Sands v. Taylor,^^ the seller resold wheat, title to

which had passed to the buyer, but which the buyer re-

fused to take and pay for. He then sued the buyer for

breach of the contract. The court allowed the suit on

the theory that the resale was not a dissolution of the

contract but was made by the seller as a ''trustee, or

agent" for the buyer. The possession of the seller was,

it must be noted, predicated in this case on abandonment

by the buyer rather than on a lien.^^

90 — Tuthill V. Skidmore, 124 92 — See discussion of this case

N. Y. 148. in Moore v. Poter, 155 N. Y. 481.

91—5 Johns. ( N. Y.) 395.

other, without default in the vendee; and therefore if the
vendee does not come and pay and take the goods, the
vendor ought to go and request him; and then if he does
not come and pay, and take away the goods in convenient
time, the agreement is dissolved, and he is at liberty to
sell them to any other person.''
'
This statement of the court indicates that the resale,
if made, is indication of a dissolution of the contract, and
many other courts have spoken of the right of resale as
founded on a ''rescission'' of the contract. The actual
decisions, however, do not bear out the idea. For the
seller to dissolve, or rescind, the contract, in a proper
sense of those terms, would put an end to its existence.
He could not be sued, thereafter, but neither, the agreement having been rescinded, could he sue the buyer in
assumpsit. Yet the decisions invariably recognize the
right of a seller to sue the buyer on the contract despite
his having enforced the lien by a resale of the goods.
The theory on which resale is based, the ref ore, cannot
really be that of a rescission of the contract and a revesting of title in the seller, VI ho may thereupon resell his own
property. It is rather, that the seller resells property of
the buyer, which his lien gives him legal authority and
power to do. "His right is very nearly that of a pledgee,
with power to sell at private sale in case of default.' ' 90
In Sands v. Taylor, 91 the seller resold wheat, title to
which had passed to the buyer, but which the buyer refused to take and pay for. He then sued the buyer for
breach of the contract. The court allowed the suit on
the theory that the resale was not a dissolution of the
contract but was made by the seller as a ''trustee, or
agent'' for the buyer. The possession of the seller was,
it must be noted, predicated in this case on abandonment
by the buyer rather than on a lien. 92
90-Tuthill v. Skidmore,
N. Y. 148.
91-5 Johns. ( N. Y.) 395.
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In Conrad v. Fisher,®^ the court said specifically, *'We

understand it to be the settled law that the right to en-

force a vendor's hen, in respect of goods sold upon credit

(sic), is not a right to rescind the contract of sale, but is

a right to detain the goods until the indebtedness for the

purchase price is discharged, at or before the expiration

of the credit, and, if not so discharged to sell them and

apply the proceeds of their sale to the liquidation of the

indebtedness. ' '^**

What Constitutes Default. — The fact that the

seller may exercise a right of resale, by virtue of his lien,

in case of essential default by the buyer, raises the ques-

tion, what constitutes such a default.

THE LAW OF SALES

In Conrad v. Fisher,93 the court said specifically, "We
understand it to be the settled law that the right to enforce a vendor's lien, in respect of goods sold upon credit
(sic), is not a right to rescind the contract of sale, but is
a right to detain the goods until the indebtedness for the
purchase price is discharged, at or before the expiration
of the credit, and, if not so discharged to sell them and
apply the proceeds of their sale to the liquidation of the
indebtedness.' ' 94 *

A repudiation of the agreement by the buyer is ob-

viously a material breach. Thus a refusal by the buyer

to receive the goods if tendered is a clear breach of con-

tract and, seemingly without demur, is held to give the

seller a right to resell and sue for the difference. Of
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course these cases do not often involve any question of

seller's hen by name, since they arise out of an attempt

by the seller to deliver possession, but they furnish a

positive analogy as to what would constitute such a

breach as to allow resale under the lien.

The case of Langfort v. Admx. of Tiler,^® already re-

ferred to, intimates that mere failure of the buyer to pay

at the time set is not such a breach as will permit a re-

93 — 37 Mo. Ap. 352, 362. upon the resale." It was assumed

94 — Diem v. Koblitz, 49 O. S. 41; in this case that title had passed

Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722, "It to the buyer. Van Brocklin v.

has never been decided that a re- Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70, the right

sale of the goods is a bar to an of resale is not limited to tangible

action for damages for non-per- property, nor to perishable prop-

formance of a contract to purchase erty, but applies to choses in a/>

them * * * it is most convenient Hon and any type of merchandise,

that when a party refuses to take Ames v. Moir, 130 111. 582; Arnold

goods he has purchased, they v. Carpenter, IG R. I. 5G0.

should be resold, and that he 95—1 Salkeld 113.

should be liable to the loss, if any,

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 61, (1).

--What Constitutes Default.-The fact that the
seller may exercise a right of resale, by virtue of his lien,
in case of essential default by the buyer, raises the question, what constitutes such a default.
A repudiation of the agreement by the buyer is obviously a material breach. Thus a refusal by the buyer
to receive the goods if tendered is a clear breach of contract and, seemingly without demur, is held to give the
seller a right to resell and sue for the difference. Of
course these cases do not often involve any question of
seller's lien by name, since they arise out of an attempt
by the seller to deliver possession, but they furnish a
positive analogy as to what would constitute such a
breach as to allow resale under the lien.
The case of Langfort v. Admx. of Tiler,95 already referred to, intimates that mere failure of the buyer to pay
at the time set is not such a breach as will permit a re93-37 Mo. Ap. 352, 362.
94-Diem v. Ko blitz, 49 0. S. 41;
Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722, "It
has never been decided that a resale of the goods is a bar to an
action for damages for non-performance of a contract to purchase
them * * * it is most convenient
that when a party refuses to take
goods he has purchased, they
should b e r e sold, and that he
should b e liable to the loss, if any,
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
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upon the resale." It was assumed
in this case that title had passed
to the buyer. Van Brocklin v.
Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70, the right
of resale is not limited to tangible
property, nor to perishable property, but applies to choses in a.ction and any type of merchandise.
Ames v. Moir, 130 Ill. 582; Arnold
v. Carpenter, 16 R. I. 560.
95-1 Salkeld 113.
61, (1).
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sale, but that thereafter ''the vendor ought to go and

request him ; and then if he does not come and pay, and

take away the goods in convenient time, * * * he (vendor)

is at liberty to sell them to any other person." This

idea that mere failure to pay is not an essential breach

is "sustained by Martindale v. Smith,^^ in which, although

the argument was as to the right to "rescind" the con-

tract and revest title because of default in payment, the

court said, "In a sale of chattels, time is not of the es-

sence of the contract, unless it is made so by express

agreement. ' ' The mere stipulation that payment was to

be made "in twelve weeks from the date" of the contract

was held not expressly to make that time of the essence.®''^

In Fancher v. Goodman,^* it was held that a seller had no

right to resell by virtue of his lien merely because the

buyer did not pay at the time set, but that he might

property have resold if he had first given notice to the

buyer that he would resell if payment were not forth-
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coming.^^

The failure of a buyer to keep his credit good revives

the seller's lien and justifies him in refusing to deliver

possession. But such failure is not a breach of the con-

tract to buy. The fact that the buyer becomes bankrupt

does not absolve the seller from his obligation to deliver

the property, if the bankrupt or his assignee is in fact

ready to perform at the time such performance is due.

Non-payment by the buyer may, as indicated below, jus-

tify the seller in reselling, but mere bankruptcy before the

time of payment does not conclusively indicate that the

96—1 Q. B. 389. 98—29 Barb. (N. Y.) 315.

97 — This case very strongly im- 99 — Raymond v. Bearnard, 12

plies that the seller has no right Johns. (N. Y.) 274; Porter v.

of resale at all, unless he shall Wormser, 94 N. Y. 431, there is no

have truly rescinded the contract, right of resale while credit given

It may possibly stand for the still exists; Greaves v. Ashlin, 3

proposition that non-payment does Camp. 426, mere failure of buyer

not permit of a rescission, and to take away goods within a rea

that resale by virtue of a lien is sonable time held not to justify a

never allowed. resale.

125

sale, but that thereafter "the vendor ought to go and
request him; and then if he does not come and pay, and
take away the goods in convenient time,* * •he (vendor)
is at liberty to sell them to any other person.'' This
idea that mere failure to pay is not an essential breach
is ·sustained by Martindale v. Smith,96 in which, although
the argument was as to the right to "rescind" the contract and revest title because of default in payment, the
court said, ''In a sale of chattels, time is not of the essence of the contract, unless it is made so by express
agreement.'' The mere stipulation that payment was to
be made ''in twelve weeks from the date'' of the contract
was held not expressly to make that time of the essence. 97
In Fancher v. Goodman,98 it was held that a seller had no
right to resell by virtue of his lien merely because the
buyer did not pay at the time set, but that he might
properly have resold if he had first given notice to the
buyer that he would resell if payment were not forthcoming.99
The failure of a buyer to keep his credit good revives
the seller's lien and justifies him in refusing to deliver
possession. But such failure is not a breach of the contract to buy. The fact that the buyer becomes bankrupt
does not absolve the seller from his obligation to deliver
the property, if the bankrupt or his assignee is in fact
ready to perform at the time such performance is due.
Non-payment by the buyer may, as indicated below, justify the seller in reselling, but n1ere bankruptcy before the
time of payment does not conclusively indicate that the
96-1 Q. B. 389.
97-This case very strongly implies that the seller has no right
of resale at all, unless he shall
have truly rescinded the contract.
It may possibly stand for the
proposition that non-payment does
not permit of a rescission, and
that resale by virtue of a lien is
never allowed.
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99-Raymond v. Bearnard, 12
Johns. (N. Y.) 274; Porter v.
Wormser, 94 N. Y. 431, there is no
right of resale while credit given
still exists; Greaves v. Ashlin, 3
Camp. 426, mere failure of buyer
to take away goods within a rea ·
sonable time held not to justify a
resale.
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buyer will not be able to pay when the time comes."" The

buyer, however, cannot practically object to a resale by

the seller, even though the seller has thereby rendered

himself unable to perform, until he, the buyer, is himself

ready to perform. The unauthorized resale is not in

itself a breach. The- breach would be the seller's unjusti-

fied refusal to deliver at the proper time and to predicate

such breach the buyer would have to show that he was

himself ready to perform.^"^

But, failure of a buyer to pay when agreed is quite an-

other matter, and, as is intimated in the cases just re-

ferred to, if, after the buyer's failure to pay at the time

stipulated, the seller specifically notifies him that pay-

ment is due, and the buyer thereafter refuses to pay, or

so neglects it as to imply a refusal, there is a sufficient

breach to justify the seller in reselling.^"^*

If there has been no such breach by the buyer as would

justify a resale by the seller, the buyer upon tender of pay-
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ment is, of course, entitled to possession of the goods. If

the seller, by an unjustified resale, has put it out of his power

to perform, the buyer may have an action against him,

upon tender of his own performance at the proper time."'

Application of Proceeds of Resale. — Assuming,

merely, that the seller, by virtue of his lien, has not a

100— Kearney v. Union Pac. R. R. 498; Hayes v. Nashville, 80 Fed.

Co., 97 Iowa 719, 59 Am. St. 434; 641; Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722;

Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & W. Ogg v. Shuter, L. R. 10 C. P. 159;

321. 1 C. P. Div. 47.

101 — Diem V. Koblitz, 49 O. S. 103 — A buyer who has tendered

41; Rappleye v. Racine Seeder the amount due the seller under

Co., 79 la. 220; Brassel v. Troxel, the latter's lien may bring an ac-

68 ni. Ap. 131; Pardee V. Kanaday, tion for conversion against the

100 N. Y. 121; Ex parte Chalmers, seller, Wright v. Andrews Co., 212

L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 289. Mass. 186, 98 N. E. 798; Pardee v.

102— VanBrocklen v. Smeallie, Kanady, 100 N. Y. 121; Martindale

SALES

buyer will not be able to pay when the time comes. 100 The
buyer, however, cannot practically object to a resale by
the seller, even though the seller has thereby rendered
himself unable to perform, until he, the buyer, is himself
ready to perform. The unauthorized resale is not in
itself a breach. The, breach would be the seller's unjustified refusal to deliver at the proper time and to predicate
such breach the buyer would have to show that he was
himself ready to perform. 101
But, failure of a buyer to pay when agreed is quite another matter, and, as is intimated in the cases just referred to, if, after the buyer's failure to pay at the time
stipulated, the seller specifically notifies him that payment is due, and the buyer thereafter refuses to pay, or
so neglects it as to imply a refusal, there is a sufficient
breach to justify the seller in reselling. 102 *
If there has been no such breach by the buyer as would
justify a resale by the seller, the buyer upon tender of payment is, of course, entitled to possession ~f the goods. If
the seller, by an unjustified resale, has put it out of his power
to perform, the buyer may have an action against him, _
upon tender of his own performance at the proper time. 10s

140 N. Y. 70; Olcese v. Mobile v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 389; compare

Fruit Co., 112 111. Ap. 281; Nelson Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M, & W.

v. Hirsch & Sons Co., 102 Mo. Ap. 321.

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 60, (1), (2).

--Application of Proceeds of Resale.-Assuming,
merely, that the seller, by virtue of his lien, has not a
100-Kearney v. UnionPac.R.R.
Co., 97 Iowa 719, 59 Am. St. 434;
Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & W.
321.
101-Diem v. Koblitz, 49 0. S.
41; Rappleye v. Racine Seeder
Co., 79 Ia. 220; Brassel v. Troxel,
68 IlL Ap. 131; Pardee v. Kanaday,
100 N. Y. 121; Ex parte Chalmers,
L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 289.
102-VanBrocklen v. Smeallie,
140 N. Y. 70; Olcese v. Mobile
Fruit Co., 112 Ill. Ap. 281; Nelson
v. Hirs eh & Sons Co., 102 Mo. Ap.

498; Hayes v. Nashville, 80 Fed.
641; Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722;
Ogg v. Shuter, L. R. 10 C. P. 159;
1 C. P. Div. 47.
103-A buyer who has tendered
the amount due the seller under
the latter's lien may bring an action for conversion against the
seller, Wright v. Andrews Co., 212
Mass. 186, 98 N. E. 798; Pardee v.
Kanady, 100 N. Y. 121; Martindale
v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 389; compare
Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & W.
321.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 60, (1), (2).
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right of rescission, but only a right to resell in satisfac-

tion of the indebtedness, a question is raised as to the

party entitled to the surplus in the unusual event that the

resale should bring more than the amount of the indebted-

ness. Logically the buyer would be entitled to the excess.

But if the seller who remains unpaid after title' has

passed has a right to revest title in himself, by so acting

he would become again the owner of the goods, and would

be entitled to all they might bring upon a resale, just as

though title had never passed to the buyer. In the event

that a resale should bring more than the purchase price,

it would probably be presumed, although no case involv-

ing the precise question has come to the writer's knowl-

edge, that the seller had chosen to revest the title in him-

self, rather than to resell in mere enforcement of his

lien. The real question, therefore, is whether a seller who

has passed title but retained possession can revest title in

himself upon the buyer's default in payment.^*'* The
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right to rescind contracts, other than those of sale,

because of essential default on the part of the promisor

is discussed in works on contract and does furnish an

analogy for the proposition that the seller in possession

may, if he choose, rescind and dissolve the contract in

such a way as to revest himself \vith title, instead of pro-

ceeding by way of enforcing his lien.*

Failure to Resell. — The same question arises in

another form also. If there has in fact been such a breach

by the buyer as would justify a resale by the seller, in

enforcement of his lien, does the buyer continue to be

OA\Tier until such resale! In other words, is it absolutely

necessary for the seller to resell in order to divest the

buyer of title? "While no court appears to have decided

104 — There are cases in which these the title was in the seller

resale has brought more than the on a different theory than rescis-

original purchase price, but in sion.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 61, (1).
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right of rescission, but only a right to resell in satisfaction of the indebtedness, a question is raised as to the
party entitled to the surplus in the unusual event that the
resale should bring more than the amount of the indebtedness. Logically the buyer would be entitled to the excess.
But if the seller who remains unpaid after title~ has
passed has a right to revest title in himself, by so acting
he would become again the owner of the goods, and would
be entitled to all they might bring upon a resale, just as
though title had never passed to the buyer. In the event
that a resale should bring more than the purchase price,
it would probably be presumed, although no case involving the precise question has come to the writer's knowledge, that the seller had chosen to revest the title in himself, rather than to resell in mere enforcement of his
lien. The real question, theref ore, is whether a seller who
has passed title but retained possession can revest title in
himself upon the buyer's default in payment. 104 The
right to rescind contracts, other than those of sale,
because of essential default on the part of the promisor
is discussed in works on contract and does furnish an
analogy for the proposition that the seller in possession
may, if he choose, rescind and dissolve the contract in
such a way as to revest himself with title, instead of proceeding by way of enforcing his lien.*

--Failure to Resell.-The same question arises in
another form also. If there has in fact been such a breach
by the buyer as would justify a resale by the seller, in
enforcement of his lien, does the buyer continue to be
owner until sucl! resale~ In other words, is it absolutely
necessary for the seller to resell in order to divest the
buyer of title 1 While no court appears to have decided
104-There are cases in which

these the title was in the seller
resale has brought more than the on a different theory than rescisoriginal purchase price, but in sion.
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 61, (1).
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the matter exactly, there are statements which intimate

that the seller could revest title in himself on the buyer's

default and need not resell the goods.

Assuming in answer to these questions that the seller

does have power to revest the title in himself, there arises

the further question whether it is necessary for him to

rescind the contract, in the precise sense of putting an

end to it, to do this. We have seen that when title has

not passed, the seller may keep the goods, which are

already his own, and sue for damages, which are gener-

ally the difference between the market value and the

agreed price. We have seen also that the seller who has

passed title can resell the goods, in a certain sense as the

buyer's property, and sue for the difference. But can the

seller who has passed title also keep the goods as his own

and still sue for the difference between their market value

and the agreed price? If, to revest title in himself, he

has to abrogate the contract, there is then no contract ex-
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isting on which to base his action for this difference.

This matter is much confused with the right of a seller

who has not passed title to keep the goods as his own and

sue for the difference between market value at time of

breach and the agreed price. But in these cases the seller

has continued in possession of the title all the time ; there

is no question of retaking it from the buyer. Neverthe-

less the authorities on this point, particularly Dustan v.

McAndrew,^°^ are occasionally made the basis of state-

ments, by both judges and text-writers, to the effect that

a seller who has passed title can retake it without actually

rescinding the contract. Thus, in Van Brocklin v. Smeal-

lie,^°^ it is very clearly said, though as a matter of dictum

only, that even where title has passed the seller still in

possession may keep the goods as his own and sue for

damages. But there are not enough cases in which the

105—44 N. Y. 72. 106—140 N. Y. 70.
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the matter exactly, there are statements which intimate
that the seller could revest title in himself on the buyer's
default and need not resell the goods.
Assuming in answer to these questions that the seller
does have power to revest the title in himself, there arises
the further question whether it is necessary for him to
rescind the contract, in the precise sense of putting an
end to it, to do this. We have seen that when title has
not passed, the seller may keep the goods, which are
already his own, and sue for damages, which are generally the difference between the market value and the
agreed price. We have seen also that the seller who has
passed title can resell the goods, in a certain sense as the
buyer's property, and sue for the difference. But can the
seller who has passed title also keep the goods as his own
and still sue for the difference between their market value
and the agreed price~ If, to revest title in himself, he
has to abrogate the contract, there is then no contract existing on which to base his action for this difference.
This matter is much confused with the right of a seller
who has not passed title to keep the goods as his own and
sue for the difference between market value at time of
breach and the agreed price. But in these cases the seller
has continued in possession of the title all the time; there
is no question of retaking it from the buyer. N evertheless the authorities on this point, particularly Dustan v.
McAndrew, 105 are occasionally made the basis of statements, by both judges and text-writers, to the effect that
a seller who has passed title can retake it without actually
rescinding the contract. Thus, in Van Brocklin v. Smeallie, 106 it is very clearly said, though as a matter of dictu1n
only, that even where title has passed the seller still in
posse sion may keep the goods as his own and sue for
damages. But there are not enough cases in which the
105-44 N. Y. 72.
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matter has been clearly passed on for any real conclusion

129

matter has been clearly passed on for any real conclusion
to be drawn.*

to be drawn.*

Notice of Resale. — The method of reselling, the

giving of notice and the like, are governed by the same

rules as apply to resale in order to fix damages in case of

the buyer's refusal to accept title. These rules have al-

ready been discussed.^"'' In that discussion it was

pointed out that one reason why the seller need not give

notice of the resale was because he was reselling his own

property for the purpose of getting evidence as to its

market value, and lack of notice, therefore, could not

affect the validity of the sale, but only the value of the

evidence. In case of resale by a seller by virtue of his

lien, he is selling property of another person. It might

be supposed therefore that he would be required to give

notice at least. In VanBrockhn v. Smeallie,^"^ however,

the court said, — as a matter of dictum since notice had

in fact been given — that, even though title had passed to
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the buyer, the resale ''need not be at auction, unless such

is the customary method of selling the sort of property in

question, nor is it absolutely essential that notice of the

time and place of sale should be given to the vendee."

In Pollen v. LeEoy,^°^ the sale was of specific property,

and the court appears to have considered that title had

passed, although its real opinion upon this point is not

clear. Nevertheless, it held expressly that notice of the

time and place of resale need not be given the buyer,

saying, "The law regards him (the seller), it has been

said in some of the cases, if in possession of the goods,

as the agent quoad hoc of the vendee. But it is no part

of such an agency, or of the duties involved in it, to notify

the principal of the time and place at which the goods are

to be sold, or exposed for sale. Indeed, in a majority of

cases such a notice would be entirely impracticable, as it

107— Ante, p. 90. 109—30 N. Y. 549.

108—140 N. Y. 70.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 61, (1).

--Notice of Resale.-The method of reselling, the
giving of notice and the like, are governed by the same
rules as apply to resale in order to fix damages in case of
the buyer's refusal to accept title. These rules have already been discussed. 107 In that discussion it was
pointed out that one reason why the seller need not give
notice of the resale was because he was reselling his own
property for the purpose of getting evidence as to its
market value, and lack of notice, the ref ore, could not
affect the validity of the sale, but only the value of the
evidence. In case of resale by a seller by virtue of his
lien, he is selling property of another person. It might
be supposed therefore that he would be required to give
notice at least. In VanBrocklin v. Smeallie,1° 8 however,
the court said,-as a matter of dicturm since notice had
in fact been given-that> even though title had passed to
the buyer, the resale ''need not be at auction, unless such
is the customary method of selling the sort of property in
question, nor is it absolutely essential that notice of the
time and place of sale should be given to the vendee."
In Pollen v. LeRoy, 109 the sale was of specific property,
and the court appears to have considered that title had
passed, although its real opinion upon this point is not
clear. Nevertheless, it held expressly that notice of the
time and place of resale need not be given the buyer,
saying, "The law regards him (the seller), it has been
said in some of the cases, if in possession of the goods,
as the agent quoad hoc of the vendee. But it is no part
of such an agency, or of the duties involved in it, to notify
the principal of the time and place at which the goods are
to be sold, or exposed for sale. Indeed, in a majority of
cases such a notice would be entirely impracticable, as it
107-Ante, p. 90.
108-140 N. Y. 70.

109-30 N. Y. 549.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 61, (1).
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would have been in this. Unless the sale is to be public

and at auction, no notice of the time and place can be

given. * * * There is no analogy in this particular be-

tween this case and that of a pledge. The pledgee is not

the owner nor the agent of the owner. He is clothed with

the possession and with a right to sell the property, in

order to repay himself a debt. Unless he resorts to

judicial proceedings to extinguish the right of his debtor,

he is bound to give notice to the latter * * * . A vendor,

on the contrary, is simply an agent, if he elect to become

such, of a vendee who refuses to complete his purchase ;

an agent to sell the property fairly and to the best advan-

tage. The only requisite to such a sale as a measure of

the rights and the injury of the party, is good faith, in-

cluding the proper observance of the usages of the par-

ticular trade. ""°

In these cases there had been notice to the buyer of the

seller 's intention to resell, though the time, place or man-
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ner of the resale were not indicated. It is probable that

this notice of intention to resell would be requisite to a

resale by virtue of the lien,^" although it is not usually

required in cases of resale merely to fix damages when

title has not passed."^* If notice were not given, it might

be a fair assumption that the seller had elected to rescind

the contract and take back title to himself, if, as we have

assumed above, courts permit revesting of title to be

done. That is, failure to notify the buyer of the resale

would indicate that the seller had chosen to resell the

goods as his own.

Stoppage in Transitu. — We have seen that a seller by

delivering possession to the buyer loses his right of lien.

110 — Waples & Co. v. Overaker Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap. 362; Dill v.

& Co., 77 Tex. 7; accd. Ridgley v. Mumford, 19 Ind. Ap. 609; New-

Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap. 362. berger v. Rountree, 18 111. Ap. 610;

111 — Hayes v. Nashville, 80 Fed. Winslow v. Harriman Iron Co.,

641; Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. At- — Tenn. — , 42 S. W. 698.

lanta Co., 109 Ga. 607; Ridgley v. U2—Ante, p. 90.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 60. (1). (3), (4). (5), 61, (2).
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would have been in this. Unless the sale is to be public
and at auction, no notice of the time and place can be
given. * * * There is no analogy in this particular between this case and that of a pledge. The pledgee is not
the owner nor the agent of the owner. He is clothed with
the possession and with a right to sell the property, in
order to repay himself a debt. Unless he resorts to
judicial proceedings to extinguish the right of his debtor,
he is bound to give notice to the latter * * * . A vendor,
on the contrary, is simply an agent, if he elect to become
such, of a vendee who refuses to complete his purchase;
an agent to sell the property fairly and to the best advantage. The only requisite to such a sale as a measure of
the rights and the injury of the party, is good faith, including the proper observance of the usages of the particular trade.' ' 110
In these cases there had been notice to the buyer of the
seller's intention to resell, though the time, place or manner of the r esale were not indicated. It is probable that
this notice of intention to resell would be requisite to a
resale by virtue of the lien, 111 although it is not usually
requir d in cases of resale merely to fix damages when
title has not passed. 11 2* If notice were not given, it might
be a fair assumption that the seller had elected to rescind
the contract and take back title to himself, if, as we have
assumed above, courts permit revesting of title to be
done. That i s, failure to notify the buyer of the resale
would indicate that the seller had chosen to · resell the
goods as his own.
Stoppage in Transitu.-W e have seen that a seller by
deliv ring possession to the buyer loses his right of lien.
110-Waples & Co. v. Overaker
& Co., 77 Tex. 7; aced. Ridgley v.
Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap. 362.
111- IJay s v. Nashville, 80 Fed.
641; Davis Sulphur Ore Co. v. Atlanta o., 109 Ca. 607; Ridgley v.
*S e Uniform Sales Act, Section

Mooney, 16 Ind. Ap. 362; Dill v.
Mumford, 19 Ind. Ap. 609 ; Newberger v. Rountree, 18 Ill. Ap. 610;
Winslow v. Harrim;i.n Iron Co.,
- Tenn . - , 42 S. W. 698.
112-Ante, p. 90.
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There is, however, one real or apparent exception to this.

If the goods have merely been given to a carrier for

transportation to the buyer and arc still in transit, the

seller is allowed to retake possession if it develops that

the buyer is apparently insolvent. This right is called

''stoppage in transitu." Like the ''seller's lien"' the

term presupposes that title has passed to the buyer.^^*

A seller who has not yet passed title may retake posses-

sion from a carrier because he is owner, just as an owner

may keep possession if he chooses. But it is only when

the right of repossession is exercised by a seller who has

parted with title that the name "stoppage in transitu"

is properly applied."**

Origin. — This right to retake possession appears

to have originated in equity, on the principle that if a

seller could prevent the goods from actually coming into

the hands of a bankrupt he ought to be allowed to do so.

It was soon developed also as a principle of law.^^^
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113 — Reynolds v. Rr., 43 N. H. frequently raised as any other

580; Dickman v. Williams, 50 Miss, mercantile question within the

131

There is, however, one real or apparent exception to this.
If the goods have merely been given to a carrier for
transportation to the buyer and are still in transit, the
seller is allowed to retake possession if it develops that
the buyer is apparently insolvent. This right is called
''stoppage in transitu. '' Like the ''seller's lien''~ the
term presupposes that title has passed to the buyer. 118
A seller who has not yet passed title may retake possession from a carrier because he is owner, just as an owner
may keep possession if he chooses. But it is only when
the right of repossession is exercised by a seller who has
parted with title that the name "stoppage in transitu"
is properly applied. 114 *

500; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick, last hundred years, it must be

(Mass.) 307; Bolton V. Lancashire, owned that the principle on which

etc. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 430, 439. it depends has never been either

114 — Courts occasionally ne- settled or stated in a satisfactory

gleet the true meaning of the manner. In courts of equity it

phrase and use it in connection has been a received opinion that

with retaking by an owner. Swan- it was founded on some principle

wick V. Sothern, 9 Ad. & El. 895; of common law. In courts of law

Cf. Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind. 240. it is just as much the practice to

The distinction is acted on in call it a principle of equity, which

-Origin.-This right to retake possession appears
to have originated in equity, on the principle that if a
seller could prevent the goods from actually coming into
the hands of a bankrupt he ought to be allowed to do so.
It was soon developed also as a principle of law. 115

Kearney v. Union Pac. Rr. Co., 97 the common law has adopted."

Iowa 719, 59 Am. St. 434. This opinion cites authority bear-

115 — Wiseman v. Vandeputt, 2 ing upon the conflicting theories

Vernon 203; Burghall v. Howard, of origin and points out, also, the

1 H. Blackstone 365 N; D'Aquila v. existence of the right in other

Lambert, 1 Ambler 399, 2 Eden 77; systems of law.

Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M. & W. That the right of stoppage orig-

321, "Although the question of inated neither in law nor in equity,

stoppage in transitu has been as but was adopted from the Law

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 57.

113-Reynolds v. Rr., 43 N. H. frequently raised as any other
580; Dickman v. Williams, 50 Miss. mercantile question within the
500; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. last hundred years, it must be
(Mass.) 307; Bolton V. Lancashire, owned that the principle on which
etc. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 430, 439.
it depends has never been either
114-Courts occasionally ne- settled or stated in a satisfactory
glect the true meaning of the manner. In courts of equity it
phrase and use it in connection has been a received opinion that
with retaking by an owner. Swan- it was founded on some principle
wick v. Sothern, 9 Ad. & El. 895; of common law. In courts of law
Cf. Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind. 240. it is just as much the practice to
The distinction is acted on in call it a principle of equity, which
Kearney v. Union Pac. Rr. Co., 97 the common la:w has adopted."
Iowa 719, 59 Am. St. 434.
This opinion cites authority bear·
115-Wiseman v. Vandeputt, 2 ing upon the conflicting theories
Vernon 203; Burghall v. Howard, of origin and points out, also, the
1 H. Blackstone 365 N; D'Aquila v. existence of the right in other
Lambert, 1 Ambler 399, 2 Eden 77; systems of law.
Gibson v. Carruthers, 8 M_. & W.
That the right of stoppage orig321, "Although the question of inated neither in law nor in equity,
stoppage in transitu has been as
but was adopted from the Law
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 57.
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When Right Arises. — The right of stoppage arises

only when the buyer is discovered, after the shipment of

the goods, to be insolvent. Since the title to the goods is

in the buyer, the seller has no right to them, after he has

parted with possession, save by virtue of this particular

remedy. This right arose, as the expression of the early

cases indicates, out of desire to protect the seller against

obvious and inevitable loss, rather than from any logic-

ally derived rule of law. ''It was determined, on solid

reasons, that the goods of one man should not be applied

in payment of another man's debts." It extends, there-

fore, only to cases where the buyer is discovered, subse-

quent to the sale, to be insolvent. The date on which the

buyer became insolvent is immaterial; it is the date on

which the seller becomes aware of it that matters. The

right of stoppage is not derogated by the fact that the

buyer was already insolvent at the time of shipment, or

even at the time the contract of sale was entered into.
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''If there be a want of ability to pay, it can make no dif-

ference, in justice or good sense, whether it was produced

by causes, or shown by acts, at a period before or after

the sale.""«

If the seller knew, actually or constructively, of the

buyer's insolvency at the time of shipment, or, a fortiori,

at the time of making the contract, there would be no rea-

son for allowing him to stop in transitu. The fact that

he shipped the goods, knowing the buj^er to be insolvent,

would clearly imply an intent to give the buyer possession

Merchant is stated in Kendall v. right as existing when title is in

Marshall, 11 Q. B. D. 356. the buyer.

It is obvious from the language 116— Loeh & Bro. v. Peters, 63

of the early cases that some idea Ala. 243, 248; Lancaster Co. Bk.

of title not having passed at all v. Huver, 114 Pa. 216; Reynolds

entered into the decision and the v. Rr., 43 N. H. 580, overruling

seller was thought of as retaking Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53;

possession of his own goods, Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend. (N.

rather than retaking title, or re- Y.) 137; O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md.

asserting a mere lien. But the 122; Blum & Co. v. Marks, 21 La.

later cases clearly recognize the An. 268; More v. Lott, 13 Nev. 376.
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--When Right Arises.-The right of stoppage arises
only when the buyer is discovered, after the shipment of
the goods, to be insolvent. Since the title to the goods is
in the buyer, the seller has no right to them, after he has
parted with possession, save by virtue of this particular
remedy. This right arose, as the expression of the early
cases indicates, out of desire to protect the seller against
obvious and inevitable loss, rather than from any logically derived rule of law. "It was determined, on solid
reasons, that the goods of one man should not be applied
in payment of another man's debts." It extends, there£ore, only to cases where the buyer is discovered, subsequent to the sale, to be insolvent. The date on which the
buyer became insolvent is immaterial; it is the date on
which the seller becomes aware of it that matters. The
right of stoppage is not derogated by the fact that the
buyer was already insolvent at the time of shipment, or
even at the time the contract of sale was entered into.
"If there be a want of ability to pay, it can make no difference, in justice or good sense, whether it was produced
by causes, or shown by acts, at a period before or after
the sale.' ' 116
If the seller knew, actually or constructively, of the
buyer's insolvency at the time of shipment, or, a fortiori,
at the time of making the contract, there would be no reason for allowing him to stop in transitu. The fact that
he shipped the goods, knowing the buyer to be insolvent,
would clearly imply an intent to give the buyer possession
Merchant is stated in Kendall v.
Marshall, 11 Q. B. D. 356.
It is obvious from the language
of the ea rly cases that some idea
of title not having passed at all
entered into the decision and the
seller was thought of as retaking
possession of his own goods,
ra ther tha n r etaking title, or reasse rti ng a mere li en. But the
lat er cases clearl y r ecognize the
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116-Loeh & Bro. v. Peters, 63
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Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn. 53;
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Y.) 137; O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md.
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despite that fact, and the reason for the exception to the

rule that a seller can not retake possession after title has

passed, would be gone. The courts so hold.^"

As will be seen later,"' the exercise of the right to stop

is not a rescission of the contract but a mere withholding

of actual possession of the goods. As no more effect' than

a delay in possession would result, the courts have been

unanimous in holding that actual insolvency of the buyer

is not necessary to justify the stoppage. Such an ap-

pearance of insolvency as would lead a reasonable man

to suppose insolvency existed is all that is necessary.

The courts appear to make a distinction, although there

is no statement to such effect, between the evidence of

insolvency which will support a seller's right to keep

possession, (as against an attaching creditor of the buyer,

for instance,) and that which will protect him against a

suit in damages for delay caused by his stoppage. For

the one, actual insolvency is necessary, for the other only
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appearance of insolvency. This may explain some of the

dissimilarity in holdings upon rather similar facts. ^^®

But there must be a real appearance of insolvency at

least and mere suspicion that the buyer is insolvent, or

belief that, from other reasons than insolvency, he will

not pay for the goods, will not justify a stoppage and a

seller who has acted on any such reason is not entitled to

possession and, moreover, will be liable in an action for

damages by the buyer."®

117 — O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md. 93 Wis. 250, failure to pay seller's

122; Buckley v. Fumiss, 15 Wend, claim and disappearance of buyer

(N. Y.) 137; Blum & Co. v Marks, sufficient; More v. Lott, 13 Nev.

21 La. An. 268; Fenkhausen v. Fel- 376.

lows, 20 Nev. 312; Evans etc. Co. 120 — Kavanaugh Mfg. Co. v.

V. Missouri K. & T. Rr., 64 Mo. Rosen, 132 Mich. 44, 92 N. W. 788,

Ap. 305. mere belief founded on unsatis-

118 — Post, p. 146. factory rating by a credit agency

119 — O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md. not sufficient; Jewett Pub. Co. v.

122, "if a stoppage of payment by Butler, 159 Mass. 517, mere doubt

the vendee be proved, it is suffi- not enough; Bayonne Knife Co. v.

cient." Jeffris v. Fitchburg R. R., Umbeuhauer, 107 Ala. 496; Smith

despite that fact, and the reason for the exception to the
rule that a seller can not retake possession after title has
passed, would be gone. The courts so hold. 117
As will be seen later, 118 the exercise of the right to stop
is not a rescission of the contract but a mere withholding
of actual possession of the goods. As no more eff ecf than
a delay in possession would result, the courts have been
unanimous in holding that actual insolvency of the buyer
is not necessary to justify the stoppage. Such an appearance of insolvency as would lead a reasonable man
to suppose insolvency existed is all that is necessary.
The courts appear to make a distinction, although there
is no statement to such effect, between the evidence of
insolvency which will support a seller's right to keep
possession, (as against an attaching creditor of the buyer,
for instance,) and that which will protect him against a
suit in damages for delay caused by his stoppage. For
the one, actual insolvency is necessary, for the other only
appearance of insolvency. This may explain some of the
dissimilarity in holdings upon rather similar facts. 119
But there must be a real appearance of insolvency at
least and mere suspicion that the buyer is insolvent, or
belief that, from other reasons than insolvency, he will
not pay for the goods, will not justify a stoppage and a
seller who has acted on any such reason is not entitled to
possession and, moreover, will be liable in an action for
damages by the buyer. 120
117-0'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md.
122; Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend.
(N. Y.) 137; Blum & Co. v Marks,
21 La. An. 268; Fenkhausen v. Fellows, 20 Nev. 312; Evans etc. Co.
v. Missouri K. & T. Rr., 64 Mo.
Ap. 305.
118-Post, p. 146.
119-0'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md.
122, "if a stoppage of payment by
the vendee be proved, it is sufficient." Jeffris v. Fitchburg R. R.,

Di 'ti.t.
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93 Wis. 250, failure to pay seller's
claim and disappearance of buyer
sufficient; More v. Lott, 13 Nev.
376.
120-Kavanaugh Mfg. Co. v.
Rosen, 132 Mich. 44, 92 N. W. 788,
mere belief founded on unsatisfactory rating by a credit agency
not sufficient; Jewett Pub. Co. v.
Butler, 159 Mass. 517, mere doubt
not enough; Bayonne Knife Co. v.
Umbenhauer, 107 Ala. 496: Smith
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The right of stoppage is not affected by the fact that

the seller has received notes or other instruments for the

price, or in other ways given credit, nnless such notes

have been accepted in payment.^^^* Neither is it affected

by part payment, although, of course, the debt for which

the property could be held would be proportionately

reduced.^^^

Does Not Exist Against Buyer's Possession. — The

right of stoppage in transitu is, as its name indicates, a

right to retake possession only while the goods are in

The right of stoppage is not affected by the fact that
the seller has received notes or other instruments for the
price, or in other ways given credit, unless such notes
have been accepted in payment. 12 u Neither is it affected
by part payment, although, of course, the debt for which
the property could be held would be proportionately
reduced. 122

transit to the buyer. The exception on which the right

is founded does not go to the extent of permitting repos-

session after the journey is ended. This point was raised

in Conyers v. Ennis.^^' In that case it appeared that one

-Does Not Exist Against Buyer's Possession.-The
right of sto'ppage in transitu is, as its name indicates, a

Rousmaniere had ordered goods of the plaintiff which

the latter duly shipped to him. He was insolvent at the

time, although this was unknown to the plaintiif , and later

committed suicide. The carrier dehvered the goods into
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the hands of his administrators, the defendants. The de-

fendants resold the goods and the plaintiffs now claimed

the proceeds. As there appeared to be no actual fraud

on Rousmaniere 's part on which a rescission of the con-

tract could be founded, the plaintiffs claimed a right of

stoppage in transitu.

Mr. Justice Story began his opinion by recognizing that

''this is a case of extreme hardship, and such as might

well induce a court to strain after some mode of redress. ' '

& Co. V. Barker, 102 Ala. 679, fact 273; Hays v. Mouille & Co., 44 Pa.

that buyer has absconded is not, 48, notes need not be tendered

by itself, enough; Gustine v. Phil- back at time of stoppage; Ed-

lips, 38 Mich. 674. wards v. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375;

121— Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me. Feise v. "Wray, 3 East 93.

93; Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453; 122 — Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.

Brewer Lumber Co. v. Bost. & Al. 93 ; Howatt v. Davis, 5 Mumford

Rr., 179 Mass. 228, even though on (Va.) 34; Feise v. Wray, 3 East

receipt of note bill is marked paid; 93.

Clapp Bros. v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa 123—2 Mason 236, Fed. Cas. 3149.

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 52, (1), (2).

right to retake possession only while the goods are in
transit to the buyer. The exception on which the right
is founded does not go to the extent of permitting repossession after the journey is ended. This point was raised
in Conyers v. Ennis. 128 In that case it appeared that one
Rousmaniere had ordered goods of the plaintiff which
the latter duly shipped to him. He was insolvent at the
time, although this was unknown to the plaintiff, and later
committed suicide. The carrier delivered the goods into
the hands of his administrators, the defendants. The defendants resold the goods and the plaintiffs now claimed
the proceeds. As there appeared to be no actual fraud
on Rousmaniere 's part on which a rescission of the contract could be founded, the plaintiffs claimed a right of
stoppage in transitu.
Mr. Justice Story began his opinion by recognizing that
"this is a case of extreme hardship, and such as might
well induce a court to strain after some mode of redress.''
& Co. v. Barker, 102 Ala. 679, fact
273; Hays v. Mourne & Co., 44 Pa.
that buyer has absconded is not,
48, notes need not be tendered
by itself, enough; Gustine v. Phil- back at time of stoppage; Edlips, 38 Mich. 674.
wards v. Brewer, 2 M. & W. 375;
121-Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me. Feise v. Wray, 3 East 93.
93; Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453;
122-Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.
Brewer Lumber Co. v. Bost. & Al. 93; Howatt v. Davis, 5 Mumford
Rr., 179 Mass. 228, even though on
(Va.) 34; Feise v. Wray, 3 East
receipt of not bill is marked paid;
93.
Clapp Bros. v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa
123-2 Mason 236, Fed. Cas. 3149.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section G2, (1), (2).
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* * The principal point, ' ' he continued, ' ' which under these

circumstances has been pressed at the bar, is that the

right of a consignor to stop property in cases of insolv-

ency, ought not to be confined to cases of stoppage in

transitu, but in equity should extend to all cases where

the property is not paid for and remains in the hands of

the consignee. It is admitted that the decisions in Eng-

land have confined the right of stoppage to cases where

the property is in its transit. But it is suggested, that the

point has not been solemnly adjudged in the United

States, and that it is open for the court to adopt the more

enlarged rule, hinted at by Lord Ilardwicke, in Snee v.

Prescott}^^ * * * All argument of this sort is addressed

in vain to this court. * * * Nothing is better settled, if

an uninterrupted series of authorities can settle the law,

than the doctrine that the vendor, in cases of insolvency,

can stop the property only while it is in its transit. If

it has once reached the consignee, there is an end of all
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right to reclaim it as a pledge for the pajTnent of the pur-

chase money. "^''^

When Goods Are in Transit. — The issue is very

often raised, therefore, as to just when the transit be-

tween seller and buyer has ceased. In general it may be

said that it is not at an end until the goods have come

into the actual possession of the buyer or the possession

of someone acting as the buyer's agent for the purpose

of possession*

Very broadly speaking the goods are in transit,

whether in motion or at rest, whether in the hands of the

original carrier or of some remote forwarder, so long as

124—1 Atk. 245. 44 Fla. 803, 33 So. 527. Even though

125 — This is true even though the carrier later takes possession

''The principal point,'' he continued, ''which under these
circumstances has been pressed at the bar, is that the
right of a consignor to stop property in cases of insolvency, ought not to be confined to cases of stoppage in
transitu, but in equity should extend to all cases where
the property is not paid for and remains in the hanas of
the consignee. It is admitted that the decisions in England have confined the right of stoppage to cases where
the property is in its transit. But it is suggested, that the
point has not been solemnly adjudged in the United
States, and that it is open for the court to adopt the more
enlarged rule, hinted at by Lord H ardwicke, in Snee v.
Prescott. 124 ~ * * All argument of this sort is addressed
in vain to this court. * * * Nothing is better settled, if
an uninterrupted series of authorities can settle the law,
than the doctrine that the- vendor, in cases of insolvency,
can stop the property only while it is in its transit. If
it has once reached the consignee, there is an end of all
right to reclaim it as a pledge for the payment of the purchase money.' n 20

the buyer personally is willing to from the buyer and goods are in

give up the goods and admits that its hands at time of seller's at-

he received them without intend- tempt to stop. Re Dancy Hard-

ing to keep them. Smith v. Gail, ware Co., 198 Fed. 336.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 58, (1), (2), (3), (4).

-When Goods Are in Transit.-The issue is very
often raised, therefore, as to just when the transit between seller and buyer has ceased. In general it may be
said that it is not at an end until the goods have come
into the actual possession of the buyer or the possession
of someone acting as the buyer's agent for the piirpose
of possession.*
Very broadly speaking the goods are in transit,
whether in motion or at rest, whether in the hands of the
original carrier or of some remote forwarder, so long as
124-1 Atk. 245.
125-This is true even though
the buyer personally is willing to
give up the goods and admits that
he received them without intending to keep them. Smith v. Gail,

44 Fla. 803, 33 So. 527. Even though
the carrier later takes possession
from the buyer and goods are in
its hands at time of seller's attempt to stop. Re Dancy Hardware Co., 198 Fed. 336.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 58, (1), (2), (3), (4).
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the bailee in whose possession they are has them by virtue

of the seller's contract with the transportation agency.

The transit does not end until the person in whose pos-

session they are, holds, by virtue of some new agreement,

under some contract relation with the buyer, or his

privy.^^^

Mere length of time elapsed between the shipment and

the attempt to stop in transitu does not itself terminate

the transit, nor otherwise affect the right. ^^"^

The carrier, as such, is an agent for carriage and not

primarily for possession and the transit is not at an end

so long as the goods are in its possession as carrier. Even

though they have come to their journey's end so far as

the carrier's duty to transport is concerned, if the freight

is still unpaid, or the carrier has another lien against

them, and the carrier has not agreed with the buyer to

hold under a new contract with him, they are still tech-

nically in transit.'^^^ But the idea of transportation — not
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necessarily meaning motion — is essential ; if it is lacking,

the agent is obviously an agent primarily for posses-

sion.^^®

The character of the carrier is immaterial. So long as

it is acting as an agent for the purpose of transportation

only and is not an agent of the buyer for purpose of pos-

session, as such, the right of stoppage may be exercised.^'®

126 — It has been said that even Schneider, 13 Ind. Ap. 23; Harding

actual physical possession by the Paper Co. v. Allen, 65 Wis. 576;

buyer would not terminate the Kahnweiler v. Buck, 2 Pears. (Pa.)

transit if without consent on his 69, even though carrier has made

part. Heinekey v. Earle, 8 El. & tender of possession to the buyer;

Bl. 410. 120 Eng. Rep. 153. Coleman v. N. Y., N. H. & H., 215

127 — Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Mass. 45, even though buyer has

Wend. (N. Y.) 137, 40 days; Jeffris paid freight and taken samples.

V. Fitchburg Rr., 93 Wis. 250, more 129— Rummel v. Blanchard, 216

than a year. js^ y 343

128- Jeffris v. Fitchburg R. R., i3o_Johnson v. Eveleth. 93 Me.

93 Wis. 250; Brewer Lumber Co. ^^^ ^^^^^^^ company as carrier;

v. Bost. & Al. R. R.. 179 Mass. Muskegon v. Underbill. 43 Mich.

228; Wheeling & L. E. R. R. Co. v. ggg. implied.

Koontz, 61 O. S. 551; Rogers v.
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the bailee in whose possession they are has them by virtue
of the seller's contract with the transportation agency.
The transit does not end until the person in whose possession they are, holds, by virtue of some new agreement,
under some contract relation with the buyer, or his
privy.12s
Mere length of time elapsed between the shipment and
the attempt to stop in transitu does not itself terminate
the transit, nor otherwise affect the right. 127
The carrier, as such, is an agent for carriage and not
primarily for possession and the transit is not at an end
so long as the goods are in its possession as carrier. Even
though they have come to their journey's end so far as
the carrier's duty to transport is concerned, if the fr eight
is still unpaid, or the carrier has another lien against
them, and the carrier has not agreed with the buyer to
hold under a new contract with him, they are still t echnically in transit. 128 But the idea of transportation-not
necessarily meaning motion-is essential; if it is lacking,
the agent is obviously an agent primarily for possession.129
The character of the carrier is immaterial. So long as
it is acting as an agent for the purpose of transportation
only and is not an agent of the buyer for purpose of possession, as such, the right of stoppage may be exercised. 130
126-It has been said that even
actual physical possession by the
buyer w ould not terminate the
transit if without con sent on his
part. H einekey v. Earle, 8 El. &
Bl. 410, 120 Eng. Rep. 153.
127-Buckley v. Furniss, 15
W end. (N. Y .) 137, 40 days; Jeffris
v . Fitchburg Rr., 93 Wis. 250, more
than a year.
128-J effris v. Fit chburg R. R.,
93 Wis . 250; Br ewer Lum be r Co.
v. Bost. & A l. R. R., 179 Ma ss.
228; Whe ling & L . E . R. R. Co. v.
Koontz, 61 0. S. 551; Roger s v.
D1giti.l

TE

by

ET ARCH VE

Schneider, 13 Ind. Ap. 23; Harding
Paper Co. v. Allen, 65 Wis. 576;
Kahnweiler v. Buck, 2 Pears. (Pa.)
69, even though carrier has made
tender of possession to the buyer;
Coleman v. N . Y., N. H . & H., 215
Mass. 45, even though buyer has
paid freight and taken samples.
129- Rummel v. Blanchard, 216
NY. 348.
130- Johnson v. Eveleth, 93 Me.
306 , logging company as carri e r;
Muskegon v . Underhill. 43 Mich.
62 9, impli ed.
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Even if the means of transportation is owned or

chartered by the buyer, if it is used as a carrier for the

purpose of transporting the goods to the buyer, the goods

are in transit until they reach him, and are subject to

stoppage. ^^^

If, however, they are delivered to a vessel or other'car-

rier as though to a warehouse, or to an agent for posses-

sion, then the transit between the seller and the buyer is

at an end, despite the fact that the goods are to be car-

ried to other points. The matter is well stated in Berndt-

son v. Strang,^^^ the court saying, ''If a man send his o\vn

ship, and orders the goods to be delivered on board his

own ship, and the contract is to deliver them free on

board, then the ship is the place of delivery and the

trausitiis is at an end, just as much * * * as if the pur-

chaser had sent his own cart, as distinguished from hav-

ing the goods put into the cart of a carrier. Of course

there is no further transit us after the goods are in the
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purchaser's own cart. There they are at home, in the

hands of the purchaser, and there is an end of the Avhole

delivery. The next thing to be looked to is, whether there

is any intermediate person interposed between the vendor

and the purchaser. Cases no doubt may arise, where the

transitus may be at an end although some person may

intervene between the period of actual delivery of the

goods and the purchaser 's acquisition of them. The pur-

chaser, for instance, may require the goods to be placed

on board a ship chartered by himself and about to sail on

a ro\'ing voyage. In that case, when the goods are on

board the ship everything is done; for the goods have

been put in the place indicated by the purchaser and there

is an end of the transitus."

The question of whether the delivery to the carrier is

for transportation between the seller and buyer, or is a

delivery to a representative of the buyer for transporta-

131— NewliaU v. Vargas, 13 Me. parte Falke, 14 Ch. Div. 446, 7 App.

93; Stubbs v. Lund, 9 Mass. 453; Cas. 573.

Ilsley V. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65; Ex 132— L. R. 4 Eq. 481.

Even if the means of transportation is owned or
chartered by the buyer, if it is used as a carrier for the
purpose of transporting the goods to the buyer, the goods
are in transit until they reach him, and are subject to
stoppage. 131
If, however, they are delivered to a vessel or other' carrier as though to a warehouse, or to an agent for possession, then the transit between the seller and the buyer is
at an end, despite the fact that the goods are to be carried to other points. The matter is well stated in Berndtson v. Strang, 132 the court saying, "If a man send his o'vn
ship; and orders the goods to be delivered on board his
O"w11 ship, and the contract is to deliver them free on
board, then the ship is the place of delivery and the
transitits is at an end, just as much * * * as if the purchaser had sent his o-wn cart, as distinguished from having the goods put into the cart of a carrier. Of course
there is no further transitus after the goods are in the
purchaser's own cart. There they are at home, in the
hands of the purchaser, and there is an end of the whole
delivery. The next thing to be looked to is, whether there
is any intermediate p erson interposed between the vendor
and the purchaser. Cases no doubt may arise, where the
transitus may be at an end although some person may
intervene between the period of actual delivery of the
goods and the purchaser's acquisition of them. The purchaser, for instance, may require the goods to be placed
on board a ship charter ed by himself and about to sail on
a roving voyage. In that case, vvhen the goods are on
board the ship everything is done; for the goods have
been put in the place indicated by the purchaser and there
is an end of the transitus."
The question of whether the delivery to the carrier i
for transportation between the seller and buyer, or is a
delivery to a representative of the buyer for transporta131-Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.
93; Stubbs v. Lund, 9 Mass. 453;
Ilsley v. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65; Ex
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Cas. 573.
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tion elsewhere, is really one of fact in each case and not
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tion elsewhere, is really one of fact in each case and not
one that can be solved by the application of any rule. 138

one that can be solved by the application of any rule.^^'

The truest test, although one not expressed by courts

is, that if the possessor of the goods holds them through

contract with the seller, the goods are in transit, while if

contract relation with the seller has terminated, or the

possession has been delivered without contract relation,

the transit is ended. ^^*

The coming of the goods into other hands than those of

the original carrier does not necessarily terminate the

transit, if the original contract still exists.

The delivery by the carrier to a wharfinger or ware-

The truest test, although one not expressed by courts
is, that if the possessor of the goods holds them through
contract with the seller, the goods are in transit, while if
contract relation with the seller has terminated, or the
possession has been delivered without contract relation,
the transit is ended. 134

houseman does not terminate the transit, if such recipient

is the carrier's agent, or a public agent, to hold the goods

until actual or constructive delivery, to the buyer. Such

a warehouseman is merely a link in the chain of trans-

portation under the seller's original directions.^'*
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133— Bethell & Co. v. Clark, 20

Q. B. Div. 615.

134 — Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.

93; Stubbs v. Lund, 9 Mass. 453;

Berrendson v. Strang, L. R. 4 Eq.

481; Cf. Schotsmans v. Lancashire

& Y. R. R., L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 336.

Id Bethell & Co. v. Clark, 20 Q. B.

Div. 615, the contract of sale was

silent as to delivery but the buy-

er's subsequent order was to "con-

The coming of the goods into other hands than those of
the original carrier do es not necessarily terminate the
transit, if the original contract still exists.
The delivery by the carrier to a wharfinger or warehouseman does not terminate the transit, if such recipient
is the carrier's agent, or a public agent, to hold the goods
until actual or constructive delivery, to the buyer. Such
a warehouseman is merely a link in the chain of transportation under the seller's original directions. 135

sign * * * to the 'Darling Downs',

to Melbourne * * *". The issue

was whether transit ended with

delivery on board the Darling

Downs. The court held that it did

not 80 end, that where the transit

"has been caused either by the

terms of the contract or by the di-

rections of the purchaser to the

vendor, the right of stoppage in

transitu exists" and that the "busi-

ness moaning" of the order in this

case was, not that the goods were

to be delivered to the Darling

Downs as to a warehouse, thence

to be sent further by the buyer,

but to her as a carrier which

would transport them to Mel-

bourne. The Darling Downs ap-

pears to have been a general ship,

scheduled to sail to Melbourne in-

dependently of the buyer. In.

Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.

(Mass.) 307, the goods were or-

dered delivered to the ship "Lion",

which the buyer owned himself,

and which he had himself appar-

ently ordered to proceed to Boston.

It was held that the transit ended

on delivery aboard the Lion.

135— Reynolds v. R. R., 43 N. H.

580; Calahan v. Babcock, 21 O. S.

280; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio

133-Bethell & Co. v. Clark, 20
Q. B. Div. 615.
134-Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.
93; Stubbs v. Lund, 9 Mass. 453;
Berrendson v. Strang, L. R. 4 Eq.
481; Cf. Schotsmans v. Lancashire
& Y. R. R., L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 336.
In Bethell & Co. v. Clark, 20 Q. B.
Div. 615, the contract of sale was
silent as to delivery but the buyer's subsequent order was to "consign • • * to the 'Darling Downs',
to Melbourne * * *". The issue
was whether transit ended with
delivery on board the Darling
Downs. The court held that it did
not so end, that where the transit
"has been caused eith er by the
terms of the contract or b y the dire tio ns of the pur haser to the
vendor, th right of stoppage in
transitu exists" and that the "business m aning" of the order in this
case was, not that the goods were

to be delivered to the Darling
Downs as to a warehouse, thence
to be sent further by the buyer,
but to her as a carrier which
would transport them to Melbourne. The Darling Downs appears to have been a general ship,
scheduled to sail to Melbourne independently of the buyer.
In
Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.
(Mass.) 307, the goods were ordered delivered to the ship "Lion",
which the buyer owned himself,
and which he had himself apparently ordered to proceed to Boston.
It was held that the transit ended
on delivery aboard the Lion.
135-Reynolds v. R. R., 43 N. H.
580; Calahan v. Babcock, 21 0. S.
280; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio
(N. Y.) 629, delivery to customs
officers; Donath v. Broomhead, 7
Pa. 301, idem.

(N. Y.) 629, delivery to customs

ofTicers; Donath v. Broomhead, 7
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Neither is the original transit terminated by dehvery

from one carrier to another so long as both are actors in

the originally contemplated journey."^ But the transit

is ended when the original carrier delivers them, even to

another carrier, if the delivery is at the buyer's order and

was not a part of the transit originally contemplated as

necessary to get them to the buyer. The second carrier

then holds them as the buyer's representative in posses-

sion. Thus, in Li re Patterson Co.,^^''^ C ordered goods

of B, who in turn ordered them of A. A thereupon

shipped them to B, at St. Louis. On their arrival there

B reconsigned them to C, in Arkansas. The court held the

transit to have ended with B's reconsignment, as the

original journey to the buyer was ended in St. Louis, even

though the sellers knew they were ultimately to go fur-

ther on, and had tagged the goods with C's name and

address.^^^

A fortiori, the transit is not ended through mere deliv-
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ery of the goods to a warehouseman whose duty is to send

the goods still further on their journey. And this is so

even though the orders as to the rest of the journey are

to come from the buyer himself. Although it does not

expressly appear in the cases, a distinction would un-

doubtedly be made if the parties had not clearly contem-

plated the place of the further journey at the time of

shipment. That is to say, the holdings that a ware-

houseman in whose care goods have been consigned is

not a possessory agent of the buyer seem to be founded

136— White v. Mitchell, 38 Mich. R. R. Co., 108 Ga. 70, 79 Am. St.

390, delivery by carrier to a 26, a sub-buyer laid his hands on

carter; Re Burlte & Co., 140 Fed. the goods while in the freight

971, idem; Bethell v. Clark, 20 house at their original destination

Q. B. Div. 615. and ordered them sent to his own

137 — 186 Fed. 629. buyer; yet the original seller was

138 — Cf. Muskegon Booming Co. allowed to retake possession. In

V. Underbill, 43 Mich. 629; Brooke Lewis v. Sharvey, 58 Minn. 464, a

Iron Co. V. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 444; mere order from the buyer to the

Norfolk Co. V. N. Y., N. H. & carrier to deliver to another per-

il. R., 202 Mass. 160. son in the same place was held

But in Bravan v. Atlanta, etc. not to terminate the transit.

Neither is the original tran it terminated by delivery
from one carrier to another o long as both are actors in
the originally contemplated journey. 136 But the transit
is ended when the original carrier delivers them, even to
another carrier, if the deliv ry i at the buyer's orde~ and
was not a part of the tran it originally contemplated as
necessary to get them to the buyer. The second carrier
then holds them as the buyer's representative in possession. Thus, in In re Patterson Co., 137 C ordered goods
of B, who in turn ordered them of A. A thereupon
shipped them to B, at St. Louis. On their arrival there
B reconsigned them to C, in Arkansas. The court held the
transit to have ended with B's reconsignment, as the
original journey to the buyer was ended in St. Louis, even
though the sellers knew they were ultimately to go further on, and had tagged the goods with C's name and
address. 138
.A. fortiori, the transit is not ended through mere delivery of the goods to a warehouseman whose duty is to send
the goods still further on their journey. And this is so
even though the orders as to the rest of the journey are
to come from the buyer himself. Although it does not
expressly appear in the cases, a distinction would undoubtedly be made if the parties had not clearly contemplated the place of the further journey at the time of
shipment. That is to say, the holdings that a warehouseman in whose care goods have been consigned is
not a possessory ag·ent of the buyer seem to be founded
136-White v. Mitchell, 38 Mich.
390, delivery by carrier to a
carter; Re Burke & Co., 140 Fed.
971, idem; Bethell v. Clark, 20
Q. B. Div. 615.
137-186 Fed. 629.
138-Cf. Muskegon Booming Co.
v. Underhill, 43 Mich. 629; Brooke
Iron Co. v. O'Brien, 135 Mass. 444;
Norfolk Co. v. N. Y., N. H. &
H. R., 202 Mass. 160.
But in Bravan v. Atlanta, etc.
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R. R. Co., 108 Ga. 70, 79 Am. St.

26, a sub-buyer laid his hands on
the goods while in the freight
house at their original destination
and ordered them sent to his own
buyer; yet the original seller was
allowed to retake possession. In
Lewis v. Sharvey, 58 Minn. 464, a
mere order from the buyer to the
carrier to deliver to another person in the same place was held
not to terminate the transit.
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on the fact that at the time of consignment it was con-

templated that tliey had still to go to some definite place

before reaching the buyer, although the buyer was to

direct their getting there. Thus, where goods were con-

signed to the buyer at Malone, in care of a warehouse-

man at Plattsburg, it was obvious that a journey beyond

Plattsburg was contemplated, even though the means

of getting them from Plattsburg to Malone was left to

the buyer's arrangement. In that case it was held that

the goods had not come to the end of their transit in

the warehouseman's hands.^^*

Delivery by the carrier, even to a recipient who has

nothing to do with the transportation, does not end the

transit if the recipient does not in any way represent

the buyer, as agent or otherwise.^*" But the right is lost

if the recipient represents the buyer, as, for instance, the

administrator of a deceased buyer's estate.^"

To recapitulate, the fact that the goods are or are not

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

in motion seems to have no effect in determining whether

or not they are in transit. Neither does the character of

the person in possession — i. e., his character as a trans-

porter, a forwarder, or a warehouseman — have any

139 — Buckley v. Furniss, 15 method of getting to original one;

Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Blackman v. Bethell v. Clark, 20 Q. B. Div. 615.

Pierce, 23 Cal. 508; Hepp v. Glov- no-Kingman & Co. v. Deni-

er, 15 La. 461; Hause v. Judson, ^^^^ g^ ^.^^^ g^g^ ^^ L. R. A. 347,

4 Dana (Ky.) 7; Chandler v. Ful- ^^^.^^^^ ^^ mortgagees of the buy-

ton, 10 Tex. 2, buyer's instructions ^„ „ , „ , „ , +„i,„„ r,^oc,^oc;^« ^*

er who had taken possession of

to intermediary to "hold onto the ■.. „^^-.^

goods until he should order them g^^ ^^ assignee or trustee in

away- held not to end transit, ^^j^kruptcy does represent the

Frame v. Oregon Liquor Co., 48 ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^.^ g^^^^^^ 258 Fed.

Ore. 272, goods in hands of a

teamster ordered by buyer to get

them from the freight depot to

which they had been consigned

held still in transit. This case

goes further than others. Hays v.

Mouille & Co., 14 Pa. 48; Cablen v. 141— Jacobs v. Bentley, 86 Ark.

Campboll, 30 Pa. 255, distinction 186; Conyers v. Ennis, 2 Mason

between new destination and 236.

688; McElroy v. Seery. 61 Md.

389; Cf., however, Tufts v. Syl-

vester, 79 Me. 213, holding a

"bankruptcy messenger" not to

represent the buyer.
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apparent effect on the decision. The one really indica-

tive circumstance that can be deduced from the cases

is the contract relation through which the holder of the

goods is in possession. If his possession is one of con-

tract, directly or indirectly, with the seller it indicates

that he holds as a link in the transit. If his possession

is under a contract with the buyer, it strongly indicates

that the buyer, has received possession — through his

agent — and the transit is at an end.

If the goods are not consigned to the buyer at all, but

to a buyer from him, to whom he has ordered them

shipped, they would nevertheless seem technically to be

in transit, so far as the right of stoppage is concerned,

until they reach the possession of the person to whom

they are consigned. This case occurs when the buyer

gives instructions for the seller to make delivery to

some third person instead of to the buyer himself. In

such case the third person would seem to stand in place
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of the buyer, and the goods to be in transit until they

have come into the possession of such representative of

the buyer. Thus, if the original buyer has resold and

thereafter directs the seller to ship to his buyer, the

transit is between the original seller and the second

buyer ; but until the goods have reached the sub-buyer it

can not be said that they have come into the hands of

either the buyer or of any possessory agent of his. They

are, therefore, logically still in transit.'^*^ The decided

cases, however, are against this position, and hold that

the right of stoppage does not exist after shipment to

the sub-buyer.^"

142 — Compare Ex parte Golding, directly to the sub-buyer. In the

13 Ch. Div. 628. former case, there is no doubt,

143 — There are two ways in from the authorities already cited,

which the case might arise: — the but that the goods would be sub-

buyer might order the goods sent ject to stoppage any time before

to some agent or representa- they reached the consignee named,

tive of his, instead of to him- Such a transit is truly one be-

self; or the buyer, having resold tween the seller and buyer as

the goods, might order them sent represented by his agent. But in

apparent effect on the decision. The one really indicative circumstance that can be deduced from the cases
is tho contract relation through which the holder of the
goods is in possession. If his possession is one of contract, directly or indirectly, with the seller it indicates
that he holds as a link in the transit. If his possession
is under a contract with the buyer, it strongly indicates
that the buyer. has received possession-through his
agent-and the transit is at an end.
If the goods are not consigned to the buyer at all, but
to a buyer from him, to whom he has ordered them
shipped, they would nevertheless seem technically to be
in transit, so far as the right of stoppage is concerned,
until they reach the possession of the person to whom
they are consigned. This case occurs when the buyer
gives instructions for the seller to make delivery to
some third person instead of to the buyer himself. In
such case the third person would seem to stand in place
of the buyer, and the goods to be in transit until they
have come into the possession of such representative of
the buyer. Thus, if the original buyer has resold and
thereafter directs the seller to ship to his buyer, the
transit is between the original seller and the second
buyer; but until the goods have reached the sub-buyer it
can not be said that they have come into the hands of
either the buyer or of any possessory agent of his. They
are, therefore, logically still in transit. 142 The decided
cases, however, are against this position, and hold that
the right of stoppage does not exist after shipment to
the sub-buyer. 143
142-Compare Ex parte Golding,
13 Ch. Div. 628.
143-There are two ways in
which the case might arise :-the
buyer might order the goods sent
to some agent or representative of his, instead of to himself; or the buyer, having resold
the goods, might order them sent

directly to the sub-buyer. In the
former case, there is no doubt,
from the authorities already cited,
but that the goods would be subject to stoppage any time before
they reached the consignee named.
Such a transit is truly one between the seller and buyer as
represented by his agent. But in
Origirral frnm
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Termination of Transit of Part of the Goods. — De-

livery to the buyer, or his possessory agent, of a part of

the goods does not necessarily put an end to the transit of

the rest of a single shipment. If, however, the delivery

of the part is of symbolic import from which can be im-

plied a new contract under which the carrier holds the

rest no longer as carrier for the seller, but as possessory

agent — even though still a carrier — of the buyer, then

the transit is at an end because the goods are in the actual

possession of the buyer through the possession of his

agent for that purpose.^**

Transit as Affected by Acts of Outsiders.— The fact

that the goods have been taken from the actual possession

of the carrier, by some one other than the buyer or his

agent, does not terminate the transit. The most usual

case of this is the attachment by creditors of the buyer

of goods still in the carrier's hands, and the consequent

THE LAW OF SALES

--Termination of Transit of Part of the Goods.-Delivery to the buyer, or his possessory agent, of a part of
the goods does not necessarily put an end to the transit of
the rest of a single shipment. If, however, the delivery
of the part is of symbolic import from which can be implied a new con tract under which the carrier holds the
rest no longer as carrier for the seller, but as possessory
agent-even though still a carrier-of the buyer, then
the transit is at an end because the goods are in the actual
possession of the buyer through the possession of his
agent for that purpose. 144

taking possession of them by the sheriff or other legal
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officer. It is uniformly held that such attachment and

change of possession does not defeat the seller's right

to retake in case of the buyer's insolvency. It makes

the second case there is doubt, seller have not reached the pos-

The spirit of the rule certainly session of anyone, other than the

justifies stoppage in such a case, carrier, they must still be in tran-

The goods are just as logically in sit to the buyer or his representa-

transit from seller to buyer when tive. The authority is scanty, but

the consignee is one to whom the what exists holds that the right

buyer has sold them as when the to stop does not exist in such

consignee is one whom the buyer cases. The theory of the decisions

has authorized otherwise to repre- is not clear. Neimeyer v. Burling-

sent him. There is no question ton, etc. R. R., 54 Neb. 321; Shep-

involved of the equity of such sub- ard v. Burroughs, 62 N. J. L. 469;

buyer, because the courts have Eaton v. Cook, 32 Vt. 58; Memphis

consistently held that one who etc. R. R. Co. v. Freed, 38 Ark.

buys from a buyer not in posses- 614; Treadwell v. Aydlett, 9

--Transit as Affected by Acts of Outsiders.-The fact
that the goods have been taken from the actual possession
of the carrier, by some one other than the buyer or his
agent, does not terminate the transit. The most usual
case of this is the attachment by creditors of the buyer
of goods still in the carrier's hands, and the consequent
taking possession of them by the sheriff or other legal
officer. It is uniformly held that such attachment and
change of possession does not defeat the seller's right
to retake in case of the buyer's insolvency. It makes

sion even of a bill of lading gets Heisk. (Tenn.) 388.

no equity that will defeat the orig- 144 — Buckley v. Furniss, 15

inal seller's right to stop in tran- Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Tanner v.

Bit. The question is, therefore, Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28; Ex parte

solely one of the transit. Logi- Falk, 14 Ch. Div. 446; 7 App. Ca.

cally, since the goods sent by the 573.

the second case there is doubt.
The spirit of the rule certainly
justifies stoppage in such a case.
The goods are just as logically in
transit from seller to buyer when
the consignee is one to whom the
buyer has sold them as when the
consignee is one whom the buyer
has authorized otherwise to represent him. There is no question
involved of the equity of such subbuyer, because the courts have
consistently held that one who
buys from a buyer not in possession even of a bill of lading gets
no equity that will defeat the original seller's right to stop in transit. The question is , therefore,
solely one of the transit. Logically, s ince the goods sent by the
D1git1:t

seller have not reached the pos·
session of anyone, other than the
carrier, they must still be in transit to the buyer or his representa·
tive. The authority is scanty, but
what exists holds that the right
to stop does not exist in such
cases. The theory of the decisions
is not clear. Neimeyer v. Burlington, etc. R. R., 54 Neb. 321; Shepard v. Burroughs, 62 N. J. L. 469;
Eaton v. Cook, 32 Vt. 58; Memphis
etc. R. R. Co. v. Freed, 38 Ark.
614; Treadwell v. Aydlett, 9
Heisk. (Tenn.) 388.
144-Buckley v. Furniss, 15
Wend. (N. Y.) 137; Tanner v.
Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28; Ex parte
Falk, 14 Ch. Div. 446; 7 App. Ca.
573.
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no difference at what time the debts of the attaching

creditors accrued — unless they were misled by a bill of

lading in the buyer's hands, a matter which is discussed

hereaftcr.^'*^ If before the seller acts, the goods have

been sold under the attachment proceedings, the right

of the seller still attaches to the money in the hands

of the court. ^*''

If the seller himself takes the goods on attachment

against the buyer the result is not certain. It is said

that by so doing he does not preclude a stoppage, since

stoppage does not affect the buyer's title and is not

inconsistent with attaching them as the buyer's goods. ^^'^

The stoppage in transitu does, however, revest the

seller w^tli his lien, and it might w^ell be said that attach-

ment is inconsistent with a lien.^*^

If, however, the goods should be taken from the carrier

by the buyer himself, or his representative, the transit

would have come to an end even though the destina-
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tion originally intended had not been reached.^**

Carrier's Lien. — The seller's right to possession is

subordinate to the carrier's lien for freight on the partic-

ular shipment, although superior to a carrier's general

lien for other freight. ^^° In this connection, an unusual

145 — Post, p. 221. But compare Fox v. Willis, 60 Tex.

146— O'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md. 373; Woodruff v. Noyes, 15 Conn.

122; Blum & Co. v. Marks, 21 La. 335.

An. 268; Bayonne Knife Co. v. Um- 148 — See ante, p. 120.

benhauer, 107 Ala. 496; Hepp v. 149 — Hays v. Mouille & Co., 14

Glover, 15 La. 461; Hause v. Jud- Pa. 48; Walsh v. Blakely, 6 Mont,

son, 4 Dana (Ky.) 7, attaches to 194; Cabeen v. Campbell, 30 Pa.

no difference at what time the debts of the attaching
creditors accrued-unless they were misled by a bill of
lading in n buyer's hands, a matter which is discussed
hereaftcr.115 If b fore the seller acts, the goods have
been sold under the attachment proceedings, the right
of the seller still attaches to the money in the hands
of the court. 146
If the seller himself takes the goods on attachment
against the buyer the result is not certain. It is said
that by so doing he does not preclude a stoppage, since
stoppage does not affect the buyer's title and is not
inconsistent with attaching them as the buyer's goods. 147
The stoppage in transitu does, however, revest the
seller with his lien, and it might well be said that attachment is inconsistent with a lien. 148
If, however, the goods should be taken from the carrier
by the buyer himself, or his representative, the transit
would have come to an end even though the destination originally intended had not been reached. 149

money made by sale; Smith v. 254; Halff v. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278;

Goss, 1 Camp. 282; Calahan v. Mecham & Son v. N. E. R. R. Co.,

Babcock, 21 O. S. 281; Frame v. 48 Scot. L. R. 987, applying statute;

Oregon Liquor Co., 48 Ore. 272, Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. &

unaffected by sale of goods under W. 518.

attachment proceedings; Hays v. 150 — Rucker v. Donovan, 13

Mouille & Co., 14 Pa. 48; White v. Kan. 251; Farrell v. Richmond, etc.

Mitchell, 38 Mich. 390. R. R., 102 N. C. 390, 3 L. R. A. 647,

--Carrier's Lien.-The seller's right to possession is
subordinate to the carrier's lien for freight on the particular shipment, although superior to a carrier's general
lien for other freight. 150 In this connection, an unusual

But cf. Couture v. McKay, 6 general lien; U. S. Steel Co. v.

Manitoba L. R. 273. Great Western Rr., L. R. 1 A. C.

147— Allyn v. Willis, 65 Tex. 65; 189, general lien.

145-Post, p. 221.
146-0'Brien v. Norris, 16 Md.
122; Blum & Co. v. Marks, 21 La.
An. 268; Bayonne Knife Co. v. Umbenhauer, 107 Ala. 496; Hepp v.
Glover, 15 La. 461; Hause v. Judson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 7, attaches to
money made by sale; Smith v.
Goss, 1 Camp. 282; Calahan v.
Babcock, 21 0. S. 281; Frame v.
Oregon Liquor Co., 48 Ore. 272,
unaffected by sale of goods under
attachment proceedings; Hays v.
Mouille & Co., 14 Pa. 48; White v.
Mitchell, 38 Mich. 390.
But cf. Couture v. McKay, 6
Manitoba L. R. 273.
147-Allyn v. Willis, 65 Tex. 65;

But compare Fox v. Willis, 60 Tex.
373; Woodruff v. Noyes, 15 Conn.
335.
148-See ante, p. 120.
149-Hays v. Mourne & Co., 14
Pa. 48; Walsh v. Blakely, 6 Mont.
194; Cabeen v. Campbell, 30 Pa.
254; Halff v. Allyn, 60 Tex. 278;
Mecham & Son v. N. E. R.R. Co.,
48 Scot. L. R. 987, applying statute;
Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. &
w. 518.
150-Rucker v. Donovan, 13
Kan. 251; Farrell v. Richmond, etc.
R. R., 102 N. C. 390, 3 L. R. A. 647,
general lien; U. S. Steel Co. v.
Great Western Rr., L. R. 1 A. C.
189, general lien.
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case was decided by the English court in Booth Steam-

ship Co. V. Cargo Fleet Co.^^^ The action was by the

carrier against the seller to recover freight charges.

The seller had ordered the delivery witliheld from the

buyer, but showed no desire to get possession of the

goods from the carrier. As the goods had been shipped

in the name of the buyer and as his property, there

was no contract for freight between the seller and

the carrier. The buyer, however, was insolvent and,

because of the stoppage, not entitled to possession,

and the carrier's lien as against his goods for freight

was practically worthless. The court treated the

matter as ' ' a novel and interesting point of law, of some

interest to carriers and merchants," mthout analogous

precedent, and by viewing the merits of the case declared

the seller to be liable.

Exercise of Right. — An attempted stoppage by the

seller gives him no right against the goods if, despite his
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attempt, they have come into the buyer's possession, at

least in the absence of actionable wrong-doing of the

buyer. That is to say, so far as the right of repossession

of the goods is concerned, stoppage in transitu means an

actual retaking of the goods before they reach the buy-

er's possession, and not a mere attempt to retake pos-

session.^^^

THE LAW OF SALES

case was decided by the English court in Booth Steamship Co. v. Cargo Fleet Co. 151 The action was by the
carrier against the seller to recover freight charges.
The seller had ordered the delivery withheld from the
buyer, but showed no desire to get possession of the
goods from the carrier. As the goods had been shipped
in the name of the buyer and as his property, there
was no contract for freight between the seller and
the carrier. The buyer, however, was insolvent and,
because of the stoppage, not entitled to possession,
and the carrier's lien as against his goods for freight
was practically worthless.
The court treated the
matter as ''a novel and interesting point of law, of some
interest to carriers and merchants,'' without analogous
precedent, and by viewing the merits of the case declared
the seller to be liable.

In the event of unsuccessful attempt, the seller must

look to the carrier for recompense for the latter 's wrong-

151—115 L. T. R. 199. Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio (N. Y.)

--Exercise of Right.-An attempted stoppage by the

152 — See authorities in preced- 629. Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613.

ing notes. But in Litt v. Cowley, This position would be sound if

7 Taunton 168, it was precisely it were the rule that stoppage in

held that the seller's attempt, by transitu, or an attempt to stop,

notification to the carrier, to stop amounted to a rescission of the

the goods amounted to such a res- contract. The accepted rule, how-

cission of the contract as deprived ever, is that it does not revest title

the buyer, to whom at^tual delivei-y in the seller but merely re-estab-

was made, of the right of posses- lishes his lien,

slon. Apparently approved in

seller gives him no right against the goods if, despite his
attempt, they have come into the buyer's possession, at
least in the absence of actionable wrong-doing of the
buyer. That is to say, so far as the right of repossession
of the goods is concerned, stoppage in transitu means an
actual retaking of the goods before they reach the buyer's possession, and not a mere attempt to retake possession.152
In the event of unsuccessful attempt, the seller must
look to the carrier for recompense for the latter's wrong151-115 L. T. R. 199.
152-See authorities in preceding notes. But in Litt v. Cowley,
7 Taunton 168, it was precisely
held that the seller's attempt, by
notificaUon to the carrier, to stop
the goods amounted to such a rescission of the contract as deprived
the buyer, to whom actual delivery
was made, of the right of possession.
Apparently approved in
D1giti.l
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Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio (N. Y.)
629. Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613 .
This position would be sound if
it were the rule that stoppage in
transitu, or an attempt to stop,
amounted to a rescission of the
contract. The accepted rule, howver, is that it does not revest title
in the seller but merely re-estab·
lishes his lien.
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ful action in delivering despite the seller 's order to stop.

But to fix any such liabiUty on the carrier the seller must

have given him notice not to deliver to the consignee.

This proposition is so obvious and elementary that it

seems to have given rise to no litigation. ^^^

The notice to the carrier need not be accompanied

with a demand for possession ; mere notice not to deliver

to the consignee is sufficient to bind the carrier.^^* The

seller may of course give notice through his own agent,

as in other cases,^^^ and **if the carrier is clearly informed

that it is the intention and desire of the vendor to exer-

cise his right of stoppage in transitu, the notice is

sufficient "."«

The notice must be brought home to the principal per-

son in possession of the goods, but the customary rules

of agency apply here and fix the relations of the various

persons connected with the carriage and notice to an

agent is notice to the principal. So, "notice to the agent
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of the carrier, who in the regular course of his agency

is in actual custody of the goods at the time the notice is

given, is notice to the carrier. ' '^"

There is surprisingly little authority in respect to the

mode of giving notice and the persons to whom and

through whom it must be given. Beyond the fact that

notice must be given to the carrier, whether individual

or association, in possession of the goods, in reasonable

time for it to get instructions to its employees to with-

153 — That the carrier is liable charge the carrier." Jones v.

for delivery after notice to with- Earl, 37 Cal. 630; Reynolds v.

hold it, see Rosenthal v. Weir, 170 R. R., 43 N. H. 580.

N. Y. 148, and this liability is

founded in tort, regardless of the

contract for carriage. Booth

155— Reynolds v. R. R., 43 N. H.

580; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.

93, notice by unauthorizd agent

Steamship Co. v. Cargo Fleet Iron ^„„ , „ ^„*-«..j. /->u j, t-. i

may be ratified Chandler v. Ful

Co., 115 L. T. R. 199, 201; The

Tigress, 8 L. T. R. 117; Pontifex

ton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188;

^. „ Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W.

V. Midland Ry., 3 Q. B. Div. 23. g^,^

154 — "A notice by the vendor,

ful action in delivering despite the seller's order to stop.
But to fix any such liability on the carrier the eller must
have given him notice not to deliver to the consignee.
This proposition is so obvious and elementary that it
seems to have given rise to no litigation. 153
The notice to the carrier need not be accompanied
with a demand for possession; mere notice not to deliver
to the consignee is sufficient to bind the carrier. 164 The
seller may of course give notice through his own agent,
as in other cases, 165 and "if the carrier is clearly informed
that it is the intention and desire of the vendor to exercise his right of stoppage in transitu, the notice is
sufficient' '. 156
The notice must be brought home to the principal person in possession of the goods, but the customary rules
of agency apply here and fix the relations of the various
persons connected with the carriage and notice to an
agent is notice to the principal. So, "notice to the agent
of the carrier, who in the regular course of his agency
is in actual custody of the goods at the time the notice is
given, is notice to the carrier.' ' 167
There is surprisingly little authority in respect to the
mode of giving notice and the persons to whom and
through whom it must be given. Beyond the fact that
notice must be given to the carrier, whether individual
or association, in possession of the goods, in reasonable
time for it to get instructions to its employees to with-

without an express demand to re- 156- Jones v. Earl, 37 Cal. 630.

deliver the goods, is suflScient to 157 — Jones v. Earl, 37 Cal. 630.

153-That the carrier is liable
for delivery after notice to withhold it, see Rosenthal v. Weir, 170
N. Y. 148, and this liability is
founded in tort, regardless of the
contract for carriage.
Booth
Steamship Co. v. Cargo Fleet Iron
Co., 115 L. T. R. 199, 201; The
Tigress, 8 L. T. R. 117; Pontifex
v. Midland Ry., 3 Q. B. Div. 23.
154-"A notice by the vendor,
without an express demand to re·
deliver the goods, is sufficient to
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charge the carrier."
Jones v.
Earl, 37 Cal. 630; Reynolds v.
R. R., 43 N. H. 580.
155-Reynolds v. R. R., 43 N. H.
580; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 Me.
93, notice by unauthorizd agent
may be ratified; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188;
Whitehead v. Anderson, 9 M. & W .
517.
156-Jones v. Earl, 37 Cal. 630.
157-Jones v. Earl, 37 Cal. 630.
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hold delivery, nothing definite can be said. As to what

employees can receive notice so as to bind the employer;

when notice given to one carrier will bind another car-

rier cooperating in the transit; how far the carrier is

obliged to notify another; what is reasonable time; and

kindred matters, the accepted rules of agency are

undoubtedly guiding analogies."^*

Effect of Stoppage.— The effect of a stoppage in

transitu was at one time in some doubt and some early

decisions are in marked conflict with the later ones.

THE LAW OF SALES

hold delivery, nothing definite can be said. As to what
employees can receive notice so as to bind the employer;
when notice given to one carrier will bind another carrier cooperating in the transit; how far the carrier is
obliged to notify another; what is reasonable time; and
kindred matters, the accepted rules of agency are
undoubtedly guiding analogies. 168 *

There was among the former a tendency to treat a stop-

page, even without actual retaking of possession, as a

rescission of the contract, whereby the title was auto-

matically revested in the seller.^^^ The rule now

accepted, however, is without question that neither an

attempted nor accomplished stoppage is a rescission of

the contract, but that the right to stop delivery and retake

possession is a m.ere extension of the seller's lien, that is
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to say, of his right to retain possession till paid. The

history of this rule is discussed in Babcock v. Bonnell,^^*^

and the conflict of authority pointed out. In conclusion

that court says, "The question has never been, that I

am aware, definitely decided in this State. As an original

question the doctrine of rescission commends itself to my

judgment as being more simple, and, in most cases, more

just to both parties than the notion that the act of stop-

page is the exercise of a right of lien, but in deference

to the prevailing current of authority, I should hesitate

in attempting to oppose it by any opinion of my own. ' '^^^^

158 — Time must be allowed for 159 — Ante, p. 144.

the notice to be passed on from 160 — SO N. Y. 244.

the person receiving it to the 161 — Resumption of lien, only,

person actually in control of Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2;

the goods, Whitehead v. Anderson, Allyn v. Willis, 65 Tex. 65; Dough-

9 M. & W. 517. erty Bros. v. Central National Bk.,

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 59, (1), (2).

tSee Uniform Sales Act, Sections 57, 61.

Effect of Stoppage.-The effect of a stoppage in
transitu was at one time in some doubt and some early
decisions are in marked conflict with the later ones.
There was among the former a tendency to treat a stoppage, even without actual retaking· of possession, as a
rescission of the contract, whereby the title was automatically revested in the seller. 159 The rule now
accepted, however, is without question that neither an
attempted nor accomplished stoppage is a rescission of
the contract, but that the right to stop delivery and retake
possession is a mere extension of the seller's lien, that is
to say, of his right to retain possession till paid. The
history of this rule is discussed in Babcock v. Bonnell, 160
and the conflict of authority pointed out. In conclusion
that court says, ''The question has never been, that I
am aware, definitely decided in this State. As an original
que tion the doctrine of rescission commends itself to my
judgment as being more simple, and, in most cases, more
just to both parties than the notion that the act of stoppage i s the exercise of a right of lien, but in deference
to the prevailing current of authority, I should hesitate
in attempti1 g to oppose it by any opinion of my own. " 161 t
158-Time must be allowed for
the notice to be passed on from
the person receiving it to the
person actually in control of
the goods, Whitehead v. Anderson,
9 M. & W. 517.

159-Ante, p. 144.

160-80 N. Y. 244.
161-Resumption of lien, only,
Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2;
Allyn v. Willis, 65 Tex. 65; Dougherty Bros. v. Central National Bk.,

*S e Uniform Sales Act, Section 59, (1), (2).
tSee niform Sales Act, Sections 57, 61.
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Since stoppage in transitu merely reinstates the seller

in the position of a lienor, his rights thereafter are iden-

tical with those already discussed as appertaining to an

unpaid seller's lien and need not be again set out here.^^*

4. Neither Title nor Possession Retained '

Since stoppage in transitu merely reinstates the seller
in the position of a lienor, his rights thereafter are identical with those already discus ed as appertaining to an
unpaid seller's lien and need not be again set out here. 162

Recovery of Price. — When the seller has parted with

both title and possession he has the same right to sue

the buyer for the purchase price as in any case when the

4.

NEITHER TITLE NOR POSSESSION RETAINED

#

title has passed.^^^

Recovery of Possession. — He has no longer, however,

any right at all in respect to the goods themselves. All

his right of possession has ceased with his loss of actual

possession. Though the buyer may flatly refuse to pay

and even though he may have become insolvent and un-

able to pay, the seller can not retake possession, in the

absence of fraud.^^* This is true even in equity ;^^^ and

Recovery of Price.-When the seller has parted with
both title and possession he has the same right to sue
the buyer for the purchase price as in any case when the
title has passed. 163

even though the buyer was insolvent at the time the con-

tract was entered into, and knew himself to be insolvent,
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the seller who has parted with both title and possession

can not retake the goods. ^^^

The whole idea is that the buyer has become the owner

of the property and the seller a mere creditor to the

93 Pa. 227; Jordan v. James, 5 v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141; Thompson

O. 88, 99; Newhall v. Vargas, 13 v. Conover, 32 N. J. L. 466, even as

Me. 93; Diem v. Koblitz, 49 O. S. to goods delivered in part per-

41; Kearney v. Union Pac. Rr. Co., formance only; Makaness v. Long,

97 Iowa 719, 59 Am. St. 434. 85 Pa. 158; Neal v. Boggan, 97

162-See ante, p. 122. ^^^- ^^^' Holland's Assee. v. Cin-

cinnati Co., 97 Ky. 454.

163— See ante, p. 109. He is not 165— Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla.

limited to the actual value of the 442.

goods. Brown v. Harris, 139 Mich. I66— Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620;

2'^2- Houghtaling v. HiHs, 59 Iowa 287;

164— Smith Lumber Co. v. Scott Franklin Sugar Co. v. Collier, 89

County Co., 149 Iowa 272, 30 la. 69; Freeman v. Toplds, 1 Marv.

L. R. A. (n. s.) 1184; Kramer v. (Del.) 174; Walsh v. Leeper Co.,

Messner, 101 Iowa 88; Thomp- Tex. 50 S. W. 630; Talcott v

Bon V. Wedge, 50 Wis. 642; Freeh Henderson, 31 O. S. 162.

Recovery of Possession.-He has no longer, however,
any right at all in respect to the goods themselves. All
his right of possession has ceased with his loss of actual
possession. Though the buyer may flatly refuse to pay
and even though he may have become insolvent and unable to pay, the seller can not retake possession, in the
absence of fraud. 164 This is true even in equity ;165 and
even though the buyer was insolvent at the time the contract was entered into, and knew himself to be insolvent,
the seller who has parted with both title and possession
can not retake the goods. 166
The whole idea is that the buyer has become the owner
of the property and the seller a mere creditor to the
93 Pa. 227; Jordan v. James, 5
O. 88, 99; Newhall v. Vargas, 13
Me. 93; Diem v. Ko blitz, 49 0. S.
41; Kearney v. Union Pac. Rr. Co.,
97 Iowa 719, 59 Am. St. 434.
162-See ante, p. 122.
163-See ante, p. 109. He is not
limited to the actual value of the
goods. Brown v. Harris, 139 Mich.
372.
164-Smith Lumber Co. v. Scott
County Co., 149 Iowa 272, 30
L. R. A. (n. s.) 1184; Kramer v.
Messner, 101 Iowa 88; Thompson v. Wedge, 50 Wis. 642; Frech
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v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141; Thompson
v. Conover, 32 N. J. L. 466, even as
to goods delivered in part performance only; Makaness v. Long,
85 Pa. 158; Neal v. Boggan, 97
Ala. 611; Holland's Assee. v. Cincinnati Co., 97 Ky. 454.
165-Godwin v. Phifer, 51 Fla.
442.
166-Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620;
Houghtaling v. Hills, 59 Iowa 287;
Franklin Sugar Co. v. Collier, 89
Ia. 69; Freeman v. Topkis, 1 Marv.
(Del.) 174; Walsh v. Leeper Co.,
Tex. 50 S. W. 630; Talcott v
Henderson, 31 0. S. 162.
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amount of the purchase price. As the seller has no pos-

session of the goods, he is in no better position than is

any other creditor. He is simply an unsecured creditor

with the rights and remedies of all unsecured creditors. ^^'

Recovery of Value of Goods. — The seller can not in

THE LAW OF SALES

amount of the purchase price. As the seller has no possession of the goods, he is in no better position than is
any other creditor. He is simply an unsecured creditor
with the rights and remedies of all unsecured creditors. 167

such circumstances sue even for the value of the goods.

He has become entitled to the purchase price, as a debt

owing from the buyer, and he is restricted to the cus-

tomary methods of suing on account of this debt.^^^ If,

however, the seller has only in part performed an entire

contract at the time of the buyer's breach, he is not yet

entitled to the full purchase price. In such case, if he

does not choose to sue simply for his damages for breach

of contract, he may bring an action, on the order of

quasi-contract, for the actual value of such goods as have

passed to the buyer.^^^

Rescission Because of Fraud. — ^When, however, the sale

has been induced by the fraud of the buyer, the seller
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can rescind the whole transaction and revest title to the

property in himself, and having revested title in himself

he can maintain replevin or otherwise repossess himself

of the goods, as owner.

When the issue is between the seller and buyer, with-

out relation to third persons, the courts seem to be in

some confusion as to whether or not the effect of the fraud

is such as to make the sale void, so that no title at all

Recovery of Value of Goods.-The seller can not in
such circumstances sue even for the value of the goods.
He has become entitled to the purchase price, as a debt
owing from the buyer, and he is restricted to the customary methods of suing on account of this debt. 168 If,
however, the seller has only in part performed an entire
contract at the time of the buyer's breach, he is not yet
entitled to the full purchase price. In such case, if he
does not choose to sue simply for his damages for breach
of contract, he may bring an action, on the order of
quasi-contract, for the actual value of such goods as have
passed to the buyer. 169

ever passed to the buyer, or merely voidable, so that title

167 — This has been ameliorated 168 — Woodward, Quasi C o n-

by statute in some states to the tracts, sec. 263.

extent of providing that statutory 169 — Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich,

exemptions shall not apply to 452; Willston Coal Co. v. Frank-

property for the purchase price of lin Paper Co., 57 O. S. 182;

which the judgment was secured. Thompson v. Gaffey, 52 Neb. 317,

Howell V. Crawford, 77 Ark. 12; option to sue for breach of con-

Roach V. Johnson, 71 Ark. 344, tract or quantum valebit; U. S.

right to sequester pendente lite; v. Molloy, 127 Fed. 953; Bartholo-

Bartou v. Sitlington, 128 Mo. 164. mew v. Markwick, 15 C. B. (n. s.)

711, 109 Eng. Com. L. 711.

Rescission Because of Fraud.-When, however, the sale
has been induced by the fraud of the buyer, the seller
can r escind the whole transaction and revest title to the
property in himself, and having revested title in himself
he can maintain replevin or otherwise repossess himself
of the goods, as owner.
When the issue is between the seller and buyer, without r elation to third persons, . the courts seem to be in
some confusion as to whether or not the effect of the fraud
is such as to make the sale void, so that no title at all
ever p assed to the buyer, or merely voidable, so that title
167-This has been ameliorated
by statute in some states to the
ext ent of pr oviding that statutory
exempt ions shall n ot ap ply to
property fo r the purch ase price of
which the judgment was secured.
Howell v. Crawford, 77 Ark . 12;
Roach v. Johnson, 71 Ar k . 344,
r ight to sequester pend nte lite ;
Bart on v. Sitlington, 128 Mo. 164.
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168-Woodward, Quasi Con·
tracts, sec. 263.
169-Wilson v. Wagar, 26 Mich.
452; Wills ton Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 57 0. S. 182;
Thompson v. Gaffey, 52 Neb. 317,
option to sue for breach of contract or quantu rn valebit,· U. S.
v. Molloy, 127 F ed. 953; Bartholomew v . Markwick, 15 C. B. (n. s.)
711 , 109 Eng. Com. L . 711.
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does pass to the buyer but subject to defeasance by the

seller if he so desires. It is very common expression

of the courts to refer to the sale as "void", but often,

too, it is spoken of as "voidable". It is in fact, however,

treated as "void" in many decisions, notably those

which allow a suit in replevin to be maintained without

any formahty of rescission, even by way of demand upon

the buyer.^'^'^

On the other hand, it is very evident in some cases

that, even as between the parties, the courts consider

a title to have passed, subject to defeasance.^'^ Such

are the cases in which it is held that a defrauded seller

who might, on account of the fraud, have rescinded the

contract has lost his right to repossession of the goods

because of undue delay in acting. The courts do not

give specific reasons for this, but the only harmoniously

logical basis for it must be that title passed by virtue of

the original contract; that the right to defeat it was lost
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by the delay and not that it passed by the delay. ^""^ That

title did pass by virtue of the agreement, although sub-

ject to avoidance, must be the basis also of those cases

recognizing suit for the purchase price as an affirmance

of ih.e buyer's title; and of those similar cases in which

the seller is held to have "ratified" the contract so as

to fix title in the buyer.^''^'

The net result appears to be that, as between the par-

170 — Butters v. Haughewat, 42 Missouri Pac. R.R., 52 Mo. Ap. 407;

III. 18; Oswego Starch Co. v. Len- McDonald v. Goodkind, 22 Mont,

drum, 57 Iowa 573; Root v. 491; Smith v. Chadron Bank, 45

French, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 570; Neb. 444; Wertheimer etc. Co. v.

Hunter v. Hudson River etc. Co. Faris, Tenn., 46 S. W. 336; Load

20 Barb. (N. Y.) 493; Loeffel v. v. Green, 15 M. & W. 216.

Pohlman, 47 Mo. Ap. 574. 173— Moller v. Tuska, 87 N. Y.

171— When the rights of third 166; Conrow v. Little, 115 N. Y.

persons are under consideration 387; Little Rock Bk. v. Frank, 63

there is no doubt but that the Ark. 16; Gallup v. Fox, 64 Conn,

transaction is considered as hav- 491; Mapes v. Burns, 72 Mo. Ap.

ing passed a title. See jyost. p. 225. 411; Chadron Natl. Bk. v. Tootle,

172— World Pub. Co. v. Hull, 81 59 Neb. 44; Seeley v. Seeley-Howe

Mo. Ap. 277; Johnson etc. Co. v. Co., 130 Iowa 626.

does pass to the buyer but subject to defeasance by the
seller if he so desires. It is very common expression
of the courts to refer to the sale as "void", but often,
too, it is spoken of as "voidable". It i in fact, howev r,
treated as ''void'' in many decisions, notably those
which allow a suit in replevin to be maintained without
any formality of rescission, even by way of demand upon
the buyer.l'T"
On the other hand, it is very evident in some cases
that, even as between the parties, the courts consider
a title to have passed, subject to defeasance. 171 Such
are the cases in which it is held that a defrauded seller
who might, on account of the fraud, have rescinded the
contract has lost his right to repossession of the goods
because of undue delay in acting. The courts do not
give specific reasons for this, but the only harmoniously
logical basis for it must be that title passed by virtue of
the original contract; that the right to defeat it was lost
by the delay and not that it passed by the delay. 172 That
title did pass by virtue of the agreement, although subject to avoidance, must be the basis also of those cases
recognizing suit for the purchase price as an affirmance
of t:he buyer's title; and of those similar cases in which
the seller is held to have "ratified" the contract so as
to fix title in the buyer. 173
The net result appears to be that, as between the par170-Butters v. Haughewat, 42
Ill. 18; Oswego Starch Co. v. Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573; Root v.
French, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 570;
Hunter v. Hudson River etc. Co.
20 Barb. (N. Y.) 493; Loeffel v ..
Pohlman, 47 Mo. Ap. 574.
171-When the rights of third
persons are under consideration
there is no doubt but that the
transaction is considered as having passed a title. See post, p. 225.
172-World Pub. Co. v. Hull, 81
Mo. Ap. 277; Johnson etc. Co. v.

Missouri Pac. R.R., 52 Mo. Ap. 407;
McDonald v. Goodkind, 22 Mont.
491; Smith v. Chadron Bank, 45
Neb. 444; Wertheimer etc. Co. v.
Faris, Tenn., 46 S. W. 336; Load
v. Green, 15 M. & W. 216.
173-Moller v. Tuska, 87 N. Y.
166; Conrow v. Little, 115 N. Y.
387; Little Rock Bk. v. Frank, 63
Ark. 16; Gallup v. Fox, 64 Conn.
491; Mapes v. Burns, 72 Mo. Ap.
411; Chadron Natl. Bk. v. Tootle,
59 Neb. 44; Seeley v. Seeley-Howe
Co., 130 Iowa 626.
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ties, the court will treat the title as not having passed

at all if the seller wishes it so treated, and acts thereon

in time, or as having actually passed, if the seller desires

so to consider it.^'*

What Constitutes Fraud. — ^What acts of the buyer

THE LAW OF SALES

ties, the court will treat the title as not having passed
at all if the seller wishes it so treated, and acts thereon
in time, or as having actually passed, if the seller desires
so to consider it. 174

will amount to a fraud upon the seller is a question of law

to be decided by the court; whether those acts were in

truth committed by the buyer is a question of fact for

the jury.^'^ As we have already seen, mere concealment

of insolvency is not of itself such fraud as will permit

rescission.^'^ An intent, existing at the time of purchase,

not to pay for the goods is, however, such fraud. The

intent must be not to pay at all. "A mere intent not to

pay for the goods when the debt becomes due is not

enough; that falls short of the idea. The inquiry is

not whether the buyer had reasonable grounds to believe

he could pay the debt at some future time, and in some

way, but whether he intended in point of fact not to
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pay it."^''"' If he did not intend to pay, there is such

fraud as will justify rescission.^''^' And the fact that a

buyer knows he is insolvent at the time of purchase mil

be considered as evidence in respect to his intention.

It ''bears upon the question of quo animo, the intent,

the fraudulent purpose.""^

174— Clough V. London & Nw. 175— Freeman v. Topkis, 1 Marv,

Ry. Co., L. R. 7 Ex. 26, p. 34. It (Del.) 174.

should be noted that the seller can 176 — Ante, p. 147.

not so far treat the transaction as 177 — Burrill v. Stevens, 73 Me.

void but that he must return to 395.

the buyer, before he can insist on 178 — Osvi^ego Starch Factory v.

possession of the goods sold, what- Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573; Belding v.

ever of value he has received. Frankland, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 67;

Doan V. Lockwood, 115 111. 490; Hennequin v. Naylor, 24 N. Y.

Moriarity v. Stofferan, 89 111. 528. 139; Talcott v. Henderson, 31 O.

But an unnegotiated note is not S. 162.

considered as a thing of value in 179 — Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick,

this sense, Thurston v. Blanchard, (Mass.) 307; Talcott v. Hender-

22 Pick. (Mass.) 18; Nichols v. son, 31 O. S. 162; Belding v.

Michael, 23 N. Y. 264. Frankland, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 67.

--What Constitutes Fraud.-What acts of the buyer
will amount to a fraud upon the seller is a question of law
to be decided by the court ; whether those acts were in
truth committed by the buyer is a question of fact for
the jury. 176 As we have already seen, mere concealment
of insolvency is not of itself such fraud as will permit
rescission. 176 An intent, existing at the time of purchase,
not to pay for the goods is, however, such fraud. The
intent must be not to pay at all. ''A mere intent not to
pay for the goods when the debt becomes due is not
enough; that falls short of the idea. The inquiry is
not whether the buyer had reasonable grounds to believe
he could pay the debt at some future time, and in some
way, but whether he intended in point of fact not to
pay it. " 177 If he did not intend to pay, there is such
fraud as will justify rescission. 178 And the fact that a
buyer knows he is insolvent at the time of purchase will
be considered as evidence in respect to his intention.
It "bears upon the question of quo animo, the intent,
the fraudulent purpose.' n 79
174-Clough v. London & Nw.
Ry. Co., L . R. .7 Ex. 26, p. 34. It
should be noted that the seller can
not so far treat the transaction as
void but that he must return to
t h e buyer, before he can insist on
possession of the goods sold, whatever of value he has received.
Doan v. Lockwood, 115 Ill. 490;
Moriar ity v. Stofferan, 89 Ill. 528.
But an unnegotiat ed note is not
considered as a th ing of value in
this sense, Thurston v . Blan ch ard,
22 Pi ck. (Mass.) 18; Nichols v.
Michael, 23 N. Y. 264.
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175-Freeman v. Topkis, 1 Marv.
(Del.) 174.
176-Ante, p. 147.
177-Burrill v. Stevens, 73 Me.
395.
178-0swego Starch Factory v.
Lendrum, 57 Iowa 573; Belding v.
Frankland, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 67;
Hennequin v. Naylor, 24 N. Y.
139; Talcott v. Henderson, 31 0.
s. 162.
179- Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.
(Mass.) 307; Talcott v. Henderson, 31 O. S. 162; Belding v.
Frankland, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 67.
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While mere concealment of insolvency is not fraud,

any positive misrepresentation, either express or by

implication, may amount to fraud."° This is true even

though the buyer be really solvent."^

Misrepresentation in respect to financial condition is,

of course, not the only fraud that will make a sale void-

able. This is simply the most frequent type of case. In

general, any actual fraud in the inducement of the con-

tract will permit of its rescission.

180— Schweizer v. Tracy, 76 111.

345; Weitheimer etc. Co. v. Faris,

Tenn., 46 S. W. 336; Skinner v.

Michigan Hoop Co., 119 Mich. 467;

While mere concealment of insolvency is not fraud,
any positive misrepresentation, either express or by
implication, may amount to fraud. 180 This is true even
though the buyer be really solvent. 181
Misrepresentation in respect to :financial condition is,
of course, not the only fraud that \vill make a sale voidable. This is simply the most frequent type of case. In
general, any actual fraud in the inducement of the contract will permit of its rescission.

Seeley v. Seeley-Howe Co., 130

Iowa 626.

181 — Richardson etc. Co. v.
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Goodkind, 22 Mont. 462.

180-Schweizer v. Tracy, 76 Ill.
345; Weitheimer etc. Co. v. Faris,
Tenn., 46 S. W. 336; Skinner v.
Michigan Hoop Oo., 119 Mich. 467;

Seeley v. Seeley-Howe Co., 130
Iowa 626.
181-Richardson etc. Co. v.
G~odkind, 22 Mont. 462 .
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CHAPTER IV

Buyer's Remedies and Rights

1. Neither Title nor Possession Acquired

The discussion of the seller's rights and remedies has

necessarily suggested the lack of right in the buyer which

CHAPTER

is the converse of the seller's rights. Obviously, for

IV

instance, if the seller has a right of continued possession

until payment, the buyer has no right of possession until

payment. Likewise, whenever the seller has no right to

BUYER'S REMEDIES AND RIGHTS

rescind a sale and take back the goods because of non-

payment the buyer has a right to keep the goods with-

1.

out paying for them. These so obvious converse rights

NEITHER TITLE NOR POSSESSION ACQUIRED

need not be repeated by positive expression. On the

other hand, a discussion of other rights and remedies

The discussion of the seller's rights and remedies has
necessarily suggested the lack of right in the buyer which
is the converse of the seller's rights. Obviously, for
instance, if the seller has a right of continued possession
until payment, the buyer has no right of possession until
payment. Likewise, whenever the seller has no right to
rescind a sale and take back the goods because of nonpayment the buyer has a right to keep the goods without paying for them. These so obvious converse rights
need not be repeated by positive expression. On the
other hand, a discussion of other rights and remedies
of the buyer will develop by their implied converse certain lack of right in the seller which was not referred to
under the particular topic heading.

of the buyer will develop by their implied converse cer-

tain lack of right in the seller which was not referred to

under the particular topic heading.

Breach of Contract. — If neither title nor possession has

passed to the buyer, he has acquired no right in respect
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to the property itself. If the seller fails to perform

according to the terms of the contract, the buyer is lim-

ited to an action against him personally for breach of

contract. Having no title, the buyer can not bring

replevin or other possessory action on the ground of

title, and the law recognizes no other right of possession

as a result merely of the contract of sale.* Even equity

1— Deutsch V. Dunham, 72 Ark. contract, by refusing or failing to

141; Backhaus v. Buells; 43 Ore. give the plaintiffs possession of

558; Chellis v. Grimes, 72 N. H. the property ♦ * * did not trans-

104, "The mere fact that defend- fer the title to the plaintiffs. Their

ants committed a breach of their refusal to deliver the property was

152

Breach of Contract.-If neither title nor po3session has
passed to the buyer, he has acquired no right in respect
to the property itself. If the seller fails to perform
according to the terms of the contract, the buyer is limited to an action against him personally for breach of
contract. Having no title, the buyer can not bring
replevin or other possessory action on the ground of
title, and the law recognizes no other right of possession
as a result merely of the contract of sale. 1 Even equity
1-Deutsch v. Dunham, 72 Ark.
141; Backhaus v. Bu ells; 43 Ore.
658; Chellis v. Grimes, 72 N. H.
104, "The mere fact that defendants committed a breach of their

contract, by refusing or failing to
give the plaintiffs possession of
the property • • • did not trans·
fer the title to the plaintiffs. Their
refusal to deliver the property was

152
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will not grant specific performance except in certain cases

will not grant specific performance except in certain cases
of sale of an absolutely unique chattel. 2 *

of sale of an absolutely unique chattel.**

Measure of Damages. — If the buyer does sue for

breach of contract his measure of damage is, in accord

with the general rule of damages, the sum which mil put

him in the same position financially as though the contract

had been carried out. But this basic principle is, as usual,

modified by the rule that the buyer must mitigate his

damage so far as possible and must accordingly be pre-

sumed to have protected himself as soon after the seller's

breach as he could reasonably be expected to do and by

all reasonable means. Accordingly, the measure of his

damage will be the difference between the price at which

the seller had contracted to sell and the price at which

the buyer could buy precisely similar goods in the market

within a reasonable time after his knowledge of the

seller's breach.'*
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not equivalent to a performance

on their part. * * * Nor did the

plaintiffs have the legal right of

possession, since that right fol-

lowed the title, which they never

had." Carpenter v. Glass, 67 Ark.

135; Platter v. Acker, 13 Ind. Ap.

417; Gibson v. Roy, 28 Ky. L. R.

444.

2 — There is some conflict, how-

ever, as to whether or not equity

--Measure of Damages.-If the buyer does sue for
breach of contract his measure of damage is, in ac9ord
with the general rule of damages, the sum which will put
him in the same position :financially as though the contract
had been carried out. But this basic principle is, as usual,
modified by the rule that the buyer must mitigate his
damage so far as possible and must accordingly be presumed to have protected himself as soon after the seller's
breach as he could reasonably be expected to do and by
all reasonable means. Accordingly, the measure of his
damage will be the difference between the price at which
the seller had contracted to sell and the price at which
the buyer could buy precisely similar goods in the market
within a reasonable time after his knowledge of the
seller's breach. 3 *

will decree specific performance

In cases where the buyer has paid

his money and the seller has be-

come Insolvent. Livesley v. Johns-

ton 45 Ore. 30, "When, therefore,

an award of damages would not

put the party seeking equitable re-

lief for the delivery of personalty

In a situation as beneficial as if

the agreement were specifically

performed, or where compensa-

tion and damages would fall short

of the redress to which he is en-

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section

titled, the jurisdiction (of equity,

for specific performance) is prop-

erly invoked, otherwise not. * * *

Insolvency of the party against

whom relief is sought, standing

alone, will not confer jurisdiction

to enforce specific performance.

* * * The fact of insolvency,

when combined with other causes

for equitable interposition, may,

however, become a potent or even

controlling factor in determining

the fact of jurisdiction." As to

unique chattels see, Lowther v.

Lowther, 13 Ves. 95, painting;

Falcke v. Gray, 4 Drew. 651 ; Pusey

V. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273.

3 — Saxe v. Penokee Lumber Co.,

159 N. Y. 371; Austrian & Co. v.

not equivalent to a performance titled, the jurisdiction (of equity,
on their part. * * * Nor did the for specific performance) is propplaintiffs have the legal right of erly invoked, otherwise not. * * *
possession, since that right fol- Insolvency of the party against
lowed the title, which they never whom relief is sought, standing
•
had." Carpenter v. Glass, 67 Ark. 3lone, will not confer jurisdiction
135; Platter v. Acker, 13 Ind. Ap. to enforce specific performance.
417; Gibson v. Roy, 28 Ky. L. R. * * * The fact of insolvency,
444.
when combined with other causes
2-There is some conflict, how- for equitable interposition, may,
ever, as to whE:ther or not equity however, become a potent or even
will decree specific performance controlling factor in determining
in cases where the buyer has paid the fact of jurisdiction." As to
his money and the seller has be- unique chattels see, Lowther v.
come insolvent. Livesley v. Johns- Lowther, 13 Ves. 95, painting;
ton 45 Ore. 30, "When, therefore, Falcke v. Gray, 4 Drew. 651; Pusey
an award of damages would not v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273.
put the party seeking equitable re·
3-Saxe v. Penokee Lumber Co.,
lief for the delivery of personalty
159 N. Y. 371; Austrian & Co. v.
in a situation as beneficial as if Springer, 94 Mich. 343; Goodrich
the agreement were specifically v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 530; Grand
performed, or where compensa- Tower Co. v. Phillips, 23 Wall. 471,
tion and damages would fall short price at nearest available place of
of the redress to which he is en- purchase plus increased cost of
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 68.

Springer, 94 Mich. 343; Goodrich
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Tower Co. v. Phillips, 23 Wall. 471,

price at nearest available place of

purchase plus increased cost of

68.
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This rule is based on the assumption that the buyer

could purchase similar goods on the market reasonably-

soon after the breach, and thus protect himself from

damage naturally consequent upon his failure to receive

the goods from the seller. If, however, he could not

procure similar goods soon enough with reasonable

effort, the rule of damages as stated could not be applied.

In such case the amount of damage would be the finan-

cial loss, at least, resulting as a normal consequent upon

the seller's failure to perform. But the burden of proof

that similar goods could not have been reasonably pro-

cured is on the plaintiff. As illustration, in Parsons v,

Sutton* the claim was that Parsons had contracted to

sell to Sutton certain paper to be used for printing a

frontispiece for a magazine; that Parsons had failed to

furnish it at the time agreed; that Sutton could not get

other paper like it and had therefore to print his maga-

zine without a frontispiece; and that because of this he
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had suffered financial loss in decrease of circulation,

waste of printed matter which was to have accompanied

the frontispiece and other normally consequent results,

'the court stated that ''the ordinary rule of damage

* * * is the difference between the contract price and

the market price at the time and place of delivery. When

the buyer can go into market and buy the article which

the seller has failed to deliver, this is the only rule, as it

offers the buyer full indemnity." The court further rec-

ognized that "special damages are allowed when this rule

will not furnish full indemnity. If there is no market for

the article where it is to be delivered, and it can not be

had there with reasonable diligence, and the buyer suffers

transportation; Schmertz v. Dwy- As to delivery by installments,

er, 53 Pa. 335; David v. Witmer, see Long Pole Co. v. Saxon etc.

46 Pa. Super. 307; Tuttle etc. Co. Co., 108 Va. 497; Hewson-Herzog

V. Coaldale Co., 136 Iowa 382; Co., v. Minnesota Brick Co., 55

Holliday v. Hyland, 43 Ind. Ap. Minn. 530.

342; Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Slattery, 4—66 N. Y. 92.

132 La. 917.

•«ee Uniform Sales Act, Section 67, (1), (2), (3).

THE LAW OF SALES

This rule is based on the assumption that the buyer
could purchase similar goods on the market reasonably
soon after the breach, and thus protect himself from
damage naturally consequent upon his failure to receive
the goods from the seller. If, however, he could not
procure similar goods soon enough with reasonable
effort, the rule of damages as stated could not be applied.
In such case the amount of damage would be the :financial loss, at least, resulting as a normal consequent upon
the seller's failure to perform. But the burden of proof
that similar goods could not have been reasonably procured is on the plaintiff. As illustration, in Parsons v.
Sutton4 the claim was that Parsons had contracted to
sell to Sutton certain paper to be used for printing a
frontispiece for a magazine; that Parsons had failed to
furnish it at the time agreed; that Sutton could not get
other paper like it and had therefore to print his magazine without a frontispiece; and that because of this he
had suffered :financial loss in decrease of circulation,
waste of printed matter which was to have accompanied
the frontispiece and other normally consequent results.
The court stated that "the ordinary rule of damage
• • • is the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time and place of delivery. When
the buyer can go into market and buy the article which
the seller has failed to deliver, this is the only rule, as it
offers the buyer full indemnity." The court further recognized that'' special damages are allowed when this rule
will not furnish full indemnity. If there is no market for
the article where it is to be delivered, and it can not be
had there with reasonable diligence, and the buyer suffers
As to delivery by installments,
transportation; Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. 335; David v. Witmer, see Long Pole Co. v. Saxon etc.
Co., 108 Va. 497; Hewson-Herzog
46 Pa. Super. 307; Tuttle etc. Co.
Co., v. Minnesota Brick Co., 55
v. Coaldale Co., 136 Iowa 382;
Holliday v. Hyland, 43 Ind. Ap. Minn. 530.
342; Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Slattery,
4-66 N. Y. 92.
132 L a. 917.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 67, (1), (2), (3).
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damage because of the seller's failure to deliver, which

is the proximate and natural consequence of such fail-

ure, such damage can be recovered." But the buyer

**must not, by inattention, want of care or excusable

negligence, permit his damage to grow and then charge

it all to the other party."

In the particular case, Parsons was ready to deliver

a few days after the time set, and there was no positive

showing that delivery at that time would have been too

late. Furthermore, the court said, "There is no proof

that such paper as this contract called for is not usually

to be found in the market, or that it could not, in the

small quantity required, be delivered in a few days

by manufacturers. All (Sutton) did was to go to deal-

ers in paper a day or two after (the date for delivery)

and try to buy paper like that which (Parsons) was to

deliver, and they could find none. It does not appear

that they made any further efforts. It does not appear
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that they could not find paper which would answer sub-

stantially the purpose. No reason is given why they

did not try more than once to find the paper. ' ' Accord-

ingly the court refused to allow recovery of the special

damage. The case demonstrates clearly the breadth of

the rule that, in general, only the difference between the

contract price and the price at which the buyer can

secure similar goods can be recovered as damage for

the breach. ' ' Very rarely, indeed, can there come a case

where the vendee suffers special damages if, at the time

and place of delivery, there was a market value for the

article purchased by him. A market value at a given place

presupposes that merchandise of that character was at

that time and place sold or offered for sale, and thus the

opportunity is presented the vendee of bujang the article

in the open market to be used for the special purpose

intended, and of recovering of the defendant the differ-

ence between such market value and the contract price. ' '®

5 — Saxe v. Penokee Lumber Co.,

159 N. Y. 371.

damage because of the seller's failure to deliver, which
is the proximate and natural consequence of such failure, such damage can be recovered.'' But the buyer
"must not, by inattention, want of care or excusable
negligence, permit his damage to grow and then ch..arge
it all to the other party.''
In the particular case, Parsons was ready to deliver
a few days after the time set, and there was no positive
showing that delivery at that time would have been too
late. Furthermore, the court said, ''There is no proof
that such paper as this contract called for is not usually
to be found in the market, or that it could not, in the
small 'quantity required, be delivered in a few days
by manufacturers. All (Sutton) did was to go to dealers in paper a day or two after (the date for delivery)
and try to buy paper like that which (Parsons) was to
deliver, and they could find none. It does not appear
that they made any further efforts. It does not appear
that they could not find paper which would answer substantially the purpose. No reason is given why they
did not try more than once to find the paper.'' Accordingly the court refused to allow recovery of the special
damage. The case demonstrates clearly the breadth of
the rule that, in general, only the difference between the
contract price and the price at which the buyer can
secure similar goods can be recovered as damage for
the breach. ''Very rarely, indeed, can there come a case
•
where the vendee suffers special damages if, at the tiw_e
and place of delivery, there was a market value for the
article purchased by him. A market value at a given place
presupposes that merchandise of that character was at
that time and place sold or offered for sale, and thus the
opportunity is presented the vendee of buying the article
in the open market to be used for the special purpose
intended, and of recovering of the defendant the difference between such market value and the contract price.' ' 5
5-Saxe v. Penokee Lumber Co.,
159 N. Y. 371.
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But the buyer need only act reasonably in protecting

himself after the seller's breach. Thus, in Austrian &

Co. V. Springer,® the seller announced early in May that

he would not be able to fulfill his contract, which called

for shipment on May 15th. The contention of the defend-

ant, the seller, was that the price of glass in May was

lower than in June, during the latter part of which the

plaintiff had protected himself by purchasing similar

goods. Evidence showed, however, that while dealers

would give a "market price" during May and early June,

they would not agree actually to furnish goods at such

prices ; in short, that dealers were dodging definite orders

in expectation of a rise in price. This the court held

sufficient to justify fixing the measure of damages by

the market prices of late June or July.

The ''market price" means market price at which

the buyer could purchase. In reversing a case because

the trial court had instructed the jury to allow the plain-
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tiffs the difference between the contract price and the

''wholesale" price at time of breach, the Supreme Court

said, "The question is not one of wholesale price or

retail price, and an instruction to measure the damage

by either might be erroneous. The true test of proper

compensation in such cases is what it would have cost the

plaintiffs to procure at the point of dehvery and at the

time or times when it was reasonable for them to supply

themselves, lumber of the kind and quahty they were

to receive on the contract. * * * So large an amount of

lumber as was covered by this contract, they might,

perhaps, have been able to procure at cargo prices ; but

we have no right to presume this, and if it were imprac-

ticable to supply themselves, except at retail rates, they

were entitled to demand those rates of defendants."''

Similarly it has been held that if the buyer has actually

protected himself by a purchase below the reported

"market value" he can recover only the difference

6—94 Mich. 343. 7— Haskell v. Hunter, 23 Mich.

305.

But the buyer need only act reasonably in protecting
himself after the seller's breach. Thus, in Austrian &
Co. v. Springer, 6 the seller announced early in May that
he would not be able to fulfill his contract, which called
for shipment on :May 15th. The contention of the defendant, the seller, was that the price of glass in May was
lower than in June, during the latter part of which the
plaintiff had protected himself by purchasing similar
goods. Evidence showed, however, that while dealers
would give a "market price" during May and early June,
they would not agree actually to furnish goods at such
prices; in short, that dealers were dodging definite orders
in expectation of a rise in price. This the court held
sufficient to justify fixing the measure of damages by
the market prices of late June or July.
The ''market price'' means market price at which
the buyer could purchase. In reversing a case because
the trial court had instructed the jury to allow the plaintiffs the difference between the contract price and the
"wholesale" price at time of breach, the Supreme Court
said, ''The question is not one of wholesale price or
retail price, and an instruction to measure the damage
by either might be erroneous. The true test of proper
compensation in such cases is what it would have cost the
plaintiffs to procure at the point of delivery and at the
time or times when it was reasonable for them to supply
themselves, lumber of the kind and quality they were
to receive on the contract. • * * So large an amount of
lumber as was covered by this contract, they might,
perhaps, have been able to procure at cargo prices; but
we have no right to presume this, and if it were impracticable to supply themselves, except at retail rates, they
were entitled to demand those rates of defendants.' ' 7
Similarly it has been held that if the buyer has actually
protected himself by a purchase below the reported
"market v lu " he can recover only the difference
6- 94 Mich. 343.
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between the contract price and what he actually had to

pay.8

For a full discussion of the amount and proof of dam-

age the reader is referred to works on damages. The

discussion here is necessarily incomplete and is intended

only to cover the broad principles, and the citations,

while chosen to present as wide a variation of circum-

stances as possible, do not touch every type of case.

Recovery of Money Paid. — If the buyer has already

paid a part of the price, or all of it, he may still, upon the

seller's failure to pass title, sue to recover compensation

for damage from the breach of contract.^ But, further-

157

between the contract price and what he actually had to
pay.a
For a full discussion of the amount and proof of damage the reader is referred to works on damages. The
discussion here is neces arily incomplete and is inteuded
only to cover the broad principles, and the citations,
while chosen to present as wide a variation of circum.
stances as possible, do not touch every type of case.

more, he may disregard damages as such, which might

be more or less than the exact amount of the purchase

price, and sue specifically to recover the money which

he paid.^° If he has received a part of the goods, and

the amount of the purchase price which they represent

is not definitely fixed by the contract, he must return
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such part before he is entitled to recover anj^thing in

such a suit."

Inspection Before Accepting Title. — Although the

buyer who has not received title cannot compel the seller

to pass the title, on the other hand, he can not be made

to take title to goods which he did not agree to buy.

If the seller tenders goods which the buyer did not

contract for, the buyer is in no way guilty of breach of

8— Arnold v. Blabon, 147 Pa. 10— Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291;

372, approved in Theiss v. Weiss, Hayes v. Stortz, 131 Mich. 63;

166 Pa. 9. WiUiams v. Allen, 10 Humph.

9 — In such case the amount of (Tenn.) 337; Altschul v. Koven,

recovery w^ould be adjusted to 94 N. Y. S. 558; Dalton v. Bentley,

cover what he had paid; if he had 15 111. 420, but he can not maintain

paid the full price, his recovery both actions; Meader v. Cornell,

would be the full market value, 58 N. J. L. 375; Cleveland v. Ster-

Recovery of Money Paid.-If the buyer has already
paid a part of the price, or all of it, he may still, upon the
seller's failure to pass title, sue to r ecover compensation
for damage from the breach of contract.9 But, furtherrnore, he may disregard damages as such, which might
be more or less than the exact amount of the purchase
price, and sue specifically to recover the inoney which
he paid. 10 If he has r eceived a part of the goods, and
the amount of the purchase price which they r epr esent
is not definitely fixed by the contract, he must return
such part before he is entitled to recover anything in
such a sui t. 11

Instead of the mere difference be- rett, 70 Pa. 204.

tween the two. Hill v. Smith, 32 11— Miner v. Bradley, 22 Pick.

Vt. 433; Winside Bank v. Lound, (Mass.) 457; Clark v. Baker, 5

52 Neb. 469. Mete. (Mass.) 452.

Inspection Before Accepting Title. -Although the
buyer who has not received title cannot compel the seller
to pass the title, on the other hand, he can not be made
to take title to goods which he did not agree to buy.
If the seller tenders goods which the buyer did not
contract for, the buyer is in no way guilty of breach of
8-Arnold v. Blabon, 147 Pa.
372, approved in Theiss v. Weiss,
166 Pa. 9.
9-In such case the amount of
recovery would be adjusted to
cover what he had paid; if he had
paid the full price, his recovery
wo uld be the full market value,
instead of the mere difference between the two. Hill v. Smith, 32
Vt. 433; Winside Bank v. Lound,
52 Neb. 469.
y
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10-Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291;
Hayes v. Stortz, 131 Mich. 63 ;
Williams v. Allen, 10 Humph.
(Tenn.) 337; Altschul v. Koven,
94 N. Y. S. 558; Dalton v. Bentley,
15 Ill. 420, but he can not m aintain
both actions; Meader v. Cornell,
58 N. J. L. 375; Cleveland v. Sterrett, 70 Pa. 204.
11-Miner v. Bradley, 22 Pick.
(Mass.) 457; Clark v. Baker, 6
Mete. (Mass.) 452.
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contract if he refuses to accept them, nor, of course, is

the buyer liable to pay for them. ''The delivery of prop-

erty corresponding with the contract is a condition prece-

dent to the vesting of the title in the vendee. The par-

ties understand that the vendee is not bound to accept

the property tendered, except upon this condition. * * *

The latter is not bound to receive and pay for a thing

that he has not agreed to purchase. * * * "^^

When the contract has been in regard to a described,

but not specifically identified, chattel, title, as we have

seen, can not pass because of the lack of identity of the

chattel. When thereafter the seller selects a particular

chattel as the one to which he intends to pass title accord-

ing to the contract, this of itself does not thrust title

upon the buyer. He, the buyer, still has a right to say

whether or not he mil take the title. If what the seller

offers is just what the buyer agreed to take, it will be a

breach of contract for the buyer to refuse the title. But
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if what the seller offers is not what the buyer agreed

to take, obviously the buyer is not at fault in refusing

title to it.*

Right to Inspect. — The buyer can not be compelled

to accept or refuse title until he has had opportunity to

see what the seller offers. This is obvious justice. Were

he compelled to accept title to whatever unseen thing

the seller should offer he might find himself saddled

with title to what he did not contract for. On the other

hand, were he to play safe, by refusing the proffered

title, he might be guilty of breach of contract. There-

fore the law allows him an opportunity to see what the

seller offers before it mil hold him guilty of breach of

contract for refusing to accept title to it. This is often

called the right of inspection. f

12— Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 361; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. W.

399.
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contract if he refuses to accept them, nor, of course, is
the buyer liable to pay for them. ''The delivery of property corresponding with the contract is a condition precedent to the vesting of the title in the vendee. The parties understand that the vendee is not bound to accept
the property tendered, except upon this condition. * * •
The latter is not bound to receive and pay for a thing
that he has not agreed to purchase. * * * " 12
When the contract has been in regard to a described,
but not specifically identified, chattel, title, as we have
seen, can not pass because of the lack of identity of the
chattel. When thereafter the seller selects a particular
chattel as the one to which he intends to pass title according to the contract, this of itself does not thrust title
upon the buyer. He, the buyer, still has a right to say
whether or not he will take the title. If what the seller
offers is just what the buyer agreed to take, it will be a
breach of contract for the buyer to refuse the title. But
if what the seller offers is not what the buyer agreed
to take, obviously the buyer is not at fault in refusing
title to it.*

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 11, (1), (2).

tSee Uniform Sales Act, Section 47, (1), (2).

--Right to Inspect.-The buyer can not be compelled
to accept or refuse title until he has had opportunity to
see what the seller offers. This is obvious justice. vVere
he compelled to accept title to whatever unseen thing
the seller should offer he might find himself saddled
with title to what he did not contract for. On the other
hand, were he to play safe, by refusing the proffered
title, he might be guilty of breach of contract. Therefore the law allows him an opportunity to see what the
seller offers before it will hold him guilty of breach of
contract for refusing to accept title to it. This is often
called the right of inspection.t
12-Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y.

361; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. W.
399.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 11, (1), (2).
tSee Uniform Sales Act, Section 47, (1), (2).
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Thus, in Charles v. Carter,^^ the plaintiff, who had

contracted to sell potatoes to defendant, sued for dam-

ages for breach of contract, because the defendant had

refused to receive the potatoes from the carrier and

refused to pay for them. The contract was for potatoes

not specifically identified at the time. On shipment the

plaintiff took a bill of lading in his own name and, as

the court held, thereby kept title in himself. The defend-

ant was notified of the arrival of the shipment and signi-

fied his willingness to take the title and possession, and

to pay the price, if an inspection of the potatoes showed

them to be such as he had contracted for. The privilege

of inspection was refused by the railroad company and

the defendant refused to receive the potatoes. The

court held, that, if these circumstances were found as

facts by the jury, the defendant was not guilty of a

breach of contract, saying, as a proper instruction to

the jury, **If you find that the conduct of the plaintiff
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and his agents at Kansas City was such that they de-

clined and refused to permit an inspection of the pota-

toes by the defendant within a reasonable time after

their arrival in Kansas City, and an inspection thereof

was, in consequence, not made, then it was no longer the

duty of the defendant to take such potatoes".^*

Expense of Inspection. — The inspection of goods

to ascertain if they are in fact what the contract of sale,

or its correlated contract of warranty, stipulates they

shall be, is a right of the buyer. But it is solely for

his benefit as a matter of protection. There is no force-

ful reason why the seller should pay the expense incurred

13 — 96 Tenn. 607. he had an opportunity to inspect it

14 — Livesly v. Johnson, 45 Ore. in order to ascertain whether it

30; Harper v. Baird's Admr., 3 was such as appellees stipulated

Penna. (Del.) 110; Deutsch v. to saw." Osborn v. Gantz, 60

Dunham, 72 Ark. 131, "The con- N. Y. 540; Croninger v. Crocker,

tract being executory, it is clear 62 N. Y. 151; Lorymer v. Smith,

that appellant could not be com- 1 Barn. & Cress. 1,

polled to accept the lumber until

Thus, in Charles v. Carter, 13 the plaintiff, who had
contracted to sell potatoes to defendant, sued for damages for breach of contract, because the qefendant had
refused to receive the potatoes from the car rier and
refused to pay for them. The contract was for p o t~toes
not specifically identified at the time. On shipment the
plaintiff took a bill of lading in his own name and, as
the court held, thereby kept title in himself. The defendant was notified of the arrival of the shipment and signified his willingness to take the title and possession, and
to pay the price, if an inspection of the potatoes showed
them to be such as he had contract ed f or. The privilege
of inspection was refused by the r ailroad company and
the defendant refus ed to r eceive the potatoes. The
court held, that, if these circu1n stances were f ound as
facts by the jury, the defendant "\Vas n ot guilty of a
breach of contract, saying, as a . proper instruction to
the jury, "If you find that the conduct of the plaintiff
and his agents at Kansas City was such that they declined and refused to permit an inspection of the potatoes by the defendant within a r easonable time after
their arrival in Kansas City, and an inspection ther:eof
was, in consequence, not made, then it was no longer the
duty of the defendant to take such potatoes". 14
--Expense of Inspection.-The inspection of goods
to ascertain if they are in fact what the contract of sale,
or its correlated contract of warranty, stipulates they
shall be, is a right of the buyer. But it is solely for
his benefit as a matter of protection. There is no forceful reason why the seller should pay the expense incurred
13-96 Tenn. 607.

14-Livesly v. Johnson, 45 Ore.
30; Harper v. Baird's Admr., 3
Penna. (Del.) 110; Deutsch v.
Dunham, 72 Ark. 131, "The contract being executory, it is clear
that appellant could not be compelled to accept the lumber until
D1g1tize by
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he had an opportunity to inspect it
in order to ascertain whether it
was such as appellees stipulat ed
to saw." Osborn v. Gantz, 60
N. Y. 540; Croninger v. Crocker,
62 N. Y. 151; Lorymer v. Smith,
1 Barn. & Cress. 1.
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by the buyer in thus protecting himself. If he tenders

the precise goods contracted for, in the manner agreed

upon, he has performed his contract. If the buyer

chooses to go to expense in making sure of this per-

formance, it is the buyer's right to do so, but it should

also be at his cost. This seems to be assumed as the

rule, since no attempts by a buyer to recover such expense

are found in the cases.*^

There are, however, some cases in which inspection

has revealed that the seller did not perform his contract,

in which the buyer has been allowed to recover the cost

of the inspection. The theory of this recovery — whether

on the ground of damages from the seller 's breach, quasi-

contract, or otherwise — is not clear. The results are

obviously just, at least. If the examination develops the

fact that the seller has not performed his contract, but is

guilty of a breach, any damage which the buyer suffered

by the breach is, logically, recoverable. Damage suf-
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fered through use of an article which does not conform to

the terms of the contract, before that non-conformity is

discovered, should come mthin this rule. So also, even

if there be no damage from use of the defective article,

the expense to which the buyer has reasonably put him-

self on the supposition that the seller has properly per-

formed should be recoverable, as a consequence of the

seller's breach.^^

15 — In Lincoln v. Gallagher, 79 apparently as damages from the

Me. 189, there is a dictum to the seller's breach of the contract of

effect that the seller must bear sale.

the expense of providing the buy- In ascertaining whether the

er with a reasonable opportunity goods do conform to the contract

to inspect. or not, it may happen that the

16— That this is the rule, is in- buyer will necessarily have used

dicated in Ruben v, Lewis, 46 N. or otherwise have destroyed a cer-

Y. S. 426, buyer's expense for tain amount of the goods tendered,

transportation held recoverable; If the goods should turn out not to

Stafford v. Pooler, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) conform to the agreement and the

143, limited to necessary ex- buyer should therefore reject

penses; Phila. Whiting Co. v. De- them, question might arise as to

troit Lead Works, 58 Mich. 29. the seller's right to compensation
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by the buyer in thus protecting himself. If he tenders
the precise goods contracted for, in the manner agreed
upon, he has performed his contract. If the buyer
chooses to go to expense in making sure of this performance, it is the buyer's right to do so, but it should
also be at his cost. This seems to be assumed as the
rule, since no attempts by a buyer to recover such expense
are found in the cases. 15
There are, howeve·r, some cases in which inspection
has revealed that the seller did not perform his contract,
in which the buyer has been allowed to recover the cost
of the inspection. The theory of this recovery-whether
on the ground of damages from the seller's breach, quasicontract, or otherwise-is not clear. The results are
obviously just, at least. If the examination develops the
fact that the seller has not performed his contract, but is
guilty of a breach, any damage which the buyer suffered
by the breach is, logically, recoverable. Damage suffered through use of an article which does not conform to
the terms of the contract, before that non-conformity is
discovered, should come within this rule. So also, even
if there be no damage from use of the defective article,
the expense to which the buyer has reasonably put himself on the supposition that the seller has properly performed should be recoverable, as a consequence of the
seller's breach. 16
15-In Lincoln v. Gallagher, 79
Me. 189, there is a dictum to the
effect that the seller must bear
the expense of providing the buyer with a reasonable opportunity
to inspect.
16-That this is the rule, is indicated in Ruben v. Lewis, 46 N.
Y. S. 426, buyer's expense for
tran sportation held recoverable;
Stafford v. Pooler, 67 Barb. (N. Y.)
143, limited to necessary expenses; Phil a. Whiting Co. v. Detroit Lead Works, 58 Mich. 29.

apparently as damages from the
seller's breach ot the contract of
sale.
In ascertaining whether the
goods do conform to the contract
or not, it may happen that the
buyer will necessarily have used
or otherwise have destroyed acertain amount of the goods tendered.
If the goods should turn out not to
conform to the agreement and the
buyer should therefore reject
them, question might arise as to
the seller's right to compensation
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Waiver of Right. — The buyer may waive this right

of inspection if he chooses. That is, he may accept the

title without looking at the goods, or he may refuse the

title without claiming an opportunity to inspect. In

the one case he gets title to the goods whether they con-

form to the contract or not ; in the other, ho is guilty of

breach of contract if thoy do conform to the contract.

But he can not be deprived of the opportunity nor legally

refused it.

Effect of Seller 's Delivery to a Carrier. — The mere

fact that the goods, as specified by the seller, were ac-

cepted by a carrier for delivery to the buyer does not

imply any intent on the buyer 's part to accept them, nor

161

-Waiver of Right.-The buyer may waive this right
of inspection if he chooses. That is, he may accept the
title without looking at the goods, or he may r efuse the
title without claiming an opportunity to inspect. In
the one case he gets title to the goods whether they conform to the contract or not; in the other, he is guilty of
breach of contract if they do conform to the contract.
But he can not be deprived of the opportunity nor legally
refused it.

any legal (constructive) acceptance by him, unless they

do conform to the conditions of the contract. We have

seen that if goods conforming to the terms of the contract

are delivered to a carrier for the buyer, title, if not

already passed, is presumed to pass then. If the theory
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behind this passing of title be, as w^as suggested in that

discussion, that the carrier is legally the agent of the

buyer to accept title, then the carrier might also be the

buyer's agent to inspect. But whether this be so, or not,

the carrier is not so far the buyer's agent that receipt

of goods which are not the ones contracted for will

vest title in the buyer. It can not be dogmatically stated

whether this right of inspection does not exist when

proper goods are delivered to a carrier, or whether it

does exist and is exercised by the carrier as the buyer's

for those destroyed. In Philadel- course, that he could not recover

phia Whiting Co. v. Detroit Lead the contract price, as such. His

Works, 58 Mich. 29, the court said right to recover in quasi-contract

specifically that in such case the appears not specifically to have

seller "would be liable for all been decided, except in the case

necessary charges and expenses just mentioned, and the analogous

in testing the article", and held propositions in quasi-contracts are

that he could not recover the value themselves so much in dispute as

of the goods used in making the to leave that authority an open

test which showed the seller's queston.

breach of contract. It is clear, of

--Effect of Seller's Delivery to a Carrier.-The mere
fact that the goods, as specified by the seller, were accepted by a carrier for delivery to the buyer does not
imply any intent on the buyer's part to accept them, nor
any legal (constructive) acceptance by him, unless they
do conform to the conditions of the contract. \Ve have
seen that if goods conforming to the t erms of the contract
are delivered to a carrier for the buyer, title, if not
already passed, is presumed to pass then. If the theory
behind this passing of title be, as was suggested in that
discussion, that the carrier is legally the agent of the
buyer to accept title, then the carrier nught also be the
buyer's agent to inspect. But whether this be so, or not,
the carrier is not so far the buyer's agent that receipt
of goods which are not the ones contracted for will
vest title in the buyer. It can not be dogmatically stated
whether this right of inspection does not exist when
proper goods are delivered to a carrier, or whether it
does exist and is exercised by the carrier as the buyer's
for those destroyed. In Philadelphia Whiting Co. v. Detroit Lead
Works, 58 Mich. 29, the court said
specifically that in such case the
seller "would be liable for all
necessary charges and expenses
in t esting the article", and held
that he could not recover the value
of the goods used in making the
test which showed the seller's
breach of contract. It is clear, of
Digitiz
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course, that he could not recover
the contract price, as such. His
right to recover in quasi-contract
appears not specifically to have
been decided, except in the case
just mentioned, and the analogous
propositions in quasi-contracts are
themselves so much in dispute as
to leave that authority an open
queston.
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agent. But at least it seems reasonably clear that title

passes on delivery of proper goods to the carrier, with-

out further act on the buyer's part; and that title does

not pass on delivery to the carrier of goods which are not

those contracted for. ''To constitute a delivery to the

carrier a delivery to the consignee so as to pass the title

and make the consignee hable for goods sold and deliv-

ered, the goods must conform in quantity as well as qual-

ity with those named in the order. ' '^' Hence, if the goods

17 — Barton v. Kane, 17 Wis. 38;

Diversey v. Kellogg, 44 111. 114;

Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539.

THE LAW OF SALES

agent. But at least it seems reasonably clear that title
passes on delivery of proper goods to the carrier, without further act on the buyer's part; and that title does
not pass on delivery to the carrier of goods which are not
those contracted for. ''To constitute a delivery to the
carrier a delivery to the consignee so as to pass the title
and make the consignee liable for goods sold and delivered, the goods must conform in quantity as well as quality with those named in the order. " 17 Hence, if the goods

Occasional dicta Imply that

some sort of a "conditional title"

does pass on delivery to a carrier,

which may be "rescinded" by the

buyer. Kuppenheimer v. Wert-
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heimer, 107 Mich. 177; Magee v.

Billingsley, 3 Ala. 679.

This proposition is not logi-

cal. The whole theory of the law

is that title can not be vested in

a buyer without his consent. His

agent, the carrier, has no author-

ity to assent to title in anything

but the goods contracted for. The

buyer himself cannot logically be

said to have assented to taking

title in goods not contracted for

until he has had a chance to learn

that other goods than those con-

tracted for have been offered to

him. If the proper goods have

been offered, the buyer's inspec-

tion does no more than verify the

validity of the carrier's assent.

But if other goods have been

delivered the buyer's inspec-

tion is the first opportunity

for his assent to be given at all;

until such inspection there is no

assent, and without assent there

can not logically be title in the

buyer.

The inaccuracy of the state-

ments referred to is further indi-

cated by the case of Gardner v.

Lane, 12 Allen (Mass.) 39. One

Wonson had contracted to sell to

the plaintiff 131 bbls. of jjl mack-

erel. On pretended performance

of this contract he delivered to

plaintiff a number of barrels,

which in fact contained 83 mack-

erel and some which contained no

mackerel at all but only salt. At

a proper time the plaintiff exam-

ined the barrels and elected to

take title to the goods despite non-

conformity with the contract. Be-

17-Barton v. Kane, 17 Wis. 38;
Diversey v. Kellogg, 44 Ill. 114;
Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539.
Occasional dicta imply that
some sort of a "conditional title"
does pass on delivery to a carrier,
which may be "rescinded" by the
buyer. Kuppenheimer v. Wertheimer, 107 Mich. 177; Magee v.
Billingsley, 3 Ala. 679.
This proposition is not logical. The whole theory of the law
is that title can not be vested in
a buyer without his consent. His
agent, the carrier, has no authority to assent to title in anything
but the goods contracted for. The
buyer himself cannot logically be
said to have assented to taking
title in goods not contracted for
until he has had a chance to learn
that other goods than those contracted for have been offered to
him. If the proper goods have
been offered, the buyer's inspection does no more than verify the
validity of the carrier's assent.
But if other goods have been
delivered the buyer's inspection is the first opportunity
for his assent to be given at all;
until such inspection there is no
ass nt, and without assent there
can not logically be title in the
buyer.
The inaccuracy of the state-

ments referred to is further indi·
cated by the case of Gardner v.
Lane, 12 Allen (Mass.) 39. One
Wonson had contracted to sell to
the plaintiff 131 bbls. of #1 mackerel. On pretended performance
of this contract he delivered to
plaintiff a number of barrels,
which in fact contained #3 mackerel and some which contained no
mackerel at all but only salt. At
a proper time the plaintiff examined the barrels and elected to
take title to the goods despite nonconformity with the contract. Before this inspection, however,
though after the delivery to the
plaintiff, the defendant, as a creditor of Wonson, had levied on the
goods as Wonson's property. The
court held that it was Wonson's
property at the time of the levy,
despite the plaintiff's possession
of it and his subsequent willingness to keep it, because at that
time the plaintiff had never consented to the vesting of title in
him. Accord, Alamo Cattle Co. v.
Hall, 220 Fed. 832; Dube v. Liberty Clothing Co., 153 N. Y. S. 577,
91 Misc. 64.
Of course, if the goods delivered
to the carrier do conform to the
terms of the contract, title passes
at that time, not because the sen ..
er can thrust even a temporary

fore this inspection, however,

though after the delivery to the

plaintiff, the defendant, as a credi-
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tor of Wonson, had levied on the

goods as Wonson's property. The

court held that it was Wonson's

property at the time of the levy,

despite the plaintiff's possession
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selected by the seller and consigned to the buyer are found
on inspection not to conform to the terms of the contract,
the buyer may r efuse to accept them, or to pay for them,
on the ground that he did not buy them. 18

THE BUYER'S RIGHTS 163

selected by the seller and consigned to the buyer are found

on inspection not to conform to the terms of the contract,

the buyer may refuse to accept them, or to pay for them,

on the ground that he did not buy them."

Waiver Through Delay. — Even if the buyer him-

self receives possession of them, he is not presumed to

have waived their non-conformity with the contract and

--Waiver Through Delay.-Even if the buyer" him-

to have taken title anyhow, until he has had a reasonable

time and opportunity to find out that they do not con-

self receives possession of them, he is not presumed to
have waived their non-conformity with the contract and
to have taken title anyhow, until he has had a reasonable
time and opportunity to find out that they do not conform to its terms.
''And what is a reasonable time is usually a question
of fact, and not of law, to be determined by the jury
upon all the circumstances, including as well the situation and liability of injury to the vendor from delay
as the convenience and necessities of the vendee. '' 19 In
the particular case from which the quotation is taken,
the delay in examining the quality of iron in certain
hoops was ten days after the carrier had unloaded the1n,
and the court said, this "was not so great that the court
can say, as a matter of law, that it was unreasonable,
and we are concluded by the finding of the referee from
re-examining the question of fact.'' In Philadelphia
Whiting Co. v. Detroit Lead W orks 20 the sale was whiting,
to be of the best quality for use in making putty. The

form to its terms.

''And what is a reasonable time is usually a question

of fact, and not of law, to be determined by the jury

upon all the circumstances, including as well the situ-

ation and liability of injury to the vendor from delay

as the convenience and necessities of the vendee."^® In

the particular case from which the quotation is taken,

the delay in examining the quality of iron in certain

hoops was ten days after the carrier had unloaded them,
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and the court said, this *Svas not so great that the court

can say, as a matter of law, that it was unreasonable,

and we are concluded by the finding of the referee from

re-examining the question of fact." In Philadelphia

Whiting Co. v. Detroit Lead Works^° the sale was whiting,

to be of the best quality for use in making putty. The

title on an unwilling buyer, but That this last proposition is cor-

because the carrier, as buyer's rect, see, Skinner v. Griffith &

agent, accepts the title. If one Sons, 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 693.

accepts the theory of the carrier's 18 — Livesly v. Johnston, 45 Ore.

agency to accept title to goods 30; Diversey v. Kellogg, 44 III.

which conform to the contract — 114; Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y.

and this is the only theory which 539; Scranton v. Mechanics Trad-

the decisions will harmoniously ing Co., 37 Conn. 130; Croninger v.

support — there is nothing incon- Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151, tender of

sistent in the proposition that goods to which the seller's title

title to goods not conforming to was defective; Columbian Iron

the contract does not pass at all Works v. Douglass, 84 Md. 44;

until the buyer's inspection and Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 7.

acceptance, but that title to goods 19 — Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y.

which do conform to the contract 539.

passes on delivery to the carrier. 20 — 58 Mich. 29.

title on an unwilling buyer, but
because the carrier, as buyer's
agent, accepts the title. If one
accepts the theory of the carrier's
agency to accept title to goods
which conform to the contractand this is the only theory which
the decisions will harmoniously
support-there is nothing inconsistent in the proposition that
title to goods not conforming to
the contract does not pass at all
until the buyer's inspection and
acceptance, but that title to goods
which do conform to the contract
passes on delivery to the carrier.
Digitize- by
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That this last proposition is correct, see, Skinner v. Griffith &
Sons, 80 Wash. 291, 141 Pac. 693.
18-Livesly v. Johnston, 45 Ore.
30; Diversey v. Kellogg, 44 Ill.
114; Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y.
539; Scranton v. Mechanics Trading Co., 37 Conn. 130; Croninger v.
Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151, tender of
goods to which the seller's title
was defective; Columbian Iron
Works v. Douglass, 84 Md. 44;
Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 7.
19-Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y.
539.
20-58 Mich. 29.
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buyer received the shipment and used 42 barrels,

out of the 300 bought, at the rate of 3 or 4 per day.

After such use the buyer began to receive complaints

as to the quality of its putty and thereupon notified the

seller that it would hold the remaining barrels as the

seller's property. The court held that it had been prop-

erly left to the jury to say whether or not the duration

and character of the examination were reasonably

necessary to determine the quality of the whiting, and

that if the jury found that such examination was reason-

able, the buyer had not lost its right to refuse title to

the rest of the goods.^^*

If the court, or jury, decides that the buyer has kept

the goods tendered for an unreasonable time, without

inspecting them or objecting to them, then it is assumed

that he has chosen to keep them despite the difference

between what they are and what they should have been.

''The delivery of property corresponding Avith the con-
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tract is a condition precedent to the vesting of the title

in the vendee. The parties understand that the vendee

is not bound to accept the property tendered, except upon

this condition. * * * The latter is not bound to receive

and pay for a thing that he has not agreed to purchase ;

but if the thing purchased is found on examination to be

unsound, or not to answer the order given for it, he must

immediately return it to the vendor, or give him notice

to take it back, and thereby rescind the contract, or he

Avill be presumed to have acquiesced in its quality. "^^

21 — Reuben v. Lewis, 46 N. Y. if the retention of possession is

S. 426; Saunders v. Jameson, 2 perfectly consistent with the idea

C. & K. 557; Gordon v. Waterous, of the buyer's rejection and of title

36 Up. Can. Q. B. 321, delay justi- still resting in the seller. Thus,

fled by fact that, seller having in Blackwood v. Cutting Packing

failed to deliver as expected, buy- Co., 76 Cal. 212, the buyer's acts

er had secured other goods and did not preclude him from denying

had no reason to open seller's title, because they had been ac-

packages at once. companied with a notice that he

22 — Reod v. Randall, 29 N. Y. was acting in the seller's interest

361. This result does not follow only. Cf. Zabriskie v. Central

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 48.
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buyer received the shipment and used 42 barrels,
out of the 300 bought, at the rate of 3 or 4 per day.
After such use the buyer began to receive complaints
as to the quality of its putty and thereupon notified the
seller that it 'vould hold the remaining barrels as the
seller's property. The court held that it had been properly left to the jury to say whether or not the duration
and character of the examination were reasonably
necessary to determine the quality of the whiting, and
that if the jury found that such examination was reasonable, the buyer had not lost its right to refuse title to
the rest of the goods. 2u
If the court, or jury, decides that the buyer has kept
the goods tendered for an unreasonable time, without
inspecting them or objecting to them, then it is assumed
that he has chosen to keep them despite the difference
between what they are and what they should have been.
"The delivery of property corresponding with the contract is a condition precedent to the vesting of the title
in the vendee. The parties understand that the vendee
is not bound to accept the property tendered, except upon
this condition. • • * The latter is not bound to receive
and pay for a thing that he has not agreed to purchase;
but if the thing purchased is found on examination to be
unsound, or not to answer the order given for it, he must
immediately return it to the vendor, or give him notice
to take it back, and thereby rescind the contract, or he
will be presumed to have acquiesced in its quality.' '22
21-Reuben v. Lewis, 46 N. Y.
S. 426; Saunders v. Jameson, 2
C. & K. 557; Gordon v. Waterous,
36 Up. Can. Q. B. 321, delay justi·
fied by fact that, seller having
failed to deliver as expected, buyer had secured other goods and
had no reason to open seller's
package s a t once.
22- R d v. Rand all, 29 N. Y.
361. This r esult does not follow
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section

if the retention of possession is
perfectly consistent with the idea
of the buyer's rejection and of title
still resting in the seller. Thus,
in Blackwood v. Cutting Packing
Co., 76 Cal. 212, the buyer's acts
did not preclude him from denying
title, because they had been ac·
companied with a notice that he
was acting in the seller's interest
only. Cf. Zabriskie v. Central
48.
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A pointed illustration is the case of Cream City Gas

Co. V. Friedlander.2^ The plaintiff sued to recover

money it had paid defendant for certain soda ash. The

ash when delivered was inspected by the plaintiff and

found not to conform to the implied terms of the contract

and the plaintiff notified the seller that it would not

accept. Thereafter, however, the plaintiff ''made a prac-

tical test of the material by trying to make glass there-

from, ' ' and demonstrated that it did not accord with the

contract terms. This action, the court held, amounted

to an acceptance of the ash and precluded the plaintiff

from rejecting it. ''It seems clear," said the court,

"that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time

after actual receipt of the material to exercise the right

of rejection in case the goods did not conform to the

contract. If this fact could only be ascertained by a

practical test, the plaintiff also had the right, mthin

such reasonable time, to make such practical test, using
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only so much of the material as was reasonably necessary

for the purpose, mthout thereby losing the right of

Vermont R. R., 131 N. Y. 72; Gold some of them held an acceptance.

Ridge Mining Co. v. Tallmadge, Pullman Car Co. v. Metropolitan

44 Ore. 34. Rr. Co., 157 U. S. 92; Coplay Iron

As to the presumption of accept- Co. v. Pope, 108 N. Y. 232; Fisher

ance of the goods as tendered, see v. Samuda, 1 Camp. 190; Doan v.

also, Barton v. Kane, 17 Wis. 38, Dunham, 79 111. 131; Titley v.

"When goods prove defective in Enterprise Co., 127 111. 457;

quality, it is, in general, incumbent Thompson v. Libbey, 35 Minn. 443.

on the purchaser to notify the In Diversey v. Kellogg, 44 111.

seller of his non-acceptance on 114, it is suggested that the reten-

that ground, else he is deemed tion of the goods would make the

to waive the objection, and to con- buyer liable for their value, as dis-
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A pointed illustration is the case of Cream City Gas
Co. v. Friedlander. 23 The plaintiff sued to recover
money it had paid defendant for certain soda ash. The
ash when delivered was inspected by the plaintiff and
found not to conform to the implied terms of the cop.tract
and the plaintiff notified the seller that it would not
accept. Thereafter, however, the plaintiff "made a practical test of the material by trying to make glass therefrom," and demonstrated that it did not accord with the
contract terms. This action, the court held, amounted
to an acceptance of the ash and precluded the plaintiff
from' rejecting it. "It seems clear," said the court,
"that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time
after actual receipt of the material to exercise the right
of rejection in case the goods did not conform to the
contract. If this fact could only be ascertained by a
practical test, the plaintiff also had the right, within
such reasonable time, to make such practical test, using
only so much of the material as was reasonably necessary
for the purpose, without thereby losing the right of

sent to keep and pay for them ac- tinct from their contract price,

cording to the terms specified. In 9o also. Basin & Co. v. Conley, 58

such case, it is considered suflBl- Md. 59.

cient evidence of acceptance that Unreasonable retention, and

the purchaser has not returned or use, of a part of the goods tend-

offered to return the goods, or ered was held to constitute an ac-

notified the seller of his non-ac- ceptance of the whole of the

ceptance." Freedman v. Shoe Mfg. goods, in Emmery Thompson Co. v.

Co., 122 Pa. 25, keeping shoes in Graves, 91 Conn. 71, 98 Atl. 331.

stock for two months and selling 23 — 84 Wis. 53.

Vermont R. R., 131 N. Y. 72; Gold
Ridge Mining Co. v. Tallmadge,
44 Ore. 34.
As to the presumption of acceptance of the goods as tendered, see
also, Barton v. Kane, 17 Wis. 38,
"When goods prove defective in
quality, it is, in general, incumbent
on the purchaser to notify the
seller of his non-acceptance on
that ground, else he is deemed
to waive the objection, and to consent to keep and pay for them according to the terms specified. In
such case, it is considered sufficient evidence of acceptance that
the purchaser has not returned or
offered to return the goods, or
notified the seller of his non-acceptance." Freedman v. Shoe Mfg.
Co., 122 Pa. 25, keeping shoes in
stock for two months and selling
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some of them held an acceptance.
Pullman Car Co. v. Metropolitan
Rr. Co., 157 U. S. 92; Coplay Iron
Co. v. Pope, 108 N. Y. 232; Fisher
v. Samuda, 1 Camp. 190; Doan v.
Dunham, 79 Ill. 131; Titley v.
Enterprise Co., 127 Ill. 457;
Thompson v. Libbey, 35 Minn. 443 .
In Diversey v. Kellogg, 44 Ill.
114, it is suggested that the retention of the goods would make the
buyer liable for their value, as distinct from their contract price.
So also, Basin & Co. v. Conley, 58
Md. 59.
Unreasonable retention, and
use, of a part of the goods tendered was held to constitute an acceptance of the whole of the
goods, in Emery Thompson Co. v.
Graves, 91 Conn. 71, 98 Atl. 331.
23-84 Wis. 53.
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rejection. But this test is plainly for the purpose only

of enabling the purchaser to decide whether the material

conforms to the contract. If the fact can be determined

by inspection alone, the test is not necessary, and the

use of the material, therefore, clearly injustifiable. Now

in this case, the plaintiff's officers determined at once,

and upon inspection alone, that the material was unfit

for their purposes, and so notified the defendant, and

rejected the entire lot. They did not claim to need any

test, they took their position definitely. After that act

they could not deal with the property in any way incon-

sistent with the rejection, if they proposed to insist upon

their right to reject. They must do no act which they

would have no right to do unless they were owners of

the goods. Under these rules it is evident the plaintiff

had no right to use up a quantity of the material several

weeks after the rejection. By the rejection it became

defendant's property if such rejection was rightful.
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Plaintiff had no right to use any part of it. It is* claimed

that the use was simply for the purpose of providing

evidence of unfitness for the purpose of the trial of this

case; but one has no right to use his opponent's prop-

erty for the purpose of making evidence. The act was

an unmistakable act of ownership, and entirely incon-

sistent with the claim that the material had been re-

jected and was owned by defendant. ' '

Inspection Before Payment. — There is a right of in-

spection whose purpose is entirely different from the

one just discussed, but which is often confused with it.

This is the right to inspect as a condition precedent to

payment. The right of inspection just discussed exists

in order that the buyer may know whether the goods

offered are those he contracted for, before he takes or

refuses the title to them. It presupposes that the con-

tract has been in respect to unidentified, though described,

goods so that title did not pass at the time of making the

rejection. But this test is plainly for the purpose only
of enabling the purchaser to decide whether the material
conforms to the contract. If the fact can be determined
by inspection alone, the test is not necessary, and the
use of the material, therefore, clearly injustifiable. Now
in this case, the plaintiff's officers determined at once,
and upon inspection alone, that the material was unfit
for their purposes, and so notified the defendant, and
rejected the entire lot. They did not claim to need any
test, they took their position definitely. After that act
they could not deal with the property in any way inconsistent with the rejection, if they proposed to insist upon
their right to reject. They must do no act which they
would have no right to do unless they were owners of
the goods. Under these rules it is evident the plaintiff
had no right to use up a quantity of the material several
weeks after the rejection. By the rejection it became
defendant's property if such rejection was rightful.
Plaintiff had no right to use any part of it. It is' claimed
that the use was simply for the purpose of providing
evidence of unfitness for the purpose of the trial of this
case; but one has no right to use his opponent's property for the purpose of making evidence. The act was
an unmistakable act of ownership, and entirely inconsistent with the claim that the material had been rejected and was owned by defendant.''
Inspection Before Payment.-There is a right of inspection whose purpose is entirely different from the
one just discussed, but which is often confused with it.
This is the right to inspect as a condition precedent to
payment. The right of inspection just discussed exists
in order that the buyer may know whether the ·goods
offered are those he contracted for, before he takes or
r :.ifu · · th title to th m. It presupposes that the contract h s b n in r pect to unidentified, though described,
g ods · th t title did not pa at the time of making the
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contract, or that, for some other reason, title has not

already passed to the buyer.

But when the parties have contracted concerning a

specifically identified chattel, the rule is that title pre-

sumably passes at the time the contract is made, regard-

less of payment or change of possession. When, there-

fore, the possession of such a chattel is offered to the

buyer and payment demanded, the buyer's inspection or

non-inspection can not affect the title — title is already in

the buyer.

If he has contracted to pay at a certain date, prior to

delivery of the goods to him, he would break the contract

by refusing to pay. But if delivery of the chattel is to

precede, or to be concurrent with, payment, he need not

pay until the very chattel he bought is delivered or of-

fered to him. Furthermore, he need not take the seller's

word that the chattel offered is the one contracted for;

he has the right to see for himself. If this opportunity
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to see. for himself is not given, he is not in breach of

the contract if he refuses to pay.* The title is none the

less in him, but he does not have to pay until he receives

possession, and he does not have to take possession with-

out knowing that he is getting the chattel he contracted

for.

This right to inspect before payment may, like the right

to inspect before taking title, be waived, and such waiver

may be implied from the terms of the contract and the

acts of the parties. An agreement, for instance, that the

goods are to be sent to the buyer ''C. 0. D." may

preclude his right to any inspection before payment.

Such may be the effect of a failure to examine the goods

at a reasonable time, or contracting for their delivery in

such a way that inspection before coincident pa^nnent is

impracticable.^*^

24 — Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N. Y. S. 793, agreement to pay on pre-

469; Whitney v. McLean, 38 N. Y. sentation of bill of lading; Law-

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 47, (1), (2).

tSee Uniform Sales Act, Section 47, (3).

contract, or that, for some other reason, title has not
already passed to the buyer.
But when the parties have contracted concerning a
specifically identified chattel, the rule is that title presumably passes at the time the contract is made, regardless of payment or change of posses ion. When, therefore, the possession of such a chatt 1 is offered to the
buyer and payment demanded, the buyer's inspection or
non-inspection can not affect the title-title is already in
the buyer.
If he has contracted to pay at a certain date, prior to
delivery of the goods to him, he would break the contract
by refusing to pay. But if delivery of the chattel is to
precede, or to be concurrent with, payment, he need not
pay until the very chattel he bought is delivered or offered to him. Furthermore, he need not take the seller's
word that the chattel offered is the one contracted for;
he has the right to see for himself. If this opportunity
to see. for himself is not given, he is not in breach of
the contract if he refuses to pay.* The title is none the
less in him, but he does not have to pay until he receives
possession, and he does not have to take possession without knowing that he is getting the chattel he contracted
for.
This right to inspect before payment may, like the right
to inspect before taking title, be waived, and such waiver
may be implied from the terms of the contract and the
acts of the parties. An agreement, for instance, that the
goods are to be sent to the buyer "C. 0. D." may
preclude his right to any inspection before payment.
Such may be the effect of a failure to examine the goods
at a reasonable time, or contracting for their delivery in
such a way that inspection before coincident payment is
impracticable. 24 t
24-Sawyer v.
469; Whitney v.
*See Uniform
tSee Uniform
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This waiver of inspection before payment, however,

does not necessarily affect title to the goods. If title has

already passed, at the time of the contract, or by seller's

dehvery to a carrier of goods conforming to the contract,

inspection or failure to inspect does not affect it ; it is in

the buyer and remains in him. On the other hand, if the

goods received by the buyer are not in fact the goods

he contracted for, neither his mere physical acceptance

of them, as we have seen, nor his payment for them, neces-

sarily implies a willingness to take title despite the sell-

er's failure to perform.

Performance of Conditions by Seller. — Both of these

rights of inspection are for the purpose of giving the

buyer opportunity to learn whether the thing offered by

the seller is in fact what the buyer contracted to take.

This, then, involves a question in each case of just what

it was that the seller agreed to transfer and the buyer to

This waiver of inspection before payment, however,
does not necessarily affect title to the goods. If title has
already passed, at the time of the contract, or by seller's
delivery to a carrier of goods conforming to the contract,
inspection or failure to inspect does not affect it; it is in
the buyer and remains in him. On the other hand, if the
goods received by the buyer are not in fact the goods
he contracted for, neither his mere physical acceptance
of them, as we have seen, nor his payment for them, necessarily implies a willingness to take title despite the seller's failure to perform.

accept.
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What Conditions Are. — ^Whether or not the seller

has tendered the goods contracted for by the buyer de-

pends obviously on the terms of the contract; that is to

say, upon those terms of the contract which relate to the

identity of the goods intended to be covered by it. These

terms of identifying description, to which goods tendered

must conform to be the goods contracted for, are usually

called '' conditions. '"^^

ton & Sons Co. v. Mackie Grocery which the buyer may refuse them.

Co., 97 Md. 1, agreement to pay Scranton v. Mechanics Trading

on delivery to a named place; Co., 37 Conn. 130; Norrington v,

Polenghi Bros. v. Dried Milk Co., Wright, 115 U. S. 188.

Performance of Conditions by Seller.-Both of these
rights of inspection are for the purpose of giving the
buyer opportunity to learn whether the thing offered by
the seller is in fact what the buyer contracted to take.
This, then, involves a question in each case of just what
it ·was that the seller agreed to transfer and the buyer to
accept.

49 Sol. Jr. 120. But, as some courts allow re-

25 — Although the term "war- jection of title of goods which are

ranty" is usually applied to those indubitably those contracted for,

terms of description which do not but which do not conform to the

affect the precise identity of the terms of the contract in other re-

goods contracted for, it is some- spects than identity, (see p. 182)

times used of those parts of de- the use of the word "warranty"

Bcription for non-conformity to itself indicates nothing.

--What Conditions Are.-Whether or not the seller
has tendered the goods contracted for by the buyer depends obviously on the terms of the contract; that is to
say, upon those terms of the contract which relate to the
identit y of the goods intended to be covered by it. These
terms of identifying description, to which goods tendered
must conform to be the goods contracted for, are usually
called ''conditions.' ' 25
t on & Sons Co. v. Mackie Grocery
Co., 97 Md. l, agreement to pay
on delivery to a named place;
Polenghi Bros. v. Dried Milk Co.,
49 Sol. Jr. 120.
25-Although the term "warranty" is usually applied to those
t erms or description which do not
affect the precise id e ntity of the
goods contracted for , it is sometimes used of those pa rts of descri ption for non-conformity to
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which the buyer may refuse them.
Scranton v. Mechanics Trading
Co., 37 Conn. 130; Norrington v.
Wright, 115 U. S. 188.
But, as some courts allow rejection of title of goods which are
indubitably those contracted for,
but which do not conform to the
terms of the contract in other respects than identity, (see p. 182)
the use ot the word "warranty"
itself indicates nothing.
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Furthermore, it may be possible that the seller tenders
to the buyer precisely the goods contracted for, in inherent nature, but does not tender them at the place
agreed upon, or at the right time, or in the right way,
etc. In such case, if the matter failed in is of ess..ential
importance in the agreement, the seller ha not performed
his agreement. And not having himself performed, he
cannot sue the buyer if the latter refu es to pay. It
might be said that, in these cases the very goods described
in the contract having been tendered, title would be presumed to have passed, although the buyer incurs no' 'liability" as to payment until the seller shall have performed according to the terms. But, on the other hand,
the goods not having been specific at the time of the making of the contract, title could not have passed then and
would not pass thereafter without some actual or constructive assent of the buyer. The buyer not having
accepted the goods, the title would not be in him, whatever might have been his reason for refusing to take it.
The question of title is not specifically raised in the cases
involving these circumstances, but the courts do agree
that, at least, there is no liability on the part of the buyer.
These provisions of the contract, also, since they must
be complied with to make the buyer liable, are called ''conditions.'' And, indeed, in some cases such terms as the
time and place of delivery-which seem normally related
to performance rather than to identity-are said to be
essential to the identity of the goods. Thus one court says,
"The date of the shipment is a material element in the
identification of the property.' ' 26 Other courts treat them
as having the same effect, ·w ithout specifically saying that
they do affect the identity. For example, the Supreme
Court says, 27 "A statement descriptive of the subject
matter, or of some material incident, such as the time or
place of shipment, is ordinarily to be regarded as a war-
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Furthermore, it may be possible that the seller tenders

to the buyer precisely the goods contracted for, in in-

herent nature, but does not tender them at the place

agreed upon, or at the right time, or in the right way,

etc. In such case, if the matter failed in is of essential

importance in the agreement, the seller has not performed

his agreement. And not having himself performed, he

cannot sue the buyer if the latter refuses to pay. It

might be said that, in these cases the very goods described

in the contract having been tendered, title would be pre-

sumed to have passed, although the buyer incurs no "lia-

biUty" as to payment until the seller shall have per-

formed according to the terms. But, on the other hand,

the goods not having been specific at the time of the mak-

ing of the contract, title could not have passed then and

would not pass thereafter without some actual or con-

structive assent of the buyer. The buyer not having

accepted the goods, the title would not be in him, what-

ever might have been his reason for refusing to take it.
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The question of title is not specifically raised in the cases

involving these circumstances, but the courts do agree

that, at least, there is no liahility on the part of the buyer.

These provisions of the contract, also, since they must

be complied with to make the buyer liable, are called ' ' con-

ditions." And, indeed, in some cases such terms as the

time and place of delivery — which seem normally related

to performance rather than to identity — are said to be

essential to the identity of the goods. Thus one court says,

''The date of the shipment is a material element in the

identification of the property. ' '^® Other courts treat them

as having the same effect, without specifically saying that

they do affect the identity. For example, the Supreme

Court says,^'' ''A statement descriptive of the subject

matter, or of some material incident, such as the time or

place of shipment, is ordinarily to be regarded as a war-

26— Clark v. Fey, 121 N. Y. 470. 27— Norrington v. Wright, 115

U. S. 188.

26-Clark v. Fey, 121 N. Y. 470.

27-Norrington v. Wright, 115
188.
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ranty, in the sense in which that term is used in insurance

and maritime law, that is to say, a condition precedent,

upon the failure or non-performance of which the party

aggrieved may repudiate the w^hole contract. ' '^^ It seems

unavoidable, therefore, to discuss both kinds of these con-

ditions, viz., those relating to performance as well as

those affecting identity, on whose performance by the

seller the buyer's liability depends, without particular

distinction.

What Are Conditions. — This brings us to the in-

quiry, what terms in the contract are "conditions" to

which the seller must conform to render the buyer liable.

When the contract is for the sale of an article specifically

identified at the time, a tender by the seller of that par-

THE LAW OF SALES

ranty, in the sense in which that term is used in insurance
and maritime law, that is to say, a condition precedent,
upon the failure or non-performance of which the party
aggrieved may repudiate the whole contract. " 28 It seems
unavoidable, therefore, to discuss both kinds of these conditions, viz., those relating to performance as well as
those affecting identity, on whose performance by the
seller the buyer's liability depends, without particular
distinction.

ticular article would seem clearly to be a performance of

his agreement, so far as his part in the transfer of title is

concerned, no matter what statements he may have made

in regard to the character or qualities of that article.
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This is fully sustained by the authorities which hold

that title to a specific chattel is presumed to have passed

at the time of the contract,^^ in conjunction mth those

28— "The quality Is a part of the N. Y. 366; Rommel v. Wingate,

description of the thing agreed to 103 Mass. 327; Cromwell v. Wil-

be sold, and the vendor is bound kinson, 18 Ind. 365; Filley v. Pope,

to furnish articles corresponding 115 U. S. 213, "The term 'ship-

with the description. If he tenders ment from Glasgow' defines an

articles of an inferior quality, the act to be done by the sellers

purchaser is not bound to accept at the outset, and a condi-

them." Pierson v. Crooks, 115 tion precedent to any liability

N. Y. 539; "What is sold is not of the buyer." Van Valken-

300 tons of rice in gross, or in berg v. Mason, 45 Neb. 654. Quan-

general. It is 300 tons of Madras tity also may be a condition pre-

rlce to be put on board at Madras cedent, Tamvaco v. Lucas, 1 El.

during the particular months", & El. 592; Downer v. Thompson,

Bowes V. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455; 2 Hill (N. Y.) 137, delivery of too

Salmon v. Boykin Co., 66 Md. 541, much; Cunliffe v. ITarrison, 6

--What Are Conditions.-This brings us to the inquiry, what terms in the contract are "conditions" to
which the seller must conform to render the buyer liable.
When the contract is for the sale of an article specifically
identified at the time, a tender by the seller of that particular article would seem clearly to be a performance of
his agreement, so far as his part in the transfer of title is
concerned, no matter what statements he may have made
in regard to the character or qualities of that article.
This is fully sustained by the authorities which hold
that title to a specific chattel is presumed to have passed
at the time of the contract, 29 in conjunction with those

quantity and place of shipment; Exch. 903, idem; Hoffman v.

Crane v. Wilson, 105 Mich. 554; King, 58 Wis. 314. Cf. Brownfield

Cleveland Rolling Mill v. Rhodes, v. .lohnson. 128 Pa. 254.

121 U. S. 255; Pope v. Porter, 102 2^— Ante, p. 19 ff.

28-"The quality !s a part of the
description of the thing agreed to
be sold, and the vendor is bound
to furnish articles corresponding
with the description. If he tenders
articles of an inferior quality, the
purchaser is not bound to accept
them." Pierson v. Crooks, 115
N. Y. 539; "What is sold is not
300 tons of rice in gross, or in
general. It is 300 tons of MadrM
rice to be put on board at MadrM
during the particular months",
Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455;
Salmon v. Boykin Co., 66 Md. 541,
quantity and place of shipment;
'rane v. Wilson, 105 Mi h. 554;
Clev lancl Rolling Mill v. Rhodes,
121 U. S. 255; Pope v. Porter, 102

N. Y. 366; Rommel v. Wingate,
103 Mass. 327; Cromwell v. Wilkinson, 18 Ind. 365; Filley v. Po pe,
115 U. S. 213, "The term 'shipment from Glasgow' defines an
act to be done by the sellers
at the outset, and a condition precedent to any liabHity
of the buyer."
Van Valkenberg v. Mason, 45 Neb. 654. Quantity also may be a condition precedent, Tamvaco v. Lucas, 1 E1.
& El. 592; Downer v. Thompson,
2 Hill (N. Y.) 137, delivery of too
much; Cunliffe v. Harrison, 6
Exch. 903, ideni; Hoffman v.
King, 58 Wis. 314. Cf. Brownfield
v. Johnson, 128 Pa. 254.
29-A nte, p. 19 ff.
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which hold that a specific chattel so sold can not be re-

turned to the seller in the absence of fraud.^°

The converse of this is equally true ; a contract to sell

a specific chattel is not satisfied by a tender of some other

chattel, even though the one tendered has all the qualities

ascribed to the one contracted for. Thus, in Columbia

Iron Works v. Douglass,^^ the contract was for the sale

of steel scrap from the plates of certain boats which the

seller was building. The court held that a tender of steel

scrap which was not from the plates of those boats

was not performance of the contract, even though that

which was tendered was of precisely equal quality. ''It

was/' said the court, "an agreement for the purchase

by the appellee and for the sale by the appellant of a spe-

cific, designated thing; and that thing was not steel of a

described grade free from a named percentage of sulphur

and phosphorous, but steel scrap from the plates, beams,

and angles of the United States cruisers built by the ap-
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pellant. This was the named and designated — the specific

and identical — thing contracted for ; and the substitution

of any other or different material, no matter what its

quality or chemical test might be, was a clear breach of

the undertaking entered into by the parties. When a per-

son buys a particular thing, he can not be compelled to

take some other thing, even if like the thing he bought.

He has a right to insist on the terms of his contract."

When the contract relates to goods not existing, or not

specific, at the time, then all terms in the description

which are reasonably necessary to identify the goods

tendered with the goods intended by the contract are con-

ditions and must be comphed with. In general, all terms

which the parties may reasonably be supposed to have

considered essential to the correct identification are a

part of the description which must be complied with. If,

for instance, one agree to sell "blue vitriol, sound, and

ZO—Post, p. 177. Cf. also, Web- Iowa 37; Scott v. Buck, 85 III. 333.

ster, Gruber Co. v. Dryden, 90 31—84 Md. 44.

which hold that a specific chattel so sold can not be reiturned to the seller in the absence of fraud. 30
The converse of this is equally true; a contract to sell
a specific chattel is not satisfied by a tender of some other
chattel, even though the one tendered has all the qu!ilities
ascribed to the one contracted for. Thus, in Columbia
Iron Works v. Douglass, 31 the contract was for the sale
of steel scrap from the plates of certain boats which the
seller was building. The court h eld that a tender of steel
scrap which was not from the plates of those boats
was not performance of the contract, even though that
which was tendered was of precisely equal quality. "It
was,'' said the court, ''an agreement for the purchase
by the appellee and for the sale by the appellant of a specific, designated thing; and that thing was not steel of a
described grade free from a named percentage of sulphur
and phosphorous, but steel scrap from the plates, beams,
and angles of the United States cruisers built by the appellant. This was the named and designated-the specific
and identical-thing contracted for; and the substitution
of any other or different material, no matter what its
quality or chemical test might be, was a clear breach of
the undertaking entered into by the parties. When a person buys a particular thing, he can not be compelled to
take some other thing, even if like the thing he bought.
He has a right to insist on the terms of his contract."
When the contract relates to goods not existing, or not
specific, at the time, then all terms in the description
which are reasonably necessary to identify the goods
tendered with the goods intended by the contract are conditions and must be complied with. In general, all terms
which the parties may reasonably be supposed to have
considered essential to the correct identification are a
part of the description which must be complied with. If,
for instance, one agree to sell "blue vitriol, sound, and
30-Post, p, 177. Cf. also, Webster, Gruber Co. v. Dryden, 90

Iowa 37; Scott v. Buck, 85 Ill. 333.
31-84 Md. 44.
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in good order," his contract is not performed by a de-

livery of vitriol, however sound and in good order, which

is not blue vitriol. ' ' Saltzberger, " or "green," vitriol

does not suffice. ^^ It is impossible to formulate a rule as

to just which terms of a contract are essential to the iden-

tification of the goods intended and which are mere de-

scription of character or quality collateral to the identifi-

cation.^^ Whether a particular term is in fact an essential

part of the contract of sale, or is only an obligation col-

lateral to the matter of passing title, is a matter that will

be decided by each court to suit itself in the particular

case. For precedent decisions, which may by the similar-

ity of their facts influence a particular judge, one must

refer to the digests.

Opinions as Conditions. — A statement of opinion

as to the characteristics or qualities of the goods con-

tracted for, is not a part of the identifying description,

even though, in expression, it may be interwoven with the
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description. It is not a condition precedent to per-

formance, therefore, that the goods shall actually conform

to that statement of opinion.

The great difficulty is to distinguish precisely between

description for the purpose of identification and mere

in good order," his contract is not performed by a delivery of vitriol, however sound and in good order, which
is not blue vitriol. "Saltzberger," or "green," vitriol
does not suffice. 32 It is impossible to formulate a rule as
to just which terms of a contract are essential to the identification of the goods intended and which are mere description of character or quality collateral to the identification.33 Whether a particular term is in fact an essential
part of the contract of sale, or is only an obligation collateral to the matter of passing title, is a matter that will
be decided by each court to suit itself in the particular
case. For precedent decisions, which may by the similarity of their facts influence a particular judge, one must
refer to the digests.

coincident expressions of opinion. There are no rules for

determining this — it is a question of particular conclu-

sion. But if this question be settled in the particular

case, the law is certain; description must be complied

with, opinion is immaterial.^*

32— Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 drover to an experienced market

N. Y. 98. man that his hogs were "suitable

33 — As to the effect of state- for New York market" was a mere

ments, by way of description or expression of opinion; Farrow v.

otherwise, in regard to goods Andrews, 69 Ala. 96; Power v.

which are specific and identified Barham, 4 Ad. & EI. 473, "It was,

at the time of sale, see the discus- therefore, for the jury to say,

sion under "warranty," post, p. 182. under all circumstances, what was

34— Bartlett v. Iloppock, 34 N. the effect of the words, and wheth-

Y. 118, a statement by a hog- er they implied a warranty of gen-

--Opinions as Conditions.-.A statement of opini on
as to the characteristics or qualities of the goods contracted for, is not a part of the identifying description,
even though, in expression, it may be interwoven with the
description. It is not a condition precedent to performance, therefore, that the goods shall actually conform
to that statement of opinion.
The great difficulty is to distinguish precisely between
description for the purpose of identification and inere
coincident expressions of opinion. There are no rules for
determining this-it is a question of particular conclusion. But if this question be settled in the particular
case, the law is certain; description must be complied
with, opinion is immaterial. 34
32-Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51
N. Y. 98.

33- As to the effect of statements, by way of description or
otherwise, in r egard to goods
which are specific and identified
at the time of sale, see the discussion und r "warranty," post, p. 182.
34- Bartl tt v. IIoppock, 34 N.
Y. 118, a statemen t by a hogC.1
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the effect of the words, and wheth·
e r they implied a warranty of gen·
I I

II

I

11

I

I

U IVERS TY OF CA IFOR

~

THE BUYER'S RIGHTS
THE BUYER'S RIGHTS 173

Implied Conditions. — An important proposition in

respect to these conditions, or terms of the description, is

that they need not be wholly express. Terms which must

be complied mth to constitute performance may be im-

plied by the other provisions of the contract.*

ThuS; ''It is understood of every contract for the future

sale and delivery of an article of merchandise, (not

specific at the time), even A\dthout express terms, that it

shall be of merchantable quality." And this is a con-

dition precedent.^^ Howard v. Hoej^,^^ arose out of a sale

of ale. On delivery it was discovered to be sour, ropy

and unfit for use and the buyer refused to keep it. The

seller contended that there was no express statement in

the contract that it should not be sour. But the court

held an express statement to be unnecessary, saying,

''It stands conceded, that, where the contract is execu-

tory,, or, in other words, to deliver an article not defined

at the time, * * * the promisee can not be compelled
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to put up satisfied with an inferior commodity. The con-

tract always carries an obligation that it shall be at least

merchantable — at least of medium quality and goodness.

If it come short of this it may be returned after the

vendee has had a reasonable time to inspect it. * * *

There is always a warranty or promise implied that the

indeterminate thing to be delivered should, at least, not

have any remarkable defect."" The implication is not

that the goods othermse described shall be of the best

quality, but only that they shall be of a normally good

ulneness, or conveyed only a de- This is a question for the jury,

scription, or an expression of Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y.

opinion." Jendwyn v. Slade, 2 198, 10 Am. Rep. 595; Allen v.

Esp. 572. Lake, 18 Q. B. 560.

The frequency with which state- 35— Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y.

ments by the seller in regard to 361.

the goods are held to be only ex- 36—23 Wend. (N. Y.) 350.

pressions of opinion is vigorously 37 — Farren v. Dameron, 99 Md.

condemned by the Supreme Court 323.

of Kansas, in Foote v. Wilson, 104

Kan. 191, 178 Pac. 430.

*See Uniform Sales Act. Sections 12, 13, 14, 15.
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--Implied Conditions.-An important proposition in
respect to these conditions, or terms of the de cription, i"'
that they need not be wholly express. Terms which must
be complied with to constitute performance may be implied by the other provisions of the contract.*
Thus, "It is under tood of every contract for the future
sale and delivery of an article of merchandise, (not
specific at the time), even without express terms, that it
shall be of merchantable quality.'' And this is a condition precedent. 35 Howard v. Hoey, 36 arose out of a sale
of ale. On delivery it was discovered to be sour, ropy
and unfit for use and the buyer refused to keep it. The
seller contended that there was no express statement in
the contract that it should not be sour. But the court
held an express_ statement to be unnecessary, saying,
"It stands conceded, that, where the contract is executory,. or, in other words, to deliver an article not defined
at the time, • • • the promisee can not be compelled
to put up satisfied with an inferior commodity. The contract always carries an obligation that it shall be at least
merchantable-at least of medium quality and goodness.
If it come short of this it may be returned after the
vendee has had a reasonable time to inspect it. * * •
There is always a warranty or promise implied that the
indeterminate thing to be delivered should, at lea t, not
have any remarkable defect.' ' 37 The implication is not
that the goods otherwise described shall be of the best
quality, but only that they shall be of a no1wally good
uineness, or conveyed only a description, or an expression of
opinion." Jendwyn v. Slade, 2
Esp. 572.
The frequency with which statements by the seller in regard to
the goods are held to be only expressions of opinion is vigorously
condemned by the Supreme Court
of Kansas, in Foote v. Wilson, 104
Kan. 191, 178 Pac. 430.
*See Uniform Sales Act. Se ctions
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This is a question for the jury,
Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y.
198, 10 Am. Rep. 595; Allen v.
Lake, 18 Q. B. 560.
35-Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y.
361.
36-23 Wend. (N. Y.) 350.
37-Farren v. Dameron, 99 Md.
323.

12, 13, 14, 15.

Origi al from

U IVE S TY 0 F CA I 0

-

JA

174
174 THE LAW OF SALES

quality.^* Usually, in cases where goods are to be

shipped, the implied statement is as to their quality and

condition at time of shipment only. This is usually the

time of constructive dehvery to the buyer.^^

Other terms that may be implied from the circum-

stances are discussed under the topic of ''Warranties".**'

Waiver of Performance of Conditions. — Assuming

that some particular term in the contract is identifying

THE LAW OF SALES

quality. 88 Usually, in cases where goods are to be
shipped, the implied statement is as to their quality and
condition at time of shipment only. This is u sually the
time of constructive delivery to the buyer. 39
Other terms that may be implied from the circumstances are discussed under the topic of "Warranties". 40

description of the goods, and therefore a condition prece-

dent to the seller's exact performance, the question may

arise — what is the result if the buyer chooses to accept

title despite the defect?

Does he, by accepting the goods tendered in place of

the ones contracted for, waive all right to recover dam-

ages suffered through the seller's failure to tender the

goods described? In other words, does he, by accepting

the goods actually tendered, legally accept them in full

satisfaction of the seller's obligation? Authority is
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very much confused upon this point. The New

York courts rather indicate that if the term with

which compliance has been waived is truly a condition,

the waiver extends not only to the passing of title but

to all claims for damage as well, if the acceptance is made

with knoivledge that the condition is not complied with.

Occasional decisions in other jurisdictions intimate a

similar rule.*^

There is tendency of the courts, however, to hold, in

38— Sweat v. Shumway, 102 well v. Lee, 34 Minn. 411; Cheboy-

Mass. 365; Harris v. Waite, 51 Vt. gan Paper Co. v. Eichberg, 184

481; Tennessee Co. v. Leeds, 97 Mich. 30; America Theater Co. v.

Tenn. 574. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 221 111. 145;

39— Leopold v. Van Kirk, 27 but of.. Underwood v. Wolf, 131 III.

Wis. 152; Mann v. Everston, 32 425; Athletic Club v. Lumber Co.,

Ind. 355. 18 Tex. Civ. Ap. 161; Hurley-

40— Posf, p. 189. Mason Co. v. Stebbings, 79 Wash.

41— Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 366, 140 Pac. 381. But cf., Spring-

358; Coplay Iron Co. v. Pope, 108 field Shingle Co. v. Edgecome Mill

N Y. 232; Carleton v. Lombard. Co., 52 Wash. 620.

Ayres & Co., 149 N. Y. 137; Max-

-Waiver of Performance of Conditions.-Assuming
that some particular term in the contract is identifying
description of the goods, and therefore a condition precedent to the seller's exact performance, the question may
arise-what is the result if the buyer chooses to accept
title despite the defect~
Does he, by accepting the goods tendered in place of
the ones contracted for, waive all right to recover damages suffered through the seller's failure to t ender the
goods described~ In other words, does he, by accepting
the goods actually tendered, legally accept them in full
satisfaction of the seller's obligation ~ Authority is
very much confused upon this point. The New
York courts rather indicate that if the term with
which compliance has been waived is truly a condition,
the waiver extends not only to the passing of title but
to all claims for damage as well, if the acceptance is made
with knowledge that the condition is not complied with.
Occasional decisions in other jurisdictions intimate a
similar rule. 41
There is tendency of the courts, however, to hold, in
38-Sweat v. Shumway, 102
Mass. 365; Harris v. Waite, 51 Vt.
481; Tennessee Co. v. Leeds, 97
Tenn. 574.
39-Leopold v. Van Kirk, 27
Wis. 152; Mann v. Evers ton, 32
Ind. 355.
40-Post, p. 189.
41- Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y.
358; Coplay Iron o. v. Pope, 108
N Y. 232; Carl ton v. Lom ba rd.
Ayres & Co., 149 N. Y. 137; MaxD1giti.l

well v. Lee, 34 Minn. 411; Cheboygan Paper Co. v. Eichberg, 184
Mich. 30; America Theater Co. v.
Siegel, Cooper & Co., 221 Ill. 145;
but cf., Underwood v. Wolf, 131 Ill.
425; Athletic Club v. Lumber Co.,
18 Tex. Civ. Ap. 161; HurleyMason Co. v. Stebbings, 79 Wash.
366, 140 Pac. 381. But cf., Springfi e ld Shin gle Co. v. Edgecome Mill
Co., 52 Wash. 620.

by

I TE NET A CHIVE

Ori ir I fr 111

LINIVERS

OF A IF

•

THE BUYER'S RIGHTS
THE BUYER'S RIGHTS 175

one way or another, that the buyer does not lose his

right to damage for non-performance by accepting title

to the goods as tendered.*^*

The matter is, however, rather hopelessly confused

by terminology. Those terms of the description which

serve to identify goods contracted for must be complied

with before the contract of sale can be properly per-

formed; they are truly conditions precedent. Those

terms which may describe, but do not identify, the goods

are not conditions, and are usually called "warranties."

They do not relate to the passing of title. As a war-

ranty, in this narrow sense, does not relate to title, the

goods could not be rejected by the buyer for breach of it —

they would still be the identical goods he agreed to take.

Hence the right to recover damages for breach of ''war-

ranty" is not lost by acceptance. Consequently it is

possible for courts to give mouth-honor to a rule that

no right of action for damages from breach of conditions

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

\vill survive acceptance of the goods, and yet in fact

allow action for breach of what even themselves would

call a condition if the buyer had chosen to reject the

goods as tendered, but what, for the purpose of allomng

the action, they do choose to call a "warranty." The

fact therefore that courts say "conditions do not sur-

vive acceptance" does not necessarily put them in the

position of so holding in fact.*^

42 — Boston Woven Hose Co. v. is allowed to survive.

Kendall, 178 Mass. 232; Under- Morse v. Union Stock Yards, 21

wood V. Wolf, 131 111. 425; Dalton Ore. 289, 14 L. R. A. 157, 28 Pac. 2;

v. Bunn, 137 Ala. 175. Lewis v. Rountree, 78 N. C. 323;

43— Cf., Springfield Shingle Co. Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 23

V. Edgecome Mill Co., 52 Wash. Am. St. 783, 22 Atl. 362.

620, and Hurley-Mason Co. v. Steb- In Day v. Poole, 52 N. Y. 416,

bins, 79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381; the court got around the rule

Fairbank Co. v. Metzger, 118 N. Y. largely on the argument that the

260, where the statement concern- buyer had accepted the goods on

ing the goods is clearly part of the the seller's promise that he would

identifying description, but Is make good for the defect,

called a "warranty" and as such The subject of "wairanties",

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 11, (1), 49.
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one way or another, that the buyer does not lose his
right to damage for non-p erformance by accepting title
to the goods as t endered. 42 *
The matter is, however, rather hopelessly confused
by terminology. Those terms of the description which
sen e to identify goods contracted for must be complied
with before the contract of sale can be properly performed; they are ·truly conditions precedent. Those
terms which may describe, but do not identify, the goods
are not conditions, and are usually called "warranties."
They do not relate to the passing of title. As a warranty, in this narrow sense, does not relate to title, the
goods could not be rejected by the buyer for breach of itthey would still be the identical goods he agreed to take.
Hence the right to recover damages for breach of ''warranty" is not lost by acceptance. Consequently it is
possible for courts to give mouth-honor to a rule that
no right of action for damages from breach of conditions
will survive acceptance of the goods, and yet in fact
allow action for breach of what even themselves would
call a condition if the buyer had chosen to reject the
goods as tendered, but what, for the purpose of allowing
the action, they do choose to call a ''warranty.'' The
fact therefore that courts say "conditions do not survive acceptance" does not necessarily put them in the
position of so holding in fact. 43
42-Boston Woven Hose Co. v.
Kendall, 178 Mass. 232; Underwood v. Wolf, 131 Ill. 425; Dalton
v. Bunn, 137 Ala. 175.
43-Cf., Springfield Shingle Co.
v. Edgecome Mill Co., 52 Wash.
620, and Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, 79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381;
Fairbank Co. v. Metzger, 118 N. Y.
260, where the statement concerning the goods is clearly part of the
identifying description, but is
called a "warranty" and as such
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
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is allowed to survive.
Morse v. Union Stock Yards, 21
Ore. 289, 14 L. R. A. 157, 28 Pac. 2;
Lewis v. Rountree, 78 N. C. 323;
Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 23
Am. St. 783, 22 Atl. 362.
In Day v. Poole, 52 N. Y. 416,
the court got around the rule
largely on the argument that the
buyer had accepted the goods on
the seller's promise that he would
make good for the defect.
The subject of "warranties",
11, (1), 49.
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2.

PossEssroN, BUT NOT TrTLE, AcQumED

2. Possession, but not Title, Acquired

The rights of a buyer who has received possession of

the goods but not title to them are, of course, consistent

with the seller's rights. These latter have already been

discussed under the appropriate heading.**

Right to Keep Possession.— So long as the buyer is not

in default, if the contract provides, expressly or im-

pliedly, that he shall have possession he is entitled to

The rights of a buyer who has received possession of
the goods but not title to them are, of course, consistent
with the seller's rights. These latter have already been
discussed under the appropriate heading. 44

keep possession and can sue the seller for any trespass

upon that right.*^

The buyer's right of possession is not opposed to the

seller only, but he can maintain actions of trespass,

replevin, etc., against other persons who unlawfully inter-

fere with his possession.*^

Right to Acquire Title.— The buyer also has the

right to acquire title by payment, or performance of

whatever may be the condition, according to the terms

of the contract. A buyer who is not in possession can
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not acquire title, unless he can get a decree of specific

performance in equity, without some act of passing title

on the part of the seller. But when the buyer is in pos-

session of the goods, his mere tender of payment, or of

performance of other conditions, is sufficient to vest title

■what they are, when they exist, some courts hold that the seller

rights arising therefrom, etc., is can not retake possession without

Right to Keep Possession.-So long as the buyer is not
in default, if the contract provides, expressly or impliedly, that he shall have possession he is entitled to
keep possession and can sue the seller for any trespass
upon that right. 45
The buyer's right of possession is not opposed to the
seller only, but he can maintain actions of trespass,
replevin, etc., against other persons who unlawfully interfere with his possession. 46

discussed post, p. 180. a demand for performance, New

44 — Ante, p. 99. Home etc. Co. v. Bothane, 70 Mich.

45— Clark v. Clement, 75 Vt. ^'^^•

417; Richardson V. G. W. Mfg. Co., 46— Harrington v. King, 121

3 Kan. Ap. 445; Wellden v. Witt, Mass. 269; Aldrich v. Hodges, 164

145 Ala. 605, 40 So. 126; Western Mass. 570, even though the seller

Union Sewing Mach. Co. v. Sachs, also has brought an action for

67 N. Y. S. 2; Cushman v. Jewell, conversion against the same de-

7 Hun. (N. Y.) 525, even after de- fendant; Freedman v. Phillips, 82

fault, if the seller has waived the N. Y. S. 96; Lord v. Buchanan, 69

default. Vt. 320, 60 Am. St. 933; Messen-

Even if the buyer is in default, ger v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 353.

Right to Acquire Title.-The buyer also has the
right to acquire title by payment, or performance of
whatever may be the condition, according to the terms
of the contract. A buyer who is not in possession can
not acquire title, unless he can get a decree of specific
performance in equity, without some act of passing title
on the part of the seller. But when the buyer is in possession of the goods, his mere tender of payment, or of
performance of other conditions, is sufficient to vest title
what they are, when they exist,
rights arising therefrom, etc., is
discussed post, p. 180.
44-Ante, p. 99.
45-Clark v. Clement, 75 Vt.
417; Richardson v. G. W. Mfg. Co.,
3 Kan. Ap. 445; Wellden v. Witt,
145 Ala. 605, 40 So. 126; Western
Union Sewing Mach. Co. v. Sachs,
67 N. Y. S. 2; Cushman v. Jewell,
7 Hun. (N. Y.) 525, even after default, if the seller bas waived the
default.
Even if the buyer is in default,

D1git1z

some courts hold that the seller
can not retake possession without
a demand for performance, New
Home etc. Co. v. Bothane, 70 Mich.
443.
46-Harrington v. King, 121
Mass. 269; Aldrich v. Hodges, 164
Mass. 570, even though the seller
also has brought an action for
conversion against the same defendant; Freedman v. Phillips, 82
N. Y. S. 96; Lord v. Buchanan, 69
Vt. 320, 60 Am. St. 933; Messenger v. Murphy, 33 Wash. 353.
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in himself.*'' This right to acquire title he can also

transfer to other persons."

Even after the buyer has lost possession through the

retaking by the seller, it has been held that the right to

acquire title by tender of payment is still in him.*® ^ But

this must presuppose that the seller's retaking has not

been by way of a proper rescission of the contract.

Right to Return the Goods. — If the buyer is in default,

he can not avoid further performance of the contract by

returning the possession of the goods, against the seller's

mil. The obligation, or promise, to return the goods in

in himself .n This right to acquire title he can also
transfer to other persons. 48
Even after the buyer has lost possession through the
retaking by the seller, it has been held that the right to
acquire title by tender of payment is still in him. 49 , But
this must presuppose that the seller's retaking has not
been by way of a proper rescission of the contract.

case of default is for the benefit of the seller, not of the

buyer, and it does not authorize the buyer to return the

goods and escape further payments.^"

"Whether the seller, who of his own volition retakes

possession of the goods, can thereafter hold the buyer

liable for further payments, has already been discussed."

Right to a Return of Money Paid. — If the seller exer-
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cises his right to retake possession he need not, ex-

cept as provided by statute, return any of the buyer's

payments as a condition precedent to the retaking.^^

47— Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Mass. 445; Cushman v. Jewell, 7

Bowers, 110 Ala. 322; Currier v. Hun. (N. Y.) 525.

Knapp, 117 Mass. 324; Hervey v. 49 — Miller v. Steen, 30 Cal. 402;

Dimond, 67 N. H. 342, 68 Am. St. Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula, 72

673, 39 Atl. 331; Albright v. Mere- Miss. 608.

dith, 58 O. S. 194; Christenson v. But the buyer can not vest title

Nelson, 38 Ore. 43, 63 Pac. 648, in himself by tender of payment

even though the tender be made after the goods have been de-

Right to Return the Goods.-If the buyer is in def a ult,
he can not avoid further performance of the contract by
returning the possession of the goods, against the seller's
will. The obligation, or promise, to return the goods in
case of default is for the benefit of the seller, not of the
buyer, and it does not authorize the buyer to return the
goods and escape further payments. 50
Whether the seller, who of his own volition retakes
possession of the goods, can thereafter hold the buyer
liable for further payments, has already been discussed. 51

tefore performance is due; Cush- stroyed while in the seller's re-

man v. Jewell, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 525, possession. Hollenberg Music Co.

idem; Pease v. Teller Corp., 158 v. Barron, 100 Ark. 403.

Cal. 807. 50 — Robinson's Appeal, 63 Conn.

48— Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 26. 290; Finlay v. Ludden & Bates Co.,

66 Am. Dec. 752; Christenson v. 105 Ga. 264; Smalback v. Wolffe,

Nelson, 38 Ore. 43, 63 Pac, 648. 46 N. Y. S. 968; Ainsworth v.

The sub-buyer will acquire title Rhines, 60 N. Y. S. 876.

Right to a Return of Money Paid.-1£ the seller exercises his right to retake possession he need not, except as provided by statute, return any of the buyer's
payments as a condition precedent to the retaking. 52

upon the original buyer's tender 51 — Ante, p. 106.

of payment, Day v. Bassett, 102 52 — Ante, p. 103. See also White

47-Birmingham Ry. Co. v.
Bowers, 110 Ala. 322; Currier v.
Knapp, 117 Mass. 324; Hervey v.
Dimond, 67 N. H. 342, 68 Am. St.
673, 39 Atl. 331; Albright v. Meredith, 58 0. S. 194; Christenson v.
Nelson, 38 Ore. 43, 63 Pac. 648,
even though the tender be made
before performance is due; Cushman v. Jewell, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 525,
idem; Pease v. Teller Corp., 158
Cal. 807.
48-Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H. 26,
66 Am. Dec. 752; Christenson v.
Nelson, 38 Ore. 43, 63 Pac. 648.
The sub-buyer will acquire title
upon the original buyer's tender
of payment, Day v. Bassett, 102
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Mass. 445; Cushman v. Jewell, 7
Hun. (N. Y.) 525.
49-Miller v. Steen, 30 Cal. 402;
Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula, 72
Miss. 608.
But the buyer can not vest title
in himself by tender of payment
after the goods have been destroyed while in the seller's repossession. Hollenberg Music Co.
v. Barron, 100 Ark. 403.
50-Robinson's Appeal, 63 Conn.
290; Finlay v. Ludden & Ba tes Co.,
105 Ga. 264; Smalback v. Wolffe,
46 N. Y. S. 968; Ainsworth v.
Rhines, 60 N. Y. S. 876.
51-A.nte, p. 106.
52-Ante, p. 103. S ee also White
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The buyer's right after such retaking to get back what

he has paid, less reasonable compensation for use, is

another matter and is recognized by some decisions.

A number of courts, notably in jurisdictions which

require "disaffirmance" as a condition precedent to

retaking of possession, lean toward the feeling that "To

permit the so-called 'lessor' (seller) to resume posses-

sion of the property, and declare all payments forfeited,

when perhaps all but one may have been paid, is con-

trary to the fundamental principles observed in courts

of equity. ' '^* The theory is probably the same one often

given as reason for not allowing the seller to enforce

further payment after retaking possession, namely, that

such retaking amounts to a rescission of the contract.^*

3. Title, but not Possession, Acquiked

When title has passed to the buyer, he has, of course,

the concomitant right of immediate possession, unless his

agreement with the seller provides otherwise, or unless
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the rights of the seller, as already set forth, give the

seller a temporary right of possession. The seller has a

lien until payment, unless he has given credit, and conse-

quently the buyer can not enforce dehvery of possession

THE LAW OF SALES

The buyer's right after such retaking to get back what
he has paid, less reasonable compensation for use, is
another matter and is recognized by some decisions.
A number of courts, notably in jurisdictions which
require "disaffirmance" as a condition precedent to
retaking of possession, lean toward the feeling that ''To
permit the so-called 'lessor' (seller) to resume possession of the property, and declare all payments forfeited,
when perhaps all but one may have been paid, is contrary to the fundamental principles observed in courts
of equity. " 53 The theory is probably the same one often
given as reason for not allowing the seller to enforce
further payment after retaking possession, namely, that
such retaking amounts to a rescission of the contract. 64

in such case until he has paid. On the other hand, if the

V. Oakes, 88 Me. 367; Thulby v. N. C. 377; Snook v. Reglan, 89 Ga.

Rainbow, 93 Mich. 164, if buyer 251, buyer may sue for money

3.

TITLE, BUT NOT PossEssroN, ACQUIRED

terminates contract by wrongful had and received, and recover

resale, demand must first be made sum paid less reasonable rent,

by seller, to show a "disaffirm- etc.; Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula

ance" of the contract; Sewing Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608, "the reserva-

Mach. Co. V. Bothame, 70 Mich, tion of the title is but as security

443, but this was a hard case such for the purchase price, and if the

as tend to shipwreck principles, property is recovered by the sell-

Cf. Tufts V. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich, er, he must deal with it as secur-

185; Colcord v. McDonald, 128 ity, and with reference to the

Mass. 470. equitable right of the purchaser."

Contra, Hayes v. Jordan, 85 Ga. 54— Snook v. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251;

741; Kotchum v. Cummings, 53 Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich. 260.

Miss. 596. Contra, Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85

53— Puffer & Sons v. I.ucas, 112 Mich. 185.

When title has passed to the buyer, he has, of course,
the concomitant right of immediate possession, unless his
agreement with the seller provides otherwise, or unless
the rights of the seller, as already set forth, give the
seller a temporary right of possession. The seller has a
lien until payment, unless he has given credit, and consequently the buyer can not enforce delivery of possession
in such case until he has paid. On the other hand, if the
v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367: Thul by v.
Rainbow, 93 Mich. 164, if buyer
terminates contract by wrongful
resale, demand must first be made
by seller, to show a "disaffirmance" of the contract; Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Bothame, 70 Mich.
443, but this was a hard case such
as tend to shipwreck principles.
Cf. Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich.
185; Colcord v. McDonald, 128
Mass. 470.
Oontra, Hayes v. Jordan, 85 Ga.
741 ; K tchnm v. Cummings, 53
Miss. 596.
53- Pnff r & Sons v. Lucas, 112

N. C. 377; Snook v. Reglan, 89 Ga.
251, buyer may sue for money
had and received, and recover
sum paid less reasonable rent,
etc.; Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula
Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608, "the reservation of the title is but as security
for the purchase price, and if the
property is recovered by the seller, he must deal with it as security, and with reference to the
equitable right of the purchaser."
54-Snook v. Raglan, 89 Ga. 251;
Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich. 260.
Contra, Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85
Mich. 185.
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seller has given credit, the buyer is entitled to possession,

regardless of payment, if his credit is still good. As this

right of possession of the buyer is merely the complement

of the seller's right of possession after title has passed,

and as that latter right has already been fully discussed,^^

it is unnecessary to discuss it further in this place.

Titular Action. — If the buyer does have the right of

possession, he is invested with all the remedies such as

179

seller has given credit, the buyer is entitled to possession,
regardless of payment, if his credit is still good. As this
right of posse ion of the buyer is merely the compl ment
of the seller's right of posses ion after title has passed,
and as that latter right has already been fully discussed, 66
it is unnecessary to discuss it further in this place.

replevin or trover, available to any owner who is kept

from his lawful possession.*

This right of the buyer to have possession when he

has acquired title exists, so far as practically enforcible,

even in those cases where the sale has been of an undi-

vided part of a larger mass. We have already seen that

while there can be no title to unspecified property at all,

the parties can pass a particular interest in some specific

larger mass if they desire to do so, and that such a

desire will be presumed in this country in case of sale
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of an unseparated part of a larger mass of fungible

goods. ^® In such cases it is settled that the buyer, whether

or not he be called owner, can maintain a possessory

action of some sort against the seller.^'''

The buyer who has acquired title, but not yet received

possession, may lose his title and right to possession

through the wrongful acts of the seller, in certain cases.

This matter is discussed under the topic of rights of

third persons.^*

Breach of Warranty. — We have seen that statements,

either express or implied, in regard to the goods may

55 — A7ite, p. 115. replevin; Hurff v. Hires, 11 Vroom.

56 — See ante, p. 63. (N. J.) 581, trover; Kimberly v.

57— Piazzek v. White, 23 Kan. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, trover; H^ll

621, replevin; Halsey v. Sim- v. Boston & W. R. R., 14 Allen

monds, 85 Ore. 324, 166 Pac. 944, (Mass.) 439, conversion,

replevin ; Seldomridge v. Bank, 87 58 — Post, p. 212.

Neb. 531, 30 L. R. A. (n. s.) 337,

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 66.

Titular Action.-If the buyer does have the right of
possession, he is invested with all the remedies such as
replevin or trover, available to any owner who is kept
from his lawful possession.*
This right of the buyer to have possession when he
has acquired title exists, so far as practically enforcible,
even in those cases where the sale has been of an undivided part of a larger mass. We have already seen that
while there can be no title to unspecified property at all,
the parties can pass a particular interest in some specific
larger mass if they desire to do so, and that such a
desire will be presumed in this country in case of sale
of an unseparated part of a larger n1ass of fungible
goods. 56 In such cases it is settled that the buyer, whether
or not he be called owner, can maintain a possessory
action of some sort against the seller. 57
The buyer who has acquired title, but not yet received
possession, may lose his title and right to possession
through the wrongful acts of the seller, in certain cases.
This matter is discussed under the topic of rights of
third persons. 68
Breach of Warranty.-W e have seen that statements,
either express or implied, in regard to the goods may
55-Ante, p. 115.
56-See ante, p. 63.

replevin; Hurff v. Hires, 11 Vroom.
(N. J.) 581, trover; Kimberly v.
Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330, trover; H\U
v. Boston & W. R. R., 14 Allen
(Mass.) 439, conversion.
58-Post, p. 212.

57-Piazzek v. White, 23 Kan.
621, replevin; Halsey v. Simmonds, 85 Ore. 324, 166 Pac. 944,
replevin; Seldomridge v. Bank, 87
Neb. 531, 30 L. R. A. (n. s.) 337,
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 66.
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be treated as part of the identifying description of the

goods. In such case goods which do not conform to the

statements are not the goods contracted for by the buyer

and he need not take title to them unless he so chooses.

These statements which serve to identify the goods con-

tracted about are properly called ** conditions. "

What a Warranty Is. — But the seller may make

statements about the goods contracted for which, while

be treated as part of the identifying description of the
goods. In such case goods which do .not conform to the
statements are not the goods contracted for by the buyer
and he need not take title to them unless he so chooses.
These statements which serve to identify the goods contracted about are properly called ''conditions.''

they serve to characterize the goods, are not in fact re-

lated to the identity of the goods. For instance, the con-

tract of sale may refer to some specific article whose

identity is so fixed, not by description only, but by actual

demonstration, that there can be no doubt as to just what

tangible thing is concerned in the contract. But at the

same time the seller may make a positive statement as

to the character, or quality, or nature generally of the

article. Such a statement, while in a sense descriptive

of the article, does not in the least serve to identify
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the subject matter of the contract. In a sense there is

a conflict of description — the oral description of char-

acteristics of the article does not accord with the visual

description by demonstration. But obviously, since it

is a tangible, visible thing that is contracted about,

rather than a mere conceptual thing, the demonstration

should dominate the inconsistent oral statements, so

far as concerns the identity of the thing to which the

parties probably intended to transfer title.

These parts of descriptions which do not affect the

real identity of the thing contracted about are called

* Svarranties ".^® The name warranty is not limited to

them, however. We have seen that if a buyer chooses to

59 — "A warranty is an express Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, 104

or implied statement of something Wash. 171, 140 Pac. 381.

which a party understands shall "When the subject matter of a

be a part of a contract, and, sale is not in existence, or not ae-

though part of the contract, col- certained at the time of the con-

lateral to the express object of it." tract, an undertaking that it

--What a Warranty Is.-But the seller may make
statements about the goods contracted for which, while
they serve to characterize the goods, are not in fact related to the identity of the goods. For instance, the contract of sale may r efer to some specific article whose
identity is so fixed, not by description only, but by actual
demonstration, that there can be no doubt as to just what
tangible thing is concerned in the contract. But at the
same time the seller may make a positive statement as
to the character, or quality, or nature generally of the
article. Such a statement, while in a sense descriptive
of the article, does not in the least serve to identify
the subject matter of the contract. In a sense there is
a conflict of description-the oral description of characteristics of the article does not accord with the visual
description by demonstration. But obviously, since it
is a tangible, visible thing that is contracted about,
r ather than a mere conceptual thing, the demonstration
should dominate the inconsistent oral statements, so
far as concerns the identity of the thing to which the
parties probably intended to transfer title.
These parts of descriptions which do not affect the
r eal identity of the thing contracted about are called
"war ranties ". 59 The name warranty is not limited to
them, however. We have seen that if a buyer chooses to
59-"A warranty is an express
or implied statement of something
which a party understands shall
be a part of a cont ract, and,
though part of the contract, collat eral to the express object of it."
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Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, 104
Wash. 171, 140 Pac. 381.
"When the subject matter of a
sale is not in existence, or not ascertain ed a t the time of the contract, an undertaking that it
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accept title to goods tendered, despite their non-conform-

ity to the identifying description, or other conditions, he

does not, in some states, waive all his rights growing out

of the breach. He may still sue to recover damages

resulting from the breach. These terms of the des<?rip-

tion, which could have been taken advantage of as con-

ditions precedent, but which have been waived as such

and exist only as a basis for recovery of damages are

usually also called "warranties".®" Sometimes they are

called warranties before they have been waived as cause

for refusing title. The name, therefore, while it may

be a convenience in expression, indicates nothing as to

the rights of the buyer, unless its particular meaning is

expressly indicated. "VVe shall use "warranty," here-

after, unless otherwise indicated, in its narrower sense

of a descriptive statement concerning the goods, which

could not be used, or has not been used, as part of the
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identifying description.^^*

shall, when existing or ascer-

tained, possess certain qualities,

is not a mere warranty, but a con-

dition * * * because the exist-

ence of those qualities being part

of the description of the thing

Bold becomes essential to its

identity". Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S.

363; United Iron Works Co. v.

Henryetta Coal Co., 62 Okla. 99,

162 Pac. 209.

accept title to goods tendered, despite their non-conformity to the identifying description, or other conditions, he
does not, in some states, waive all his rights growing out
of the breach. He may still sue to recover damages
resulting from the breach. These terms of the des~rip
tion, which could have been taken advantage of as conditions precedent, but which have been waived as such
and exist only as a basis for recovery of damages are
usually also called "warranties". 60 Sometimes they are
called warranties before they have been waived as cause
for refusing title. The name, therefore, while it may
be a convenience in expression, indicates nothing as to
the rights of the buyer, unless its particular meaning is
expressly indicated. We shall use "warranty," hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, in its narrower sense
of a descriptive statement concerning the goods, which
could not be used, or has not been used, as part of the
identifying description. 6 u'

60 — Jones v. Witousek Co., 114

la. 14; North Alaska Salmon Co.

V. Hobbs, 159 Cal. 380.

61 — The term is also used, not

infrequently, in reference to the

contract, the promise, which is im-

plied by law, as is hereafter dis-

cussed, from these statements.

This is apt to cause especial diffi-

culty because of the expressions

"Implied warranty" and "Express

warranty". The duplex usage of

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section

"warranty" leaves it uncertain in

such expressions whether an "ex-

press warranty" means an express

promise or only an express state-

ment from which the necessary

promise will be implied. Con-

versely, "implied warranty" may

mean an implied statement from

which a promise will be implied in

law, or it may mean a promise

which is implied from an express

statement. The expressions are

more commonly used in reference

to the statement, than to the

promise, and will be here so used,

unless otherwise indicated.

The term "warranty" is used of

representations of fact or prom-

ises wholly unconnected with any

shall, when existing or ascertained, possess certain qualities,
is not a mere warranty, but a condition * * * because the existence of those qualities being part
of the description of the thing
sold becomes essential to its
identity". Pope v. Allis, 115 U.S.
363; United Iron Works Co. v.
Henryetta Coal Co., 62 Okla. 99,
162 Pac. 209.
60-Jones v. Witousek Co., 114
Ia. 14; North Alaska Salmon Co.
v. Hobbs, 159 Cal. 380.
61-The term is also used, not
in!requently, in reference to the
contract, the promise, which is implied by law, as is hereafter discussed, from these statements.
This is a pt to cause especial difficulty because of the expressions
"Implied warranty" and "Express
warranty". The duplex usage of
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section

"warranty" leaves it uncertain in
such expressions whether an "express warranty" means an express
promise or only an express statement from which the necessary
promise will be implied. Conversely, "implied warranty" may
mean an implied statement from
which a promise will be implied in
law, or it may mean a promise
which is implied from an express
statement. The expressions are
more commonly used in reference
to the statement, than to the
promise, and will be here so used,
unless otherwise indicated.
The term "warranty" is used of
representations of fact or promises wholly unconnected with any
sale in Cameron v. Mount, 68 Wis.
477; Kuehn v. Wilson, 13 Wis.
104, "warranty" that a horse would
be cured by certain treatment.
12.

sale in Cameron v. Mount, 68 Wis.

477; Kuehn v. Wilson, 13 Wis.
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be cured by certain treatment.
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Eif ect of Breach of Warranty. — Return of Goods. —

Restricting the term ** warranty" to statements con-

cerning quality, etc., of goods objectively identified in

other ways, there is rather hopeless conflict as to whether

property purchased can be returned for breach of war-

ranty.

Many jurisdictions do allow the buyer to return the

goods and recover the purchase price if already paid. In

the often cited case of Smith v. Hale^^ the facts were that

Smith had sold a certain old buggy to Hale. At the time,

some question about the strength of its springs having

arisen, Smith ''warranted" that they would bear up

under a certain weight. Some months later a spring

broke under a less weight. Hale thereafter tendered

the buggy back to Smith and, on Smith's refusal to

accept it, entered Smith's premises and took away the

cow which he had given in exchange for the buggy. The

court held that Hale was justified in taking the cow as
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he had a right to rescind the contract because of the

broken spring.

The theory on which such rescission is allowed is abso-

lutely indeterminate. Where parties have dealt about

an article definitely identified by ocular demonstration,

there would seem no possible doubt as to the specific

object which the one has contracted to sell and the other

to buy. Our whole theory of chattel property is, orig-

inally, objective. There is suggestion, however, in some

cases that the subjective nature as well as the objective

may have a part in identifying the object matter of the

contract. In one case, for instance,^' the plaintiff had

agreed to buy and the defendant to sell a certain specific

cow named ''Rose 2nd of Aberlone." Both parties sup-

posed at the time that she was barren. Later it developed

that she was fertile. The plaintiff was denied a recovery

on various theories. One of them was that, the cow

62—158 Mass. 178. 6;j— Sherwood v. Walker, 66

Mich. 568.

THE LAW OF SALES

--Effect of Breach of Warranty.-Return of Goods.Restricting the term "warranty" to statements concerning quality, etc., of goods objectively identified in
other ways, there is rather hopeless conflict as to whether
property purchased can be returned for breach of warranty.
~{any jurisdictions do allow the buyer to return the
goods and recover the purchase price if already paid. In
the often cited case of Smith v. Hale 62 the facts were that
Smith had sold a certain old buggy to Hale. At the time,
some question about the strength of its springs having
arisen, Smith "warranted" that they would bear up
under a certain weight. Some months later a spring
broke under a less weight. Hale thereafter tendered
the buggy back to Smith and, on Smith's refusal to
accept it, entered Smith's premises and took away the
cow which he had given in exchange for the buggy. The
court held that Hale was justified in taking the cow as
he had a right to rescind the contract because of the
broken spring.
The theory on which such rescission is allowed is absolutely indeterminate. Where parties have dealt about
an article definitely identified by ocular demonstration,
there would seem no possible doubt as to the specific
object which the one has contracted to sell and the other
to buy. Our whole theory of chattel property is, originally, objective. There is suggestion, however, in some
cases that the subjective nature as well as the objective
may have a part in identifying the object matter of the
contract. In one case, for instance,63 the plaintiff had
agreed to buy and the defendant to sell a certain specific
cow named "Rose 2nd of Aberlone." Both partjes supposed at the time that she was barren. Later it developed
that he was fertile. The plaintiff was denied a recovery
on various theories. One of them was that, the cow
62-158 Mass. 178.
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being not barren, but fertile, she was not in fact the

animal the defendant intended to sell.^* On this theory,

that every material statement as to the nature of the

chattel sold is part of the identifying description, there is

no such thing as a warranty. Every ''warranty"

becomes a condition.®^

Another theory is that although the parties have con-

tracted concerning the specific property delivered and

received, they have been mutually mistaken regarding

its nature. Because of this mutual mistake a rescission

will be allowed.^^

As a matter of fact the cases are probably sui generis.

The whole modern idea of warranty is that a promise to

indemnify is judicially "implied", or simply imposed, as

the result of an express or implied statement about the

goods. If the courts can imply a promise to indemnify the

buyer, there is no reason why they can not imply a

promise, or, what is the same thing in effect, impose a
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liability to take back the goods. At any rate, many courts

allow the buyer to return the goods and recover his

money.^'^*

64 — Accord, Harvey v. Harris, kept the note. The court held this

112 Mass. 32; Gardner v. Lane, 12 lieeping to be a taking on the

Allen (Mass.) 39; Chapman v. theory that the owner had never

Cole, 12 Gray (Mass.) 141. given the £10 note to the defend-

65 — This idea, that the concept ant and the legal possession of it

in the minds of the parties is the had continued always in the orig-

real subject matter cf their con- inal owner. Wolfstein v. People,

tract and their objective indica- 6 Hun (N. Y.) 121.

tion of some tangible chattel is On the other hand these cases

only an incorrect attempt at de- are out of harmony with those lu

scribing it, is supported by some which a seller is held to have

of the cases in criminal law. Lar- dealt with the physical personality

ceny requires a wrongful taking before him regardless of the con-

of property. In Regina v. Hehir, cept of personality which may

[1895] 2 Ir. R. 709, the owner had have been in his mind. See post,

deliberately given a certain tangi- p. 227.

ble piece of paper to the defend- 66 — Newell v. Smith, 53 Conn,

ant. Both parties thought this 72; Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich,

tangible thing was a £1 note. In 568.

fact it was a £10 note. On discov- 67 — Western Commercial Co. v.

ering the mistake the defendant Western Wholesale Drug Co., 29

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 69, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).

being not barren, but fertile, she "as not in fact the
animal the defendant intended to sell. 64 On this theory,
that every material statement as to the nature of the
chattel sold is part of the identifying description, there is
no such thing as a warranty. Every "warraaty"
becomes a condition. 66
Another theory is that although the parties have contracted concerning the specific property delivered and
received, they have been mutually mistaken regarding
its nature. Because of this mutual mistake a rescission
will be allowed. 66
As a matter of fact the cases are probably sui generis.
The whole modern idea of warranty is that a promise to
indemnify is judicially "implied", or simply imposed, as
the result of an express or implied statement about the
goods. If the courts can imply a promise to inde1nnify the
buyer, there is no reason why they can not imply a
promise, or, what is the same thing in effect, impose a
liability to take back the goods. At any rate, many courts
allow the buyer to return the goods and recover his
money. 67 "'
64-Accord, Harvey v. Harris,
112 Mass. 32; Gardner v. Lane, 12
Allen (Mass.) 39; Chapman v.
Cole, 12 Gray (Mass.) 141.
65-This idea, that the concept
in the minds of the parties is the
real subject matter of their contract and their obje ctive indication of some tangible chattel is
only an incorrect attempt at describing it, is supported by some
of the cases in criminal law. Larceny requires a wrongful taking
of property. In Regina v. Hehir,
[1895] 2 Ir. R. 709, the owner had
deliberately given a certain tangible piece of paper to the defendant. Both parties thought this
tangible thing was a £ 1 note. In
fact it was a £ 10 note. On discovering the mistake the defendant
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section
D.~IL.1"'-"'-
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kept the note. The court held this
keeping to be a taking on the
theory that the owner had never
given the £ 10 note to the defendant and the legal possession of it
had continued always in the original owner. Wolfstein v. People,
6 Hun (N. Y.) 121.
On the other hand these cases
are out of harmony with those ir.:.
which a seller is held to have
dealt with the physical personality
before him regardless of the concept of personality which may
have been in his mind. See post,
p. 227.
66-Newell v. Smith, 53 Conn.
72; Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich.
568.
67-Western Commercial Co. v.
Western Wholesale Drug Co., 29
69, (1), (2), (3), (4), (5).
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On the other hand, many courts proceed on the theory

that the parties have contracted concerning a specific

chattel. If the seller has delivered that chattel he has

performed his contract to sell, and his contract of war-

ranty is not an agreement to take back the chattel, but

only to pay damages resulting from the false statement.^*

Effect of Breach of Warranty. — Suit for Damages.

— ^Whether the buyer can return the goods after breach of

On the other hand, many courts proceed on the theory
that the parties have contracted concerning a specific
chattel. If the seller has delivered that chattel he has
performed his contract to sell, and his contract of warranty is not an agreement to take back the chattel, but
only to pay damages resulting from the false statement.68

warranty, or not, if he does not do so he has a right of

action against the seller for damages resulting from the

incorrect statement.^®

Cal. Ap. Dec. 25, rescission of the

contract was allowed even after a

resale by the buyer; Autofedan

Hay-Press Co. v. Ward, 89 Kan.

218; North Alaska Salmon Co. v.

Hobbs, 159 Cal. 380, dictum;
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Feeney & B. Co. v. Stone, 89 Ore.

-Effect of Breach of Warranty.-Suit for Damages.
-Whether the buyer can return the goods after breach of
warranty, or not, if he does not do so he has a right of
action against the seller for damages resulting from the
incorrect statement.69

360, 171 Pac. 569, dictum; Fulton

Bank v. Mathers, 183 la. 226, 166

N. W. 1050; Hoyer v. Good. —

la. — , 161 N. W. 691, sale of a

specific horse, warranted "sound";

Jones V. Witousek Co., 114 la. 14;

International Harvester Co. v.

Brown, 182 Ky. 435, 206 S. W. 622,

dictum; of. Lightbum v. Cooper,

1 Dana (Ky.) 273; Bryant v. Is-

burg, 13 Gray (Mass.) 607, prob-

ably the leading case; Frih & Co.

V. HoUan, 133 Ala. 583, dictum;

Campbell v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414,

dictum; MUliken v, Skillings, 89

Me. 180.

Even in these states the right to

rescind may be lost by long de-

lay, Autofedan Hay Press Co. v.

Ward, supra; International Har-

vester Co. V. Brown, supra; Cf.

Lightburn v. Cooper, 1 Dana (Ky.)

273 ; Storage Battery Co. v. Water-

loo Ry. Co., 138 la. 369, semhle;

Sturgis v. Whistler, 145 Mo. Ap.

148.

Of course, an express provision

in the contract, providing for re-

scission in case of breach of war-

ranty will be given effect. Dick

V. Clark Jr. Elec. Co., 161 Ky. 622.

Also, such misrepresentation as

amounts to actual fraud will jus-

tify a rescission on that ground,

Taylor v. First National Bank, 25

Wy. 204, 167 Pac. 707.

68— H. W. Williams Transporta-

tion Co. V. Darius Cole Co., 129

Mich. 209; Worchester Mfg. Co. v.

Waterbury i*ress Co., 73 Conn.

554; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat.

184; Wright v. Davenport, 44 Tex.

164; Street v. Blay, 2 B. & A. 456.

In the case of a conditional sale,

Cal. Ap. Dec. 25, rescission of the
contract was allowed even after a
resale by the buyer; Autofedan
Hay-Press Co. v. Ward, 89 Kan.
218; North Alaska Salmon Co. v.
Hobbs, 159 Cal. 380, dictum;
Feeney & B. Co. v. Stone, 89 Ore.
360, 171 Pac. 569, dictum,· Fulton
Bank v. Mathers, 183 Ia. 226, 166
N. W. 1050; Hoyer v. Good. Ia. - , 161 N. W. 691, sale of a
specific horse, warranted "sound";
Jones v. Witousek Co., 114 Ia. 14;
International Harvester Co. v.
Brown, 182 Ky. 435, 206 S. W. 622,
dictum; cf. Lightburn v. Cooper,
1 Dana (Ky.) 273; Bryant v. Isburg, 13 Gray (Mass.) 607, probably the leading case; Frih & Co.
v. Hollan, 133 Ala. 583, dictum;
Campbell v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414,
dictum; Milliken v. Sk1llings, 89
Me. 180.
Even in these states the right to
rescind may be lost by long delay, Autofedan Hay Press Co. v.
Ward, supra; International Harvester Co. v. Brown, supra; Cf.
Li ghtburn v. Cooper, 1 Dana (Ky.)
273; Storage Battery Co. v. Waterloo Ry. Co., 138 Ia. 369, semble;
Sturgis v. Whistler, 145 Mo. Ap.
148.

if the chattel actually offered for

D1

1

ize. by

the buyer's possession is not the

chattel which the seller's contract

bound him to present, the buyer

can refuse to receive it and can

sue for breach of the seller's
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Of course, an express provision
in the contract, providing for rescission in case of breach of warranty will be given effect. Dick
v. Clark Jr. Elec. Co., 161 Ky. 622.
Also, such misrepresentation as
amounts to actual fraud will justify a rescission on that ground,
Taylor v. First National Bank, 25
Wy. 204, 167 Pac. 707.
68-H. W. Williams Transportation Co. v. Darius Cole Co., 129
Mich. 209; Worchester Mfg. Co. v.
Waterbury Press Co., 73 Conn.
554; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat.
184; Wright v. Davenport, 44 Tex.
164; Street v. Blay, 2 B. & A. 456.
In the case of a conditional sale,
if the chattel actually offered for
the buyer's possession is not the
chattel which the seller's contract
bound him to present, the buyer
can refuse to receive it and can
sue for breach of the seller's
promise. But if the chattel delivered to the buyer is in fact the
one the seller contracted to deliver, although its characteristics
are not what the buyer thought
they would be, or if the buyer
has consented to receive possession of some other chattel than
the one specifically called for by
":::!"
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The theory on which this liabiUty for false warranty

is based is threefold.

The hability was originally considered as arising in

tort, and courts gave compensation for the damage caused

by the seller's deceit.'''^ And this theory and form of

action are not obsolete.''^

But, even in this form, it now differs from the ordi-

nary action in tort for deceit or fraud, to the extent that

the contract, in such case he can

not hold the seller for damage re-

sulting from such difference until

he has acquired the title. Thus

185

The theory on which this liability for false warranty
is based is threefold.
The liability was originally considered as arising in
tort, and courts gave compen sation for the damage caused
by the seller's deceit. 71 And this theory and form of
action are not obsolete. 72
But, even in this form, it now differs from the ordinary action in tort for deceit or fraud, to the extent that

in an action by the seller to re-

cover possession of the chattel on

the ground that the buyer has

failed to pay as agreed the buyer

can not defeat the action by a
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showing that his damages from

non-conformity of the chattel to

the warranty are in excess of the

amount of the unpaid purchase

price. The rule is that "a war-

ranty is an incident only of con-

summated or completed sales and

has no place as a contract, hav-

ing present vitality and force, in

an executory contract of sale."

Osborn v. Gantz, 60 N. Y.

540; EJnglish v. Hanford, 27 N.

Y. S. 672, but an action for fraud

or deceit may be maintained. Car-

penter V. Chapman, 139 N. Y. S.

849, but damages for breach of

warranty were allowed to be set-

off against a claim for the pur-

chase price; People v. Munson,

144 N, Y. S. 1077, semble; Stearns

V. Drake, 24 R. I. 272; Blair v. A.

Johnson & Sons, 111 Tenn. Ill, at

least not by way of set-off or re-

coupment in a seller's action of

replevin.

69 — Breach of warranty not

waived by acceptance with knowl-

edge thereof, Grisinger v. Hub-

bard, 21 Idaho 469; Gold Ridge

Mining Co. v. Tallmadge, 44 Ore.

34; Frith & Co. v. Hollan, 133 Ala.

583; Wallack v. Clark & Son, —

Okla. — , 174 Pac. 557, citing much

authority; Alaska Salmon Co. v.

Hobbs, 159 Cal. 380; Rice v.

Friend Bros. Co., 179 la. 355, 161

N. W. 310, not lost because of

attempted, but unsuccessful, re-

scission, nor because contract

contained a provision permitting

return of the goods; Boston

Woven Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178

Mass. 232, not lost even though the

defect was obvious on inspection;

the contract, in such case he can
not hold the seller for damage resulting from such difference until
he has acquired the title. Thus
in an action by the seller to recover possession of the chattel on
the ground that the buyer has
failed to pay as agreed the buyer
can not defeat the action by a
showing that his damages from
non-conformity of the chattel to
the warranty are in excess of the
amount of the unpaid purchase
price. The rule is that "a warranty is an incident only of consummated or completed sales and
has no place as a contract, having present vitality and force, in
an executory contract of sale."
Osborn v. Gantz, 60 N . Y.
540; English v. Hanford, 27 N.
Y. S. 672, but an action for fraud
or deceit may be maintained. Carpenter v. Chapman, 139 N. Y. S.
849, but damages for breach of
warranty were allowed to be setoff against a claim for the purchase price; People v. Munson,
144 N. Y. S. 1077, semble; Stearns
v. Drake, 24 R. I. 272; Blair v. A.
Johnson & Sons, 111 Tenn. 111, at
least not by way of set-off or recoupment in a seller's action of
replevin.
69-Breach of warranty not
waived by acceptance with knowledge thereof, Grisinger v. Hub-

bard, 21 Idaho 469; Gold Ridge
Mining Co. v. Tallmadge, 44 Ore.
34; Frith & Co. v. Hollan, 133 Ala.
583; Wallack v. Clark & Son, Okla.-, 174 Pac. 557, citing much
authority; Alaska Salmon Co. v.
Hobbs, 159 Cal. 380; Rice v.
Friend Bros. Co., 179 Ia. 355, 161
N. W. 310, not lost because of
attempted, but unsuccessful, rescission, nor because contract
contained a provision permitting
return of the goods; Boston
Woven Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178
Ma ss. 232, not lost even though the
defect was obvious on inspection;
Regina Co. v. Gately Co., 157 N. Y.
S. 746, "At common law an express
war ranty survives acceptance, but
an implied warranty (condition?)
does not."
71-Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 H arvard Law Rev. 8. That
form of a ction is used in Freeman
v. Baker, 5 Car. & P . 475 , and
Pickering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 779,
and the liability discussed on the
theory of deceit.
72-West v. Emery, 17 Vt. 583;
Johnson v. McDaniel, 15 Ark. 109;
Ives v. Carter, 24 Conn. 392; Carter v. Glass, 44 Mich. 154 ; Do bell
v. Stevens, 5 D. & Ry. 490; Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519;
Brown v. Edgington, 2 M. & G.
279.

Regina Co. v. Gately Co., 157 N. Y.

S. 746, "At common law an express
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warranty survives acceptance, but

an implied warranty (condition?)

does not."

71 — Ames, History of Assump-

sit, 2 Harvard Law Rev. 8. That
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in suing for deceit on a warranty it is not necessary to

aver that the defendant knew the warranty to be falseJ*

The seller's liability is also based on the theory of

contract, the idea being that in making the statement

the seller impliedly promises, on the same consideration

that supports the promise to pass title, that if the state-

ment be not true he will stand responsible in damages.''*

This theory, that the seller's liability is one assumed

by him as a part of the contract, logically implies an

intention on his part so to do; a conscious assumption

of hability, even though such intention may necessarily

have to be determined objectively. In the earlier cases

it was held to be essential that this intent to assume the

liability be truly evident from the circumstances. Some

of them even indicate that some express indication of

intention, such as the actual use of the word ''warrant"

in the contract, was necessary .''^^ And there is still strong

suggestion in some cases that, even though express
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intent need not appear, a real or at least a probable

intent to assume the liability must be shown by the facts

of the transaction.''^

The third theory gives mouth-honor to the idea of con-

tract, but really simply imposes a liability on the seller

73 — Williamson v. Allison, 2 was in contract and not in tort.

East 446, cited in Carter v. Glass, Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234,

44 Mich. 154. holding "consideration" for the

74 — Baldwin v. Daniel, 69 Ga. warranty to be essential.

782; Congar v. Chamberlain, 14 75 — Chandler v. Lopus, Cro.

Wis. 258. The American editor Jac. 4, as discussed by Mr. Ames

of Benjamin on Sales, 7th ed., p. in 2 Harvard Law Rev. 9; DeSew-

663, says, with the citation of con- hanberg v. Buchanan, 5 Car. &

siderable authority, "A warranty, P. 343.

therefore, being a contract, re- 76 — Borrekin v. Bevan, 3 Rawle

quires, like all other contracts a (Pa.) 23, 23 Am. Dec. 85; Weth-

consideration to support it." Wels- erill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. 448, 59 Am.

hausen v. Parker Co., 83 Conn. Dec. 741; Coats v. Hord, 29 Cal.

231, "without a contract there can Ap., 115, 154 Pac. 491; Henson v.

be no warranty." In Jackson v. King, 3 Jones (N. C.) 419; Har-
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in suing for deceit on a warranty it is not necessary to
aver that the defendant knew the warranty to be false. 18
The seller's liability is also based on the theory of
contract, the idea being that in making the statement
the seller impliedly promises, on the same consideration
that supports the promise to pass title, that if the statement be not true he will stand responsible in damages.74
This theory, that the seller's liability is one assumed
by him as a part of the contract, logically implies an
intention on his part so to do; a conscious assumption
of liability, even though such intention may necessarily
have to be determined objectively. In the earlier cases
it was held to be essential that this intent to assume the
liability be truly evident from the circumstances. Some
of them even indicate that some express indication of
intention, such as the actual use of the word ''warrant''
in the contract, was necessary. 15 And there is still strong
suggestion in some cases that, even though express
intent need not appear, a real or at least a probable
intent to assume the liability must be shown by the facts
of the transaction. 76
The third theory gives mouth-honor to the idea of contract, but really simply imposes a liability on the seller

Watson & Sons [1909] 2 K. B. gous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 73; Lichten-

193, the decision turned on the stein v. Rabolinski, 90 N. Y. S.

specific holding that the action 247, aff. 184 N. Y. 520.

73-Williamson v. Allison, 2
East 446, cited in Carter v. Glass,
44 Mich. 154.
74-Baldwin v. Daniel, 69 Ga.
782; Congar v. Chamberlain, 14
Wis. 258. The American editor
of Benjamin on Sales, 7th ed., p.
66 3, says, with the citation of considerable authorit y, "A warranty,
therefore, being a contract, requires, like a ll oth er con tracts a
consideration to support it." W elshausen v. Parker Co. , 83 Conn.
231, "without a contract ther e can
be no warranty." In Jackson v.
Watson & Sons [1 909] 2 K . B.
193, the deci sion tnrned on the
specific holding that t he ac tion
'i
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was in contract and not in tort.
Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234,
holding "consideration" for the
warranty to be essential.
75-Chandler v. Lopus, Cro.
Jae. 4, as discussed by Mr. Ames
in 2 Harvard Law Rev. 9; DeSewhanberg v. Buchanan, 5 Car. &
P. 343.
76-Borrekin v. Bevan, 3 Rawle
(Pa.) 23, 23 Am. Dec. 85 ; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Pa. 448, 59 Am.
Dec. 741 ; Coats v. Hord, 29 Cal.
Ap., 115, 154 Pac. 491; Henson v.
King, 3 Jone s (N. C.) 419; Hargous v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 73; Lichtenstein v. Rabolinski, 90 N. Y. S.
247, aff. 184 N. Y. 520.
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as a matter of public policy. This liability has no rela-

tion whatever to any real intent of the seller. It is a

liability which follows, as a matter of law, from his act

of selling goods under certain circumstances. Theoreti-

cally there is a basic legal distinction between a liability

arising from the intentional and conscious assumption

of liability, even though such intent be objectively deter-

mined, and a liability which follows arbitrarily from

certain acts of the seller, regardless of his probable

intent. Theoretically they ought to be kept distinct

in discussion. But actually the courts do not make the

distinction. They use the phrase "liability on a war-

ranty" to cover both reasons for the liability, and ordi-

narily disregard all reference to actual intent while at

the same time talking of ''implied warranties" as though

a promise were really implied by the facts. In other

words, "implied" ma?/ now mean implied by the facts, but

usually means "imposed by law." The discussion there-
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fore must follow this lead. The question of warranty or

no warranty has long ceased to be, "Did the seller intend

to warrant?" and has become, "Does the law impose a

liability in this type of case?"'''''

What Are Warranties? — We may say generally,

then, that a "warranty" is a statement by the seller in

regard to the goods for which the courts will require him

to make good in damages if it be not true.

Not all express statements concerning the goods are

warranties — that is to say they do not create a legal

liability. As we have already seen from the origin of

the buyer 's right, they must be acted upon by the buyer,

either by giving consideration for them or by otherwise

relying upon them to his detriment. Furthermore, mere

77— Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres Greer v. Whalen, 125 Md. 273, use

& Co., 149 N. Y. 137; Cook v. Dar- of word "warrant" unnecessary;

ling, 160 Mich. 475; McClure v. and see authorities cited in the

Central Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, foHowing notes.

53 L. R. A. 153, 58 N. E. 777;

as a matter of public policy. This liability has no relation whatever to any real intent of the aeller. It is a
liability which follows, as a matter of law, from his act
of selling goods under certain circumstances. Theoretically there is a basic legal distinction between a liability
arising from the intentional and conscious assumption
of liability, even though such intent be objectively determined, and a liability which follows arbitrarily from
certain acts of the seller, regardless of his probable
intent. Theoretically they ought to be kept distinct
in discussion. But actually the courts do not make the
distinction. They use the phrase ''liability on a warranty" to cover both reasons for the liability, and ordinarily disregard all reference to actual intent while at
the same time talking of "implied warranties" as though
a promise were really implied by the facts. In other
words, ''implied'' may now mean implied by the facts, but
usually means ''imposed by law.'' The discussion therefore must follow this lead. The question of warranty or
no warranty has long ceased to be, "Did the seller intend
to warrant~" and has become, "Does the law impose a
liability in this type of case 1" 77
-What Are Warranties ~-We may say generally,
then, that a "warranty" is a statement by the seller in
regard to the goods for which the courts will require him
to make good in damages if it be not true.
Not all express statements concerning the goods are
warranties-that is to say they do not create a legal
liability. As we have already seen from the origin of
the buyer's right, they must be acted upon by the buyer,
either by giving consideration for them or by otherwise
relying upon them to his detriment. Furthermore, mere
77-Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres
& Co., 149 N. Y. 137; Cook v. Darling, 160 Mich. 475; McClure v.
Central Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108,
63 L. R. A. 153, 58 N. E. 777;

Greer v. Whalen, 125 Md. 273, use
of word "warrant" unnecessary;
and see authorities cited in the
following notes.
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statements of opinion, even though relied on by the

buyer, do not create any hability on the part of the

seller.'^**

Similarly, a statement which is obviously untrue and

therefore could not have mislead the buyer does not

create a liability on the seller for its untruth. On the

theory that a warranty is a false statement of fact which

gives rise to an action in tort for deceit, it is evident

that the buyer would have no action, because he was not

deceived. On the theory that a warranty is a statement

from which the courts vdll infer a promise to answer for

its inaccuracy, or because of which the courts will impose

liability as a matter of public policy, it is equally evident

that no promise could be reasonably implied and no lia-

bility reasonably imposed.* Of course, if there were not

only an express statement, but also an express promise to

make it good, the courts would probably enforce the con-

tract even though the buyer did know it to be untrue.
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The damages, however, would probably be nominal only.

Statements which the courts will treat as warranties

may cover any characteristic of the goods whatever. The

seller need not make any representations about the goods,

but if he does make representations, of any nature what-

soever, the courts may imply, or impose, therefrom a

promise to make good its truth. Whether or not a seller

did make the alleged representations is purely a question

of fact, to be determined as such. If it is settled that he

did make a certain representation, just what he meant by

his words is a question of law.''^^ That is to say, it is a

78— See authorities cited under 174 N. C. 442, 93 S. E. 94G.

opinion as a "condition," ante, p. 79 — Murchie v. Cornell, 155

172 Picard v. McCormick, 11 Mich. Mass. 60, use of term "ice" held

68, statement as to value may be to mean clear ice; Sheffield

a warrantj'. Seixas v. Woods, 2 Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill Co.,

Caines 48, 2 Am. Dec. 215. 52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 2-33, 35 L,.

Whether or not an express state- R. A. (n. s.) 258, "Star A Star"

ment is a mere opinion is a ques- shingles held to mean a certain

tion for the jury; Kime v. Riddle, (luality.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 12.

statements of opinion, even though relied on by the
buyer, do not create any liability on the part of the
seller. 70
Similarly, a statement which is obviously untrue and
therefore could not have mislead the buyer does not
create a liability on the seller for its untruth. On the
theory that a warranty is a false statement of fact which
gives rise to an action in tort for deceit, it is evident
that the buyer would have no action, because he was not
deceived. On the theory that a warranty is a statement
from which the courts 'vill infer a promise to answer for
its inaccuracy, or because of which the courts will impose
liability as a matter of public policy, it is equally evident
that no promise could be reasonably implied and no liability reasonably imposed.* Of course, if there were not
only an express statement, but also an express promise to
make it good, the courts would probably enforce the contract even though the buyer did know it to be untrue.
The damages, however, would probably be nominal only.
Statements which the courts will treat as warranties
may cover any characteristic of the goods whatever. The
seller need not make any representations about the goods,
but if he does make representations, of any nature ''Thatsoever, the courts may imply, or impose, therefrom a
promise to make good its truth. Whether or not a seller
did make the alleged representations is purely a question
of fact, to be determined as such. If it is settled that he
did make a certain representation, just what he meant by
his words is a question of law. 79 That is to say, it is a
78-See authorities cited under
174 N. C. 442, 93 S. E. 946.
opinion as a "condition," ante, p.
79-Murchie v. Cornell, 155
172 i artl v. McCormick, 11 Mich.
Mass. 60, use of term "ice" held
68, statement as to value 1nay be to m ean clear ice; Sheffield
a warranty. Seixas v. Woods, 2 Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill Co.,
aines 48, 2 Am. Dec. 215.
52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233, 35 L.
Whether or not an express state· R. A. (n. s.) 258, "Star A Star"
ment is a mere opinion is a ques- shingles held to mean a certain
tion for the jury; Kime v. Riddle, quality.
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 12.
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question which the court \\t.11 determine. But there is no

rule, and can be none, for making the decision. Each case

must be decided according to its own facts. And whether

the statement is such that the courts will impose a liabil-

ity to make it good is also a matter for the court itself.

Implied Warranties. — It is not necessary that the

seller make an express statement in order to be liable for

the truth of a representation. Certain liability-creating

question which the court will determine. But there is no
rule, and can be none, for making the decision. Each case
must be decided according to it O\Yn fact . And whether
the statement is such that the courts will impose a liability to inake it good is also a matter for the court it.self.

representations may be implied by the circumstances of

the transaction. Or, to put the rule in words more nearly

in accord with the decisions, the law will sometimes

impose a liability because of the circumstances of the

transaction, regardless of any actual representation,

express or tacit, on the part of the seller.

Thus the issue often is, does the law *' imply a war-

ranty" — or impose a liability — in the particular case.

There is no rule deducible from the cases by which

this question can always be answered. Each case stands
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upon its own facts — which means that the answer rests

in the particular judge's own conclusions.®*' But there

have developed certain broad rules, both positive and

negative, as to when a liability will be imposed without

an express representation by the seller.*

For example, one who sells under such circumstances

that the buyer reasonably supposes him to be o^\^ier,

will be held to have warranted title in himself. If title

was not in him at the time of the sale he will be held

liable to the buyer in damages, even though he made no

statements whatever concerning the title.®^ But, of

course, if there is something about the transaction which

80 — Whether there is such lia- Va. 702; Costigan v. Hawkins, 22

bility is a matter of law, for the Wis. 74; Sherman v. The Cham-

court to decide, Heilbut v. Buckle- plain Trans. Co., 31 Vt. 162; Boyd

ton, 1913 A. C. 30. v, Whitfield, 19 Ark. 447; Linton

81— Gaylor v. Copes, 16 Fed. v. Porter, 31 111. 107; Word v.

49; Byrnside v. Burdett, 15 W. Cavin, 38 Tenn. 506.

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 13, (1), (2), (3), (4), 14, 15, (1),

(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 16.

--Implied Warranties.-It is not necessary that the
seller make an express statement in order to be liable for
the truth of a representation. Certain liability-creating
representation~ may be implied by the circumstances of
the transaction. Or, to put the rule in words more nearly
in accord with the decisions, the law will son1etimes
impose a liability because of the circumstances of the
transaction, regardless of any actual representation~
express or tacit, on the part of the seller.
Thus the issue often is, does the law "imply a warranty' '-or impose a liability-in the particular case.
There is no rule deducible from the cases by which
this question can always be answered. Each case stands
upon its own facts-which means that the answer rests
in the particular judge's own conclusions. 80 But there
have developed certain broad rules, both positive and
negative, as to when a liability will be imposed without
an express r epresentation by the seller.*
For example, one who sells under such circumstances
that the buyer reasonably supposes him to be O\Yner,
will be held to have warranted title in himself. If title
was not in him at the time of the sale he vvill be held
liable to the buyer in damages, even though he made no
statements whatever concerning the title. 81 But, of
course, if there is something about the transaction which
80-Whether there is such liability is a matter of law, for the
court to decide, Heil but v. Buckleton, 1913 A. C. 30.
81-Gaylor v. Copes, 16 Fed.
49; Byrnside v. Burdett, 15 W.
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section

Va. 702; Costigan v. Hawkins, 22
Wis. 74; Sherman v. The Champlain Trans. Co., 31 Vt. 162; Boyd
v. Whitfield, 19 Ark. 447; Linton
v . Porter, 31 Ill. 107; Word v.
Cavin, 38 Tenn. 506.
13, (1), (2), (3), (4), 14, 15, (1),

(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 16.
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would indicate to a reasonable buyer that the seller was

not selling as owner — as in case of sale by a sheriff, pawn-

broker, administrator, etc. — he will not be liable to the

buyer in damages unless he expressly promised to make

good any lack of title in himself.®^

There is also a representation implied under some cir-

cumstances, that the goods as in other respects described

shall be fit for the purpose for which the buyer intends

to use them. Li Gold Ridge Mining Co. v. Tallmadge,*^

the defendant had sold to the plaintiff ' ' tAvo hundred full

miners' inches of first or second water," which he knew

the plaintiff intended to use for mining purpose. The

water as delivered was too full of debris to be usable.

In deciding that the seller was liable for failure to per-

form his contract, the court said, ' ' It is settled law that,

where an article or commodity is to be made or supplied

to a purchaser for a particular purpose known to the

seller, there is an implied warranty that it shall be rea-
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sonably fit and suitable for the purpose intended."®*

82 — Thus, the fact that the chat- be capable of fertilizing; Inter-

tel is not in the seller's possession state Grocer Co. v. Bentley, 214

has been held to negative an im- Mass. 227, "sardines" must be

plied warranty of title, Byrnside marketable under that general

V. Burdett, 15 W. Va. 702; Costi- name.

gan V. Hawkins, 22 Wis. 74; Budd As illustrations: a seller of

V. Power & Co., 8 Mont. 380. food manufactured by himself im-

No warranty implied if circum- pliedly warrants it fit to eat. Race

stances reasonably negative it, Co- v. Crum, 22.2 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E.

gar v. Bums Lumber Co., 46 W. Va. 852; Doyle v. Fuerst, 129 La. 838;

256; Johnson v. Laybourn, 56 Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 171

Minn. 332, judicial sale; Storm N. Y. S. 840. One who installed

~

ould indicate to a reasonable buyer that the seller was
not selling as owner-as in case of sale by a sheriff, pawnbroker, administrator, etc.-he will not be liable to the
buyer in damages unless he expressly promised to make
good any lack of title in himself. 82
There is also a representation implied under some circumstances, that the goods as in other respects described
shall be fit for the purpose for which the buyer intends
to use them. In Gold Ridge Mining Co. v. Tallmadge,83
the defendant had sold to the plaintiff "two hundred full
miners' inches of first or second water,'' which he knew
the plaintiff intended to use for mining purpose. The
water as delivered was too full of debris to be usable.
In deciding that the seller was liable for failure to perform his contract, the court said, "It is settled law that,
where an article or commodity is to be made or supplied
to a purchaser for a particular purpose known to the
seller, there is an implied warranty that it shall be reasonably fit and suitable for the purpose intended.' ' 84

V. Smith, 43 Miss. 497; Scranton a wireless telegraph apparatus

V. Clark, 39 N. Y. 220. held to have impliedly warranted

83 — 44 Ore. 34. that its use would not infringe

84 — In the sale of a machine de- patents, DeForest Co. v. Standard

scribed as a "potato digger" there Oil Co., 238 Fed. 346; Implied war-

is an implied provision that it is ranty that fruit trees sold by a

capable of use for digging pota- nursery will grow, Gresinger v.

toes, Hallock v. Cutler, 71 111. Ap. Hubbard, 21 Ida. 469; that water

471; Kennebrew v. Southern etc. sold for mining purposes will be

Co., 106 Ala. 377; Barry & Co. v. sufliciently clear of sediment for

Usry, 70 Ga. 711, "fertilizer" must use, Gold Ridge Mining Co. v.

82-Thus, the fact that the chattel is not in the seller's possession
has been held to negative an implied warranty of title, Byrnside
v. Burdett, 15 W. Va. 702; Costigan v. Hawkins, 22 Wis. 74; Budd
v. Power & Co., 8 Mont. 380.
No warranty implied if circumstances reasonably negative it, Cogar v. Burns Lumber Co., 46 W. Va.
256; Johnson v. Laybourn, 56
Minn. 332, judicial sale; Storm
v. Smith, 43 Miss. 497; Scranton
v. Clark, 39 N. Y. 220.
83-44 Ore. 34.
84--In the sale of a machine de·
scribed as a "potato digger" there
is an implied provision that it is
capable of use for digging potatoes, IIallo k v. Cutler, 71 Ill. Ap.
471; Kenn brew v. Southern etc.
Co., 106 Ala. 377; Barry & o. v.
1 s ry, 70 Ga. 711, "fertilizer" must
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be capable of fertilizing; Interstate Grocer Co. v. Bentley, 214
Mass. 227, "sardines" must be
marketable under that general
name.
As illustrations: a seller of
food manufactured by himself impliedly warrants it fit to eat, Race
v. Crum, 22.2 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E.
852; Doyle v. Fuerst, 129 La. 838;
Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 171
N. Y. S. 840. One who installed
a wireless telegraph apparatus
held to have impliedly warranted
that its use would not infringe
pateuts, DeForest Co. v. Standard
Oil Co., 238 Fed. 346; implied warranty that fruit trees sold by a
nursery will grow, Gresinger v.
Hubbard, 21 Ida. 469; that water
sold for mining purposes will be
sum i ntly clear of sediment for
use, Gold Ridge Minin g Co. v.
11~11
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But no such representation will be implied, of course,

if the circumstances are not such as to justify it. If the

seller does not know of the purpose for which the thing

described is to be used, no requisite of fitness beyond

what normally appertains to an article so described will

be implied. To quote, as illustration, from Talbot Paving

Co. V. Gorman,^^ ''The exact point made by the plaintiff

appears to be that, inasmuch as the defendant (the

seller) knew what the specifications were, the law implied

a warranty of fitness. A pertinent inqiury is, *A fitness

for what?' "Was it fitness for the paving jobs that the

plaintiff had on hand ? If this be claimed, it is a sufficient

answer to say that the evidence fails to disclose that

the defendant knew what jobs plaintiff had. "^^

Neither will there be implied anything that the seller

could not reasonably be supposed to have known con-

cerning the chattel itself. He impliedly undertakes to

furnish what is reasonable under the circumstances,
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which is a chattel, such as described in the contract, that

will, in addition to that express description, suit the

buyer's known purpose of use, so far as the seller ought

reasonably to know its characteristics outside of the

express description. But he does not impliedly agree

that, if it conforms to the express description, it shall

be free from defects of which he could not reasonably

know.®'*

Nor will the law imply a representation that the

described goods will be of a quality, or of a fitness for

Tallmadge, 44 Ore. 34; municipal- 87— Bragg v. Morrill, 49 Vt. 45;

ity in furnishing water impliedly Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines 48, 2

warrants that it is free from dis- Am. Dec. 215; Swett v. Colgate,

ease germs, Canavan v. City of 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 196, 11 Am. Dec.

Mechanicsville, 177 N. Y. S. 808; 266; Ryan v. Ulmer 108 Pa. 332,

reversed, N. Y. 1920, 128 N. E. 56 Am. Rep. 210; Julian v. Laub-

885. enberger, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 646;

85—103 Mich. 403, 406. Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197.

86 — Day v. Mapes-Reeve Cons. See authorities post.

Co., 174 Mass. 412.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 13, (1), (2), (3), (4), 14, 15, (1).

(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 16,

But no such representation will be implied, of course,
if the circumstances are not such as to justify it. If the
seller does not know of the purpose for which the thing
described is to be used, no requisite of fitness beyond
what normally appertains to an article so describecl.. will
be implied. To quote, as illustration, from Talbot Paving
Co. v. Gorman, 85 ''The exact point made by the plaintiff
appears to be that, inasmuch as the defendant (the
seller) knew what the specifications were, the law implied
a warranty of fitness. A pertinent inqiury is, 'A fitness
for what~' Was it fitness for the paving jobs that the
plaintiff had on hand~ If this be claimed, it is a sufficient
answer to say that the evidence fails to disclose that
the defendant knew what jobs plaintiff had.' ' 86
Neither will there be implied anything that the seller
could not reasonably be supposed to have known concerning the chattel itself. He impliedly undertakes to
furnish what is reasonable under the circumstances,
which is a chattel, such as described in the contract, that
will, in addition to that express description, suit the
buyer's known purpose of use, so far as the seller ought
reasonably to know its characteristics outside of the
express description. But he does not impliedly agree
that, if it conforms to the express description, it shall
be free from defects of which he could not reasonably
know. 87 *
Nor will the law imply a representation that the
described goods will be of a quality, or of a fitness for
Tallmadge, 44 Ore. 34; municipality in furnishing water impliedly
warrants that it is free from disease germs, Canavan v. City of
Mechanicsville, 177 N. Y. S. 808;
reversed, N. Y. 1920, 128 N. E.
885.
85-103 Mich. 403, 406.
86-Day v. Mapes-Reeve Cons.
Co., 174 Mass. 412.
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section
(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 16,
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87-Bragg v. Morrill, 49 Vt. 45;
Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines 48, 2
Am. Dec. 215; Swett v. Colgate,
20 Johns. (N. Y.) 196, 11 Arn. Dec.
266; Ryan v. Ulmer 108 Pa. 332,
56 Am. Rep. 210; Julian v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 646;
Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197.
See authorities post.
13, (1), (2), (3), (4), 14, 15, (1),
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particular purpose, inconsistent with tlie known, or the

normal, characteristics of goods conforming to the

express description. For instance, if a buyer orders ''a

driving belt with cemented laps, instead of riveted ones,

to run an elevator hoist ' ' he can not hold the seller liable

if a belt with cemented laps is not suitable for that pur-

pose.®^ There is, ordinarily, no duty on the part of the

seller to point out inconsistency between the express

description and the purpose, and his performance accord-

ing to the description is sufficient. In Chanter v. Hop-

kins,^^ the defendant had ordered of plaintiff one of his

''patent furnaces," stating in the order that it was to be

used in a certain way. Plaintiff's patent furnaces were

all of a standard and all had the same characteristics.

The one sent, although of this known standard, was not

fit for the defendant's purpose. It was held, neverthe-

less, that the plaintiff had fulfilled the agreement. Lord

Abinger said, "The question is, whether or no the order
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has not been complied with in its terms. What is the

order? It is an order for one of those engines of W'hich

the plaintiff was known to be the patentee; he was not

obliged to know the object or use to w^hich the defendant

meant to apply it; and it is admitted there is no fraud.

If, when the plaintiff received such an order, he had

known it could not be so applied, and felt that the defend-

ant was under some misapprehension on the subject, and

that he was buying a thing on the supposition that he

could apply it to that use, when the plaintiff very well

knew he could not, in that case it might affect the con-

tract on the ground of the suppression of a material fact ;

that might be a question for the jury. Or if the terms

of the contract were proposed by the plaintiff* himself,

such as, 'I will send you one of my smoke-consuming fur-

naces, which shall suit your brewery ; ' in such case that

would be a warranty that it would suit a brewery. But

88— Gregg v. Page Belting Co., 89—4 M. & V/. 399.

69 N. H. 247.

particula_r purpose, inconsistent ·w ith the known, or the
normal, characteristics of goods conforming to the
express description. For instance, if a buyer orders ''a
driving belt with cemented laps, instead of riveted ones,
to run an elevator hoist'' he can not hold the seller liable
if a belt with cemented laps is not suitable for that purpose.ss There is, ordinarily, no duty on the part of the
seller to point out inconsistency between the express
description and the purpose, and his performance according to the description is sufficient. In Chanter v. Hopkins,s9 the defendant had ordered of plaintiff one of his
"patent furnaces," stating in the order that it was to be
used in a certain way. Plaintiff's patent furnaces were
all of a standard and all had the same characteristics.
The one sent, although of this known standard, was not
fit for the defendant's purpose. It was held, nevertheless, that the plaintiff had fulfilled the agreement. Lord
Abinger said, ''The question is, whether or no the order
has not been complied with in its terms. What is the
order~ It is an order for one of those engines of which
the plaintiff was kno-vvn to be the patentee; he was not
obliged to know the object or use to which the defendant
meant to apply it; and it is admitted there is no fraud.
If, when the plaintiff received such an order, he had
known it could not be so applied, and felt that the defendant was under some misapprehension on the subject, and
that he was buying a thing on the supposition that he
could apply it to that use, when the plaintiff very well
knew he could not, in that case it might affect the contract on the ground of the suppression of a material fact;
that might be a question for the jury. Or if the terms
of the contract were proposed by the plaintiff himself,
su h as, 'I will send you one of my smoke-consuming furnac s, whi h shall suit your br wery;' in such case that
would be a warranty that it would suit a brewery. But
88-Gregg v. Page Belting Co.,
69 N. H. 247.
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in this case no fraud whatever is suggested; and the

case is that of an order for the purchase of a specific

chattel, which the buyer himself describes, believing,

indeed, that it will answer a particular purpose to which

he means to put it; but if it does not, he is not the less

on that account bound to pay for it."^''

This is only one phase of the general rule that no rep-

sentation of fact, and its attendant liability, will he im-

plied by the courts when such an implication would be in-

consistent with the express statements, or with the ex-

press terms of the contract. A fortiori, if the seller

definitely states that there is no liability dependent on the

statements he makes, and that no otlier representations

are to be implied, the courts will not attach a hability to

such statements.^^*

But, although the courts will not unreasonably imply

statements inconsistent with the express ones,i/ there are

in fact, or by reasonable implication, incongruous state-
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ments, the courts may impose a liability for the incorrect

one. In Drummond v. Van Ingen,®^ for instance, the seller

agreed to furnish goods exactly like a certain sample and

represented that they would be suitable for a certain pur-

90— Gregg v. Page Belting Co., v. Conley, 58 Md. 59.

69 N. H. 247; Titley v. Enterprise But a fitness for the purpose

Stone Co., 127 111. 457, an agree- may be a part of the total de-

ment for "rubble stone from sell- scription even though inconsis-

er's quarry" carries no implica- tent with other parts. That is to

tion of special characteristics; say, the foregoing mile is not ab-

Milwaukee Boiler Co. v. Duncan, solutely correct, nor meticulously

87 Wis. 120; Wilson v. Lawrence, adhered to. See following notes

139 Mass. 318; Cafre v. Lockwood, for citations.

47 N. Y. S. 916; Fairbanks Morse 91— Hartin v. Pelt, 76 Ark. 177;

Co. V. Baskett, 98 Mo. Ap. 53; Fauntleroy v. Wilcox, 80 lU. 477;

Warren Glass Works v. Keystone Lynch v. Curfman, 65 Minn. 170;

Co., 65 Md. 547; Port Carbon Iron Wood v. Ross (Tex.), 26 S. W.

Co. V. Groves, 68 Pa. 149; Bounce 148; M'Lean v. Green, 2 McMuI.
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in this case no fraud whatever is suggested; and the
case is that of an order for the purchase of a specific
chattel, which the buyer himself describes, believing,
indeed, that it will answer a particular purpose to which
he means to put it; but if it does not, he is not th~ less
on that account bound to pay for it. " 90
This is only one phase of the general rule that no repsentation of fact, and its attendant liability, will be implied by the courts when such an implication would be inconsistent with the express statements, or with the express terms of the contract. A fortiori, if the seller
definitely states that there is no liability dependent on the
statements he makes, and that no other representations
are to be implied, the courts will not attach a liability to
such statements.9 u
But, although the courts will not unreasonably imply
statements inconsistent with the express ones, if there are
in fact, or by reasonable implication, incongruous statements, the courts may impose a liability for the incorrect
one. In Drummond v. Van Ingen, 92 for instance, the seller
agreed to furnish goods exactly like a certain sample and
represented that they would be suitable for a certain pur-

V. Dow, 64 N. Y. 412; Wheaton (S. C.) 17; Burnett v. Hensley,

etc. Co. V. Noye etc. Co., 66 Minn. 118 la. 575.

156; Wisconsin Red Brick Co. v. 92—12 App. Cas. 284,

Hood, 67 Minn. 329; Basin & Co.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 71.

90-Gregg v. Page Belting Co.,
69 N. H. 247; Titley v. Enterprise
Stone Co., 127 Ill. 457, an agreement for "rubble stone from seller's quarry" carries no implication of special characteristics;
Milwaukee Boiler Co. v. Duncan,
87 Wis. 120; Wilson v. Lawrence,
139 Mass. 318; Cafre v. Lockwood,
47 N. Y. S. 916; Fairbanks Morse
Co. v. Baskett, 98 Mo. Ap. 53;
Warren Glass Works v. Keystone
Co., 65 Md. 547; Port Carbon Iron
Co. v. Groves, 68 Pa. 149; Dounce
v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 412; Wheaton
etc. Co. v. Noye etc. Co., 66 Minn.
156; Wisconsin Red Brick Co. v.
Hood, 67 Mi11n. 329; Basin & Co.
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section

v. Conley, 58 Md. 59.
But a fitness for the purpose
may be a part of the total description even though inconsistent with other parts. That is to
say, the foregoing rule is not absolutely correct, nor meticulously
adhered to. See following notes
for citations.
91-Hartin v. Pelt, 76 Ark. 177;
Fauntleroy v. Wilcox, 80 Ill. 477;
Lynch v. Curfman, 65 Minn. 170;
Wood v. Ross (Tex.), 26 S. W.
148; M'Lean v. Green, 2 McMul.
(S. C.) 17; Burnett v. Hensley,
118 Ia. 575.
92-12 App. Cas. 284.
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pose. The goods when furnished were in fact exactly

like the sample, but they were not fit for the purpose.

The representation that they would be fit for the purpose

intended was necessarily inconsistent with the promise

that they should be exactly hke the sample. The court

held the former representation to be more important

than the literal form of the latter promise and imposed

on the seller a liability to make good his representation

of fitness.^* There is no rule by which it can absolutely

be determined how a court will solve any possible incon-

sistency of tljis kind.

In summarization, then, the courts will usually imply

a warranty that goods are fit for the purpose for which

the buyer intends them, whether that purpose be re-sale,

consumption, or anything else. But they will not imply

such warranty unless the seller may reasonably be sup-

posed to know that purpose. And they will not imply

such a warranty if it is expressly negatived by the seller,
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nor if to do so would be inconsistent with the other parts

of the description.

Neither will the courts imply a warranty unless the

seller can reasonably be supposed to know more about

the goods sold than the buyer does. A manufacturer, for

instance, may know more about the chattel sold than does

the buyer, but a retail seller has not necessarily any more

exact knowledge than the buyer. Hence a seller is not

usually responsible, hy mere implication, for hidden

defects in an article of which he is not the manufac-

turer, or grower, or packer, or otherwise so concerned

as reasonably to have opportunity for greater knowledge

than the buyer has.^*

93 — Accd., West End Mfg. Co. perienced butcher, who inspects

V. Warren Co., 198 Mass. 320; it; National Cotton Oil Co. v.

Lissberger v. Kellog, 78 N. J. L. Young, 74 Ark. 144, cattle feed

86. not warranted free from accident-

94 — Zielinski v. Potter, — Mich. al defects; Lukens v. Freund, 27

— , L. R. A. 1917 D 822, no war- Kan. 664, id.; Cf. Houk v. Berg,

ranty of fitness implied in sale Tex. — , 105 S. W. 1176. Wisconsin

of animal to be slaughtered to e" Brick Co. v. Hood, 67 Minn. 329;

pose. The goods when furnished were in fact exactly
like the sample, but they were not fit for the purpose.
The representation that they would be fit for the purpose
intended was necessarily inconsistent with the promise
that they should be exactly like the sample. The court
held the former representation to be more important
than the literal form of the latter promise and imposed
on the seller a liability to make good his representation
of fitness. 93 There is no rule by which it can absolutely
be determined how a court will solve any possible inconsistency of tl}.is kind.
In summarization, then, the courts will usually imply
a warranty that goods are fit for the purpose for which
the buyer intends them, whether that purpose be re-sale,
consumption, or anything else. But they will not imply
such warranty unless the seller may reasonably be supposed to know that purpose. And they will not imply
such a warranty if it is expressly negatived by the seller,
nor if to do so would be inconsistent with the other parts
of the description.
Neither will the courts imply a warranty unless the
seller can reasonably be supposed to know more about
the goods sold than the buyer does. A manufacturer, for
instance, may know more about the chattel sold than does
the buyer, but a retail seller has not necessarily any more
exact knowledge than the buyer. Hence a seller is not
usually responsible, by mere i1nplication, for hidden
defects in an article of which he is not the manufacturer, or grower, or packer, or otherwise so concerned
a reasonably to have opportunity for greater knowledge
than the buyer has. 94
93-Accd., West End Mfg. Co.
v . Warren Co., 198 Mass. 320;
Lissberger v. Kellog, 78 N. J. L.
86.
94- Zielinski v. Potter, - Mich.
822, no war- , L. R. A. 1917
ranty of fitness implied in sale
ot animal to be slaughtered to e·~
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perienced butcher, who inspects
it; National Cotton Oil Co. v.
Young, 74 Ark. 144, cattle feed
not warranted free from accidental defects; Lukens v. Freund, 27
Kan. 664, id.,· Cf. Houk v. Berg,
Tex.-, 105 S. W. 1176. Wisconsin
Brick Co. v. Hood, 67 Minn. 329;
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Implied Warranties in Sales of Food. — In case of a

sale of food there is a tendency to depart from this logical

position that no warranty will be imphed unless the

seller had more reason than the buyer to know about the

goods. Thus, in Chapman v. Roggenkamp^^ the jjlaintiff

had bought a can of peas from the defendant and had been

made violently sick from some toxin in them. She sued

for damages on an impUed warranty that they were

wholesome. The defendant was only a retailer and had

not himself packed the peas. He had apparently every

reason to suppose that they were perfectly wholesome.

His counsel ''argued that where a person purchases from

such a dealer articles of food in cans for immediate con-

sumption, the buyer, from the nature of the transaction,

must know that the seller has no greater knowledge as

to the condition of the articles than the buyer has, and,

hence, does not rely upon the seller's superior knowl-

edge, and that, therefore, there is no implied warranty
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of the wholesomeness of said articles." Despite the

obvious forcefulness of this argument the court decided

that the defendant was liable on an implied warranty,

on the principle that ''public safety demands that, in all

sales of provisions for domestic use by a retail dealer,

there should be an implied warranty."®^

There is strong dissent from this imposition of arbi-

trary liability in cases where the seller has no more

opportunity to learn the truth than the buyer has.®'''

Swank v. Battaglia, 84 Ore. 159, L. however, is legally presumed to

R. A. 1917 F 469, sale of apparent- know its character, Reynolds v.

ly sound, but really worthless po- Gen'l Elec. Co., 141 Fed. 551.

tatoes by one dealer to another; 95 — 182 111. Ap. 117.

Thompson v. Libby, 35 Minn. 443, 96— Accd., Ward v. Great Atlan-

fitness for purpose; Fairbanks Co. tic & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90,

V. Holt, 79 Wash. 361, 140 Pac. 394. 120 N. E. 225.

sale of second hand goods; White Such liability is imposed by

V. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, dealer in statute in Pennsylvania. Weiss

folding beds not liable for ten- v. Swift & Co., 36 Pa. Sup. Ct. 376.

dency of bed sold to close up un- 97 — Julian v. Laubenberger,

expectedly. 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 646, the doctrine

The manufacturer of an article, of implied warranty "proceeds

--Implied Warranties in Sales of Food.-In case of a
sale of food there is a tendency to depart from this logical
position that no warranty will be implied unless the
seller had more reason than the buyer to know about the
goods. Thus, in Chapman v. Roggenkamp 95 the plaintiff
had bought a can of peas from the defendant and had been
made viol~tly sick from so~e toxin in them. She sued
for damages on an implied warranty that they were
wholesome. The defendant was only a retailer and had
not himself packed the peas. He had apparently every
reason to suppose that they were perfectly wholes01ne.
His counsel ''argued that where a p erson purchases from
such a dealer articles of food in cans for immediate consumption, the buyer, from the nature of the transaction,
must know that the seller has no greater knowledge as
to the condition of the articles than the buyer has, and,
hence, does not rely upon the seller's superior knowledge, and that, therefore, there is no implied warranty
of the wholesomeness of said articles.'' Despite the
obvious forcefulness of this argument the court decided
that the defendant was liable on an implied warranty,
on the principle that "public safety demands that, in all
sales of provisions for domestic use by a retail dealer,
there should be an implied warranty.' '96
There is strong dissent from this imposition of arbitrary liability in cases where the seller has no more
opportunity to learn the truth than the buyer has. 97
Swank v. Battaglia, 84 Ore. 159, L.
R. A. 1917 F 469, sale of apparent-

ly sound, but really worthless potatoes by one dealer to another;
Thompson v. Libby, 35 Minn. 443,
fitness for purpose; Fairbanks Co.
v. Holt, 79 Wash. 361, 140 Pac. 394,
sale of second hand goods; White
v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, dealer in
folding beds not liable for tendency of bed sold to close up unexpectedly.
The manufacturer of an article,

however, is legally presumed to
know its character, Reynolds v.
Gen'l Elec. Co., 141 Fed. 551.
95-182 Ill. Ap. 117.
96-Accd., Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 231 Ma ss. 90,
120 N. E. 225.
Such liability is imposed by
statute in Pennsylvan ia . Weiss
v. Swift & Co., 36 P a . Sup. Ct. 376.
97- Julian v. L auben be rger,
16 Misc. (N. Y.) 646, the doctrine
of implied warranty "proceeds
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But where the food is not in cans, or other-^-ise con-

cealed, the weight of authority makes a dealer liable on

implied warranty of wholesomeness, on the ground that

as a dealer his knowledge of its condition is superior to

that of the buyer.^^ But even this liability does not

extend to sellers who are not regular dealers in the

particular type of article.®^ Nor does it arise in cases

where tl;e buyer is fully as conversant with the nature

of the article as is the seller.

Time of Making the Warranty. — It is not essential

to the seller 's liability that the statements shall have been

immediately connected mth the other transactions of

the sale. It is sufficient if they were intended to be a

part of the transaction. Thus in one case^°° the defend-

THE LAW OF SALES

But where the food is not in cans, or other~i.se concealed, the weight of authority makes a dealer liable on
implied warranty of wholesomeness, on the ground that
as a dealer his knowledge of its condition is superior to
that of the buyer.98 But even this liability does not
extend to sellers who are not regular dealers in the
particular type of article. 99 Nor does it arise in cases
where th.e buyer is fully as conversant with the nature
of the article as is the seller.

ant was accustomed to sell fiberoid to the plaintiff from

time to time. In March the plaintiff complained that

the goods had too great tendency to catch fire. The

defendant replied that in the future it would be all right.
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The following October, mthout any further representa-

upon the assumption that the Lombard, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 57;

vendor has some means of knowl- Bishop v. Webber, 139 Mass. 411.

edge, opportunities for inspection, In Farrell v. The Manhattan Mar-

or sources of information with re- ket Co., 198 Mass. 271, this was

gard to the article which are not confined to articles selected from

accessible or are unknown to the his general stock by the dealer

purchaser." The dealer has no himself, as distinct from those

better way of knowing what is in picked out by the customer;

the cans than has the buyer. Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 111. 93;

Bigelow V. Maine Cent. R. R., 110 Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 157

Me. 105. N. Y. S. 561, sale of meat stamped

98 — "The early rules of law wholesome by government inspec-

•were formulated upon the theory tors.

--Time of Making the Warranty.-It is not essential
to the seller's liability that the statements shall have been
immediately connected with the other transactions of
the sale. It is sufficient if they were intended to be a
part of the transaction. Thus in one case 100 the defendant was accustomed to sell fiberoid to the plaintiff fr~m
time to time. In March the plaintiff complained that
the goods had too great tendency to catch fire. The
defendant replied that in the future it would be all right.
The following October, without any further representa-

that the provision dealer and the The packer impliedly warrants

victualer, having an opportunity what he sells to the dealer, Copas

to observe and inspect the appear- v. Provision Co., 73 Mich. 541.

ance and quality of the food prod- 99 — Giroux v. Steadman, 145

ucts they offered to the public, Mass. 439, sale of hogs by a farm-

were, accordingly, charged with er.

knowledgeof their imperfections;" 100 — Leavitt v. Fiberoid Co.,

Bigelow V. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 196 Mass. 440.

110 Me. 105; citing Winslow v.

upon the assumption that the
vendor has some means of knowledge, opportunities for inspection,
or sources of information with regard to the article which are not
accessible or are unknown to the
purchaser." The dealer has no
better way of knowing what is in
the cans than has the buyer.
Bigelow v. Maine Cent. R. R., 110
Me. 105.
98-"The early rules of law
were formulated upon the theory
that the provision dealer and the
victualer, having an opportunity
to observe and inspect the appearance and quality of the food products they offered to the public,
were, accordingly, charged with
knowledge of their imperfections;"
Bigelow v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co.,
110 Me. 105; citing Winslow v.
Di itiLe by
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Lombard, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 57;
Bishop v. Webber, 139 Mass. 411.
In Farrell v. The Manhattan Mar·
ket Co., 198 Mass. 271, this was
confined to articles selected from
his general stock by the dealer
himself, as distinct from those
picked out by the customer;
Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93;
Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 157
N. Y. S. 561, sale of meat stamped
wholesome by government inspectors.
The packer impliedly warrants
what he sells to the dealer, Copas
v. Provision Co., 73 Mich. 541.
99-Giroux v. Steadman, 145
Mass. 439, sale of hogs by a farmer.
100-Leavitt v. Fiberoid Co.,
196 Mass. 440.
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tions in the meantime, the plaintiff bought more fiberoid

which did catch fire too readily. He sued on the express

warranty that it would be all right. The court sustained

the suit, saying, ''this w^as a continuing offer of guar-

antee. * * * It is not necessary that the giving orf the

warranty should be simultaneous with the sale. It is

enough if it is made under such circumstances as to war-

rant the inference that it enters into the contract as

finally made. ""^

Measure of Damages. — The buyer may recover

compensation for damage resulting from the false state-

ments, either by setting off the amount against the pur-

101 — Another court, Bowen v.

Zaccanti, 203 Mo. 208, 208, S. W.

tions in the meantime, the plaintiff bought more :fiberoid
which did catch fire too readily. He sued on the express
warranty that it would be all right. The court su tained
the suit, saying, ''this was a continuing offer of guarantee. • • • It is not necessary that the giving of the
warranty should be simultaneous ·with the sale. It is
enough if it is made under such circumstances as to warrant the inference that it enters into the contract as
finally made. ' 1101

277, has gone so far as to hold that

a statement made after the con-

tract had been completely entered
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into creates a liability as a war-

ranty, if it was made before the

money had been paid and before

title had passed. In this case, of

--Measure of Damages.-The buyer may recover
compensation for damage resulting from the false statements, either by setting off the amount against the pur-

course, there could have been no

"consideration" for the warranty,

the contract having been admit-

tedly complete before the state-

ment was made. Neither could it

well be said that the buyer had

been deceived to his damage, he

having already fully bound himself

to take the goods and pay the

price by a contract quite free from

fraud or deceit. The so-called

warranty was clearly no part of

the contract of sale. There is

really no theory on which this

particular decision can be sup-

ported. The case to which the

court refers as original authority,

namely McGaughey v. Richardson,

148 Mass. 60S, does not in fact

support it, as the warranty therein

considered had been made orally

at the time of the contract of sale

and as a part of it, and merely

put into writing thereafter.

To the effect that if otherwise

a part of the contract of sale,

representations need not be coin-

cident with the rest of the transac-

tion, see Powers v. Briggs, 139

Mich. 664. In Way v. Martin, 140

Pa. 499, it was left to the jury to

determine whether statements

made before the final contract was

entered into v/ere intended to be

a part of that contract; Grossman

v. Johnson, G3 Vt. 333.

But compare Rausberger v. Ing,

55 Mo. Ap. 621.

The statement must be a part

of the contract transaction, Hop-

101-Another court, Bowen v.
Zaccanti, 203 Mo. 208, 208, S. W.
277, has gone so far as to hold that
a statement made after the contract had been completely entered
into creates a liability as a warranty, if it was made before the
money had been paid and before
title had passed. In this case, of
course, there could have been no
"consideration" for the warranty,
the contract having been admittedly complete before the statement was made. Neither could it
well be said that the buyer had
been deceived to his damage, he
having already fully bound himself
to take the goods and pay the
price by a contract quite free from
fraud or deceit. The so-called
warranty was clearly no part of
the contract of sale. There is
really no theory on which this
particular decision can be supported. The case to which the
court refers as original authority,
namely McGaughey v. Richardson,
148 Mass. 608, does not in fact
support it, as the warranty therein
considered had been made orally

at the time of the contract of sale
and as a part of it, and merely
put into writing thereafter.
To the effect that if otherwise
a part of the contract of sale,
representations need not be coincident with the rest of the transac- tion, see Powers v. Briggs, 139
Mich. 664. In Way v. Martin, 140
Pa. 499, it was left to the jury to
determine whether statements
made before the final contract was
entered into were intended to be
a part of that contract; Crossman
v. Johnson, 63 Vt. 333.
But compare Rausberger v. Ing,
55 Mo. Ap. 621.
The statement must be a part
of the contract transaction, Hopkins v. Tanqueray, 15 Com. B.
130.
This matter is confused
through failure to distinguish
whether the seller must have intended it as a term in the contract, which is the basis of decision in the case cited, and in Zimmerman v. Morrow, 28 Minn. 367,
or whether it is sufficient that the
buyer was justified in supposing
it to have been so intended.

kins V. Tanqueray, 15 Com. B.

130. This matter is confused
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through failure to distinguish

whether the seller must have in-

tended it as a term in the con-

tract, which is the basis of deci-

sion in the case cited, and in Zim-
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chase price, or, if he has already paid, by a separate

action for damages.^"*

The usual rules for fixing the damages apply in this

case. The elements considered must vary with the cir-

cumstances of each case. But it may be said as a broad,

general rule, that the amount of damage is the difference

between the value of the goods as they actually were

when the breach was discovered, and the value they

would have had if the representations had been true.'^®'*

This comparison of values is not always practically

applied, and, even if a comparison could be made, it would

limit the damages recoverable at most to the difference

between the proper goods and worthless goods. It would

not cover collateral damage at all. But, in fact, when

the difference in values is not a fair or practical measure

of the damage it is not the measure used. The broader

rule is, that ''upon any breach of contract, whether of

warranty or otherwise, the defendant is liable for what-
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ever damages follow as a natural consequence and the

proximate result of his conduct, or which may reason-

ably be supposed to have been within the contemplation

of the parties at the time the contract was made as a

probable result of a breach of it. ' '^°*

102 — But he can not sue for ranty to be the difference be-

damage before the seller has tween the value as it should have

either passed the title or broken been and as it actually was "at the

the contract of sale. Bunday v. time to which the warranty re-

Columbus Machine Co., 143 Mich, ferred." This was interpreted, in

10; Moneyweight Scale Co. v. Shearer v. Park Nursery Co., 103

David, 180 Mich. 8; G. B. Shearer Cal. 415, to mean the time at

Co. V. Kakoulis, 144 N. Y. S. 1077, which the breach is, or should be,

a conditional buyer can not set discovered.

up breach of warranty in defense 104 — Leavitt v. Fiberoid Co.,

of an action for an installment 196 Mass. 440, 445, citing many

due. And see ante p. 184. authorities. In Boston Woven

103 — Deutsch v. Pratt, 149 Mass. Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass.

415; Scranton v. Mechanics Trad- 232, the buyer was allowed to re-

ing Co., 37 Conn. 130; Cal. cover amounts which he had been

chase price, or, if he has already paid, by a separate
action for damages. 102
The usual rules for fixing the damages apply in this
case. The elements considered must vary with the circumstances of each case. But it may be said as a broad,
general rule, that the amount of damage is the difference
between the value of the goods as they actually were
when the breach was discovered, and the value they
would have had if the representations had been true. 103 •
This comparison of values is not always practically
applied, and, even if a comparison could be made, it would
limit the damages recoverable at most to the difference
between the proper goods and worthless goods. It would
not cover collateral damage at all. But, in fact, when
the difference in values is not a fair or practical measure
of the damage it is not the measure us ed. The broader
rule is, that "upon any breach of contract, whether of
warranty or otherwise, the defendant is liable for whatever damages follow as a natural consequence and the
proximate result of his conduct, or which may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation
of the parties at the time the contract was made as a
probable result of a breach of it. " 104

Civil Code, sec. 3313, declares compelled to pay to his own em-

damages for breach of war- ployees who had been injured

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 69. (6), (7), 70.

102-But he can not sue for
damage before the seller has
either passed the title or broken
the contract of sale. Bunday v.
Columbus Machine Co., 143 Mich.
10; Moneyweight Scale Co. v.
David, 180 Mich. 8; G. B. Shearer
Co. v. Kakoulis, 144 N. Y. S. 1077,
a conditional buyer can not set
up breach of warranty in defense
of an action for an installment
due. And see ante p. 184.
103-Deutsch v. Pratt, 149 Mass.
415; Scranton v. Mechanics Trading Co., 37 Conn. 130; Cal.
Civil Code, sec. 3313, declares
damages for breach of war•see Uniform Sales Act, Section

c..
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ranty to be the difference between the value as it should have
been and as it actually was "at the
time to which the warranty referred." This was interpreted, in
Shearer v. Park Nursery Co., 103
Cal. 415, to mean the time at
which the breach is, or should be,
discovered.
104-Leavitt v. Fiberoid Co.,
196 Mass. 440, 445, citing many
authorities.
In Boston Woven
Hose Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass.
232, the buyer was allowed to recover amounts which he had been
compelled to pay to his own employees who had been injured
69, (6), (7), 70.
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Who May Sue. — The warranty is personal to the

buyer. That is to say, it does not run wdth the ownership

of the chattel, and the second buyer can not sue the

original warrantor for the breach. ^°^

through defects in the warranted

--Who May Sue.-The warranty is personal to the
buyer. That is to say, it does not run with the ownership
of the chattel, and the second buyer can not sue the
original warrantor for the breach. 105

chattel. In Weston v. B. & M.

~
R. R. Co., 190 Mass. 298, the loss

of probable profits was allowed as

damage.

For breach of warranty of seeds,

the buyer was allowed the differ-

ence between the value of the

crop actually produced and the

value of such a crop as would

ordinarily have been produced had

the seeds been as warranted, Ford

V. Farmer's Exch., 136 Tenn. 287,
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189 S. W. 368; Passenger v. Thor-

burn, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; Schutt

V. Baker, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 536; Flick

V. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392. Other

cases have allowed the cost of pre-

paring the soil and the loss of

use of the land to be added to the

cost price of the seed as damage,

Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230;

Butler V. Moore, 68 Ga. 780; Ferris

V. Comstock, 33 Conn. 513;

Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfel-

low, 56 Fla. 708; Phelps v. Blyria

Milling Co., 12 Ohio Dec. 695.

In Campbell Co. v. Thorp, 36

Fed. 414, it was said that the

monetary difference between a

chattel warranted "satisfactory"

and one which was "reasonably

good" could not be estimated.

For breach of warranty of title,

the purchase price with interest

and possibly the cost of attempt-

ing to defend title, is allowed.

Smith V. Williams, 117 Ga. 783.

105— Thisler v. Keith, 7 Kan.

Ap. 363; Smith v. Williams, 117

Ga. 782; Nelson v. Armour Pack-

ing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 6 Ann. Cas.

237; Tomlinson v. Armour Pack-

ing Co., 75 N. J. L. 748; Roberts

V. Anheuser Busch Assn., 211

Mass. 449; Prater v. Campbell,

110 Ky. 23; Crigger v. Coca Cola

Bot. Wks., 132 Tenn. 545.

Nor can one not in privity take

advantage of it, Gearing v. Berk-

son, 223 Mass. 257.

There is a growing tendency of

late to hold that the warranty

does run with the ownership of

the goods in cases of the sale of

food. If the warrantor's liability

were truly one of contract these

decisions would be utterly illogi-

through defects in the warranted
chattel. In Weston v. B. & M.
R. R. Co., 190 Mass. 298, the loss
of probable profits was allowed as
damage.
For breach of warranty of seeds,
the buyer was allowed the difference between the value of the
crop actually produced and the
value of such a crop as would
ordinarily have been produced had
the seeds been as warranted, Ford
v. Farmer's Exch., 136 Tenn. 287,
189 S. W. 368; Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 17; Schutt
v. Baker, 9 Hun. (N. Y.) 536; Flick
v. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 392. Other
cases have allowed the cost of preparing the soil and the loss of
use of the land to be added to the
cost price of the seed as damage,
Reiger v. Worth, 127 N. C. 230;
Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 780; Ferris
v. Comstock, 33 Conn. 513;
Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 708; Phelps v. Elyria
Milling Co., 12 Ohio Dec. 695.
In Campb8ll Co. v. Thorp, 36
Fed. 414, it was said that the
monetary difference between a
chattel wananted "satisfactory"
and one which was "reasonably
good" could not be estimated.
For breach of warranty of title,
the purchase price with interest
and possibly the cost of attempting to d efend title, is allowed.
Smith v. 'Nilliams, 117 Ga. 783.
105-Thisler v. Keith, 7 Kan.
Ap. 363; Smith v. Williams, 117
Ga. 782; Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 6 Ann. Cas.
237; Tomlinson v. Armour Pack-

cal, but since in reality the lia-
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ing Co., 75 N. J. L. 748; Roberts
v. Anheuser Busch Assn., 211
Mass. 449; Prater v. Campbell,
110 Ky. 23; Crigger v. Coca Cola
Bot. Wks., 132 Tenn. 545.
Nor can one not in privity take
advantage of it, Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257.
There is a growing tendency of
late to hold that the warranty
does run with the ownership of
the goods in cases of the sale of
food. If the warrantor's liability
were fruly one of contract these
decisions would be utterly illogical, but since in reality the liability has become one imposed by
law, regardless of intent, it is
merely a question of how far the
policy of the courts will go. Held
that the liability of the manufacturer-seller does run with the ownership, Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 48 L. R. A. (n. s.)
213; Ward v. Morehead City Sea
Food Co., 171 N. C. 33; Catani v.
Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52; Davis v.
Van Camp Packing Co., - Ia., - ,
176 N. W. 382; dissenting opinion
in Drury v. Armour & Co., 140 Ark.
371, 216 S. W. 40; but cf. Welshausen v. Parker Co., 83 Conn.
231, "There must have been evidence of a contract between the
parties, for without a contract
there could be no warranty."
Attention is called to the fact
that the judicial tendency to hold
a manufacturer of food absolutely
res ponsible for its wholesomeness
is not restricted to the theory of
implied warranty, but can also be
taken advantage of by an action
Ori::iir:al fr m
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merely a question of how far the

policy of the courts will go. Held
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in tort, for negligence. There is

marked tendency in such cases to

hold the manufacturer liable as

insurer, on the fiction of negli-

gence whether there is any evi-

dence of negligence in fact or not.

On this theory, suit can be main-

tained by any one who is injured

by the unwholesome product. See

18 Mich. Law Rev. 316; 18 Mich.

in tort, for negligence. There is
marked tendency in such cases to
hold the manufacturer liable as
insurer, on the fiction of negligence whether there is any evidence of negligence in fact or not.
On this theory, suit can be maintained by any one who is injured
by the unwholesome product. See

Law Rev. 436.

18 Mich. Law Rev. 316; 18 Mich.
Law Rev. 436.
But even in such cases, many
courts hold to the rule that a third
person injured by unwholesome
food sold can not recover on warranty-as distinct from tort for
negligence-unless the buyer was
the plaintiff's agent. Gearing v.
Berkson, 223 Mass. 267.

But even in such cases, many

courts hold to the rule that a third

person injured by unwholesome

food sold can not recover on war-

ranty — as distinct from tort for

negligence — unless the buyer was
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the plaintiff's agent. Gearing v.

Berkson, 223 Mass. 257.

D1 itize by

ER ET A CHIVE

Ori ir I fr n

U JIVERS lY OF A

CHAPTER V

Remedies and Rights of Third Persons

In discussing the rights of buyers and sellers we have

heretofore assumed that the seller was the absolute owner

of the goods whose title he had undertaken to transfer.

CIIAPTER V

But it occasionally happens that one sells, or attempts

to sell, goods of which he is not o\^^Ier, or which he other-

wise has no legal power to transfer. In such case the

rights of his buyer may be subject to those of someone

who was not a party to the contract of sale. It is the

REMEDIES AND RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS

rights of such persons, between whom there is no contract

relation, that are now to be discussed.

1. Purchasers from a Person in Possession, but With-

out Title

The foundation on which all these rights are based is

the general principle that, one can not be deprived of

ownership without his consent. A seller, therefore, who

has no title himself can not pass a title to the buyer so

as to affect the rights of the real o^vner — except as the
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broad principle has been modified in one respect or

another.

In General. — The commonest case in which the ques-

tion arises, is where one buys for value from another who

is in possession of the goods and whom the buyer believes

in good faith to be the owner, but who in fact is not the

owner. Even in such case, although the seller may have

been lawfully in possession, though there may have been

nothing peculiar to warn the buyer that he was not o^\Tier,

In discussing the rights of buyers and sellers we have
heretofore assumed that the seller was the absolute owner
of the goods whose title he had undertaken to transfer.
But it occasionally happens that one sells, or attempts
to sell, goods of which he is not owner, or which he otherwise has no legal power to transfer. In such case the
rights of his buyer may be subject to those of someone
who was not a party to the contract of sale. It is the
rights of such persons, between whom there is no contract
relation, that are now to be discussed.

and though the buyer may have parted with money which

he can not practically recover, nevertheless the buyer's

201

1. PuRCHASERS FROM A PERSON IN PossEssroN, BUT WITHOUT TITLE
The foundation on which all these rights are based is
the general principle that. one can not be deprived of
ownership without his consent. A seller, therefore, who
has no title himself can not pass a title to the buyer so
as to affect the rights of the real o'vner-except as the
broad principle has been modified in one respect or
another.
In General.-The commonest case in which the question arises, is where one buys for value from another who
is in possession of the goods and whom the buyer believes
in good faith to be the owner, but who in fact is not the
owner. Even in such case, although the seller may have
been lawfully in possession, though there may have been
nothing peculiar to warn the buyer that he was not owner,
and though the buyer may have parted with money which
he can not practically recover, nevertheless the buyer's
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rights in the property are subordinate to those of the

real owner, if the sale was made without the latter 's

consent.*

Thus, as illustration, A employed B to buy seed for

rights in the property are subordinate to those of the
real owner, if the sale was made without the latter's
consent.*

him and in his, A's, name to lend it to farmers. B was

to pay for the seed Avith A's money, and it was definitely

understood between them that it was to be A's property

as purchased. B, while in possession of some of this

seed, sold it to C. The latter knew nothing of the agree-

ment between A and B, and honestly assumed from B's

possession that he was the o\\Tier. A sued C in trover

for the seed and got judgment, the court holding that

B's mere possession of the seed with A's consent was

not enough to preclude A from setting up his title.^

Even though the person in possession has actual

authority to sell to some particular person, it has been

1— Gilman Oil Co. v. Norton, 89
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111. 434, citing other authority;

Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540;

Oliver Ditson Co. v. Bates, 181

Mass. 455, plaintiff, a wholesale

dealer in pianos, leased an instru-

ment to B, "a dealer in musical in-

Thus, as illustration, A employed B to buy seed for
him and in his, A's, name to lend it to farmers. B was
to pay for the seed with A's money, and it was definitely
understood between them that it was to be A's property
as purchased. B, while in possession of some of this
seed, sold it to C. The latter knew nothing of the agreement between A and B, and honestly assumed from B's
possession that he was the owner. A sued C in trover
for the seed and got judgment, the court holding that
B's mere possession of the seed with A's consent was
not enough to preclude A from setting up his title. 1

struments." B, while in posses-

sion, sold to defendant who sup-

posed him to be owner, or at least

to have the right to sell. Plain-

Even though the person in possession has actual
authority to sell to some particular person, it has been

tiff sued for conversion and it was

held that the written lease re-

butted any pretense of agency on

B's part and that the buyer was

not otherwise protected. Milner

& K. Co. V. DeLoach Mill Co., 139

Ala. 645, 101 Am. St. 63, purchaser

at sheriff's sale of goods in judg-

ment debtor's possession not pro-

tected; Tobin V. Portland Mills

Co., 41 Ore. 269, owners in com-

mon of grain stored in warehouse

allowed to recover from purchas-

er from warehouseman; Tuttle v.

White, 46 Mich. 485; Ladd v.

Brewer, 17 Kan. 204, buyer of

horse from one in charge of liv-

ery stable not protected; Klein v.

Siebold, 89 111. 540, sale, while in

possession, by husband of owner;

Baker 'v. Taylor, 54 Minn. 71; Mc-

Ginley v. Betchel, 4 Neb. Un., 552,

95 N. W. 32; Staples v. Bradbury,

8 Me. 181, 23 Am. Dec. 494; Thach-

er V. Moors, 134 Mass. 156; Collins

V. Ralli, 20 Hun. (N. Y.) 246; Al-

bany Warehouse Co. v. Fiske Cot-

ton Co., 16 Ala Ap. 256, 76 So. 988;

Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. 276;

Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Ore. 539, 3

Am. St. Rep. 184, citing much au-

thority; A. F. T. Corp. v. Pathe

Exch., 172 N. Y. S. 364, an extreme

1-Gilman Oil Co. v. Norton, 89
Ill. 434, citing other authority;
Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540;
Oliver Ditson Co. v. Bates, 181
Mass. 455, plaintiff, a wholesale
dealer in pianos, leased an instrument to B, "a dealer in musical instruments." B, while in possession, sold to defendant who supposed him to be owner, or at least
to have the right to sell. Plaintiff sued for conversion and it was
held that the written lease rebutted any pretense of agency on
B's part and that the buyer was
not otherwise protected. Milner
& K. Co. v. DeLoach Mill Co., 139
Ala. 645, 101 Am. St. 63 , purchaser
at sheriff's sale of goods in judgment debtor's possession not protected; Tobin v. Portland Mills
Co., 41 Ore. 269, owners in common of grain stored in warehouse
allowed to recover from purchas-

er from warehouseman; Tuttle v.
White, 46 Mich. 485; Ladd v.
Brewer, 17 Kan. 204, buyer of
horse from one in charge of livery stable not protected; Klein v.
Siebold, 89 Ill. 540, sale, while in
possession, by husband of owner;
Baker ' v. Taylor, 54 Minn. 71; McGinley v. Betchel, 4 Neb. Un., 552,
95 N. W. 32; Staples v. Bradbury,
8 Me. 181, 23 Am. Dec. 494; Thacher v. Moors, 134 Mass. 156; Collins
v. Ralli, 20 Hun. (N. Y.) 246; Albany Warehouse Co. v. Fiske Cotton Co., 16 Ala Ap. 256, 76 So. 988;
Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. 276;
Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Ore. 539, 3
Am. St. Rep. 184, citing much authority; A. F. T. Corp. v. Pathe
Exch., 172 N. Y. S. 364, an extreme
case; Barrow v. Brent, 202 Ala.
650, 81 So. 669; Yates v. Russell,
20 Ariz.' 338, 180 Pac. 910; O'Neil
v. Thompson, 152 Mich. 396.

case; Barrow v. Brent, 202 Ala.

650, 81 So. 669; Yates v. Russell,

20 Ariz. 338, 180 Pac. 910; O'Neil

V. Thompson, 152 Mich. 396.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 23, (1), (2), 76, "Goods".

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 23, (1), (2), 76, "Goods".
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held that another person who lends money on his appar-

ent ownership is not protected.^

Even the fact that the person in possession has

authority to find customers for the goods does not pro-

tect one who buys from him, believing he has power to

sell.»

Not even when the character of the goods has been

changed by the possessor can he pass title to a pur-

chaser, unless, of course, his change in the goods has

been such as, by rules of title, vests title in himself,

regardless of the owner's consent*

The so-called rule, that ''where one of two innocent

parties must suffer from the fraud of a third, the loss

will fall on him whose fault enabled the fraud to be com-

mitted", is often invoked in these cases. But, as a rule

for decision, it is meaningless, since it still leaves to be

decided the question as to whose fault enabled the fraud

to be perpetrated. Was it the owner's fault in entrust-
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ing the goods to the one who fraudulently disposed of

them? Or was it the fault of the buyer in purchasing

from one of whose title he was not absolutely sure?

In answering this, the issue of title is decided at once

without help from the ' ' rule. ' ' But, so far as the ' ' rule ' '

is concerned, the cases say specifically that the fault is

the buyer's, and therefore, according to the ''rule," the

loss must fall on him.^

2 — Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. purchase, from one who has no

276. right to sell, should be treated as

3 — Levi V. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 a wrong doer; but the explanation

Am. Rep. 332, even though the per- of the principle lies in the com-

son in possession was a trader in mon-law maxim caveat emptor,

such goods. Thacher v. Moors, which applies to the transfer of

134 Mass. 156. personal property. It is the tuy-

4 — Strubbee v. Trustees, 78 Ky. er's own fault, If he is so negli-

481. gent as not to ascertain the right

5 — Velsian v, Lewis, 15 Ore. of the vendor to sell, and he can

539, 3 Am. St. Rep. 184, "at first not successfully Invoke his hona

blush, it may seem strange that -ficies to protect himself from lia-

one who takes possession of goods bility to the true owner, who can

or chattels under a contract of only be divested of his rights or

held that another person who lends money on his apparent ownership is not protected. 2
Even the fact that the person in possession has
authority to find customers for the goods does not protect one who buys from him, believing he has power to
sell. 8
Not even when the character of the goods has been
changed by the possessor can he pass title to a purchaser, unless, of course, his change in the goods has
been such as, by rules of title, vests title in himself,
regardless of the owner's consent. 4
The so-called rule, that "where one of two innocent
parties must suffer from the fraud of a third, the loss
will fall on him whose fault enabled the fraud to be committed", is often invoked in these cases. But, as a rule
for decision, it is meaningless, since it still leaves to be
decided the question as to whose fault enabled the fraud
to be perpetrated. Was it the owner's fault in entrusting the goods to the one who :fraudulently disposed of
them~ Or was it the fault of the buyer in purchasing
from one of whose title he was not absolutely sure~
In answering this, the issue of title is decided at once
without help from the "rule." But, so far as the "rule"
is concerned, the cases say specifically that the fault is
the buyer's, and therefore, according to the "rule," the
loss must fall on him. 5
2-Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass.
276.
3-Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42
Am. Rep. 332, even though the person in possession was a trader in
such goods. Thacher v. Moors,
134 Mass. 156.
4-Strubbee v. Trustees, 78 Ky.
481.
5-Velsian v. Lewis, 15 Ore.
539, 3 Am. St. Rep. 184, "at first
blush, it may seem strange that
one who takes possession of goods
or chattels under a contract of

purchase, from one who has no
right to sell, should be treated as
a wrong doer; but the explanation
of the principle lies in the common-law maxim caveat emptor,
which applies to the transfer of
personal property. H is the buyer's own fault, if he is so negligent as not to ascertain the right
of the vendor to sell, and he can
not successfully invoke his bona
fides to protect himself from liability to the true owner, who can
only be divested of his rights or
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An infinitely more usable test, or rule, is the one that

where two persons have each an equity in the goods — as

sharply distinct from an equity against some person —

that one ivill prevail who has also the legal title. If it be

assumed that one who has been wrongfully, e. g. fraudu-

lently, or by an act of conversion, deprived of possession

has an equity in the goods, that one who has paid money,

or otherwise acted, in reliance on the payee's possession

of goods has also an equity in them and that one who

rehed on another person, but not on his possession, has

not an equity in the goods, it will be found that courts give

judgment with great consistency in favor of the person

who, coupled mth an equity, has the legal title, general

or special. This principle is not often stated, at least in

this particular connection, but it is undoubtedly the most

positively applicable rule.

\ Of course, if the true owner has given the person in

possession authority to sell, a sale by him, in accord
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with that authority, will vest the rights of ownership

in the buyer. This is merely the estabhshed principle

of agency applied to the specific case of a sale. In such

case the title passes directly from the original o^\^ler

and not from the first buyer. It passes not because the

seller had title, but because he was agent of the real

owner to pass it.^^

' Furthermore, the authority to sell need not be ex-

pressly given — it may be shown by the implication of all

the circumstances. The leading case on this point is

Pickering v. Busk.^ The plaintiff, who had bought cer-

tain hemp through one Swallow, had the warehouseman

title to his property by his own Brennan, 53 Miss. 596, "A buyer

act, or by the operation of law. may trust to appearances; but if

Every person is bound at his peril they prove false and delusive, he

to ascertain in whom the real title takes the risk, and must abide the

to property is vested, and however result." Johnson v. Credit Lyon-

much diligence he may exert to nais Co., 3 C. P. Div. 32.

that end, he must abide by the 5a— Robinson's Appeal, 63 Conn.

consequences of any mistake." 290.

(Author's italics.) Ketchura v. 6—15 East 38.

An infinitely more usable test, or rule, is the one that
where two persons have each an equity in the goods-as
sharply distinct from an equity against some personthat one will prevail who has also the legal title. If it be
assumed that one who has been wrongfully, e. g. fraudulently, or by an act of conversion, deprived of possession
has an equity in the goods, that one who has paid money,
or otherwise acted, in reliance on the payee's possession
of goods has also an equity in them and that one who
relied on another person, but not on his possession, has
not an equity in the goods, it will be found that courts give
judgment with great consistency in favor of the person
who, coupled with an equity, has the legal title, general
or special. This principle is not often stated, at least in
this particular connection, but it is undoubtedly the most
positively applicable rule.
Of course, if the true owner has given the person in
possession authority to sell, a sale by him, in accord
with that authority, will vest the rights of ownership
in the buyer. This is merely the established principle
of agency applied to the specific case of a sale. In such
case the title passes directly from the original O"\Vner
and not from the first buyer. It passes not because the
seller had title, but because he was agent of the real
owner to pass it. 5a
Furthermore, the authority to sell need not be expressly given-it may be shown by the implication of all
the circumstances. The leading case on this point is
Pickering v. Busk. 6 The plaintiff, who had bought certain hemp through one Swallow, had the warehouseman
title to his property by his own
act, or by the operation of law.
Every person is bound at his peril
to ascertain in whom the real title
to property is vested, and howevt'ff
much diligence he rnay exert to
that. ncl, he rnust abide by the
consequ nces of any mistalce."

(Author's italics.)
Di

"ti~e

Ket hum v.

Brennan, 53 Miss. 596, "A buyer
may trust to appearances; but if
they prove false and delusive, he
takes the risk, and must abide the
result." Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais o., 3 C. P. Div. 32.
5a- Robinson's Appeal, 63 Coun.
290.
6- 15 East 38.
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who stored it transfer it on his books to the name of

Swallow. Another parcel was carried on the books in

both of their names. Swallow afterwards sold this hemp

to the defendants, who supposed him to be the owner.

The court held title to be in the defendant. Lord Jilllen-

borough put it on the ground that Swallow had an osten-

sible authority to sell, but without saying just what

demonstrated that ostensible authority. The real basis of

the decision, however, is that Swallow had a real, though

implied rather than express, authority to sell. Justice

LeBlanc said, "the mere possession of personal property

does not convey a title to dispose of it. * * * Now for

what purpose could the plaintiff leave it in the name of

Swallow, but that Swallow might dispose of it in his ordi-

nary business as broker * * *." And Justice Bayley

said, "if a person puts goods into the custody of another,

whose common business it is to sell, without limiting his

authority (author's italics), he thereby confers an im-
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plied authority upon him to sell them."

As we have seen, and as Justice LeBlanc said, merely!

putting one in possession of goods does not imply in him

any authority to sell them. There must be something!

more in the facts. Pickering v. Busk indicates that!

putting them in the possession of one whose common busi-

ness it is to sell such goods, does create such an impli-

cation. But even in such case there will be no authority

imphed, as Justice Bayley said, if other facts nega-

tive it.'' And the fact that the person in possession has

also some other business than that of selling, by virtue

of which the goods might have been entrusted to him, is

enough, as the authorities cited above show, to negative

an inference of agency.

Just what other combination of circumstances will

imply, in the person entrusted with possession, an agency

7 — Levi V. Booth, 58 Md. 305; in selling automobiles held not to

Bank V.Johnson, 104 Wash. 550, 177 give them apparent authority to

Pac. 340, possession of automobile sell,

by corporation engaged generally
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who stored it transfer it on his books to the name of
Swallow. Another parcel was carried on the books in
both of their names. Swallow afterwards sold this h emp
to the defendants, who supposed him to be the owner.
The court held title to be in the def endant. Lord ~llen
borough put it on the ground that Swallow had an ostensible authority to sell, but without saying just what
demonstrated that osten sible authority. The real basis of
the decision, however, is that Swallow had a real, though
implied rather than express, authority to sell. Justice
LeBlanc said, ''the mer e possession of personal property
does not convey a title to dispose of it. * * * Now for
what purpose could the plaintiff leave it in the name of
Swallow, but that Swallow might dispose of it in his ordinary business as broker * * :);' ." And Justice Bayley
said, "if a p erson puts goods into the custody of another,
whose common business it is to sell, without limiting his
authority (author's italics), he thereby confers an implied authority upon him to sell them."
As we have seen, and as Justice LeBlanc said, merely1
putting one in possession of goods does not imply in him
any authority to sell them. There must be something
more in the facts. Pickering v. Busk indicates that,
putting them in the possession of one whose common busi-ness it is to sell such goods, does create such an implication. But even in such case there will be no authority
implied, as Justice Bayley said, if other facts negative it. 7 And the fact that the person in possession has
also some other business than that of selling, by virtue
of which the goods might have been entrusted to him, is
enough, as the authorities cited above show, to negative
an inference of agency.
Just what other combination of circumstances will
imply, in the person entrusted with possession, an agency
7-Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305;
Bank v. Johnson, 104 Wash. 550, 177
Pac. 340, possession of automobile
by corporation engaged generally

D1gmz

I TERNET A

y

-CH~VE

in selling automobiles held not to
give them apparent authority to
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to sell, can be determined only from particular prece-

dents. It is a matter of individual conclusion in each

case and can not be deteraiined by rule.*

Pledges. — Even when the person in possession does

THE LAW OF SALES

to sell, can be determined only from particular precedents. It is a matter of individual conclusion in each
case and can not be determined by rule. 8

have authority to sell, express or implied from the cir-

cumstances, it does not follow that he has also implied

authority to pledge the goods.^*

When Seller Has a Right to Acquire Title. — That the

innocent purchaser will not be protected against the real

OMTier is true at Common Law^° even when the person in

possession has a contractual right to acquire the title.

That is to say, one who has possession of goods under a

Pledges.-Even when the person in possession does
have authority to sell, express or implied from the circumstances, it does not follow that he has also implied
authority to pledge the goods. 9 *

"conditional sale" contract, whereby he is to acquire title

upon performance of a stipulated condition, can not pass

a title, even to a bona fide purchaser for value, before per-

formance of the condition.^*

8 — "The implied authority must Am. Rep. 382, person in posses-

arise from the natural and obvious sion was a dealer; Wright v. Solo-
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interpretation of facts according mon, 19 Cal. 64, 79 Am. Dec. 196;

to the habits and usages of busi- Quinn v. Davis, 78 Pa. 15.

ness." Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 9 — Paterson v. Tash, 2 Strange

(N. Y.) 267; Lewenberg v. Hayes, 1178; Commercial Bank of Selma

91 Me. 104, 94 Am. St. Rep. 215; v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130, 12 So. 568;

Ladd V. Brewer, 17 Kan. 204; Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. 276.

Calais Steamboat Co. v. Scudder, 10 — All of these rules have been

2 Black, (67 U. S.) 372; Smith v. more or less modified by statutes.

Clews, 105 N. Y. 283, acquiescence But it seems desirable to discuss

in prior sales by the one entrusted the Common Law as a whole,

with possession held sufficient; without interruptive digressions

When Seller Has a Right to Acquire Title.-That the
innocent purchaser will not be protected against the real
owner is true at Common Law 10 even when the person in
possession has a contractual right to acquire the title.
That is to say, one who has possession of goods under a
''conditional sale'' contract, whereby he is to acquire title
upon performance of a stipulated condition, can not pass
a title, even to a bona fide purchaser for value, before performance of the condition. 11

Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22 concerning statutory change, in

Wend. (N. Y.) 348, 34 Am. Dec. order to give a clear background

317; Cowdry v. Vandenburg, 101 against which to observe the

U. S. 572, indorsing a non-negoti- various statutes.

able instrument in blank held 11 — Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk

enough; Winchester Wagon R. R. Co., 187 Mass. 500; Payne v.

Works V. Carmen, 109 Ind. 31, 58 June, 92 Ind. 252; Lippincott v.

♦This rule has been changed by statute in a number of states, al-

though not by the Uniform Sales Act. These provide, in general, that

if an agent has been entrusted with goods, or dociinients of title, with

authority to sell them, a pledge by him may also be effective. The

provisions vary, however.

8-"The implied authority must
Am. Rep. 382, person in possesarise from the natural and obvious sion was a dealer; Wright v. Solointerpretation of facts according mon, 19 Cal. 64, 79 Am. Dec. 196;
to the habits and usages of busi- Quinn v. Davis, 78 Pa. 15.
9-Paterson v. Tash, 2 Strange
ness." Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend.
(N. Y.) 267; Lewenberg v. Hayes, 1178; Commercial Bank of Selma
v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130, 12 So. 568;
91 Me. 104, 94 Am. St. Rep. 215;
Prentice v. Page, 164 Mass. 276.
Ladd v. Brewer, 17 Kan. 204;
10-All of these rules have been
Calais Steamboat Co. v. Scudder,
more
or less modified by statutes.
2 Black, (67 U. S.) 372; Smith v.
Clews, 105 N. Y. 283, acquiescence But it seems desirable to discuss
in prior sales by the one entrusted the Common Law as a whole,
with possession held sufficient; without interruptive digressions
concerning statutory change, in
Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22
Wend. (N. Y.) 348, 34 Am. Dec. order to give a clear background
317; Cowdry v. Vandenburg, 101 against which to observe the
U. S. 572, indorsing a non-negoti- various statutes.
11-Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk
able instrument in blank held
enough; W i n ch e s t e r Wagon R. R. Co., 187 Mass. 500; Payne v.
Works v. Carmen, 109 Ind. 31, 58 June, 92 Ind. 252; Lippincott v.
*This rule has been changed by statute in a number of states, although not by the Uniform Sales Act. Th se provid , in general, that
if an ag nt has been entrusted with goods, or lo ·uments of title, with
authority lo s 11 them, a pledge by him may also be effective. The
provisions vary, however.
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In a few jurisdictions, however, this does not hold and

one in possession under a contract oi' conditional sale can

sell in such a way that his buyer will be protected against

the original owner.^^ This doctrine, embodied in statutes

in many other states, may be economically wise, but it is

inconsistent with kindred rules. Either it is illogical, or

they are. When the seller is in possession, his appear-

ance of ownership is the same whether he acquired that

possession by contract to buy, by hire, by loan, or by theft.

If the buyer knows how his seller got possession, he knows

that his seller has no title. If the buyer does not know

how his seller got possession, then the manner of posses-

sion can not affect the seller's appearance of title, or right

to sell. The doctrine of these decisions, which protect the

innocent purchaser when the seller is in possession under

a conditional sale contract, can not be estopped, for the

same reasons would apply to other cases of possession, in

which the innocent buyer is not protected. The only other
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explanation is to say that the "conditional buyer" really

has title and that what the seller by conditional sale really

reserves is something less than title. This finds express

support in some cases which allow suit for the purchase

price after the conditional seller has retaken possession

on account of the buyer's default. But other cases are

Rich, 22 Utah 196; Albany Ware- 293; Studebaker Bros. v. Mau, 13

house Co. V. Fisk Cotton Co., 16 Wyom. 358; Freed Furniture Co.

Ala. Ap. 256, 76 So. 988, person in v. Sorenson, 28 Utah 419; Leigh-

possession would ordinarily have ton v. Stevens, 22 Me. 252, attach-

had title save for statute which ing creditors.

declared that title should not pass 12 — Coors v. Reagan, 44 Colo,

till payment, but buyer from him 126; Lincoln v. Guynn, 68 Md. 299,

was not protected; Riley v. Dillon, 6 Am. St. Rep. 446; Mertz v. Stew-

148 Ala. 283, dictum; Harkness v. art, 211 HI. Ap. 508, "possession of

Russell, 118 U. S. 663, citing much personalty is prima facie evidence

authority; Ballard v. Burgett, 40 of ownership." VanDuzor v. Allen,

N. Y. 314, citing authority and set- 90 111. 499; M. C. R. R. Co. v.

tling doubt in New York; Menke Phillips, 60 111. 191; Haak v. Lind-

v. First Natl. Bank., — Tex.— , 206 erman & Skeer, 64 Pa. 499; Cf.,

S. W. 693; Ocean S. S. Co. v. So. Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa.

207

In a few jurisdictions, however, this does not hold and
one in posse siou under a ontract of conditional ·ale can
sell in such a way that his buyer will be protected against
the original owner. 12 This doctrine, embodied in statutes
in many other states, may be economically wise, but it is
inconsistent with kindred rules. Either it is illogical, or
they are. When the seller is in possession, his appearance of ownership is the same whether he acquired that
possession by contract to buy, by hire, by loan, or by theft.
If the buyer knows how his seller got possession, he knows
that his seller has no title. If the buyer does not know
how his seller got possession, then the manner of possession can not affect the seller's appearance of title, or right
to sell. The doctrine of these decisions, which protect the
innocent purchaser when the seller is in possession under
a conditional sale contract, can not be estopped, for the
same reasons would apply to other cases of possession, in
which the innocent buyer is not protected. The only other
explanation is to say that the "conditional buyer" really
has title and that what the seller by conditional sale really
reserves is something less than title. This finds express
support in some cases which allow suit for the purchase
price after the conditional seller has retaken possession
on account of the buyer's def a ult. But other cases are

States Naval Stores Co., 145 Ga. 431; Wender Coal Co. v. Louisville

798; Palmer v. Howard, 72 Cal. Property Co., 137 Ky. 339.

Rich, 22 Utah 196; Albany Warehouse Co. v. Fisk Cotton Co., 16
Ala. Ap. 256, 76 So. 988, person in
possession would ordinarily have
had title save for statute which
declared that title should not pass
till payment, but buyer from him
was not protected; Riley v. Dillon,
148 Ala. 283, dictum; Harkness v.
Russell, 118 U. S. 663, citing much
authority; Ballard v. Burgett, 40
N. Y. 314, citing authority and settling doubt in New York; Menke
v. First Natl. Bank., - Tex.-, 206
S. W. 693; Ocean S. S. Co. v. So.
States Naval Stores Co., 145 Ga.
798; Palmer v. Howard, 72 Cal.

293; Studebaker Bros. v. Mau, 13
Wyom. 358; Freed Furniture Co.
v. Sorenson, 28 Utah 419; Leighton v. Stevens, 22 Me. 252, attaching creditors.
12-Coors v. Reagan, 44 Colo.
126; Lincoln v. Guynn, 68 Md. 299,
6 Am. St. Rep. 446; Mertz v. Stewart, 211 Ill. Ap. 508, "possession of
personalty is prima facie evidence
of ownership." VanDuzor v. Allen,
90 Ill. 499; M. C. R. R. Co. v.
Phillips, 60 Ill. 191; Haak v. Linderman & Skeer, 64 Pa. 499; Cf.,
Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa.
431; Wender Coal Co. v. Louisville
Property Co., 137 Ky. 339.
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quite out of harmony. The real reason is probably eco-

nomic.

"Whatever interest in the goods the seller does have,

however, will pass to his buyer and such buyer stands in

his seller's place in respect to trespassers, or as to the

right to acquire title from the real owner.^^

But purely contractual rights do not pass to the buyer

except by specific assignment.^*

Estoppel. — Although merely to entrust another with

possession of property does not give him such appear-

ance of ownership as reasonably to mislead one who buys

from him, and though the real owaier is not in such case

THE LAW OF SALES

quite out of harmony. The real reason is probably econorrnc.
Whatever interest in the goods the seller does have,
however, will pass to his buyer and such buyer stands in
his seller's place in respect to trespassers, or as to the
right to acquire title from the real owner. 13
But purely contractual rights do not pass to the buyer
except by specific assignment. 14

estopped from setting up his title against one who claims

to have been misled, the owner may do such other things

in addition to giving possession as mil create in the pos-

sessor a legally sufficient appearance of ownership. In

such case, the real owner, having so acted as to mislead a

buyer from the one in possession, will be precluded from
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asserting his title against that buyer. Thus, in Leavitt v.

Fairbanks,^^ the real o^vner was held estopped to assert

his title because, for many months after he knew that the

defendant had bought the goods, he sat quiet and made no

attempt to recover them. So, in Grace v. McKissock,^^

the real OAvner lost his title because, having been asked by

the buyer if he had an interest in the goods, he said

nothing about his title. Again, in O'Connor v. Clark,"

the real owTier of a wagon allowed the person in posses-

sion to paint his, the possessor's, o^vn name on it for the

very purpose of making him appear to be owner. The

court held the real owner estopped to set up his title. ^^

13 — Ante, p. 176. 18 — Johnston v. Milwaukee, etc.

li— Ante, p. 199. ^°' ^^ ^®^- ^^^' ^^^ ^^ ^° ""^"'

dorsed notes, Subletts v. Brewing-

15—92 Me. 521. ^.^^^ ^39 j^j^ ^p 410,1228. W.1150:

16—49 Ala. 163. Marling v. Fitzgerald, 138 Wis. 93,

17—170 Pa. 318. 120 N. W. 388.

Estoppel.-Although merely to entrust another with
possession of property does not give him such appearance of ownership as reasonably to mislead one who buys
from him, and though the real owner is not in such case
estopped from setting up his title against one who claims
to have been misled, the owner may do such other things
in addition to giving possession as will create in the possessor a legally sufficient appearance of ownership. In
such case, the real owner, having so acted as to mislead a
buyer from the one in possession, will be precluded from
asserting his title against that buyer. Thus, in Leavitt v.
Fairbanks,15 the real owner was held estopped to assert
his title because, for many months after he knew that the
defendant had bought the goods, he sat quiet and made no
attempt to recover them. So, in Grace v. 11:cKissock, 16
the real owner lost his title because, having been asked by
the buyer if he had an interest in the goods, he said
nothing about his title. Again, in 0 'Connor v. Clark, 17
the real owner of a wagon allowed the person in possession to paint his, the possessor's, O\vn name on it for the
very purpose of making him appear to be owner. The
court held the real owner estopped to set up his title. 18
13-Ante, p. 176.
14-Ante, p. 199.

15-92 Me. 521.
16-49 Ala. 163.
17-170 Pa. 318.

Di 'ti

18-Johnston v. Milwaukee, etc.
Co., 46 Neb. 480; cf., as to unindorsed notes, Sublett e v. Brewington, 139 Mo. Ap. 410, 122 S. W.1150:
Marling v. Fitzgerald, 138 Wis. 93,
120 N. W. 388.

b

N ER ET ARCH VE

Origir-al fr

UNIVERS

1

0 CAl -O N

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS 209

Particular Types of Property. — There is a tendency

to change this strict rule, and to modify its application

to certain types of property. Money, for instance, passes

from a mere possessor to purchaser in good faith quite

free from any rights of the original owner. This is

possibly on the ground that money has no ear-marks of

identification; more probably for reasons of economic

policy. So also, those instruments which were negotiable

by the law-merchant and its supplementary statutes now

pass from one person to another, free from the rights of

an unconsenting original owner. Bonds, in the form of an

unconditional promise to pay to bearer, or to the order

of a named person, are generally held to pass free from

equities under these rules.^^

Many courts apply this exception, more or less incon-

sistently, to other property in the form of written obli-

gations. Thus the lawful possession of stock certificates

has been held to give the possessor power to vest a title
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in a buyer without notice.^" So also power to pass title

has been extended to one intrusted with mere possession

of other instruments.^^

But even the exception in regard to stock-certificates,

209

Particular Types of Property.-There is a tendency
to change this strict rule, and to modify its application
to certain types of property. :~.Toney, for instance, passes
from a mere possessor to purchaser in good faith quite
free from any rights of the original owner. Th~s is
possibly on the ground that money has no ear-marks of
identification; more probably for reasons of economic
policy. So also, those instruments which were negotiable
by the law-merchant and its supplementary statutes now
pass from one person to another, free from the rights of
an unconsenting original owner. Bonds, in the form of an
unconditional promise to pay to bearer, or to the order
of a named person, are generally held to pass free from
equities under these rules. 19

warrants, and other documents not covered by the Law

Merchant, does not apply to persons in possession with-

out the real owner's consent. They must have been ** en-

trusted" with possession by the owner. Thus the man-

ager of a corporation who takes stock-certificates from

its safe and sells them without its consent, does not vest

19 — Pratt V. Higginson, 230 sell; Walker v. Detroit Transit

Mass. 256. Ry. Co., 47 Mich. 338.

20— Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 21— Scollans v. Rollins, 179

86 Pa. 80, by Implication and die- Mass. 346, "non-negotiable" bond;

turn; Russell v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.. Delfosse v. Metropolitan Nat'l

180 Mass. 467, in view of custom; Bank, 98 111. Ap. 123, city warrant

Many courts apply this exception, more or less inconsistently, to other property in the form of written obligations. Thus the lawful possession of stock certificates
has been held to give the possessor power to vest a title
in a buyer without notice. 20 So also power to pass title
has been extended to one intrusted with mere possession
of other instruments. 21

Burton's Appeal, 93 Pa. 214; Mc- for payment; Brown v. Perera,

Neil V. Tenth National Bank, 46 ^q n. Y. S. 215, paper money ol

N. Y. 325, but only because in- foreign countries.

dorsed in blank with a power to

But even the exception in regard to stock-certificates,
warrants, and other documents not covered by the Law
Merchant, does not apply to persons in possession without the real owner's consent. They must have been "entrusted" with possession by the owner. Thus the manager of a corporation who takes stock-certificates from
its safe and sells them without its consent, does not vest
19-Pratt v. Higginson, 230
Mass. 256.
20-Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal,
86 Pa. 80, by implication and dictum; Russell v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.,
180 Mass. 467, in viev;,r of custom;
Burton's Appeal, 93 Pa. 214; McNeil v. Tenth National Bank, 46
N. Y. 325, but only because indorsed in blank with a power to

sell; Walker v. Detroit Transit
Ry. Co., 47 Mich. 338.
21-Scollans v. Rollins, 179
Mass. 346, "non-negotiable" bond;
Delfosse v. Metropolitan Nat'l
Bank, 98 Ill. Ap. 123, city warrant
for payment; Brown v. Perera,
176 N. Y. S. 215, paper money ot
foreign countries.
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a title in the buyer, because he was not entrusted with

possession by the company."

Bills of Lading. — As to whether one in lawful posses-

THE LAW OF SALES

a title in the buyer, because he was not entrusted with
possession by the company. 22

sion of a bill of lading or a warehouse receipt, properly

indorsed, can give a bona fide purchaser the title which

he himself has not, there is much confusion. Writers

generally indicate that mere possession of an indorsed

bill of lading is such evidence of title as will estop the

one who has created that appearance from setting up

his own title. The actual authority, however, is scant

and uncertain. In National Bank v. Baltimore & Ohio

R. R. Co.,^^ for instance, A sold lumber to B and put

him in possession, but with a reservation of title in A

till payment. B then delivered the lumber to a carrier

and got a bill of lading. This bill he sold to C, who

bought in good faith. The court held that C acquired

title even against A. Superficially this case indicates

that the possessor of a bill of lading can pass a title
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although he himself has none. But, in fact, Maryland

is one of the few jurisdictions in which one in possession

of goods themselves, under a conditional sale contract,

can vest his buyer with title. So the case means nothing

as to the effect of possession of a bill of lading com-

pared with possession of the goods themselves. Again,

in Munroe v. Phila. Warehouse Co.,^* the purchaser of

a bill of lading from one in mere lawful possession of

it was protected. But it is not improbable that a state

statute declaring bills of lading to be "negotiable" had

22 — Knox V. Eden Music Co., of a properly indorsed certificate

148 N. Y. 441; Scollans v. Rollins, of stock by any one in possession

179 Mass. 346, dissenting opinion; will vest title in a bona fide pur-

Belknap v. Nat'l Bk., 100 Mass. chaser.

376, by analogy. 23—99 Md. 61. 105 Am. St. 321.

This has been changed by stat- 24—75 Fed. 545, aff'd., 79 Fed.

ute In some states, so that the sale 999.

Bills of Lading.-As to whether one in lawful possession of a bill of lading or a warehouse receipt, properly
indorsed, can give a bona fide purchaser the title which
he himself has not, there is much confusion. Writers
generally indicate that mere possession of an indorsed
bill of lading is such evidence of title as will estop the
one who has created that appearance from setting up
his own title. The actual authority, however, is scant
and uncertain. In National Bank v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R. Co., 23 for instance, A sold lumber to B and put
him in possession, but with a reservation of title in A
till payment. B then delivered the lumber to a carrier
and got a bill of lading. This bill he sold to C, who
bought in good faith. The court held that C acquired
title even against A. Superficially this case indicates
that the possessor of a bill of lading can pass a title
although he himself has none. But, in fact, Maryland
is one of the few jurisdictions in which one in possession
of goods themselves, under a conditional sale contract,
can vest his buyer with title. So the case means nothing
as to the effect of possession of a bill of lading compared with possession of the goods ·themselves. Again,
in Munroe v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 24 the purchaser of
a bill of lading from one in mere la \Vf ul possession of
it was protected. But it is not improbable that a state
statute declaring bills of lading to be "negotiable" had
22-Knox v. Eden Music Co.,
148 N. Y. 441; Scollans v. Rollins,
179 Mass. 346, dissenting opinion;
Belknap v. Nat'l Bk., 100 Mass.
376, by analogy.
This has been changed by statute in some states, so that the sale

Di itiL

by

NTERNET ARCHIVE

of a properly indorsed certificate
of stock by any one in possession
will vest title in a bona fide purchaser.
23-99 Md. 61, 105 Am. St. 321.
24-75 Fed. 545, aff'd., 79 Fed.
999.
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something to do with the fact that it went "free from
equities. " 25
On the other hand, there is some precise authority
to the effect that ~he buyer of a bill of lading in possession of the seller is no better off than he would have been
had the seller merely possessed the goods themselves. 26 *)
Furthermore, whatever may be the rule in cases where
the possessor of the bill of lading has been entrusted
therewith by the owner, lthe rule is clear tb,at possession
of a bill of lading not entrusted to the possessor by the
owner does not enable the possessor to invest its buyer
with any rights superior to those of the real owner J
This is true even though t~e owner had entrusted posses-
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something to do with the fact that it went ''free from

equities. '"^^

On the other hand, there is some precise authority

to the effect that (the buyer of a bill of lading in posses-

sion of the seller is no better off than he would have been

had the seller merely possessed the goods themselves.^^*)

Furthermore, whatever may be the rule in cases where

the possessor of the bill of lading has been entrusted

therewith by the owner, (the rule is clear that possession

of a bill of lading not entrusted to the possessor by the

owner does not enable the possessor to invest its buyer

with any rights superior to those of the real owner.J

This is true even though the owner had entrusted posses-

25— Cf. Miller v. Browarski, 130

Pa. 372; In Commercial Bank v.

Armsby Co., 120 Ga. 74, sometimes

cited for the proposition that pos-

session of the bill of lading is
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sufficient evidence of title to estop

the one who has entrusted pos-

session to the defrauder, there are

extraneous circumstances indi-

cating implied authority to sell

which were probably the real

25-Cf. Miller v. Browarski, 130
Pa. 372; In Commercial Bank v.
Armsby Co., 120 Ga. 74, sometimes
cited for the proposition that possession of the bill of lading is
sufficient evidence of title to estop
the one who has entrusted possession to the defrauder, there are
extraneous circumstances indicating implied authority to sell
which were probably the real
basis of the decision. In Pollard
v. Reardon, 65 Fed. 848, the rule as
to retention of possession by a
seller undoubtedly had some effect. Willinghams Sons v. McGuffin, 18 Ga. Ap. 658.
26-Stollenwerck v. Thacher,
115 Mass. 224, "A bill of lading,
even when in terms running to
order or assigns, is not negotiable,
like a bill of exchange, but a
symbol or representative of the

basis of the decision. In Pollard

V. Reardon, 65 Fed. 848, the rule as

to retention of possession by a

seller undoubtedly had some ef-

fect. Willinghams Sons v. Mc-

Guffin, 18 Ga. Ap. 658.

26 — Stollenwerck v. Thacher,

115 Mass. 224, "A bill of lading,

even when in terms running to

order or assigns, is not negotiable,

like a bill of exchange, but a

symbol or representative of the

goods themselves; and the rights

arising out of the transfer of a

bill of lading correspond, not to

those arising out of the indorse-

ment of a negotiable promise for

the payment of money, but to

those arising out of a delivery of

the property itself under similar

circumstances. * * * But so long

as the bill of lading remains in the

hands of the original party, or of

an agent intrusted with it for a

special purpose, and not author-

ized to sell or pledge the goods,

a person who gets possession of

it without the authority of the

owner, although with the assent

goods themselves; and the rights
arising out of the transfer of a
bill of lading correspond, not to
those arising out of the indorsement of a negotiable promise for
the payment of money, but to
those arising out of a delivery of
the property itself under similar
circumstances. * * * But so long
as the bill of lading remains in the
hands of the original party, or of
an agent intrusted with it for a
special purpose, and not authorized to sell or pledge the goods,
a person who gets possession of
it without the authority of the
owner, although with the assent
of the agent, acquires no title as
against the principal." Baker Co.
v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196; Burton
v. Curyea, 40 Ill. 320, 89 Am. Dec.
350; Commercial Bank v. Canal
Bank, 239 U. S. 520.

of the agent, acquires no title as

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 31, ff. See also the related provisions of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act.

against the principal." Baker Co.

V. Brown, 214 Mass. 196; Burton

V. Curyea, 40 111. 320, 89 Am. Dec.

Various state statutes have declared bills of lading to be "negotiable". As to their meaning, see Shaw v. Railroad, 101 U. S. 557;
Tiedman v. Knox, 53 Md. 612; Hardie v. Railroad, 118 La. 254.

350; Commercial Bank v. Canal

Bank, 239 U. S. 520.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 31, ff. See also the related pro-

visions of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act.

Various state statutes have declared bills of lading to be "nego-

tiable". As to their meaning, see Shaw v. Railroad, 101 U. S. 557;

Digitize by

Origi al from

I TE NET ARCHIVE

LINIVERS TY OF CA IFOR IA

•

Tiedman v. Knox, 53 Md. 612; Hardie v. Railroad, 118 La. 254.

212 THE LAW OF SALES

sion of the goods to the person who thereby was enabled

to get a bill of lading for them.'*'

3. PUECHASEES FEOM SeLLEE REMAINING IN POSSESSION

Aftee Passing Title

There is a type of case in which one who has posses-

sion only, without either title or authority to sell, can

invest another, who takes from him in good faith, with

rights superior to those of the true owner. This is the

case where a buyer has allowed his seller to remain in

possession after title has passed and an innocent third

person is misled thereby.*

Fraud as a Reason. — These cases, considered as a mat-

ter of result rather than of theory, are divided into two

groups. The primary decision on this point is Twyne's

case2^ decided in 1601. A statute of 13 Elizabeth

provided, in effect, that all grants intended to hinder

or defraud creditors should be void, in so far as they

accomplished that result. In Twyne's Case, the seller
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had continued in possession of the goods and the court

considered this, along with other matters, as evidence of

intent to defraud. The sale was, therefore, set aside.

The first group of cases is in harmony with Twyne's

Case, although they may go somewhat further. They

hold that retention of possession by the seller is prima

27— Decan V. Shipper, 35 Pa. 239, 57 Ga. 410; Commercial Bk. v.

78 Am. Dec. 334; Hart v. Boston Hurt, 99 Ala. 130, 12 So. 568; Seal,

& M. R. R. Co., 72 N. H. 410, prop- Lawson & Co. v. Zell & Sons, 63

erty itself had been entrusted to Md. 356; Mechanics & Traders

defrauder; Merchants Nat'l Bk. v. Bk. v. Farmers etc. Bk., 60 N. Y.

Bates. 148 Ala. 279, property itself 40; The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575; Saltua

had been stolen; Raleigh & G. R. v. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267,

R. Co. V. Lowe, 101 Ga. 320, biU of 32 Am. Dec. 541.

lading had been stolen by the 2g 3 Coke 80

seller; Tison & Gordon v. Howard,

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 25.
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facie evidence of fraud in the first transaction and, be-

cause of this fraud, it will be set aside in favor of subse-

quent bona fide buyers or attaching creditors. This

prima facie inference of fraud is rebuttable, however, by

proof that there was in fact no fraud intended.

According to these decisions, "no transaction shall be

considered fraudulent, which is not so in point of fact.

* * * Possession remaining with the vendor, after an

absolute sale of personal property, is a badge of fraud,

devolves on the party the necessity of showing that the

transaction is honest, and that a sufficient considera-

tion has been paid for it. By so doing, the apparent

incongruity of the ownership not being with the posses-

sion is explained; and certainly the plaintiff has no

claim on the principles of justice, to have his execution

satisfied out of property which does not belong to the

defendant in execution".^®

In the case just quoted from, the court indicates that
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mere payment of proper consideration and good faith in

the transaction generally, is sufficient to rebut the pre-

sumption of fraud arising from the retention of posses-

sion.^"

29 — Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala. cizing its adoption by the Supreme

354. The court eliminates a cor- Court, in Hamilton v. Russell, 1

related but entirely different Cranch 309, and discussing the

problem which has caused confu- original authorities generally.

§ion in other cases by saying, Mayer v. Clark, 40 Ala. 259 ; Hight

"Should the property be suffered v. Harris, 56 Ark. 98, delivery of

to remain so long, that the pos- title and delivery of possession

sessor acquired a delusive credit hopelessly confused in verbiage,

from the apparent ownership after but although there was in fact no

such sale, another question de- delivery of possession and no

pending on different principles sound reason for its retention yet

would arise, which it is not neces- the first buyer was protected;

sary to determine at this time." Burke v. Sharp, 88 Ark. 433;

30— That retention of possession Fleming v. Townseud, 6 Ga. 103,

facie evidence of fraud in the first transaction and, because of this fraud, it will be set aside in favor of subsequent bona fide buyers or attaching creditors. This
prima facie inference of fraud is rebuttable, however, by
proof that there was in fact no fraud intended.
According to these decisions, ''no transaction shall be
considered fraudulent, which is not so in point of fact.
* * * Possession remaining with the vendor, after an
absolute sale of personal property, is a badge of fraud,
devolves on the party the necessity of showing that the
transaction is honest, and that a sufficient con ideration has been paid for it. By so doing, the apparent
incongruity of the ownership not being with the possession is explained; and certainly the plaintiff has no
claim on the principles of justice, to have his execution
satisfied out of property which does not belong to the
defendant in execution' '. 29
In the case just quoted from, the court indicates that
mere payment of proper consideration and good faith in
the transaction generally, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of fraud arising from the retention of possession.30

creates only a rebuttable presump- "the question of fraud or not is

tion of fraud, see: Hobbs v. Bibb, submitted to the jury;" but cf.

2 Stew. (Ala.) 54, rejecting the Beers v. Dawson, 8 Ga. 556; Jones

"fraud per se" rule of Edwards v. v. Newberry, 16 Ga. Ap. 424, 85 S.

Harben, 2 Term R. 587, and criti- E. 617; Bryant v. Kelton.l Tex. 415,

29-Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala.
354. The court eliminates a correlated but entirely different
problem which has caused confu~ion in other cases by saying,
"Should the property be suffered
to remain so long, that the possessor acquired a delusive credit
from the apparent ownership after
such sale, another question depending on different principles
would arise, which it is not necessary to determine at this time."
30-That retention of possession
creates only a rebuttable presumption of fraud, see: Hobbs v. Bibb,
2 Stew. (Ala.) 54, rej ecting the
"fraud per se" rule of Edwards v.
Harben, 2 T·e rm R. 587, s.nd criti-

Di .ti

cizing its adoption by tJ:ie 8npreme
Court, in Hamilton v. Russell, 1
Cranch 309, and discussmg the
original
authorities
generally.
Mayer v. Clark, 40 Ala. 259; Hight
v. Harris, 56 Ark. 98, delivery of
title and delivery of possession
hopelessly confused in verbiage,
but although there was in fact no
delivery of possession and no
sound reason for its retention yet
the first buyer was protected;
Burke v. Sharp, 88 Ark. 433;
Fleming v. Townsend, 6 Ga. 103,
"the question of fraud or not is
submitted to the jury;" but cf.
Beers v. Dawson, 8 Ga. 556; Jones
v. Newberry, 16 Ga. Ap. 424, 85 S.
E. 617; Bryant v. Kelton, l Tex. 415,

b

NTER JET ARCH VE

Origi al fr m

UNIVERS

OF CALIFO

JIA

214
214 THE LAW OF SALES

Policy as a Reason. — The second group comprises those

decisions whicli hold that, where the seller has retained

possession, the first sale will be ineffective against sub-

sequent purchasers and attaching creditors, quite regard-

less of whether the first transaction was tainted with

fraud or not. The results in this group of cases are

essentially similar, but the different theories upon which

these results are reached subdivide the group into four

classes.

One class puts the result on the theory that as between

immediate parties title will pass without any change of

possession, but that delivery of possession is necessary

to pass the title as against subsequent purchasers and

creditors who take possession. The vague meaning given

to ''title" in such statements speaks for itself. But the

result is clear ; the first buyer, unless he takes possession,

loses his rights in respect to the goods as against the

subsequent bona fide takers, quite regardless of any real
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fraudulent purpose in the first sale or in the retention of

possession.^^

A second sub-group puts the loss of the first buyer's

rights upon the ground of ' ' public policy. ' ' They recog-

nize that, as between the parties, title may have passed

without delivery of possession.^^ But, frankly disregard-

ful of the question of fraudulent intent, they set the first

buyer's title aside in favor of the subsequent purchasers

and creditors as a matter of sound policy. This theory

is, however, so often undistinguished from that of the

third group as to make actual separation of the decisions

impossible.

discussing the original author- quent purchasers or attaching

Itles; Hlggins v. Spahr, 145 Ind. creditors, that there should be a

167. delivery of the property" — the

31 — Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. question of fraud or good faith

110; Dempsey v. Gardner, 127 was not allowed to go to the jury.

Mass. 381, "by the law as estab- 32— Frost v. Woodruff, 54 III.

llshed In this Commonwealth, it 155; Corgan v. Frew, 39 111. 31.

was necessary, as against subse-
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Policy as a Reason.-The second group comprises those
decisions which hold that, where the seller has retained
possession, the first sale will be ineffective against subsequent purchasers and attaching creditors, quite regardless of whether the first transaction was tainted with
fraud or not. The results in this group of cases are
essentially similar, but the different theo ries upon which
these results are reached subdivide the group into four
classes.
One class puts the result on the theory that as between
immediate parties title will pass without any change of
possession, but that delivery of po ssession is necessary
to pass the title as against subsequent purchasers and
creditors who take possession. The vague meaning given
to ''title'' in such statements speaks for itself. But the
result is clear; the first buyer, unless he takes possession,
loses his rights in respect to the goods as against the
subsequent bona fide takers, quite regardless of any real
fraudulent purpose in the first sale or in the retention of
possession. 31
A second sub-group puts the loss of the first buyer's
rights upon the ground of ''public policy.'' They recognize that, as between the parties, title may have passed
\vithout delivery of possession. 32 But, frankly disregardful of the question of fraudulent intent, they set the first
buyer's title aside in favor of the subsequent purchasers
and creditors as a matter of sound policy. This theory
i , however, so often undistinguished from that of the
il1iTd group as to make actual separation of the decisions
jmpos ible.
discussing the original authorities; Higgins v. Spahr, 145 Ind.
167.
31-Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.
110; Dempsey v. Gardner, 127
Mass. 381, "by the law as established in this Commonwealth, it
was necessary, as against subseDI 111.l
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question of fraud or good faith
was not allowed to go to the jury.
32-Frost v. Woodruff, 54 Ill.
155; Corgan v. Frew, 39 111. 31.
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The theory of the third class is that fraud in the first

transaction is the reason for setting it aside in favor of

creditors and later buyers. But in order to carry out a

general policy of setting the first transaction aside re-

gardless of the presence or absence of actual fraud, they

introduce a fiction, a pure pretense. They hold that the

retention of possession is "constructive fraud," or is

** conclusive evidence" of fraud. As a consequence of

this pretense, a sale under which possession has not been

delivered to the buyer is ''fraudulent in law, as to cred-

itors and subsequent purchasers, notwithstanding the

sale may have been in good faith and for an adequate

consideration. ' '^^

But even in these states, where fraud is really immate-

rial and the retention of possession is the true reason

for invalidating the first sale, the rule is not applied

absolutely. By the introduction of another fiction the

courts avoid it in some cases. "Where there is in fact
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no fraud, and the actual delivery of possession is physi-

cally impracticable, they are apt to hold that ''where

an actual delivery by taking or removing the property is

impracticable, a symbolic deliver}^ will answer."^* But

these courts will not apply this doctrine of constructive

delivery merely because there was in fact no fraud;

33 — O'Leary v. Bradford, 39 111. by statute, Brooklyn Cooperage

Ap. 182, dictum; Corr^an v. Frew, Co. v. Cora etc. Co., 137 La. 807;

39 111. 31; Huschle v. Morris, 131 Bass v. Abeles, 143 Mo. Ap. 274,

111. 587, even though retention of 126 S. W. 1002; Rankin v. Schultz,

possession was specifically pro- 141 la. 681, 118 N. W. 383.

vlded for in the bill of sale; Bass 34— Lewis v. Swift, 54 111. 436;

V. Pease, 79 111. Ap. 308. Ticknor v. McClelland, 84 111. 471;

Gardiner v. McDonough, 147 Thompson v. Wilhite, 81 111. 356,

Cal. 313, inextricably confused constructive delivery of growing

with the doctrine of implied corn sufficient; Jewett v. Lincoln,

authority to resell; Daniel v. Mor- 14 Me. 116, 31 Am. Dec. 36. Hobba

rison's Exr. 6 Dana (Ky.) 182; v. Carr, 127 Mass. 532; W^estem

Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219. Mining Co. v. Quinn, 40 Mont. 156,

Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch 135 Am. St. Rep. 612; Ingalls v

309, fixing the rule for the Federal Hcrrick, 108 Mass. 392; Cf., how-

Courts, ever, Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.

The theory of the third class i that _fraud in the first
transaction is the reason for setting it aside in faYor of
creditors and later buyers. But in order to carry out a
general policy of setting tho first tran action aside regardless of the presence or absence of actual fraud, they
introduce a :fiction, a pure pretense. They hold that the
retention of possession is ''constructive fraud,'' or is
''conclusive evidence'' of fraud. As a consequence of
this pretense, a sale under which possession has not been
delivered to the buyer is "fraudulent in law, as to creditors and subsequent purchasers, notwithstanding the
sale may have been in good faith and for an adequate
consideration.' ' 33
But even in these states, where fraud is really immaterial and the retention of possession is the true reason
for invalidating the first sale, the rule is not applied
absolutely. By the introduction of another fiction the
courts avoid it in some cases. Where there is in fact
no fraud, and the actual delivery of possession is physically impracticable, they are apt to hold that ''where
an actual delivery by taking or removing the property is
impracticable, a symbolic delivery will answer.' ' 34 But
these courts will not apply this doctrine of constructive
delivery merely because there was in fact no fraud;

In some states the rule is fixed 110.

33-0'Leary v. Bradford, 39 Ill.
Ap. 182, dictum; Cor ~an v. Frew,
39 Ill. 31; Huschle v. :\1orris, 131
III. 587, even though retention of
possession was specifically provided for in the bill of sale; Bass
v. Pease, 79 Ill. Ap. 308.
Gardiner v. McDonough, 147
Cal. 313, inextricably confused
with the doctrine of implied
authority to resell; Daniel v. Morrison's Exr. 6 Dana (Ky.) 182;
Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219.
Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch
309, fixing the rule for the Federal
Courts.
In some states the rule is fixed
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by statute, Brooklyn Cooperage
Co. v. Cora etc. Co., 137 La. 807;
Bass v. Abeles, 143 Mo. Ap. 274,
126 S. W. 1002; Rankin v. Schultz,
141 Ia. 681, 118 N. W. 383.
34-Lewis v. Swift, 54 Ill. 436;
Ticknor v. McClelland, 84 Ill. 471;
Thompson v. Wilhite, 81 Ill. 356,
constructive delivery of growing
corn sufficient; Jewett v. Lincoln,
14 1\Ie. 116, 31 Am. Dec. 36. Hobbs
v. Carr, 127 Mass. 532; Western
Mining Co. v. Quinn, 40 Mont. 156,
135 Am. St. Rep. 612; Ingalls v .
Herrick, 108 Mass. 392; Cf., however, Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.
110.
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there must have been some real impracticability in the

way of actual dehvery.^^

The fourth sub-class of this group sets the first salo

aside regardless of actual fraud, but evidences distinct

uncertainty as to just why it is so set aside.

Thus in Connecticut it was decided in Meade v. Smith^^

that title passed irrespective of delivery of possession,

not only as between the parties, but as to third persons

as well. A retention of possession by the seller, said

the court, or a revesting of possession in him after a

formal delivery to the buyer, "furnishes, in all cases,

presumptive evidence that the sale was fraudulent, open

however to explanation." And in this case the court

held the explanation quite sufiicient to rebut the presump-

tion. But some years later, in Hatstat v. Blakeslee,^"^

it appeared that the buyer of a wagon, who had taken

actual possession, returned it to the seller to be painted.

Creditors of the seller thereafter attached it, and the court
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held that the buyer's rights were lost, saying, ''This

rule of law, that the retention of possession of personal

property by the vendor is conclusive evidence of a color-

able sale, is a rule of policy, required for the prevention

of fraud, and is to be inflexibly maintained. "^^

Still later, the opinion in Huebler v. Smith^^ com-

bined this conflict into one case. The court quoted with

approval the statement in Hatstat v. Blakeslee, and

others to the effect that, "That the retention of posses-

sion of personal property by the vendor after a sale

raises a presumption of fraud w^hich cannot be repelled

35 — Thompson v. Wilhite, 81 111. 38— Lucas v. Birdsey, 41 Conn.

356, transaction admittedly with- 357, "The policy of our Jaw for-

out fraud, nevertheless fact that bids the retention by the vendor

buyer employed seller to feed the of the possession of personal chat-

hogs sold held no evidence of tels after a sale, and, except as

change of possession; Cobb v. botw^een the parties, makes such

Haskell, 14 Me. 303, 31 Am. Dec. retention very strong, if not in-

56. deed conclusive evidence of a

36 — IG Conn. 346. colorable sale." (dictum.)

37—41 Conn. 302. 39—62 Conn. 186.

there must have been some real impracticability in the
way of actual delivery. 85
The fourth sub-class of this group sets the first sale
aside regardless of actual fraud, but evidences distinct
uncertainty as to just why it is so set aside.
Thus in Connecticut it was decided in :Meade v. Smith 36
that title passed irrespective of delivery of possession,
not only as between the parties, but as to third persons
as well. A retention of possession by the seller, said
the court, or a revesting of possession in him after a
formal delivery to the buyer, ''furnishes, in all cases,
presumptive evidence that the sale was fraudulent, open
however to explanation.'' And in this case the court
held the explanation quite sufficient to rebut the presump, tion. But some years later, in Hatstat v. Blakeslee,37
it appeared that the buyer of a wagon, who had taken
actual possession, returned it to the seller to be painted.
Creditors of the seller thereafter attached it, and the court
held that the buyer's rights were lost, saying, "This
rule of law, that the retention of possession of personal
property by the vendor is conclusive evidence of a colorable sale, is a rule of policy, required for the prevention
of fraud, and is to be inflexibly maintained.' ' 38
Still later, the opinion in Huebler v. Smith 39 combined this conflict into one case. The court quoted with
approval the · statement in Hatstat v. Blakeslee, and
others to the effect that, "That the retention of possession of personal property by the vendor after a sale
raises a presumption of fraud which cannot be repelled
35-Thompson v. Wilhite, 81 Ill.
356, transaction admittedly with·
out fraud, nevertheless fact that
buyer e mplo yed selle r to fe ed the
hogs sold h eld no evidence of
change of possession; Cobb v.
H askell, 14 Me. 303, 31 Am . Dec.
66.
36- 16 Conn. 346.
37- 41 Conn. 302.
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38-Lucas v. Birdsey, 41 Conn.
357, "The policy of our law for-

bids the retention by the vendor
of the possession of personal chattels after a sa le, and, exce pt as
between the parties, makes such
retention very strong, if not indeed con lusive evidence of a
colorable sale." (dictum.)
39- 62 Conn. 186.
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by any evidence that the transaction was bona fide and

for valuable consideration, is still adhered to and en-

forced by the courts of this state with undiminished

rigor, as a most important rule of public policy. * * •

The reason of extending it from a mere rule of evid'ence,

calling it a badge of fraud only, and arbitrarily declar-

ing, as a matter of law, that it renders the sale void as

to creditors, notwithstanding the highest evidence as to

the honesty of the sale, is because it has been thought

better to take away the temptation to practice fraud than

to incur the danger arising from the facility with which

testimony may be manufactured to show that a sale was

honest." Despite this strong statement, however, the

court held that where the sale was a judicial one con-

ducted by an officer of the court and there was really

no fraud, the rule did not apply, although the original

owner was left by the buyer in continued possession.

Probably the true rule represented by this group of
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decisions is that stated in Osborne v. Tuller*°, that the

retention of possession invalidates the buyer's title,

regardless of what the jury may think as to good faith,

but does not invalidate it if the court is convinced that

there was some sound reason for the retention, such as

impracticability of actual change. In these cases it is

not mere absence of actual fraud which will protect the

buyer, but some positive justification for the retention

of possession is required.'*^

40—14 Conn. 529. er. 29 N. J. L. 250, overruling the

41 — Gibson v. Love, 4 Fla. 217, statement as to the conclusive

the possession indicates fraud un- presumption in Chumar v. Wood,

less explained, "as for instance. 6 N. J. L. 155; Nelson v. Good, 20

that the sickness of the slave S. C. 223; but cf. Pringle v.

Henry made his delivery impos- Rhame, 10 Rich. L. (S. C.) 72,

sible;" Volusia County Bk. v. Ber- where actual fraud or not was said

tola, 44 Fla. 734; Gardiner Bk. v. to be for jury; Preguali v. Miller,

Hodgdon, 14 Me. 453; Coburn v. 21S. C. 385; Sturdevant v Ballard.

Pickering, 3 N, H. 415; McDon- 9 Johns. (N. Y) 337: Dickman v.

ough V. Prescott, 62 N. H. 600, Cook, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 332; Clay-

Chamberlain Co. V. Tuttle, 75 .K ton v. Anthony, 6 Rand. (Va.)

H 171, 71 Atl. 865; Miller v. Shrev- 285; Davis v. Turner, 4 Grat. (Va.)

by any evidence that the transaction was bona fide and
for valuable consideration, is still adhered to and enforced by the courts of this tate with undiminished
rigor, as a most. important rule of public policy. • • •
The reason of extending it from a mere rule of evidence,
calling it a badge of fraud only, and arbitrarily declaring, as a matter of law, that it renders the sale void as
to creditors, noh~rithstanding the highes t evidence as to
the honesty of the sale, is because it has been though i
better to take away the t emptation to practice fraud than
to incur the danger arising from the facility ·with which
testimony may be manufactured to show that a sale was
honest." Despite this strong statement, however, th e
court held that where the sale was a judicial one conducted by an officer of the court and there was really
no fraud, the rule did not apply, although the original
owner was left by the buyer in continued possession.
Probably the true rule represented by this group of
decisions is that stated in Osborne v. Tuller 40 , that the
retention of possession invalidates the buyer's title,
regardless of what the jury n1ay think as to good faith.
but does not invalidate it if the court is convinced that
there was some sound reas on for the retention, such as
impracticability of achtal change. In these cases it is
not mere absence of actual fraud which will protect the
buyer, but some positive justification for the retention
of possession is required. 41
40-14 Conn. 529.
41-Gibson v. Love, 4 Fla. 217,
the possession indicates fraud unless explained, "as for instance.
that the sickness of the slava
Henry made his delivery impossible;" Volusia County Bk. v. Bertola, 44 Fla. 734; Gardiner Bk. v.
Hodgdon, 14 Me. 453; Coburn v.
Pickering, 3 N. H. 415; McDonough v. Prescott, 62 N. H. 600,
Chamberlain Co. v. Tuttle, 75 N
H 171, 71 Atl. 865; Miller v. Shrev-

e. .
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er. 29 N. J. L . 250, overruling the
statement as to the conclusive
presumption in Chumar v. Wood,
6 N. J. L. 155; Nelson v. Good, 20
S. C. 223; but cf. Pringle v.
Rhame, 10 Ri ch. L. (S. C.) 72,
where actual fraud or not was said
to be for jury ; Pregnaii '\. l\Iiller,
21 S. C. 385; Sturdevant v Ballard.
9 Johns. (N. Y) 337: Dickman v.
Cook, 17 Johns. ( •. Y.) 332; Clayton v. Anthony, 6 Rand. (Va.)
285; Davis v. Turner, 4 Grat . (Va.)
Jr.::i.r . fr ..
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The whole matter is further complicated by the asser-

tion or denial of many courts, no matter in what group

their actual decisions belong, that if the retention of

possession is provided for specifically by the bill of sale,

it is not fraudulent.*^

The effect of retention, whatever it be in the differ-

ent jurisdictions, runs not only in favor of subsequent

purchasers, but of attaching creditors as well. It is not

even essential that the creditor shall have been actually

misled by the seller's retention, for the legal effect of

retention relates to prior creditors as well as to those

subsequent to the first sale.'*^* But one who became a

creditor subsequent to the sale, with actual knowledge of

the sale, can not have it avoided in his favor.**

What Constitutes Possession. — In none of these cases

is change of position considered as necessary to actual

change of possession.*^
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423, overruling the earlier rule of

conclusive presumption; Cf., Curd

V. Miller, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 185.

Poling V, Flanagan, 41 W. Va. 191;
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The whole matter is further complicated by the assertion or denial of many courts, no matter in what group
their actual decisions belong, that if the retention of
possession is provided for specifically by the bill of sale,
it is not fraudulent. 42
The effect of r etention, whatever it be in the different jurisdictions, runs not only in favor of subsequent
purchasers, but of attaching creditors as well. It is not
even essential that the creditor shall have been actually
misled by the seller's retention, for the legal effect of
retention relates to prior creditors as well as to those
subsequent to the first sale. 43 * But one who became a
creditor subsequent to the sale, with actual knowledge of
the sale, can not have it avoided in his favor. 44

Blocker v. Burners, 2 Ala. 354, dis-

senting opinion; Cocke v. Chap-

man, 7 Ark. 197; Field v. Simea,

7 Ark. 269.

42 — Hamilton v. Russell, 1

Cranch 309; Holliday v. McKinnie,

22 Fla. 153; Bass v. Pease, 79 III.

What Constitutes Possession.-In none of these cases
is change of position considered as necessary to actual
change of possession. 45

Ap. 308; Cf. Huschle v. Morris, 131

III. 587; Osborne v. Tuller, 14

Conn. 529, explaining that It

means "legally" consistent with

the deed.

43— Gibson v. Love, 4 Fla. 217,

surety on seller's bond protected;

Johnson v. Holloway, 82 111. 334,

prior creditors; Fleming v. Town-

send, 6 Ga. 103, subsequent credi-

tors; Streeper v. Eckart, 2 Whar-

ton 302, 30 Am. Dec. 258; Ander-

son V. Anderson, 64 Ala. 403,

whether claim is contingent or

absolute; Bongard v. Block, 81 111.

186, id.; Reade v. Livingston, 3

Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec.

520; cf. Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow.

(N. y.) 406.

44 — Kane v. Roberts, 40 Md.

590, constructive notice; Sledge

v. Oberehain, 58 Miss. 670, id.;

Lehmberg v. Biberstein, 51 Tex.

457.

45— Finer v. Cover, 55 111. 391;

Jewett V. Lincoln, 14 Me. 116, 31

Am. Dec. 36; Bass v. Pease, 79

111. Ap. 308; Cf., as to what con-

stitutes change of possession,

nooley V. Pease, 180 U. S. 126;

Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219.

423, overruling the earlier rule of
conclusive presumption; Cf., Curd
v. Miller, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 185.
Poling v. Flanagan, 41 W. Va. 191;
Blocker v. Burners, 2 Ala. 354, dis·
sen ting opinion; Cocke v. Chap·
man, 7 Ark. 197; Field v. Simeo,
7 Ark. 269.
42-Hamilton v. Russell, 1
Cranch 309; Holliday v. McKinnie,
22 Fla. 153; Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill.
Ap. 308; Cf. Huschle v. Morris, 131
Ill. 587; Osborne v. Tuller, 14
Conn. 529, explaining that it
means "legally" consistent with
the deed.
43-Gibson v. Love, 4 Fla. 217,
surety on seller's bond protected;
John son v. Holloway, 82 Ill. 334,
prior reditors; Fleming v. Townsend, 6 Ga. 103, subsequent credi·
tors; Streeper v. Eckart, 2 Wharton 302, 30 Am. Dec. 258; Ander-

son v. Anderson, 64 Ala. 403,
whether claim is contingent or
absolute; Bongard v. Block, 81 Ill.
186, id.; Reade v. Livingston, 3
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 481, 8 Am. Dec.
520; cf. Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow.
(N. Y.) 406.
44-Kane v. Roberts, 40 Md.
590, constructive notice; Sledge
v. Oberehain, 58 Miss. 670, id.,·
Lehmberg v. Biberstein, 51 Tex.
457.
45-Piner v. Cover, 55 Ill. 391;
Jewett v. Lincoln, 14 Me. 116, 31
Am. Dec. 36; Bass v. Pease, 79
Ill. Ap. 308; Cf., as to what constitutes change of possession,
Dooley v. Pease, 180 U. S. 126;
Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219.
Delivery to carrier, consigned
to buyer, is sufficient, Cary v.
Williams, 47 Colo. 256, 107 Pac. 219.

Delivery to carrier, consigned

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 26.

to buyer. Is sufficient, Gary v.

Williams, 47 Colo. 256, 107 Pac. 219.

D1 1tize by

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 26.
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Bills of lading and other documents whicli evidence a

carrier's or warehouseman's possession of property and

which must be surrendered to the carrier or warehouse-

man in order to secure possession of the property are

sometimes treated for purposes of title as though they

were the goods themselves. Possession of such documents

is theoretically the possession of the goods. Hence a

transfer of possession of such a bill of lading or ware-

house receipt is theoretically transfer of possession of the

goods. Even in states absolutely requiring transfer of

possession to perfect a buyer's title as against subse-

quent purchasers from the seller, it is possible that the

transfer of a bill of lading representing the property

would be sufficient.*^ There is, however, an obvious un-

reality in pretending that possession of the bill of lading

is possession of the goods. Like all pretenses it is potent

for trouble. When one bill of lading is the only key by

which actual possession may be had, it is justifiable to give
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its possession the effect of possession of the goods. But

when it is not the only key, such a holding defies all the

reasons on w^iich the setting aside of the first buyer's title

is based.

4. Purchasers from One Who has Title, but not

Possession

Subject to Original Owner's Rights. — A seller who does

not have possession, but does have title, can invest his

46 — The leading case is Barber from the carrier Myerstein then

M. Myerstein, L. R. 4 H. of L. 317, brought suit as owner of the

In which one Abraham, the owner goods, and the court upheld his

of property represented by a bill claim, saying, "When the vessel

of lading in triplicate, pledged the is at sea and the cargo has not

property to Myerstein and gave yet arrived the parting with the

him possession of two copies of bill of lading is parting with that

the bill of lading. Later on Abra- which is the symbol of property,

ham pledged the same goods to and which for the purpose of con-

219

Bills of lading and other docun1ents which evidence a
carrier's or warehouseinan 's possession of property and
which must be surrendered to the carrier or warehouseman in order to secure posse sion of the property are
sometimes treated for purposes of title as though they
were the goods then1selves. Possession of such documents
is theoretically the possession of the goods. Hence a
transfer of posses ion of such a bill of lading or warehouse receipt is theoretically transfer of possession of the
goods , Even in states absolutely requiring transfer of
possession to perfect a buyer's title as against subsequent purchasers from the seller, it is possible that the
transfer of a bill of lading representing the property
would be sufficient. 46 There is, however, an obvious unreality in pretending· that possession of the bill of lading
is possession of the goods. Like all pretenses it is potent
for trouble. When one bill of lading is the only key by
which actual possession may be had, it is justifiable to give
its possession the effect of possession of the goods. But
when it is not the only key, such a holding defies all the
reasons on which the setting aside of the first buyer's title
is based.

Barber and gave him possession veying a right and Interest In the

of the third copy of the bill of property, is the property itself."

lading. Barber used his copy first, Accord, Broadwell v. Howard, 77

4.

PURCHASERS FROM ONE

and got possession of the goods 111. 305.

wHO HAS TITLE, BUT NOT

POSSESSION

Subject to Original Owner's Rights.-A seller who does
not have possession. but does have title, can invest his
46-The Jeading case is Barber
v. Myerstein, L . R. 4 H. of L. 317,
in which one Abraham, the owner
of property represented by a bill
of Jading in triplicate, pledged the
property to Myerstein and gave
him possession of two copies of
the bill of Jading. Later on Abraham pledged the same goods to
Barber and gave him possession
of the third copy of the bill of
lading. Barber used his copy first,
and got possession of the goods

from the carrier Myerstein then
brought suit as owner of the
goods . and the court upheld his
claim, saying. "When the vessel
fe at sea and the cargo has not
yet arrived the parting with the
biIJ of ~ading is parting with ~hat
which is the symbol of property,
and which for the purpose of conveying a right and interest in the
property, is the property itself."
Accord, Broadwell v. Howard, 77
Ill. 305.
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buyer with what he has, namely, title. But he can not

by the sale cut off the rights of the original owner. These

rights of the original seller are, as we have seen, only

the right of a seller's lien and its extension by way of

stoppage m transitu. So long as the seller retains

possession, in the absence of credit to the buyer he

has a lien upon the goods themselves for payment.*''

This right exists even though the title itself has

passed to a third person who paid for it in ignorance of

any outstanding rights. The second seller's lack of pos-

session is sufficient to put a purchaser from him on notice

of such rights.*^ But the sub-purchaser having acquired

such rights as his seller did have, has a right to acquire

possession by tendering payment before the lien has been

enforced.*^

Likewise, a seller's right to stop in transitu upon dis-

covery of his buyer's insolvency is not lost through that

buyer's having resold even to a purchaser in good faith
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— unless the latter buys on the strength of a bill of

lading.^"

47 — Ante, p. 111. Ga. 70, 79 Am. St. 26, even though

48 — Perrine v. Barnard, 142 Ind. an unindorsed bill of lading was

448; McElwee v. Metropolitan given to the sub-buyer; Pattisou

Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Robin- v. Crilton, 33 Ind. 240, 5 Am. Rep.

son V. Morgan, 65 Vt. 37; Tuthill 199, making an express distinction

V. Skidmore, 124 N. Y. 148; between the resale without trans-

M'Ewan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. 309. fer of a bill of lading and one ac-

49 — Pardee v. Kanady, 100 N. Y. companied by such transfer; Ilsley

121; New England Iron Co. v. Gil- v. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65, 6 Am. Dec.

bert etc. Co., 91 N. Y. 153, by 29; Sheppard v. Newhall, 54 Fed.

analogy. 306, unaffected by delivery of unin-

50 — Kemp v. Falk, L. R. 7 App. dorsed bill of lading; Holbrook v.

Cas. 573, cited in McElwee v. Vose, 19 N. Y. Superior 76; Delta
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buyer with what he has, namely, title. But he can not
by the sale cut off the rights of the original owner. These
rights of the original seller are, as we have seen, only
the right of a seller's lien and its extension by way of
stoppage in transitu. So long as the seller retains
possession, in the absence of credit to the buyer he
has a lien upon the goods themselves for payment. 47
This right exists even though the title itself has
passed to a third person who paid for it in ignorance of
any outstanding rights. The second seller's lack of possession is sufficient to put a purchaser fron1 him on notice
of such rights. 48 But the sub-purchaser having acquired
such rights as his seller did have, has a right to acquire
possession by tendering payment before the lien has been
enf oreed. 49
Likewise, a seller's right to stop in transitu upon discovery of his buyer's insolvency is not lost through that
buyer's having resold even to a purchaser in good f.aith
-unless the latter buys on the strength of a bill of
lading. 50

Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed. Bag Co. v. Kearns, 112 111. Ap. 269;

302; Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind. Clapp Bros. v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa

240, 5 Am. Rep. 199, but here, al- 273; Ocean S. S. Co. v. Ehrlich, 88

though the court talks of stoppage Ga. 502, 30 Am. St. 164, even

in transitu, the title was in fact though the bill of lading was

still in the seller and he was shown, but not delivered, to the

merely retaking his own goods; sub-buyer, the freight receipts

Eaton V. Cook, 32 Vt. 58, dictum; given him and he received a part

Brenan v. Atlanta etc. R. R., 108 of the goods from the carrier;

47-Ante, p. 111.

48-Perrine v. Barnard, 142 Ind.
448; McElwee v. Metropolitan
Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302; Robinson v. Morgan, 65 Vt. 37; Tuthill
v. Skidmore, 124 N. Y. 148;
M'Ewan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. 309.
49-Pardee v. Kanady, 100 N. Y.
121; New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert etc. Co., 91 N. Y. 153, by
analogy.
60-Kemp v. Falk, L. R. 7 App.
Cas. 573, cited in McElwee v.
Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed.
302; Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind.
240, 5 Am. Rep. 199, but here, although the court talks of stoppage
in trQtn,situ, the title was in fact
still in the s Iler and h e was
merely r taking his own goods;
Eaton v. Cook, 32 Vt. 58, dictum;
Brenan v. Atlanta etc. R. R., 108
D1g1t1z
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Ga. 70, 79 Am. St. 26, even though
an unindersed bill of lading was
given to the sub-buyer; Pattison
v. Crilton, 33 Ind. 240, 5 Am. Rep.
199, making an express distinction
between the resale without transfer of a bill of lading and one accompaniea by such transfer; Ilsley
v. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65, 6 Am. Dec.
29; Sheppard v. Newhall, 54 Fed.
306, unaffected by delivery of unindorsed bill of lading; Holbrook v.
Vose, 19 N. Y. Superior 76; Delta
Bag Co. v. Kearns, 112 Ill. Ap. 269;
Clapp Bros. v. Sohmer, 55 Iowa
273; Ocean S. S. Co. v. Ehrlich, 88
Ga. 502, 30 Am. St. 164, even
though the bill of lading was
shown, but not delivered, to the
sub-buyer, the freight receipts
given him and he received a part
of the goods from the carrier;
ng1r I fr m
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Purchase of Bill of Lading. — The seller's right to stop

is defeated, however, if he has put his buyer in possession

of a properly indorsed bill of lading which the latter

transfers to his own buyer.* This was decided in the case

of Lickbarrow v. Mason.^^ It appeared that the buy^r had

pledged the goods and delivered the bill of lading to Lick-

barrow. But the seller, having discovered that the buyer

was bankrupt, retook possession of the goods from the car-

rier. Lickbarrow then sued in trover. The intermediate

appellate court decided that title had never passed to the

buyer and that Lickbarrow therefore got no title. The

House of Lords, however, held that title had passed to the

buyer. The seller's only right against the goods, therefore,

was the right to stop in transitu. But by the buyer's

pledge to Lickbarrow his title passed to the latter. The

question was thus squarely presented, whether Lickbar-

row 's title was subject to the original seller's right to stop

in transitu. The House of Lords held that it was not so
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subject. This decision it put clearly on the ground that

the right to stop in transitu is an equity and will prevail

against a bare legal title, but it will not prevail against

one who, having bought for a fair consideration, has him-

self an equity coupled with his legal title.

This equity in the sub-buyer was said to arise from

his having purchased the goods for good consideration

and without notice. The sub-seller's possession of a bill

of lading was not mentioned as having anything spe-

cifically to do with the matter of the sub-purchaser's

equity, although it was discussed in relation to the trans-

fer of title. From the case itself it might be concluded

that a sub-buyer for value and without notice from

one not having a bill of lading would be treated as having

an ''equity" connected with his title and therefore to be

Gass V. Astoria Veneer Mills, 118 51 — 6 East 20, note. 2 Term.

N. Y. S. 982, even though "non- Rep. 63.

negotiable" bill was delivered.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 62.

Purchase of Bill of Lading.-The seller's right to stop
is defeated, however, if he ha s put his buyer in possession
of a properly indorsed bill of lading which the latter
transfers to his own buyer. * Thi wa decided in the case
of Lickbarrow v. Mason. 51 It appeared that the buyer had
pledged the goods and delivered the bill of lading to Lickbarrow. But the seller, having di covered that the buyer
was bankrupt, retook possession of the goods from the carrier. Lickbarrow then sued in trover. The intermediate
appellate court decided that title had never passed to the
buyer and that Lickbarrow therefore got no title. The
House of Lords, however, held that title had passed to the
buyer. The seller's only right against the goods, therefore,
was the right to stop in transitu. But by the buyer's
pledge to Lickbarrow his title passed to the latter. The
question was thu~ squarely presented, whether Lickbarrow 's title was subject to the original seller's right .to stop
in transitii. The House of Lords held that it was not so
subject. This decision it put clearly on the ground that
the right to stop in transitii is an equity and will prevail
against a bare legal title, but it will not prevail against
one who, having bought for a fair consideration, has himself an equity coupled with his legal title.
This equity in the sub-buyer was said to arise from
his having purchased the goods for good consideration
and without notice. The sub-seller's possession of a bill
of lading was not mentioned as having anything specifically to do with the matter of the sub-purchaser'
equity, although it was discussed in relation to the transfer of title. From the case itself it might be conclud d
that a sub-buyer for value and vvithout notice from
one not having a bill of lading would be treated as having
an "equity" connected with his title and therefore to be
Gass v. Astoria Veneer Mills, 118
51-6 East 20, note. 2 Term.
N. Y. S. 982, even though "non- Rep. 63.
negotiable" bill was delivered .
•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 62.
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protected. But while the precise statement on the matter

is somewhat scant, the authorities cited in the preceding

discussion clearly limit the seller's loss of his right to

cases where the sub-buyer has relied on the first buy-

er's possession of a bill of lading.^^

It is still indeterminate what is the effect of a transfer

of a bill of lading after the seller has notified the carrier

of his stoppage in transitu. One phase of the matter was

decided in Newhall v. Central Pacific Er. Co.^^ Two hours

after the seller had notified the carrier not to deliver the

goods, the buyer pledged the bill of lading to the plaintiff.

The latter presented the bill to the carrier and demanded

the goods; the carrier refused because of the seller's

orders to stop, and suit was brought against the carrier.

Judgment was given for the plaintiff. Delivery of the bill

of lading, said the court, had passed the title to him, and

in relying on his seller's possession of the bill of lading

he acquired quite as strong an equity in the goods as

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

though the orders to stop had not been given. Hence,

having both title and an equity, his right to the goods was

superior to that flowing from the seller's bare equity.

This, however, appears to be the first decision precisely

52 — That re-sale with transfer of Nat'l Bk. v. Schmidt, 6 Colo. Ap.

the indorsed bill of lading defeats 216, right is lost by transfer as

stoppage in transitu, see: Chand- security for antecedent debt, cit-

ler V. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. ing authority; Shepard v. Bur-

Dec. 188, making an express dls- rows, 62 N. J. L. 469, mere knowl-

tinction between the case and one edge that goods are not paid for

where there was no transfer of does not affect sub-purchaser's

bill of lading; this case holds also position; Audenreid v. Randall, 3

that knowledge that goods had not Cliff. 99, Fed. Cas. S644. But see,

been paid for would not affect sub- contra, Castanola v. Mo. Pac. R. R.

purchaser's rights, but his knowl- Co., 24 Fed. 267; Lee v. Kimball,

edge of his seller's insolvency 45 Me. 172, even though considera-

would do so. Missouri Pac. R. R. tion was payment of antecedent

protected. But while the precise statement on the matter
is somewhat scant, the authorities cited in the preceding
discussion clearly limit the seller's loss of his right to
cases where the sub-buyer has relied on the first buyer's possession of a bill of lading. 52
It is still indet erminate what is the effect of a transfer
of a bill of lading after the seller h as notified the carrier
of his stoppage in transitu. One phase of the matter was
decided in Newhall v. Central Pacific Rr. Co. 53 Two hours
after the seller h a d notified the carrier not to deliver the
goods, the buyer pledged the bill of lading to the plaintiff.
The latter presented the bill to the carrier and demanded
the goods; the carrier r efu sed because of the seller's
orders to stop, and suit was brought against the carrier.
Judgment was given for the plaintiff. Delivery of the bill
_of lading, said the court, had passed the title to him, and
in relying on his seller's possession of the bill of lading
he acquired quite a s strong an equity in the goods as
though the orders to stop had not been given. Hence,
having both title and an equity, his right to the goods was
superior to that flowing from the seller's bare equity.
Thj s, however, appears to be the first decision precisely

V. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 105, 27 debt; Dymock v. Midland Nat'l

Am. St. 861, even though the bill Bank, 67 Mo. Ap. 97, seller's right

was stamped "duplicate." St. not lost by transfer of bill of lad-

Paul Roller Mill Co. v. Great Ing as security for an antecedent

Western Co.. 27 Fed. 434, as collat- debt,

eral security for antecedent debt. 53—51 Cal. 345, 21 Am. Rep. 713.

62-That re-sale with transfer of
the indorsed bill of lading defeats
stoppage in transitu, see: Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am.
Dec. 188, making an express distinction between the case and one
where there was no transfer of
bill of la ding; this case holds also
that k nowledge that goods had not
been paid for w ould not affect subpurch aser 's rights, but his knowledge of his seller's insolvency
would do so. Missouri Pac. R. R.
v. H eidenheimer, 82 Tex. 105, 27
Am. St. 861, eve n though the bill
w a s st am ped "duplicate."
St.
P a ul Roller Mill Co. v. Great
W estern o .. 27 Fed. 43 4, as collateral secur ity for antecedent debt.
D1giti.l
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Nat'l Bk. v. Schmidt, 6 Colo. Ap.
216, right is lost by transfer as
security for antecedent debt, cit·
ing authority; Shepard v. Bur·
rows, 62 N. J. L. 469, mere knowl·
edge that goods are not paid for
does not affect sub-purchaser's
position; Audenreid v. Randall, 3
Cliff. 99, Fed. Cas. #644. But see,
contra, Castanola v. Mo. Pac. R. R.
Co., 24 Fed. 267; Lee v. Kimball,
45 Me. 172, even though consideration was payment of antecedent
debt; Dymock v. Midland Nat'l
Bank, 67 Mo. Ap. 97, seller's right
not lost by transfer of bill of lading as security for an antecedent
debt.
53-51 Cal. 345, 21 Am. Rep. 713.
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involving the point, aiid was so stated by the court. It is

also, so far as the author has discovered, the only de-

cision involving the particular question.^**

Assuming that the decision in the Newhall case will

stand, there is left undecided the possible case of s'ale of

the bill of lading after the seller had not onlj^ ordered the

goods stopped in transitu, but had also, with a '' dupli-

cate" bill of lading, or without any, secured possession of

the goods. The obvious difficulty in answering this ques-

tion is due to the fact that the whole doctrine growing out

of Lickbarrow v. Mason is illogical. That opinion de-

clared that the sub-buyer had an ecjuity in the goods. But

the sub-buyer did not rely on his' seller 's possession of the

goods. Therefore, if he had an equity, every sub-buyer

who relies on his seller's word should also have an equity.

Possession of the bill of lading is no more indicative of

a title free from someone's else right of stoppage in tran-

situ than is no possession. In fact, it shows that the goods
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are still in transit and therefore subject to stoppage. So

far as Lickbarrow v. Mason is concerned, every sub-

buyer, whether of a bill of lading or not, ivould be pro-

tected. But, in other cases, sub-buyers who have not re-

lied on a bill of lading are not protected. The bill of lad-

ing has therefore been given an illogical value as denoting

a free title. The result is difficulty where the logical and

the illogical meet.

Pledgees. — Even the delivery of a bill of lading defeats

the original seller's right of stoppage only to the extent

of the legal interest created in the third person. If the

latter is a sub-buyer, so that he gets complete o^^^lership,

the original seller's right is lost entirely, no matter what

54— In Poole V. H. & T. C. Ry. that the rights of a taker in good

Co , 58 Tex. 134, there was a trans- faith were not involved. In Bank

fer of the bill of lading after v. Ry Co., 69 Mo. Ap. 246, there is

notice to stop had been given, but a casual dictum in accord with

the taker accepted it with intent Newhall v. Central Pacific R. R.

to defeat a probable stoppage, so

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 62.
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involving the point, and was so tatcd by the court. It is
also, so far as the author has discovered, the only decision involving the particular question. 50
Assuming that the deci ion in the Newhall case will
stand, there is left undecided the possible case of s~ale of
the bill of lading after the seller had not only order ed the
goods stopped in transitu, but had al. o, with a '' duplicate" bill of lading, or without any, secured posses ion of
the goods. The obvious difficulty in answering this question is due to the fact that the whole doctrine growing out
of Lickbarrow v. 1.1ason is illogical. That opinion declared that the sub-buyer had an equity in the goods. But
the sub-buyer did not rely on his seller's possession of the
goods. Therefore, if he had an equity, every sub-buyer
who relies on his seller's word should also have an equity.
Possession of the bill of lading is no more indicative of
a title free from someone's else right of stoppage in transitu than is no possession. In fact, it shows that the goods
are still in transit and therefore subject to stoppage. So
far as Lickbarrow v. 11:ason is concerned, every subbuyer, whether of a bill of lading or not, woitld be protected. But, in other cases, sub-buyers who have not relied on a bill of lading are not protected. The bill of lading has therefore been given an illogical value as denoting
a free title. The result is difficulty where the logical and
the illogical meet.
Pledgees.-Even the delivery of a bill of lading defeats
the original seller's right of stoppage only to the extent
of the legal interest created in the third person. If the
latter is a sub-buyer, so that he gets complete ownership,
the original seller's right is lost entirely, no matter what
54-In Poole v. H. & T. C. Ry.
that the rights of a taker in good
Co , 58 Tex. 134, there was a trans- faith were not involved. In Bank
fer of the bill of lading after v. Ry Co., 69 Mo. Ap. 246, there is
notice to stop had been given, but a casual dictum, in accord with
the taker accepted it with intent Newhall v. Central Pacific R. R.
to defeat a probable stop page, so
*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 62.
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amount the sub-buyer actually paid — provided, of course,

it was not so little as to derogate his good faith. But if

the third person is not a buyer, but a pledgee only, then

his legal interest is to the amount of his pledge only and

the seller's right of stoppage is lost only to that extent.

The right of stoppage still exists against whatever right

in the goods the original buyer may still have.^^

There is some question, however, whether the seller can

stop the goods and thereafter pay the buyer's pledgee the

amount of his interest, or must pay the pledgee before

he can stop the goods. In Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Heiden-

heimer,^^ the carrier was sued by the buyer's pledgee for

refusal to deliver the goods. The defense was, that, the

buyer having become insolvent, the seller had ordered

delivery stopped. The court intimated that the seller

would be protected as to any surplus over the amount of

the pledge, but decided that, ''in any event, it must, we

think, be conceded that if the transfer by way of pledge
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or mortgage, or as collateral security for a loan, does not

absolutely defeat the right of 'stoppage in transitu,' the

seller can not exert that right until he has discharged the

debt secured by the transfer, as his right is subject to

that of the mortgage or pledgee." Consequently, the

carrier was bound to deliver to the pledgee so long as his

right was outstanding. The authority on the matter is

too scant for it to be determined definitely whether satis-

faction of the pledgee 's interest is a condition precedent

to the right to stop or not.

55 — Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. I think that, in equity, the trans-

2, 60 Am. Dec. 188; Spalding v. fer took effect only to the extent

Ruding, 6 Beavan 376, "As against of the consideration paid by the

Thomas (the buyer), I think that transferee, leaving in the plain-

the plaintiffs had a right to stop tiffs an equitable Interest in the

the • goods in transitu; and, al- surplus value." Berndtson v.

though the legal right to the goods Strang, L. R. 4 Equity 481.

was transferred (to Thomas' 5g_g2 Tex. 195, 27 Am. St. 861.

pledgee) with the bill of lading, yet
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amount the sub-buyer actually paid-provided, of course,
it was not so little as to derogate his good faith. But if
the third person is not a buyer, but a pledgee only, then
his legal interest is to the amount of his pledge only and
the seller's right of stoppage is lost only to that extent.
The right of stoppage still exists against whatever right
i~ the goods the original buyer may still have. 55
There is some question, however, whether the seller can
stop the goods and thereafter pay the buyer's pledgee the
amount of his interest, or must pay the pledgee before
he can stop the goods. In 1\fo. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Heidenheimer,56 the carrier was sued by the buyer's pledgee for
refusal to deliver the goods. The defense was, that, the
buyer having become insolvent, the seller had ordered
delivery stopped. The court intimated that the seller
would be protected as to any surplus over the amount of
the pledge, but decided that, "in any event, it must, we
think, be conceded that if the transfer by way of pledge
or mortgage, or as collateral security for a loan, does not
absolutely defeat the right of 'stoppage in transitu,' the
seller can not exert that right until he has discharged the
debt secured by the transfer, as his right is subject to
that of the mortgage or pledgee. '' Consequently, the
carrier was bound to deliver to the pledgee so long as his
right was outstanding. The authority on the matter is
too scant for it to be determined definitely whether satisfaction of the pledgee 's. interest is a condition precedent
to the right to stop or not.
55-Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex.
2, 60 Am. Dec. 188; Spalding v.
Ruding, 6 Beavan 376, "As against
Thomas (the buyer), I think that
the plaintiffs bad a right to stop
the goods in transitu; and, althou gh the legal righ t to the goods
was transf rred (to Thomas'
pledgee) with the bill of lading, yet
D1giti.l
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I think that, in equity, the transfer took effect only to the extent
of the consideration paid by the
transferee, leaving in the plaintiffs an equitable interest in the
surplus value."
Berndtson v.
Strang, L. R. 4 Equity 481.
56-82 Tex. 195, 27 Am. St. 861.
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5. Purchasers from One Who has Possession and a
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HAS POSSESSION AND A

TITLE

Voidable Title

"When both title and possession are in the buyer, the

seller, as we have seen, has no rights at all against the

goods except the right to revest title in himself if the sale

was induced by the buyer's fraud. As, with this excep-

tion, the goods are free from any rights of the seller while

title is in the buyer, it follows that a third person, pur-

chasing from the buyer, or otherwise standing in his

shoes, will hold the goods equally free from any claims

of the seller.

But furthermore, a third person who has purchased

the goods from the buyer, in good faith, acquires a title

which is free even from the seller's right to rescind the

sale because of fraud. That is to say, the original seller's

right to revest title in himself because of the buyer's

fraud is lost if not exercised before his buyer resells to

a third person acting in good faith. So, if A sells goods
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to B and gives B possession, if the transaction was in-

duced b}^ fraud on the part of B, A may revest title in

himself and retake the goods from B. But if before A

does so, B passes on the title to C, who takes it for value

and in good faith, A can not retake the goods from C.

This rule is undoubtedly based on the same principle that

permits a buyer to cut off his seller's right of stoppage

in transitu by sale of the bill of lading. That is to say,

although the buyer has title, it is subject to the defrauded

seller's right to retake it; but when the buyer has passed

his title to a sub-purchaser, the latter has not only title,

but also an equitable right in the goods, and the two to-

gether are superior to the seller's right."*

57 — Truxton v. Fait & Slagle buyer, and he may sell or dispose

Co., 1 Penna. (Del.) 483, 73 Am. of them to a bona fide purchaser

St. Rep. 81, "Until the contract is for value, and thus vest in him a

rescinded or avoided, the title or good, indefeasable, and irrevoc-

property in the goods is in the able title to the property. • • •

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 24.

When both title and possession are in the buyer, the
seller, as we have seen, has no rights at all again~t the
goods except the right to revest title in himself if the sale
was induced by the buyer's fraud. As, with this exception, the goods are free from any rights of the seller while
title is in the buyer, it follows that a third person, purchasing from the buyer, or otherwise standing in his
shoes, will hold the goods equally free from any claims
of the seller.
But furthermore, a third person who has purchased
the goods from the buyer, in good faith, acqui)'es a title
which is free even from the seller's right to rescind the
sale because of fraud. That is to say, the original seller's
right to revest title in himself because of the buyer's
fraud is lost if not exercised before his buyer r esells to
a third person acting in good faith. So, if A sells goods
to B and gives B possession, if the transaction was induced by fraud on the part of B, A may revest title in
himself and retake the goods from B. But if before A
does so, B passes on the title to C, who takes it for value
and in good faith, A can not retake the goods from C.
This rule is undoubtedly based on the same principle that
p ermits a buyer to cut off his seller's right of stoppage
in transitu by sale of the bill of lading. That is to say,
although the buyer has title, it is subject to the defrauded
seller's right to retake it; but when the buyer has passed
his title to a sub-purchaser, the latter has not only title,
but also an equitable right in the goods, and the two together are superior to the seller's right. 57 *
57-Truxton v. Fait & Slagle
Co., 1 Penna. (Del.) 483, 73 Am.
St. Rep. 81, "Until the contract is
rescinded or avoided, the title or
property in the goods is in the

buyer, and he may sell or dispose
of them to a bona fide purchaser
for value, and thus vest in him a
good, indefeasable, and irrevocable title to the property. • • •

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 24.
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Purchaser Not in Good Faith.-A sub-purchaser who
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Purchaser Not in Good Faith. — A sub-purchaser who

has not taken the goods in good faith, or for value,

although he may get his seller's title, does not couple an

equitable right in the goods with it, and is, therefore, in

no better position to resist the original seller's right to

the goods than was the original buyer.^^

A consignee of goods who in good

faith makes advances upon them

has not taken the goods in good faith, or for value,
although he may get his seller's title, does not couple an
equitable right in the goods with it, and is, the ref ore, in
no better position to resist the original seller's right to
the goods than was the original buyer.68

stands precisely in the same posi-

tion as a purchaser for value, as

against the original vendor, and

the same principles of law, in this

regard apply to this case."

Schloss V. Estey, 114 Mich. 429;

Pelham v. Chattahoochee Grocery

Co., 146 Ala. 216, 119 Am. St. Rep.

19, stating the rules as to the bur-
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den of proof; Lee v. Wilkins, 79

Mo. Ap. 159, mortgagee of fraudu-

lent buyer protected; Levi v.

Bray, 12 Ind. Ap. 9, "It is well

settled that even though a sale of

property is induced by fraud the

title vests in the vendee, subject

to the right of the vendor, upon

discovering the fraud to rescind.

Until the vendor elects to rescind,

the title to the property remains

in the vendee, and a sale by him

for value to a third person who is

ignorant of the fraud, vests a good

title in the latter, even against

the original vendor." Wilk v. Key,

Simmons & Co., 117 Ala. 285, as

to sub-buyers who take in pay-

ment of existing debt; Donaldson

V. Byrd & Co., 16 Ky. L. R. 448;

Hochberger v. Baum, 85 N. Y. S.

385; Tetrault v. O'Connor, 8 N. D.

15; National Bk. v. Bait. & O. R. R.

Co., 99 Md. 661, 105 Am. St. Rep.

321; Levi v. Booth, 56 Md. 305,

dictum; B. & O. Ry. Co. v. Good,

82 O. S. 278.

Some few cases indicate that

where the first sale has been in-

duced by fraud it is absolutely

void and vests no title in the buy-

er, but that, apparently arbitrarily,,

a sub-purchaser from him will be

treated as having title. Catlin v.

Warren, 16 111. Ap. 418, but cf.

Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. Sheffy, 99

111. Ap. 189; Root v. French, 13

Wend. (N. Y.) 570.

A sale, or assignment, of a right

against a person, as distinct from

rights in respect to a particular

thing, does not vest the buyer, if

guilty of fraud, with power to pass

A consignee of goods who in good
faith makes advances upon them
stands precisely in the same position as a purchaser for value, as
against the original vendor, and
the same principles of law, in this
regard apply to this case."
Schloss v. Estey, 114 Mich. 429;
Pelham v. Chattahoochee Grocery
Co., 146 Ala. 216, 119 Am. St. Rep.
19, stating the rules as to the burden of proof; Lee v. Wilkins, 79
Mo. Ap. 159, mortgagee of fraudulent buyer protected; Levi v.
Bray, 12 Ind. Ap. 9, "It is well
settled that even though a sale of
property is induced by fraud the
title vests in the vendee, subject
to the right of the vendor, upon
discovering the fraud to rescind.
Until the vendor elects to rescind,
the title to the property remains
in the vendee, and a sale by him
for value to a third person who is
ignorant of the fraud, vests a good
title in the latter, even against
the original vendor." Wilk v. Key,
Simmons & Co., 117 Ala. 285, as
to sub-buyers who take in payment of existing debt; Donaldson
v. Byrd & Co., 16 Ky. L. R. 448;
Hochberger v. Baum, 85 N. Y. S.
385; Tetrault v. O'Connor, 8 N. D.
15; National Bk. v. Balt. & 0. R. R.
Co., 99 Md. 661, 105 Am. St. Rep.
321; Levi v. Booth, 56 Md. 305,
dictum; B. & O. Ry. Co. v. Good,
82 o. s. 278.

Some few cases indicate that
where the first sale has been in·
duced by fraud it is absolutely
void and vests no title in the buyer, but that, apparently arbitrarily,.
a sub-purchaser from him will be
treated as having title. Catlin v.
Warren, ' 16 Ill. Ap. 418, but cf.
Reid, Murdoch & Co. v. Sheffy, 99
Ill. Ap. 189; Root v. French, 13
Wend. (N. Y.) 570.
A sale, or assignment, of a right
against a person, as distinct from
rights in respect to a particular
thing, does not vest the buyer, if
guilty of fraud, with power to pass
his right untainted with the fraud
to an innocent sub-buyer. A contrary rule is found in some jurisdictions. See Williston on Contracts, § 438.
58-Reid, Murdoch & Co. v.
Sheffy, 99 Ill. Ap. 189; Mashburn
& Co. v. Dannenburg Co., 117 Ga.
567, pledgee as security for antecedent debt not protected because
"the debt of the mortgage creditor
was not contracted on the faith
of the property in possession of
the debtor." Schweitzer v. Tracy,
76 Ill. 345, attaching creditor;
Oswego Starch Factory v. Le!ldrum, 57 Iowa 573; Butters v.
Haughwont, 42 Ill. 18, taken in
payment of existing debt, protected; Load v. Green, 15 M. & W.
216, assignee in bankruptcy not
protected.

his right untainted with the fraud

to an innocent sub-buyer. A con-

trary rule is found in some juris-

Di)ti

by

dictions. See Williston on Con-

tracts, § 438.

58— Reid, Murdoch & Co. v.

Sheffy, 99 111. Ap. 189; Mashburn

& Co. V. Dannenburg Co., 117 Ga.
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What Constitutes a Voidable Title. — On the other hand,

as we have already seen, if the first buyer has no title

himself, but only possession, a buyer from him, no matter

how innocent, will get no title. So, where possession is

given to one claiming to be agent of another, if it turns

out that the ''agency" was a fiction and the pretended

agent had no authority to act for his alleged principal, but

was getting possession solely for himself, there is no title

in him. The contract of sale was not made vnth him in-

dividually, but with his principal, through him as agent.

If it turns out that there was in fact no principal for him

to represent, then there was no party on his side of the

contract and, in consequence, no contract. There being

no contract, no title could have passed out of the ' ' seller. ' '

It could not have passed to the fictitious principal ; there

was no intention to pass it to the alleged agent himself ; it

would still be in the seller. The alleged agent, having no

title, although he be in possession, can give no title to a
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purchaser.^^

Some difficulty in applying this rule arises in cases

where the seller does intend to pass title to the physical

person to whom he gives possession, but believes him to be

another, metaphysical, person of a certain name and

credit. Thus, if B represents himself to A as being X and

having X's credit, and A deals with B and puts him in

possession, the question arises, did B get even a voidable

title.

In such a case there are three possibilities as to A's

real intent. He may have intended to pass title to the per-

son represented by the visible characteristics before him.

Or, he may have intended to deal mth a person repre-

ss — Smith Premier Typewriter Mass. 187, even though the alleged

Co. V. Stidger, 18 Colo. Ap. 261, principal was himself the sub-

citing Hamet v. Letcher, 37 O. S. purchaser and the seller sent the

356 and Parker v. Dinsmore, 72 goods direct to him.

Pa. St. 427; Rogers v. Button, 182
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What Constitutes a Voidable Title.-On the other hand,
as we have already seen, if the first buyer has no title
himself, but only possession, a buyer fron1 him, no matter
how innocent, will get no title. So, where possession is
given to one claiming to be agent of another, if it turns
out that the ''agency'' was a :fiction and the pretended ·
agent had no authority to act for his alleged principal, but
was getting possession solely for himself, there is no title
in him. The contract of sale was not made with him individually, but with his principal, through him as agent.
If it turns out that there was in fact no principal for him
to represent, then there was no party on his side of the
contract and, in consequence, no contract. There being
no contract, no title could have passed out of the ''seller.''
It could not have passed to the :fictitious principal; there
was no intention to pass it to the alleged agent himself; it
would still b8 in the seller. The alleged agent, having no
title, although he be in possession, can give no title to a
purchaser. 59
Some difficulty in applying this rule arises in cases
where the seller does intend to pass title to the physical
person to whom he gives possession, but believes him to be
another, meta physical, person of a certain name and
credit. Thus, if B represents himself to A as being X and
having X's credit, and A deals with B and puts him in
possession, the question arises, did B get even a voidable
title.
In such a case there are three possibilities as to A's
real intent. He may have intended to pass title to the person represented by the visible characteristics before him.
Or, he may have intended to deal with a person repre59-Smith Premier Typewriter
Co. v. Stidger, 18 Colo. Ap. 261,
citing Hamet v. Letcher, 37 0. S.
356 and Parker v. Dinsmore, 72
Pa. St. 427; Rogers v. Dutton, 182
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Mass. 187, even though the alleged
principal was himse~f tbe sub·
purchaser and the seller sent the
goods direct to him.
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sented by the nominal and credit characteristics of X,

Or he may have intended to deal with a person repre-

sented by both the visible characteristics before him and

the name and character of X. In the latter case there

would be no contract, because there was no such persoa

and, therefore, there was no ''other side" to a contract

This seems the most probable intent on A's part, but the

courts ignore it. They assume that he intended to deal

with one or the other of the existing personahties. If A

intended to deal with that represented by the name and

credit of X, then, again, there would be no contract. The

person, X, existed, but he did not enter the contract and

therefore, as in the other case, the contract would have

but one side — and would not be truly a contract. But if

A intended to deal with the person represented by the

visible characteristics, then there would be a contract,

even though entered into through mistake, because that

same person intended to contract with A. ,
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When the conflict of possibilities is between the person

of nominal characteristics and the person of visible char-

acteristics — the courts ignore the third possibiUty — intent

to deal with the visible one is assumed.^® But where the

60— Edmunds v. Merchants Dis- [1919] 2 K. B. 243; Martin v.

patch Co., 135 Mass. 283, "We Green, 117 Me. 138; Phelps v.

think it clear, upon principle and McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232 L. R.

authority, that there was a sale, A. 1918 B 973. The rule appears

and the property in the goods to be in dispute in regard to

passed to the purchaser. * * * orders for the payment of money.

The minds of the parties met That is, where a payee is

♦ * *. The fact that the seller was named and the maker of the in-

induced to sell by fraud of the strument gives it to one whom he

buyer made the sale voidable, but supposes to be so named but is in

not void. He could not have sup- fact not that nominal person, some

posed that he was selling to any courts hold that the drawee must

other person; his intention was pay to the nominal person intend-

THE LAW OF SALES

sented by the nominal and credit characteristics of ~
Or he may have intended to deal with a person represented by both the visible characteristics before him and
the name and character of X. In the latter case there
would be no contract, because there was no such person
and, therefore, there was no "other side" to a contract.
This seems the most probable intent on A's part, but the
courts ignore it. They assume that he intended to deal
with one or the other of the existing personalities. If A
intended to deal with that represented by the name and
credit of X, then, again, there would be no contract. The
person, X, existed, but he did not enter the contract and
therefore, as in the other case, the contract would have
but one side-and would not be truly a contract. But if
A intended to deal with the person represented by the
visible characteristics, then there would be a contract,
even though entered into through mistake, because that
same person intended to contract with A.
When the conflict of possibilities is between the person
of nominal characteristics and the person of visible characteristics-the courts ignore the third possibility-intent
to deal with the visible one is assumed. 60 But where the

to sell to the person present, and ed by the drawer and is not pro-

Identified by sight and hearing; it tected in paying to the mere physl-

does not defeat the sale because cal personality whom the draw-

the buyer assumed a false name er thought was the bearer of the

• • • ." This case was cited and name.

followed in Phillips v. Brooks, Dodge v. National Exch. Bk., 20

60-Edmunds v. Merchants Dispatch Co., 135 Mass. 283, "We
think it clear, upon principle and
authority, that there was a sale,
and the property in the goods
passed to the purchaser. • • •
The minds of the parties met
• • • . The fact that the seller was
induced to sell by fraud of the
buyer made the sale voidable, but
not void. He could not have supposed that he was selling to any
other person; his intention was
to sell to the person present, and
identified by sight and hearing; it
does not defeat the sale because
the buyer assumed a false name
• • • ." This case was cited and
follow ed in Ph11lips v. Brooks,

[1919] 2 K. B. 243; Martin v.
Green, 117 Me. 138; Phelps v.
McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232 L. R.
A. 1918 B 973. The rule appears
to be in dispute in regard to
orders for the payment of money.
That is, where a payee is
named and the maker of the instrument gives it to one whom he
supposes to be so named but is in
fact not that nominal person, some
courts hold that the drawee must
pay to the nominal person intended by the drawer and is not protected in paying to the mere physical personality whom the drawer thought was the bearer of the
name.
Dodge v. National Exch. Bk., 20
Ori ir I fr r-
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confusion is between the nominal personality and that
represented by handwriting, or characteristics other than
physical appearance, the rule appears to be to treat the
nominal person as the one really intended.61
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confusion is between the nominal personality and that

represented by handwriting, or characteristics other than

physical appearance, the rule appears to be to treat the

nominal person as the one really intended.^^

Avoidance by Infants. — An infant's right to avoid

--Avoidance by Infants.-An infant's right to avoid
his contract of sale and to retake title and possession of
the chattel sold is not based upon mere equitable right,
but is a matter of public policy in his protection. Consequently, when a third person has acquired the chattel for
value from the infant's buyer, that third person's right
to keep it as against the infant seller does not depend on
a comparison of equities as affected by the legal title. It
depends on whether public policy, as interpreted by the

his contract of sale and to retake title and possession of

the chattel sold is not based upon mere equitable right,

but is a matter of public policy in his protection. Conse-

quently, when a third person has acquired the chattel for

value from the infant's buyer, that third person's right

to keep it as against the infant seller does not depend on

a comparison of equities as affected by the legal title. It

depends on whether public policy, as interpreted by the

O. S. 235; Tolman v. Am. Nat'l Bk.,

22 R. I. 462, 84 Am. St. Rep. 850;

Simpson v. Denver & R. G. R. R.,

43 Utah 105, 46 L. R. A. (n. s.)
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1164; Cf. Mercantile Nat'l Bk. v.

Silverman, 132 N. Y. S. 1017, aff.

210 N. Y. 567.

But contra, Land Title & Tr. Co.

V. Northwestern Bank, 196 Pa.

230, 79 Am. St. Rep. 717, 50 L.

0. S. 235; Tolman v. Am. Nat'l Bk.,
22 R. I. 462, 84 Am. St. Rep. 850;
Simpson v. Denver & R. G. R. R.,
43 Utah 105, 46 L. R. A. (n. s.)
1164; Cf. Mercantile Nat'l Bk. v.
Silverman, 132 N. Y. S. 1017, aff.
210 N. Y. 567.

R. A. 75, annotated; Robert-

eon V. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231;

Heavey v. Com. Nat'l Bk., 27 Utah

222; Hoffman v. Am. Exch. Bk.,

Neb., 96 N. W. 112; Jamieson v,

Heim, 43 Wash. 153; Boatsman v.

Stockman's Nat'l Bk., 56 Colo.

495; McHenry v. Nat'l Bk.,

85 O. S. 203, 38 L. R. A. (n. s.)

1111 N.

But contra, Land Title & Tr. Co.
v. Northwestern Bank, 196 Pa.
230, 79 Am. St. Rep. 717, 50 L.
R. A. 75, annotated; Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231;
Heavey v. Com. Nat'l Bk., 27 Utah
222; Hoffman v. Am. Exch. Bk.,
Neb., 96 N. W. 112; Jamieson v.
Heim, 43 Wash. 153; Boatsman v.
Stockman's Nat'l Bk., 56 Colo.
495; McHenry v. Nat'l Bk.,
85 0. S. 203, 38 L. R. A. (n. s.)
1111 N.
61-Pacific Express Co. v.
Shearer, 160 Ill. 215, rejecting the
decision in Samuel v. Cheney, 135
Mass. 278; Consumers Ice Co. v.
Webster, 53 N. Y. S. 56, dictum
to the effect that physical presence of agent will not dominate
nominal
characteristics.

61 — Pacific Express Co. v.

Shearer, 160 111. 215, rejecting the

decision in Samuel v. Cheney, 135

Mass. 278; Consumers Ice Co. v.

Webster, 53 N. Y. S. 56, dictum

to the effect that physical pres-

ence of agent will not domi-

nate nominal characteristics.

Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459,

name dominated hand-writing.

Newberry v. Norfolk & S. R.

Co., 133 N. C. 45. Some confusion

is caused in these cases by con-

founding the question of which

personality was intended, with the

question whether a carrier is ab-

solutely bound to deliver to the

person so intended. On the lat-

ter question there is considerable

diversity of opinion.

Contra, as to payee of a promis-

sory note. First Natl. Bk. v. Am.

Exch. Bk., 63 N. Y. S. 58, 170 N. Y.

88; in Sherman v. Corn Exch. Bk.,

86 N. Y. S. 341; the real owner of

the goods for which the note was

given was held the proper payee,

Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459,
name d om i n a t e d hand-writing.
Newberry v. Norfolk & S. R.
Co., 133 N. C. 45. Some confusion
is caused in these cases by confounding the question of which
personality was intended, with the
question whether a carrier is absolutely bound to deliver to the
person so intended. On the latter question there is considerable
diversity of opinion.
Oontra, as to payee of a promissory note, First Natl. Bk. v. Am.
Exch. Bk., 63 N. Y. S. 58, 170 N. Y.
88; in Sherman v. Corn Exch. Bk.,
86 N. Y. S. 341; the real owner of
the goods for which the note was
given was held the proper payee,
although the maker had in mind
another person of the same name.
The maker had in mind a person
who had both furnished the consideration and had certain other
characteristics; as there was no
such person the former characteristic was held indicative of the legally proper payee.

although the maker had in mind

another person of the same name.
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courts, requires the right of rescission to be available

even against such third persons. The decided cases indi-

cate that the infant can retake even from them.^**

THE LAW OF SALES

courts, requires the right of rescission to be available
even against such third persons. The decided cases indicate that the infant can retake even from them. 6s-

Avoidance by Insane Persons. — Where the seller

is insane, a purchaser from his buyer is in no better posi-

tion than is that first buyer, but the right of the insane

person to avoid even as against the first buyer varies in

different jurisdictions. The weight of authority is that

he can not avoid against even his owm buyer, who took

in good faith and for fair consideration, without restora-

tion of the consideration.^'

62 — Hill V. Anderson, 5 Smed. & Am. Dec. 409; McMorris v. Webb,

M. (Miss.) 216; Downing v. Stone, 17 S. C. 558, 43 Am. Rep. 629.

47 Mo. Ap. 144. 63— For a compilation of author-

For the analogy of the same ^^y ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Annotated

rule in sales of real property, see cag^g 19^4 d gg?

Harrod v. Myers, 21 Ark. 592, 76
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•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 2.

--Avoidance by Insane Persons.-Where the seller
is insane, a purchaser from his buyer is in no better position than is that first buyer, but the right of the insane
person to avoid even as against the first buyer varies in
different jurisdictions. The weight of authority is that
he can not avoid against even his own buyer, who took
in good faith and for fair consideration, without restoration of the consideration. 63
62-Hill v. Anderson, 5 Smed. &
M. (Miss.) 216; Downing v. Stone,
47 Mo. Ap. 144.
For .the analogy of the same
rule in sales of real property, see
Harrod v. Myers, 21 Ark. 592, 76

Am. Dec. 409; McMorris v. Webb,
17 S. C. 558, 43 Am. Rep. 629.
63-For a compilation of authority see the note in Annotated
Cases, 1914 D 867.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 2.
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CHAPTER VI

The Statute of Frauds

1. Contracts Affected by the Statute

In 1677 the English Parliament put into effect the

CHAPTER VI

Statute of Frauds, This was enacted, according to its

preamble, ^ ' For prevention of many fraudulent practices

which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjuTy

and subornation of perjury." Its several sections cover

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

various contracts and conveyances of land.

The seventeenth section concerns contracts for the

1.

sale of goods and reads, ' ' No contract for the sale of any

CONTRACTS AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE

goods, wares or merchandises for the price of ten pounds

Sterling or upwards shall be allowed to be good except

the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actu-

ally receive the same or give something in earnest to

bind the bargain or in part payment, or that some note

or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made

and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract

or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized."
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The substance of this statute, in slightly varying form,

has been enacted into law in most of the states of the

Union. ^* The application of the rule to particular cases

has been a most prolific source of litigation.

1 — This Statute did not become This Statute should not be con-

a part of the common law and, fused with statutes declaring sales

therefore, is not in force in this in fraud of creditors to be void, as

country except as it has been en- was done in Mahan v. U. S., 16

acted into law by the legislatures Wall. 143.

of the several states. Cleveland v.

Williams, 29 Tex. 204, 94 Am. Dec.

274.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, (1).
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In 1677 the English Parliament put into effect the
Statute of Frauds. This was enacted, according to its
preamble, "For prevention of many fraudulent practices
which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by perju'ry
and subornation of perjury.'' Its several sections cover
various contracts and conveyances of land.
The seventeenth section concerns contracts for the
sale of goods and reads, "No contract for the sale of any
goods, wares or merchandises for the price of ten pounds
Sterling or upwards shall be allowed to be good except
the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same or give something in earnest to
bind the bargain or in part payment, or that some note
or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made
and signed by the parties to be charged by such contract
or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.''
The substance of this statute, in slightly varying form,
has been enacted into law in most of the states of the
Union.u The application of the rule to particular cases
has been a most prolific source of litigation.
1-This Statute did not become
a part of the common law and,
therefore, is not in force in this
country except as it has been enacted into law by the legislatures
of the several states. Cleveland v.
Williams, 29 Tex. 204, 94 Am. Dec.

This Statute should not be confused with statutes declaring sales
in fraud of creditors to be void, as
was done in Mahan v. U. S., 16
Wall. 143.

274.

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, (1).

231
Digitize by

Original fmm

I TERNET A CHIVE

LJNIVERS TY OF CA IFORNIA

THE LAW OF SALES

232
232 THE LAW OF SALES

Executory Contracts. — The first question to arise con-

cerning its application is, '*What is a contract of sale?"

Does it mean a contract by which title has passed and the

change of ownership is judicially recognized, or a con-

tract by which title is to be passed? The English courts

were originally somewhat at variance on this point.

In 1829, however, Parliament settled this disagreement

by the passage of Lord Tenterden's Act,^ which pro-

vided that the 17th Section of the Statute of Frauds

should '* extend to all contracts for the sale of goods of

the value of ten pounds Sterling and upwards, notwith-

standing the goods may be intended to be delivered at

some future time, or may not at the time of such con-

tract be actually made, procured, or provided, or fit or

ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for

the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same

fit for delivery."

"While this later statute has not been generally adopted
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by legislation in this country, the courts have consist-

ently assumed that the Statutes of Fraud in the various

states apply to all contracts, if truly contracts of sale,

regardless of whether title has or has not passed.^*

2 — 9 Geo. IV. Ch. 14. a contract for the sale of goods

3 — Atwater v. Hough, 29 Conn. is not without the purview of the

508, 79 Am. Dec. 229, defendant statute merely because it Is execu-

had contracted to sell to plaintiff tory." Accord, Ide & Smith v.

100 sewing machines for which he Stanton, 15 Vt. 685, 40 Am. Dec.

had already contracted withathird 698; Downs & Skillinger v. Ross,

party. Some of the machines were 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 270, contract was

already manufactured, others were for sale of existing wheat to be

not. No title to any of them was threshed and cleaned by seller;

to pass until actual delivery of Jackson v. Covert's Admrs., 5

possession to the plaintiff. It was Wend. (N. Y.) 139; Irwin v. Knox,

held, nevertheless, that the con- 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 364. "The statute

tract wa.s affected by the Statute. applies as well to executory as to

"It seems now to be settled, in ac- other contracts; and the decisions

cordance with the rules of just in- of the English courts, on this

Executory Contracts.-The first question to arise concerning its application is, "What is a contract of sale~"
Does it mean a contract by which title has passed and the
change of ownership is judicially recognized, or a contract by which title is to be passed~ The English courts
were originally somewhat at variance on this point.
In 1829, however, Parliament settled this disagreement
by the passage of Lord Tenterden 's Act, 2 ·which provided that the 17th Section of the Statute of Frauds
should ''extend to all contracts for the sale of goods of
the value of ten pounds Sterling and upwards, notwithstanding the goods may be intended to be delivered at
some future time, or may not at the time of such contract be actually made, procured, or provided, or fit or
ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for
the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same
fit for delivery."
While this later statute has not been generally adopted
by legislation in this country, the courts have consistently assumed that the Statutes of Fraud in the various
states apply to all contracts, if truly contracts of sale,
regardless of whether title has or has not passed. 3 *

terpretation,aswell as the dictates point, in Rondeau v. Wyatt, 2 H.

of reason and common sense, that Bl. 63, and in Corper v. Elst/on, 7

♦See Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, (2).

2-9 Geo. IV. Ch. 14.
3-Atwater v. Hough, 29 Conn.
508, 79 Am. Dec. 229, defendant
had contracted to sell to plaintiff
100 sewing machines for which he
had already contracted with a third
party. Some of the machines were
already manufactured , others were
not. No title to any of them was
to pass until actual delivery of
possession to the plaintiff. It was
held, nevertheless, that the contract was affect ed by the Statute.
"It seems now to be settled, in accordance with the rules of just inter pr etation , as well as the dictates
of r eason an d ommon sense, that

a contract for the sale of goods
is not without the purview of the
statute merely because it is executory." Accord, Ide & Smith v.
Stanton, 15 Vt. 685, 40 Am. Dec.
698; Downs & Skillinger v. Ross,
23 Wend. (N. Y.) 270, contract was
for sale of existing wheat to be
threshed and cleaned by seller;
Jackson v. Covert's Admrs., 5
Wend. (N. Y.) 139; Irwin v. Knox,
10 Johns. (N. Y.) 364. "The statute
applies as well to executory as to
other contracts; and the decisions
of the Engli sh courts, on this
point, in Rondeau v. Wyatt, 2 H.
Bl. 63, and in Oorper v. Elston, 1

•see Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, (2).
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Contracts to Manufacture and Sell. — The question

whether a contract is a contract of sale or a contract

to do ivork has caused far more difficulty. There is in

fact no general!}'' accepted test by which one can be dis-

tinguished from the other.

English Rule. — The early English decisions, by

233

Contracts to Manufacture and Sell.-The question
whether a contract is a contract of sale or a contract
to do work ha caused far more difficulty. There is in
fact no generally accepted test by which one can be di tingui hed from the other.
~

their holdings that the Statute did not apply to executory

contracts, necessarily confined the Statute to cases in

which title could pass coincidently with the making of the

contract. Contracts for goods to be manufactured were

not within the statute, not expressly because they were

contracts for work and labor, but because title was to

pass in the future.*

When, subsequently, the courts decided that executory

contracts, as well as those whereby title had already

passed, were properly within the Statute, instead of

overruling the preceding decisions they '* distinguished"

them. In Rondeau v. Wyatt^ it was held that the Statute
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did apply even though title to the goods had not passed,

and Lord Loughborough, to avoid the precedent of Tow-

ers V. Osborne,® said that case was outside of the statute

"not because it was an executory contract, as it has been

said, but because it was for work and labor to be done,

and materials and other necessary things to be found,

which is different from a mere contract of sale, to which

species of contract alone the statute is apphcable."

This suggestion that a contract to create a chattel

might be outside the statute was followed in the decision

of Groves v. Buck,'' holding that the statute did not apply

where the thing contracted to be sold was not in existence

Term Rep. 14, contain the sound Statute. Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind.

and just construction of the 522, 55 Am. Rep. 222, 5 N. E. 666.

statute." 4 — Towers v. Osborne, 1 Strange

An oral contract to bequeath 506; Clayton v. Andrews, 4 Bur-

personal property by will, so that rows 2101.

title would not pass until the 5 — 2 H. Bl. 63.

death of the testat^or, has been 6 — 1 Strange, 506.

held within the purview of the 7—3 M. & S. 178 (1814).

--English Rule.-The early English decisions, by
their holdings that the Statute did not apply to executory
contracts, nece arily confined the Statute to cases in
which title could pass coincidently with the making of the
contract. Contracts for goods to be manufactured were
not within the statute, not expressly because they were
contracts for work and labor, but because title was to
pas in the future. 4
"\\Then, subsequently, the courts decided that e:xecutory
contracts, as well as those whereby title had already
passed, ·were properly within the Statute, instead of
overruling the preceding decisions they ''distinguished''
them. In Rondeau v. vVyatt 5 it was held that the Statute
did apply even though title to the goods had not passed,
and Lord Loughborough, to avoid the precedent of Towers v. Osborne, 6 said that case was outside of the statute
"not because it ·was an executory contract, as it has been
said, but because it was for work and labor to be done,
and materials and other necessary things to be found,
\vhich is different from a mere contract of sale, to which
species of contract alone the statute is applicable.''
This suggestion that a contract to create a chattel
might be outside the statute ·was followed in the decision
of Groves v. Buck, 7 holding that the statute did not apply
where the thing contracted to be sold was not in existence
Term Rep. 14, contain the sound
and just construction of the
statute."
An oral contract to beciueath
personal property by will, so that
title would not pass until the
death of the testator, has been
held within the purview of the
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522, 55 Am. Rep. 222, 5 N. E. 666.
4-Towers v. Osborne, 1 Strange
506; Clayton v. Andrews, 4 Bur·
rows 2101.
5-2 H. Bl. 63.
6-1 Strange, 506.
7-3 M. & S. 178 (1814).

Origir.al fr m

UNIVERS TY OF CA IFORNIA

234
234 THE LAW OF SALES

at the time of the contract. In the following year, how-

ever, a contradictory decision was reached in Wilks v.

Atkinson.^ The defendant had contracted to sell to the

plaintiff a quantity of oil to be pressed from seed which

the defendant had. This was held to be a contract of

sale of goods and did not, therefore, require a revenue

stamp. *'A baker," said the court, ^'agrees to produce

me a loaf tomorrow; he has not the bread, but he has

the flour, and is to make it into bread, and deliver it.

How often does a butcher contract to deliver meat, Avhen

he has not the meat, and the beast is not yet killed? It is

out of all common sense to say this is not a contract relat-

ing to goods, wares, and merchandises."®

In Clay v. Yeates^*' the contract sued on was for the

printing of a book, the printer to furnish the paper.

This was held not to be a contract of sale, but one to do

work and labor and, therefore, not required to be in writ-

ing.
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In Lee v. Griffin," however, one of the most frequently

cited cases on the point. Clay v. Yeates was practically

overruled. The contract was for the manufacture and

fitting of a set of false teeth. It was held to be a con-

tract for the sale of goods, and therefore required to be

in writing. Justice Blackburn laid down the general

proposition that '*If the contract be such that, when car-

ried out, it would result in the sale of a chattel, the

party can not sue for work and labor ; but, if the result

of the contract is that the party has done work and labor

which ends in nothing that can become the subject of a

sale, the party can not sue for goods sold and delivered,"

This ''rule" appears to furnish a real test, i. e., if the

contract will result in the transfer of title to a chattel, it

is a contract of sale, regardless of the relative value of

8—6 Taunton 11 (1815). 561 (1829), sale of timber to be

9 — Accord, Garbutt v. Watson, 5 made from seller's own trees.

Bam. & Aid. 613 (1833), sale of iq— i Hurl. & Norm. 73 (1856).

flour to be Kround from wheat; ^^_^ ^^^^^ ^ g^j^j^^ 272 (1861).

Smith V. Surman, 9 Barn. & Cress.,
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at the time of the contract. In the following year, however, a contradictory decision was reached in Wilks v.
Atkinson. 8 The defendant had contracted to sell to the
plaintiff a quantity of oil to be pressed from seed which
the defendant had. This was held to be a contract of
sale of goods and did not, therefore, require a revenue
stamp. ''A baker,'' said the court, ''agrees to produce
me a loaf tomorrow; he has not the bread, but he has
the flour, and is to make it into bread, and deliver it.
How often does a butcher contract to deliver meat, when
he has not the meat, and the beast is not yet killed~ It is
out of all common sense to say this is not a contract relating to goods, wares, and merchandises.' '9
In Clay v. Y eates 10 the contract sued on was for the
printing of a book, the printer to furni sh the paper.
This was held not to be a contract of sale, but one to do
work and labor and, therefore, not required to be in writing.
In Lee v. Griffin, 11 however, one of the inost frequently
cited cases on the point, Clay v. Yeates was practically
overruled. The contract was for the manufacture and
fitting of a set of false teeth. It was held to be a contract for the sale of goods, and therefore required to be
in writing. Justice Blackburn laid down the general
proposition that "If the contract be such that, when curried out, it would result in the sale of a chattel, the
party can not sue for work and labor; but, if the result
of the contract is that the party has done work and labor
which ends in nothing that can become the subject of a
sale, the party can not sue for goods sold and delivered."
This ''rule'' appears to furnish a real test, i. e., if the
contract will result in the transfer of title to a chattel, it
is a contract of sale, regardless of the relative value of
8-6 Taunton 11 (1815).
9-Accord, Garbutt v. Watson, 5
Barn. & Ald. 613 (1833), sale of
ftour to be groun d from wheat;
Smith v. Surman, 9 Barn. & Cress.,
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10- 1 Hurl. & Norm. 73 (1856).
11-1 Best & Smith, 272 (1861).
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the chattel, as such, and of the personal element involved

in its production. But, unfortunately, Blackburn de-

stroys its apparent certainty in his next sentence, saying

that the preparation by an attorney of a deed is a con-

tract of work and labor, despite the fact that the written

paper, when done, is a chattel the ownership of which

is transferred from the attorney to the client. However,

the rule as stated is still the English rule and gives a wide

scope to tho meaning of ** contracts of sale" as used in

the Statute.i2

The most satisfactory statement of the English rule

seems to be that there is a sale, within the Statute of

Frauds, when the contract involves a transfer of title

to a chattel which has an intrinsic value of its own suf-

ficient to be recognized by the courts.

New York Rule. — The courts of the United States,

although recognizing that the Statute applies to executory

contracts, are greatly at variance as to the distinction
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between a contract of sale and one for work and labor.

The New York courts early took the opposite extreme

from the view of the English courts. They admit that

coincident passing of title is not necessary to bring a

contract within the Statute, nor is even the possibility of

the chattel, as such, and of the personal element involved
in its production. But, unfortunately, Blackburn destroys its apparent certainty in his next sentence, saying
that the preparation by an attorney of a deed is a contract of work and labor, despite the fact that the wntten
paper, when done, is a chattel the ownership of which
is transferred from the attorney to the client . . However,
the rule as stated is still the English rule and gives a wide
scope to tho meaning of "contracts of sale" as used in
the Statute. 12
The most satisfactory statement of the English rule
seems to be that there is a sale, within the Statute of
Frauds, when the contract involves a transfer of title
to a chattel which has an intrinsic value of its own sufficient to be recognized by the courts.

immediate passing of title necessary. The Statute applies

to contracts to pass title as well as to those by which title

has been passed.^^ But while thus overruling and discard-

12 — Compounding of a prescrip- 13 — Irwin v. Knox, 10 Johns. (N.

tion by a druggist and transfer of Y.) 364; Jackson v. Covert's Admrs.,

title to the compound is a "sale" 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 139; Downs &

and not a mere contract for "per- Skillinger v. Ross, 23 id. 270;

sonal service." Rex v. Wood Chamberlain v. Jones, 52 N. Y. S.

Green Profiteering Com. [1920], K. 998, contract to sell bonds not then

B. 55, 89 L. J. R. 55; furnishing owned by seller held a contract of

of coffee in a restaurant is a sale; Nichols v. Clark, 81 N. Y. S.

"sale," Rex v. Birmingham Profit- 262; Juilliard v. Trokie, 124 N. Y.

eering Com. [1920], K. B. 57, 89 S. 121, even though the goods be

L. J. R. 59; contract to paint a por- not in existence, if the seller is

trait held a contract for sale, not himself the manufacturer.

Isaacs V. Hardy, 1 Cab. & E. 287.

--New York Rule.-The courts of the United States,
although recognizing that the Statute applies to executory
contracts, are greatly at variance as to the distinction
between a contract of sale and one for work and labor.
The New York courts early took the opposite extreme
from the view of the English courts. They admit that
coincident passing of title is not necessary to bring a
contract within the Statute, nor is even the possibility of
immediate passing of title necessary. The Statute applies
to contracts to pass title as well as to those by which title
has been passed. 13 But while thus overruling and discard12-Compounding of a prescription by a druggist and transfer of
title to the compound is a "sale"
and not a mere contract for "personal service."
Rex v. Wood
Green Profiteering Com. [1920], K.
B. 55, 89 L. J. R. 55; furnishing
of coffee in a restaurant is a
"sale," Rex v. Birmingham Profiteering Com. [1920], K. B. 57, 89
L. J. R. 59; contract to paint a portrait held a contract for sale,
Isaacs v. Hardy, 1 Cab. & E. 287.
D1gitiz

13-Irwin v. Knox, 10 Johns. (N.
Y.) 364; Jackson v. Covert'sAdmrs.,
5 Wend . (N. Y.) 139; Downs &
Skillinger v. Ross, 23 id. 270;
Chamberlain v. Jones, 52 N. Y. S.
998, contract to sell bonds not then
owned by seller held a contract of
sale; Nichols v. Clark, 81 N. Y. S.
262; Juilliard v. Trokie, 124 N. Y.
S. 121, even though the goods be
not in existence, if the seller is
not himself the manufacturer.

Origi al fr m

by

IN ER ET ARCHIVE

U IVERS

OF CALI ORNIA

236
236 THE LAW OF SALES

ing the reasons stated in Towers v. Osborne^* and Clayton

V. Andrews^^, the New York courts do adopt the conclu-

sions of these cases, as explained in Eondeau v. Wyatt.^®

Thus, Sewall v. Fitch" involved a contract by the defend-

ant to sell 300 kegs of nails of a specified kind. The de-

fendant had no nails at hand but was to manufacture

them. The court held that this contract did not need

to be in writing as it was not a contract for the sale

of goods, but one for work and labor. Referring to Tow-

ers V. Osborne and Clayton v, xVndrews the court said

*' those cases were rightly determined though upon a

wrong principle, ' '^*

Complementary to this rule are the decisions that if the

thing sold does exist at the time of the contract it is a

contract of sale within the Statute despite the fact that

something is still to be done to put the thing in a deliv-

erable condition, or to make it fit for use.

Therefore the rule in New York, often called the ' ' New
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York rule," appears to be that a contract, to be a con-

tract of sale within the Statute, must be for the transfer,

whether immediately or in the future, of a chattel in

existence at the time of the contract.^®

14 — 1 strange 506, ante. But, furthermore, unless the seller

15 — 4 Burrows 2101. himself is to manufacture them,

16 — 2 H. Bl. 63, ante. the courts do not inquire where

17—8 Cow. (N. Y.) 215 (1828). he is to get them. It is immaterial

18 — Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. that he must have them manufac-

252, contract to make a circus tent; tured by a third person; his con-

Gerli v. Metzger & Co., 99 N. Y. S. tract with the buyer is treated as

858, 51 Misc. 46; Myers Bros. Drug a contract of sale. Thus it hap-

Co. V. McKinney, 121 N. Y. S. 845. pens that even the New York

19 — While this is clearly the courts do occasionally treat what

idea of the rule and is in sub- is in reality a contract for goods

stance the common judicial state- not in existence as a contract of

ment, it is in one application in- sale. Juilliard v. Trokie, 124 N.

accurate. The fact that the seller Y. S. 121 ; Dow v. Sehloss, 12 Daly
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ing the reasons stated in Towers v. Osborne 14 and Clayton
v. Andrews 15, the New York courts do adopt the conclusion;::, of these cases, as explained in Rondeau v. vVyatt. 16
Thus, Sewall v. Fitch17 involved a contract by the defendant to sell 300 kegs of nails of a specified kind. The defendant had no nails at hand but was to manufacture
them. The court held that this contract did not need
to be in writing as it was not a contract for the sale
of goods, but one for work and labor. Referring to Towers v. Osborne and Clayton v. _._\.ndrews the court said
''those cases were rightly determined though upon a
wrong principle.' ' 18
Complementary to this rule are the decisions that if the
thing sold does exist at the time ·of the contract it is a
contract of sale within the Statute despite the fact that
something is still to be done to put the thing in a deliverable condition, or to make it fit for use.
Therefore the rule in New York, often called the ''New
York rule," appears to be that a contract, to be a contract of sale within the Statute, must be for the transfer,
whether immediately or in the future, of a chattel in
existence at the time of the contract. 19

does not himself own the goods 533; Evarts v. Thorn, 11 N. Y.

at the time of his contract, and State Rep. 668; Pitkin v. Noyes,

therefore, can not deliver imme- 48 N. H. 294; 2 Am. Rep. 218; cf.

diate title, does not prevent the Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94,

contract from being one of sale. 12 Am. Rep. 55; Palewski v. Har-

14-1 Strange 506, ante.
15-4 Burrows 2101.
16-2 H. Bl. 63, ante.
17-8 Cow. (N. Y.) 215 (1828).
18-Higgins v . Murray, 73 N. Y.
252, contract to makeacircustent;
Gerli v. Metzger & Co., 99 N. Y. S.
858, 51 Misc. 46; Myers Bros. Drug
Co. v. McKinney, 121 N. Y. S. 845.
19-While this is clearly the
idea of the rule and is in substance the common judicial statement, it is in one application inaccurate. The fact that the seller
does not himself own the goods
at the time of his ontract, and
therefore, ·an not deliver imm ediat titl , does not prevent the
·ontract from being one of sale.
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But, furthermore, unless the seller
himself is to manufacture them,
the courts do not inquire where
he is to get them. It is immaterial
that he must have them manufactured by a third person; his contract with the buyer is treated as
a contract of sale. Thus it happens that even the New York
courts do occasionally treat what
is in reality a contract for goods
not in existence as a contract of
sale. Juilliard v. Trokie, 124 N.
Y. S. 121; Dow v. Sehloss, 12 Daly
533; Evarts v. Thorn, 11 N. Y.
Stat Rep. 668; Pitkin v. Noyes,
48 N. H. 294; 2 Am. Rep. 218; cf.
Pres ott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94,
12 Am. Rep. 55; Palewski v. HarOrigir I fr m
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But this rule, like its opposite English rule, leaves a

modicum of uncertainty in its application. As inter-

preted by the courts there may be uncertainty as to

just what the chattel is that a particular contract deals

with. In Kellogg v. Witherhead^° the defendant -had

agreed to buy "all the hams aud shoulders plaintiffs

would smoke" at 10c a pound. The agreement was not

in writing. Obviously the question was whether it was a

contract for hams, to be smoked by the plaintiff, or a

contract for smoked hams. The court held that it was

the former. *'Tliis was a contract for sale, not for work

and labor. The plaintiffs were not to make the hams;

they were to smoke them."^^ So, in Fitzsimmons v.

Woodruff*^^ the contract was for a mantel selected at the

plaintiff's store, but which the plaintiff was to set up

in the buyer 's house with certain alterations in it. It was

held a contract for sale of the mantel as it stood.

On the other hand, in Mead v. Case^^ the defendant
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had agreed to take a certain stone monument then in

the plaintiff's shop, but which the plaintiff w^as to polish

and letter with the appropriate names. This was held

to be a contract to make a polished and lettered monu-

ment and therefore not a contract of sale.

Reason of the Different Rules. — The reason for the

difference between the English rule and that of New

greaves, 47 N. J. L. 334; 54 Am. gelded at seller's risk rather than

Rep. 162. But compare, Webster for the gelded animal. Downs v.

V. Zielly, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 482. This Ross, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 270,

subject is discussed in the note wheat, to be threshed and

in 19 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1298. cleaned; Flint v. Corbitt, 6 Daly

20— 6 Thompson & Cook (N. Y.) (N. Y.) 429; Brewster v. Tay-

525. lor, 63 N. Y. 587; sale of a

21 — In Bates v. Coster, 3 Thomp- wagon to be fitted with a new

son & Cook (N. Y.) 580, the plain- pole; Seymour v. Davis, 4 Super,

tiff offered to sell a colt. The de- Ct. (2 Sandf.)- 239, cider to be re-

fendant replied, "If you will cas- fined; Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y.
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But this rule, like its oppo ite Engli:h rule, leave. a
modicum of uncertainty in it· applic tiou. As interpr ted by the courts there may be uncertainty a, to
just what the chattel is that a particular contract deals
with. In Kellogg v. Witherhead 20 the d fendant -had
agreed to buy "all the hams aud shoulders plaintiffs
would smoke" at lOc a pound. The agreement was not
in writing. Obviously the question was whether it was a
contract for hams, to be smoked by the plaintiff, or a
contract for smoked hams. The court held that it was
the former. "This was a contract for sale, not for work
and labor. The plaintiffs were not to make the hams;
they were to smoke them. " 21 So, in Fitzsimmons v.
Woodruff 22 the contract was for a mantel selected at the
plaintiff's store, but which the plaintiff was to set up
in the buyer's house with certain alterations in it. It was
held a contract for sale of the mantel as it stood.
On the other hand, in Mead v. Case 23 the defendant
had agreed to take a certain stone monument then in
the plaintiff's shop, but which the plaintiff was to polish
and letter with the appropriate names. This was held
to be a contract to make a polished and lettered monument and therefore not a contract of sale.

trate him, when he is well I will 352.

give you $1,000 for him. The 22—1 Thompson & Cook 3.

court held that the contract was ^q qq Barb 202

for the existing animal, to be

--Reason of the Different Rules.-The reason for the
difference between the English rule and that of New
greaves, 47 N. J. L. 334; 54 Am.
Rep. 162. But compare, Webster
v. Zielly, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 482. This
subject is discussed in the note
in 19 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1298.
20-6 Thompson & Cook (N. Y.)
525.
21-In Bates v. Coster, 3 Thompson & Cook (N. Y.) 580, the plaintiff offered to sell a colt. The defendant replied, "If you will castrate him, when he is well I will
give you $1,000 for him. The
court held that the contract was
for the existing animal, to be
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gelded at seller's risk rather than
for the gelded animal. Downs v .
Ross, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 270,
wheat, to be threshed and
cleaned; Flint v. Corbitt, 6 Daly
(N. Y.) 429; Brewster v. Taylor, 63 N. Y. 587; sale of a
wagon to be fitted with a new
pole; Seymour v . Davis, 4 Super.
Ct. (2 Sandf.) 239, cider to be refined; Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y.
352.
22-1 Thompson & Cook 3.
23-33 Barb. 202.
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York is not expressed in the decisions. The opinions are

founded on precedent, or original statement that a trans-

action is or is not a "sale," rather than on any logical

reasoning as to the meaning and apphcation of the Stat-

ute. The customary definition of a " sale ' ' is, in effect, a

transfer of the ownership of specific personal property

from one person to another for a consideration valued in

money. By this accepted definition, every contract for

a monetary consideration to make a chattel for another,

which contemplates the ultimate transfer of ownership

of the chattel when made, to the one for whom it is

made, is undeniably a contract of "sale". It may be

primarily an agreement to do work, but since it contem-

plates also the transfer of ownership of the thing to be

made it is, in that respect, a contract to sell the article.

In the literal interpretation of the Statute, therefore, the

English rule is clearly the more logical.

Moreover, as is indicated in other cases, the real pur-
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pose of the Statute is in dispute. Its preamble reads,

"For prevention of many fraudulent practices commonly

endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of

perjury." The tendency to perjury would seem to be

just as great in regard to a contract whose primary pur-

pose is the manufacture of a chattel, ultimately to be

transferred to the other party, as it would be in regard

to a contract whose primary and immediate purpose is

the transfer of ownership. In this view of the Statute,

the English rule, which brings all such contracts within

the Statute, seems clearly the better.

On the other hand, Blackstone's sole comment on the

Statute is that "The Statute of frauds and perjuries

(was) a great and necessary security to private prop-

erty."** If its purpose is to protect the ownership of

property, there is justification for interpreting its use of

"contract of sale" as meaning a contract whose primary

purpose is the transfer of title of existing property.

24 — Commentaries, Bk. 4, p. 440.

THE LAW OF SALES

York is not expressed in the decisions. The opinions are
founded on precedent, or original statement that a transaction is or is not a ''sale,'' rather than on any logical
reasoning as to the meaning and application of the Statute. The customary definition of a ''sale'' is, in effect, a
transfer of the ownership of specific personal property
from one person to another for a consideration valued in
money. By this accepted definition, every contract for
a monetary consideration to make a chattel for another,
which contemplates the ultimate transfer of ownership
of the chattel when ma.de, to the one for whom it is
made, is undeniably a contract of "sale". It may be
primarily an agreement to do work, but since it contemplates also the transfer of ownership of the thing to be
made it is, in that respect, a contract to sell the article.
In the literal interpretation of the Statute, therefore, the
English rule is clearly the more logical.
Moreover, as is indicated in other cases, the real purpose of the Statute is in dispute. Its preamble reads,
''For prevention of many fraudulent practices commonly
endeavored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of
perjury.'' The tendency to perjury would seem to be
just as great in regard to a contract whose primary purpose is the manufacture of a chattel, ultimately to be
transferred to the other party, as it would be in regard
to a contract whose primary and immediate purpose is
the transfer of ownership. In this view of the Statute,
the English rule, which brings all such contracts within
the Statute, seems clearly the better.
On the other hand, Blackstone's sole comment on the
Statute is that ''The Statute of frauds and perjuries
(was ) a great and necessary security to private property. " 24 If its purpose is to protect the ownership of
pr p erty, th r e is justification for interpreting its use of
"contra t of sale " as meaning a contract whose primary
purpose is the transfer of title of existing property.
24-Comme ntaries, Bk. 4, p. 440.
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"While the foregoing may be an explanation of the dif-

ference in the rules there is no clear evidence in the

decisions that it is, and the English cases certainly are

not consistent in treating the Statute as designed pri-

marily to prevent perjury. Probably the best that 'can

be said of any rule as to what constitutes a contract of

sale within the meaning of the Statute is that ''This rule

may not be logical — ^very likely it is not, as an original

proposition; but that it is the rule established by the

authorities there can be no doubt. ' '^^

Massachusetts Rule. — The Massachusetts courts

have taken a position often called "the Massachusetts

rule, ' ' between the extremes of the English rule and that

of New York. They follow the New York rule to the ex-

239

While the foregoing may be an explanation of the difference in the rules there is no clear evidence in the
decisions that it is, and the English cases certainly are
not consistent in treating the Statute as designed primarily to prevent perjury. Probably the best that'can
be said of any rule as to what constitutes a contract of
sale within the meaning of the Statute is that "This rule
may not be logical-very likely it is not, as an original
proposition; but that it is the rule established by the
authorities there can be no doubt.' ' 25

tent of holding that the primary purpose of the agreement

is what makes it a contract of sale, or otherwise, and,

therefore, that not all contracts are within the Statute

merely because they contemplate ultimately a change of
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ownership of a chattel. On the other hand, Massachusetts

does not go so far as New York in requiring that the chat-

tel sold be in existence at the time of the contract. Even if

the seller has contracted to manufacture the chattel, it

will be a contract of sale "within the Statute if it is a chat-

tel that the seller would normally have made for the

general market. Thus in Gardner v. Joy^° the defendant

had contracted to make and deliver to the plaintiff 100

boxes of candles at an agreed price. The defendant was

to make the candles subsequently to the agreement.

It does not positively appear that he was in the candle

manufacturing business, but apparently the candles were

such as were normally made for general market. The

court held it to be a contract of sale.^' So, also, in Lamb

25 — Evans v. Winona Lumber sons v. Loucks, 48 N. Y. 17, where

Co., 30 Minn. 515. a contract by a manufacturer of

26 — 9 Mete. (Mass.) 177. paper to make and deliver a cer-

27 — Compare, as to the differ- tain amount of book-paper was

ence in the New York rule, Par- held a contract for work and labor

--Massachusetts Rule.-The Massachusetts courts
have taken a position often called ''the Massachusetts
rule,'' between the extremes of the English rule and that
of New York. They follow the New York rule to the extent of holding that the primary purpose of the agreement
is what makes it a contract of sale, or otherwise, and .
therefore, that not all contracts are within the Statute
merely because they contemplate ultimately a change of
ownership of a chattel. On the other hand, :Massachusetts
does not go so far as New York in r equiring that the chattel sold be in existence at the time of the con tract. E ven if
the seller has contracted to manufacture tho chattel, it
will be a contract of sale within the Statute if it is a chattel that the seller would normally have made for the
general market. Thus in Gardner v. J oy 26 the defendant
had contracted to make and deliver to the plaintiff 100
boxes of candles at an agreed price. The defendant was
to make the candles subsequently to the agreement.
It does not positively appear that he was in the candle
manufacturing business, but apparently the candles were
such as were normally made for general market. The
court held it to be a contract of sale. 27 So, also, in Lamb
25-Evans v. Winona Lumber
Co., 30 Minn. 515.
26-9 Mete. (Mass.) 177.
27-Com pare, as to the differ·
ence in the New York rule, Par·

sons v. Loucks, 48 N. Y. 17, where
a contract by a manufacturer of

paper to make and deliver a certain amount of book-paper was
held a contract for work and labor
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V. Crafts,^^ a contract by a tallow manufacturer to make

and deliver a quantity of refined tallow prepared from

the raw material was held a contract of sale, the court

saying, "Where a person stipulates for a future sale of

articles which he is habitually making and which, at

the time, are not made, or finished, it is essentially a

contract of sale, and not a contract of labor; otherwise

when the article is made pursuant to the agreement.^^

But, on the other hand, if the article contracted for

is not an article that would normally have been made

for the general market, the contract is not one of sale,

even though it intends the transfer of title to the article.

Thus in Mixer v. Howarth^" the plaintiff was a manu-

facturer of buggies. At the time of the contract he

had on hand the nearly finished body of a buggy. He

contracted with the defendant to finish this body and

to line it with cloth selected by the defendant. In addi-

tion to the fact that it was to be lined according to the
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defendant's desires, there was some evidence that the

plaintiff would not have completed it at all that year

except for the defendant's order. This was held to be a

contract for work and labor and not a contract for sale.

This decision is not entirely reconcilable in spirit with

the rule just quoted as laid down by the same judge,

Chief Justice Shaw, in Lamb v. Crafts'^ a few years

later. A buggy would seem to be a thing habitually

made by a buggy-manufacturer, unless the difference is

in the mere agreement to line it with the kind of cloth

the buyer wanted. The fact is that the Massachusetts

rule, while even more definite than the New York rule

both in statement and in the consistency with which

because the subject matter was "tussah" — a wound and twisted

not in existence at the time of silk, made out of raw silk — was

the contract, held to be a contract for work and

28—12 Mete. (Mass.) 353. labor.

29— Compare with Gerli v. Metz- 30—21 Pick (Mass.) 205.

ger & Co., 99 N. Y. S. 858, 51 Misc. 31—12 Mete. (Mass.) 353.

46, where a contract to furnish
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v. Crafts, 28 a contract by a tallow manufacturer to make
and deliver a quantity of refined tallow prepared from
the raw material was held a contract of sale, the court
saying, ''Where a person stipulates for a future sale of
articles which he is habitually making and which, at
the time, are not made, or :finished, it is essentially a
contract of sale, and not a contract of labor; otherwise
when the article is made pursuant to the agreement. 29
But, on the other hand, if the article contracted for
is not an article that would normally have been made
for the general market, the contract is not one of sale,
even though it intends the transfer of title to the article.
Thus in Mixer v. Howarth 30 the plaintiff was a manufacturer · of buggies. At the time of the contract he
had on hand the nearly finished body of a buggy. H e
contracted with the defendant to finish this body and
to line it with cloth selected by the defendant. In addition to the fact that it was to be lined according to the
defendant's desires, there was some evidence that the
plaintiff would not have completed it at all that year
except for the defendant's order. This was held to be a
contract for work and labor and not a contract for sale.
This decision is not entirely reconcilable in spirit with
the rule just quoted as laid down by the same judge,
Chief Justice Shaw, in Lamb v. Crafts 81 a few years
later. A buggy would seem to be a thing habitually
made by a buggy-manufacturer, unless the difference is
in the mere agreement to line it with the kind of cloth
- the buyer wanted. The fact is that the Massachusetts
rule, while even more definite than the New York rule
both in statement and in the consistency with which
because the subject matter was
not in existence at the time of
the contract.
28-12 Mete. (Mass.) 353.
29- ompar e with Gerli v. Metzger & Co., 99 N. Y. S. 858, 51 Misc.
46, where a contract to furnish
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"tussah"-a wound and twisted
silk, made out of raw silk-was
held to be a contract for work and
labor.
30-21 Pick (Mass.) 205.
31-12 Mete. (Mass.) 353.
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courts follow a definite idea, has, like the others, a bor-

der line of cases Avhere the application is uncertain. As

the court itself expresses the matter, ''It is true that in

'the infinitely various shades of different contracts' there

is some practical difficulty in disposing of the questions

that arise under that (17th) section of the Statute. But

we see no ground for holding that there is any uncer-

tainty in the rule itself. "^'^

Rule of Other States. — The rest of the states follow,

though with an occasional inconsistency, one or another

of these three rules. In some states one or the other rule

241

courts follow a definite idea, has, like the others, a border line of cases where the application is uncertain. As
the court itself expresses the matter, "It is true that in
'the infinitely various shades of different contracts' there
is some practical difficulty in disposing of the questions
that arise under that (17th) section of the Statute. But
we see no ground for holding that there is any uncertainty in the rule itself. " 32

has been declared effective by Statute.

Exchanges. — The distinction between a ' * sale ' ' and an

"exchange", which has been so clearly made by the courts

in regard to statutes prohibiting the "sale" of intoxi-

cating liquor^', is not recognized in connection with the

Statute of Frauds. A contract to pass the title to chattels

is a contract of sale, within the meaning of the latter
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statute, regardless of whether the consideration is reck-

oned in terms of money or not.^*

-Rule of Other States.-The rest of the states follow,
though ·with an occasional inconsistency, one or another
of these three rules. In some states one or the other rule
has been declared effective by Statute.

32 — Goddard v. Binney, 115 tracts of barter are regarded, so

Mass. 450. Accord, that a contract far as the statute of frauds is con-

to manufacture a chattel not such, cerned, as contracts of sale." Cit-

as the maker would naturally man- ing Bowling v. McKenney, 124

ufacture for general trade is not a Mass. 478; Kuhus v. Gates, 96 Ind.

contract of sale, Smalley v. Ham- 66, and Rutan v. Hinchman, 30 N.

blin, 170 Mass. 380. J. L. 255.

ZZ—Ante, p. 3. Bennett v. Hull, 10 Johns. (N.

34 — In Gorman v. Brossard, 120 Y.) 364, apples in exchange for

Mich. 611, the contract was to de- liquors; Franklin v. Matoa Gold

liver curb stone in consideration Mining Co., 158 Fed. 941, 16 L. R.

of the cancellation of a debt. This A. (n. s.) 381, contract to trans-

might well have been held to be fer shares of stock in return for

such a consideration as would services.

make the agreement one of sale, Contra, Spinney v. Hill, 81

Exchanges.-'I,he distinction between a ''sale'' and an
''exchange'', which has been so clearly made by the courts
in regard to statutes prohibiting the ''sale'' of intoxicating liquor 33 , is not recognized in connection with the
Statute of Frauds. A contract to pass the title to chattels
is a contract of sale, within the meaning of the latter
statute, regardless of whether the consideration is reckoned in terms of money or not. 34

but the court treated it as a con- Minn. 316, contract to transfer

tract of barter and exchange and shares of stock in return for serv-

quoted with approval from Browne ices.

on the Statute of Frauds, "con-

32-Goddard v. Binney, 115
Mass. 450. Accord, that a contract
to manufacture a chattel not such
as the maker would naturally manufacture for general trade is not a
contract of sale, Smalley v. Hamblin, 170 Mass. 380.
33-Ante, p. 3.
34-ln. Gorman v. Brossard, 120
Mich. 611, the contract was to deliver curb stone in consideration
of the cancellation of a debt. This
might well have been held to be
such a consideration as would
make the agreement one of sale,
but the court treated it as a contract of barter and exchange and
quoted with approval from Browne
on the Statute of Frauds, "conDigitiz
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tracts of barter are regarded, so
far as the statute of frauds is concerned, as contracts of sale." Citing Dowling v. McKenney, 124
Mass. 478; Kuhus v. Gates, 96 Ind.
66, and Rutan v. Hinchman, 30 N.
J. L. 255.
Bennett v. Hull, 10 Johns. (N.
Y.) 364, apples in exchange for
liquors; Franklin v. Matoa Gold
Mining Co., 158 Fed. 941, 16 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 381, contract to transfer shares of stock in return for
services.
Oontra, Spinney v. Hill, 81
Minn. 316, contract to transfer
shares of stock in return for services.
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Other Contracts. — Contracts which do not contemplate

the transfer of title between the parties thereto are not

contracts of sale within the Statute, even though they

relate to and their subject matter involves a contract

of sale between one of the parties with some one else.

Thus a contract whereby two persons agree to cooperate

In selling the property of one of them to a third person

is not itself a contract of sale."^ Likewise, a contract

whereby one person authorizes another to buy goods for

him, as his agent, is a contract of agency and not a

contract of sale.^^

Mortgages of personal property, although in a certain

legal usage they are said to pass the title to the mort-

gagee, seem to be held not to be contracts of sale within

the meaning of the Statute.^'''

A contract as part of a contract of sale, to ** rescind"

the sale, or to take back title in case the buyer becomes

dissatisfied, is not itself a contract of sale.^®
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35— Bogigian V. Harsanoff, 186 143 Wis. 639; Trenholm v. Kloep-

Mass. 380. per, 88 Neb. 236.

36 — Wiger v. Carr, Wis., 11 L. R. The real reason why such a con-

A. (n. s.) 650; Kutz v. Flersher, 67 tract is not covered by the Statute

Cal. 93; Hatch V. McBrien, 83 Mich, is not altogether clear. The

159; Frank v. Murray, 7 Mont. 4; authorities just cited indicate that

Stover V. Flack, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) it is considered as not being a

162. contract of sale. Other decisions.

The fact that part of the con- however, indicate that it might, as

tract relates to something else a whole, be a contract of sale pri-

than a sale does not prevent the marily within the Statute, but that

Other Contracts.-Contracts which do not contemplate
the transfer of title between the parties thereto are not
contracts of sale within the Statute, even though they
relate to and their subject matter involves a contract
of sale between one of the parties with some one else.
Thus a contract whereby two persons agr ee to cooperate
in selling the prop erty of one of them to a third person
is not itself a contract of sale.35 Likewise, a contract
whereby one person authorizes another to buy goods for
him, as his agent, is a contract of agency and not a
contract of sale. 36
Mortgages of personal property, although in a certain
legal usage they are said to pass the title to the mortgagee, seem to be held not to be contracts of sale within
the meaning of the Statute. 37
A contract as part of a contract of sale, to "rescind"
the sale, or to take back title in case the buyer becomes
dissatisfied, is not itself a contract of sale. 88

/

contract from coming within the it has been taken out of the Stat-

Statute, Atwater v. Hough, 29 ute through the buyer's receipt

Conn. 508, 79 Am. Dec. 229; Pit- and acceptance of the goods,

kin V. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294. Gurwell v. Morris, 2 Cal. Ap. 451,

37— Mower v. McCarthy, 79 Vt. 83 Pac. 578; Armstrong v. Orlen,

142, 7 L. R. A. (n. s.) 418, an oral 220 Mass. 112; Freemont Carriage

mortgage was held effective, but Co. v. Thomsen, 65 Neb. 370.

the Statute was not referred to; This latter idea is strengthened

Bogigian v. Hassanoff, 186 Mass. by the fact that a contract to take

380, 71 N. E. 789. back goods sold, standing as an

38 — Schaefer v. Strieder, 203 entirety by itself, may be a con-

Mass. 407; llilliard v. Weeks, 173 tract of sale. Karrer v. Madden,

Mass. 304; Haukwitz v. Barrett, 152 Wis. 646.

35-Bogigian v. Harsanoff, 186
Mass. 380.
36-Wiger v. Carr, Wis., 11 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 650; Kutz v. Flersher, 67
Cal. 93; Hatch v. McBrien, 83 Mich.
159; Frank v. Murray, 7 Mont. 4;
Stover v. Flack, 41 Barb. (N. Y.)
162.
The fact that part of the contract r elates to something else
than a sale does not prevent the
contract from coming within the
Statute, Atwater v. Hough, 29
Conn. 508, 79 Am. Dec. 229; Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H . 294.
37-Mower v. McCarthy, 79 Vt.
142, 7 L. R. A. (n. s.) 418, an oral
mortgage was held effec tive, but
the Statute was not referred to;
Bogigian v. Hassanoff, 186 Mass.
380, 71 N. E. 789.
38- S ·haefer v. Strieder, 203
Mass. 467; Hilliard v. Weeks, 173
Mass. 304; Ilankwitz v. Barrett,
D1gitiz
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143 Wis. 639; Trenholm v. Kloep.
per, 88 Neb. 236.
The real reason why such a con·
tract is not covered by the Statute
is not altogether clear. The
authorities just cited indicate that
it is considered as not being a
contract of sale. Other decisions,
however, indicate that it might, as
a whole, be a contract of sale primarily within the Statute, but that
it has been taken out of the Statute through the buyer's receipt
and acceptance of the goods.
Gurwell v. Morris, 2 Cal. Ap . 451,
83 Pac. 578 ; Armstrong v. Orlen,
220 Mass. 112; Freemont Carriage
Co. v. Thomsen, 65 Neb. 370.
This latter idea is strengthened
by the fa ct that a contract to take
back goods sold, standing as an
entirety by itself, may be a contract of sale. Karrer v. Madden,
152 Wis. 646.
Origir I fr
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Subject Matter. — If it has been determined that a con-

tract is a contract of sale, within the meaning of the

Statute, the question then arises whether it is a contract

for sale of the particular things specified in the Sta^tute.

The original Statute covered sales of "goods, wares or

merchandises." This is also the language of many of

the state statutes. Other statutes read, "goods, chattels,

or things in action." Still others include "personal

property."

IncorpCi#«».^ Property. — Under the expression

"goods, wares, or merchandise," there has been consider-

able question as to whether anything but corporeal prop-

erty is included. Stock certificates, promissory notes, and

similar evidenciary documents of debts or rights in action,

243

Subject Matter.-If it has been determined that a contract is a contract of sale, within the meaning of the
Statute, the question then arises whether it is a contract
for sale of the particular things specified in the Sta.,tute.
The original Statute covered sales of ''goods, wares or
merchandises.'' This is also the language of many of
the state statutes. Other statutes read, ''goods, chattels,
or things in action." Still others include "personal
property."

are themselves tangible things. But it has generally been

held that transactions relating to such things, although

in words they purport to deal mth the certificate, or the

note, etc., really relate to the "right" represented by the
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corporeal certificate, note, etc., and therefore are essen-

tially contracts for the transfer, or whatever it may be, of

the intangible right. Consequently it is in relation to

contracts for the sale of shares of stock, promissory

notes, etc., that the question, w^hether such incorporeal

things are goods, wares or merchandises, has chiefly been

before the courts.*

In England the rule is that such things are not goods,

wares or merchandises.^^

In the United States, however, some statutes, as noted,

specifically include "things in action," or "personal

39— Duncufl v. Albrecht, 12 Sim. In Knight v. Barker, 16 M. & W.

189; Bradley v. Holdsworth, 2 M. 66, a contract for sale of stock was

& W. 422; Tempest v. Kilner, 3 held not exempt from the stamp

C. B. 249; Bowlby v. Bell, 3 C. B. tax as were contracts for sale of

284; Watson v. Spratley, 10 Ex. goods, wares and merchandise.

222; Humble v. Mitchell, 11 E. &

E. 205.

*See Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, 76 "Goods".

--IncorpG~1

Property. - Under the expression
''goods, wares, or merchandise,'' there has been considerable question as to whether anything but corporeal property is included. Stock certificates, promissory notes, and
similar evidenciary documents of debts or rights in action,
are themselves tangible things. But it has generally been
held that transactions relating to such things, although
in words they purport to deal with the certificate, or the
note, etc., really relate to the ''right'' represented by the
corporeal certificate, note, etc., and therefore are essentially contracts for the transfer, or whatever it may be, of
the intangible right. Consequently it is in relation to
contracts for the sale of shares of stock, promissory
notes, etc., that the question, whether such incorporeal
things are goods, wares or merchandises, has chiefly been
before the courts.*
In England the rule is that such things are not goods,
wares or merchandises. 39
In the United States, however, some statutes, as noted,
specifically include ''things in action,'' or ''personal
39-Duncuff v. Albrecht, 12 Sim.
189; Bradley v. Holdsworth, 2 M.
& W. 422; Tempest v. Kilner, 3
C. B. 249; Bowlby v. Bell, 3 C. B.
284; Watson v. Spratley, 10 Ex.
222; Humble v. Mitchell, 11 E. &
E. 205.
'•See Uniform Sales Act, Section

In Knight v. Barker, 16 M. & W.
66, a contract for sale of stock was
held not exempt from the stamp
tax as were contracts for sale of
goods, wares and merchandise.

4, 76 "Goods".
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property," either of which would include shares of stock

and the like.*° Even where the statute reads, ''goods,

w^ares and merchandises," the American courts tend to

hold that so-called intangible property is included, al-

though there is not entire harmony. In Sprague v.

Hosie,*^ the court held that savings bank stock was goods,

wares or merchandise, saying, ' ' It must be admitted that

at common law shares of an incorporated company occu-

pied much the same position as promissory notes and

other mere choses in action. * * * Such shares have,

however, come to be subjects of common barter and sale,

arft usually evidenced by certificates which, in the absence

of statute provisions, operate by assignment and deliv-

ery to transfer title to the shares as between the parties.

They are in this state by statute subject to levy^ and sale

or execution. In many other respects they are treated as

something more than mere choses in action. * * * That

contracts for the sale and delivery of shares of stock
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are subject to the mischief aimed at by the statute must

be admitted. We are of the opinion that reason and the

weight of authority favor the conclusion that shares of

stock in an incorporated company, the shares having been

issued, are goods within the meaning of the statute of

frauds. It follows that the parole contract for their sale

was invalid."*^

40 — Franklin v. Matoa Gold Min- merchandise, within the Statute of

ing Co., 158 Fed. 941, 16 L. R. A. Fraud is almost unanimously rec-

(n. 8.) 381; So. Life Ins. Co. v. ognized by the courts of this coun-

Cole, 4 Fla. 359. try", note in 19 L. R. A. (n. s.)

41 — 155 Mich. 30, 19 L. R, A. (n. 874, citing many cases. See also,

s.) 874. Stifft V. Stiewel, 91 Ark. 445; 18

42— Citing, Tisdale v. Harris, 20 Ann. Cas. 597; Russell v. Betts,

Pick. (Mass.) 9; Boardman v. Cut- 107 Ark. 629; Korrer v. Madden,

ter, 128 Mass. 388; North v. For- 152 V7is. 646; Snowstorm Co. v.

est, 15 Conn. 400; Pray v. Mitchell, Johnson, 186 Fed. 745; Hewson v.

60 Me. 430; Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. Peterman Mfg. Co., 76 Wash. 600,

192; Johnson v. Mulvy, 51 N. Y. 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 398; Nichols

634. V. Clark, 81 N. Y. S. 262; Laundry

"The doctrine that a contract for Co. v. Whitmore, 92 O. S. 44.

the sale of corporate stock is one But shares are not "goods," Rog-

property,'' either of which would include shares of stock
and the like. 40 Even where the statute reads, ''goods,
wares and merchandises, '' the American courts tend to
hold that so-called intangible property is included, although there is not entire harmony. In Sprague v.
Hosie, 41 the court held that savings bank stock was goods,
wares or merchandise, saying, "It must be admitted that
at common law shares of an incorporated company occupied much the same position as promissory notes and
other mere choses in action. * * * Such shares have,
however, come to be subjects of common barter and sale,
are. usually evidenced by certificates which, in the absence
of statute provisions, operate by assignment and delivery to transfer title to the shares as between the parties.
They are in this state by statute subject to levy and sale
or execution. In many other respects they are treated as
something more than mere choses in action. * * * That
contracts for the sale and delivery of shares of stock
are subject to the mischief aimed at by the statute must
be admitted. We are of the opinion that reason and the
weight of authority favor the conclusion that shares of
stock in an incorporated company, the shares having been
issued, a.re goods within the meaning of the statute of
frauds. It follows that the parole contract for their sale
was invalid. '' 42

for the sale of goods, wares and ers v. Burr, 105 Ga. 432, 70 Am. St.

40-Franklin v. Matoa Gold Mining Co., 158 Fed. 941, 16 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 381; So. Life Ins. Co. v.
Cole, 4 Fla. 359.
41-155 Mich. 30, 19 L. R. A. (n.
s.) 874.
42-Citing, Tisdale v. Harris, 20
Pick. (Mass.) 9; Boardman v. Cutter, 128 Mass. 388; North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400; Pray v. Mitchell,
60 Me. 430; Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis.
192; Johnson v. Mulvy, 51 N. Y.
634.
"The doctrine that a contract for
the sale of corporate stock is one
for the sale of goods, wares and
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merchandise, within the Statute of
Fraud is almost unanimously recognized by the courts of this country", note in 19 L. R. A. (n. s.)
874, citing many cases. See also,
Stifft v. Stiewel, 91 Ark. 445; 18
Ann. Cas. 597; Russell v. Betts,
107 Ark. 629; Korrer v. Madden,
152 Wis. 646; Snowstorm Co. v.
Johnson, 186 Fed. 745; Hewson v.
Peterman Mfg. Co., 76 Wash. 600,
51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 398; Nichols
v. Clark, 81 N. Y. S. 262; Laundry
Co. v. Whitmore, 92 0 . S. 44.
But shares arc not "goods," Rogers v. Burr, 105 Ga. 432, 70 Am. St.
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A contract by a corporation to sell its own stock was

held a contract for the sale of goods, in Hewson v. Peter-

man Mfg. Co.**

Contracts of subscription for corporate stocks to^ be

issued have been held not within the Statute on the

ground, not that stock was not ' ' goods, ' ' but that the con-

tract was not one of **sale."** The transfer of a promis-

sory note has been held to be a sale of ''goods."" So

also a contract to assign a debt.*^

Water, Ice. — A contract to supply water has been

held a sale of goods,*' and ice, whether cut or uncut, is

personalty.*®

Growing Crops. — Growing crops are in many re-

A contract by a corporation to sell its own stock was
held a contract for the sale of goods, in Hewson v. Peterman M:fg. Co.43
Contracts of subscription for corporate stocks to be
issued have been held not within the Statute on "the
ground, not that stock was not" goods," but that the contract was not one of ''sale.' ' 44 The tr an sf er of a promissory note has been held to be a sale of ''goods.' ' 45 So
also a contract to assign a debt.46

spects treated as a part of the land by which they are pro-

duced*^ and they have been held not to be within the mean-

ing of a statute requiring manual delivery of goods and

chattels as against creditors.^" But if they are crops

which, although the product of the soil, are also the result
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of cultivation and annual industry, they are generally

held to be personal property so far as to come within the

--Water, Ice.-.A. contract to supply water has been
held a sale of goods, 47 and ice, whether cut or uncut, is
personalty.48

meaning of the 17th section of the Statute.^^

Rep. 50; Webb v. Baltimore, etc., 49 — They pass, though not spe-

R. R. Co., 77 Md. 92; 39 Am. St. cifically mentioned, by a deed to

-Growing Crops.-Growing crops are in many re-

Rep. 396. the land. Kammrath v. Kidd, 89

43— 76 Wash. 6-00, 51 L. R. A. (n. Minn. 380, 99 Am. St. 603; Gib-

s.) 398. bons v. Dillingham, 10 Ark. 9; Tur-

44 — Gadsden V. Lance, 1 McMul- ner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56; Smith v.

len's Eq. (S. C.) 87, 37 Am. Dec. Leighton, 38 Kan. 544; Wooton v.

548. White, 90 Md. 64; Jones v. Adams,

45— Baldwin V. Williams, 3 Mete. 37 Ore. 473; Mcllvain v. Harris,

(Mass.) 365. 20 Mo. 457.

46 — French v. Schoonmaker, 69 Centra, Aldrlch v. Bank of

N. J. L. 6. Ohiowa, 64 Neb. 276, 97 Am. St.

47 — Mayor v. Town of Harri- 643.

son, 71 N. J. L. 69; Canavan v. 50— Bernal v. Havious, 17 Cal.

City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y. 541, 79 Am. Dec. 147; Davis v. Mc-

473, 128 N. E. 882. Farlane, 37 Cal. 634, 99 Am. Dec.

spects treated as a part of the land by which they are produced49 and they have been held not to be within the meaning of a statute requiring manual delivery of goods and
chattels as against creditors. 50 But if they are crops
which, although the product of the soil, are also the result
of cultivation and annual industry, they are generally
held to be personal property so far as to come within the
meaning of the 17th section of the Statute. 51

48 — Higgins v. Kusterer, 41 340.

Mich. 318, 32 Am. Rep. 160. 51— Mighell v. Dougherty, 86 la.

Rep. 50; Webb v. Baltimore, etc.,
R. R. Co., 77 Md. 92; 39 Am. St.
Rep. 396.
43-76 Wash. 6'00, 51 L. R. A. (n.
s.) 398.
44-Gadsden v. Lance, 1 McMullen's Eq. (S. C.) 87, 37 Am. Dec.
548.
45-Baldwin v. Williams, 3 Mete.
(Mass.) 365.
46-French v. Schoonmaker, 69
N. J. L. 6.
47-Mayor v. Town of Harrison, 71 N. J. L. 69; Canavan v.
City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y.
473, 128 N. E. 88 2.
48-Higgins v. Kusterer, 41
Mich. 318, 32 Am. Rep. 160.
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49-They pass, though not specifically mentioned, by a deed to
the land. Kammrath v. Kidd, 89
Minn. 380, 99 Am. St. 603; Gibbons v. Dillingham, 10 Ark. 9; Turner v. Cool, 23 Ind. 56; Smith v.
Leighton, 38 Kan. 544; Wooton v.
White, 90 Md. 64; Jones v. Adams,
37 Ore. 473; Mcilvain v. Harris,
20 Mo. 457.
0(1Jntra, Aldrich v. Bank of
Ohiowa, 64 Neb. 276, 97 Am. St.
643.
50-Bernal v. Havious, 17 Cal.
541, 79 Am. Dec. 147; Davis v. McFarlane, 37 Cal. 634, 99 Am. Dec.
340 . .
51-Mighell v. Dougherty, 86 Ia.
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Trees, etc. — Growing things, such as trees and

grass, which are naturally produced by the soil, and things

which by attachment have become legally part of the soil,

are the subject of very much confusion in the cases.

Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds requires sales of

land, or of an interest in land, to be in writing; so that

growing things are necessarily covered by one section or

the other. The two sections do differ, however, in their

requirements; the chief distinction being that under

section 17 a writing is not necessary if there has been

payment of part of the price, or if part of the goods have

been received and accepted. Section 4 applies to every

contract; section 17 only to those involving a certain

value. It therefore makes a material difference whether

the contract comes under one section or the other.

In respect to matters other than the Statute of Frauds

trees, grass and fixtures are considered as real estate

so long as they are a part of the land — that is to say,
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while they are still growing in or legally attached to the

soil. But when severed from the soil they at once become

personal property in and of themselves. Trees and

grass are subjects of sale irrespective of the land,

whether they are still growing in it or not.^^

Logically, therefore, a sale of trees, or grass, would

seem to be a sale of real estate, or a sale of personal

property, according as it contemplates a transfer of title

to the trees before or after severance. That is, a trans-

480, 41 Am. St. 511; Kingsley v. rated from the rest by express res-

Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313, 86 Am. ervation or grant; and even when

Dec. 173, dictum. so separated it retains its distinc-

Growing peaches, to be picked tive character as an incident of

by the buyer, were held not to be real property so long as it remains

an interest in land in Pumer v. uncut; but when cut and severed

Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 17 Am. Rep. from the soil, it becomes personal

591. property, to which title may be ac-

52 — "It is elementary knowledge quired, as in the case of other

that growing timber forms a part chattels * * *". Emerson v.

of the realty, and, like any other Shores, 95 Me. 237, 85 Am. St. 404;

part of the estate, may be sepa- White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 378.

THE LAW OF SALES

--Trees, etc.-Growing things, such as trees and
grass, which are naturally produced by the soil, and things
which by attachment have become legally part of the soil,
are the subject of very much confusion in the cases.
Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds requires sales of
land, or of an interest in land, to be in writing; so that
growing things are necessarily covered by one section or
the other. The two sections do differ, however, in their
requirements; the chief distinction being that under
section 17 a writing is not necessary if there has been
payment of part of the price, or if part of the goods have
been received and accepted. Section 4 applies to every
contract; section 17 only to those involving a certain
value. It therefore makes a material difference whether
the contract comes under one section or the other.
In respect to matters other than the Statute of Frauds
trees, grass and fixtures are considered as real estate
so long as they are a part of ·the land-that is to say,
while they are still growing in or legally attached to the
soil. But when severed from the soil they at once become
personal property in and of themselves. Trees and
grass are subjects of sale irrespective of the land,
whether they are still growing in it or not. 52
Logically, therefore, a sale of trees, or grass, would
seem to be a sale of real estate, or a sale of personal
property, according as it contemplates a trans! er of title
to the trees before or after severance. That is, a trans480, 41 Am. St. 511: Kingsley v.
Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313, 86 Am.
Dec. 173, dictum.
Growing peaches, to be picked
by the buyer, were held not to be
an interest in land in Purner v.
Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 17 Am. Rep.
591.
52-"It is elementary knowledge
that growing timber forms a part
or the realty, and, like any other
part of the estate, may be sepaD1gitiz
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rated from the rest by express reservation or grant; and even when
so separated it retains its distinc·
tive character as an incident of
real property so long as it remains
uncut; but when cut and severed
from the soil, it becomes personal
property, to which title may be acquired, as in the case of other
chattels * * *". Emerson 7.
Shores, 95 Me. 237, 85 Am. St. 404;
White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 378.
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fer of title in unsevered trees should properly be a sale

of a part of the realty ; a transfer of title which is not to

take place until after the trees have been severed, a sale of

personalty. The fact that at the time of making the con-

tract the trees are uncut should not logically determine

the character of the contract. A sale of false teeth to be

made is in no sense a sale of the porcelain and rubber

out of which they are to be made ; it is a sale of the teeth,

or else a mere contract for w^ork and labor. So, a con-

tract for the transfer of title to severed trees is not prop-

erly a contract for the sale of gromng trees out of

which the severed trees are to be made.

The whole matter, however, is further complicated by

a preliminary inquiry. Does the Statute, in speaking of

contracts for the sale of personalty, mean the sale of

that which is personalty at the time the contract is en-

tered into, or does it mean the sale of that which mil

be personalty at the time the title is passed? There is
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no definite answer to this in the decisions. The broadest

analogies indicate the latter alternative. But, at least,

an understanding of this problem is a help in under-

standing the decisions.

The intention of the parties as to whether there should

vest in the buyer enforcible legal rights in and to the

trees before they are cut or after they are cut, should

be determinative of whether they have contemplated

giving the buyer an interest in real property or in per-

sonal property. And the intention of the parties in this

respect would seem to be indicated by whether the buyer

is expected to enter and cut the trees — in which case

they must have contemplated that he should have

rights in the growing trees — or w^hether the seller is to

cut them before the buyer can act in regard to them.

There is some support for this theoretical test in the

decisions — although it is nowhere expressed — ^but not a

great deal. On the other hand, a distinction, or test, occa-

sionally expressed, but not more precisely followed, is

fer of title in unsevered trees should properly be a sale
of a part of the realty; a transfer of title which is not to
take place until after the trees have been severed, a sale of
personalty. The fact that at the time of making the contract the trees are uncut should not logically determine
the character of the contract. A sale of fals e t eeth to be
made is in no sense a sale of the porcelain and rubber
out of which they are to be made; it is a sale of the teeth,
or else a mere contract for work and labor. So, a contract for the transfer of title to severed trees is not properly a contract for the sale of gTo-wing trees out of
which the severed trees are to be made.
The whole matter, however, is further complicated by
a preliminary inquiry. Does the Statute, in speaking of
contracts for the sale of personalty, mean the sale of
that which is personalty at the time the contract is entered into, or does it mean the sale of that which will
be personalty at the time the title is passed ~ There is
no definite answer to this in the decisions. The broadest
analogies indicate the latter alternative. But, at least,
an understanding of this problem is a help in understanding the decisions.
The intention of the parties as to whether there should
vest in the buyer enforcible legal rights in and to the
trees before they are cut or after they are cut, should
be determinative of whether they have contemplated
giving the buyer an interest in real property or in personal property. And the intention of the parties in this
respect would seem to be indicated by whether the buyer
is expected to enter and cut the trees-in which case
they must have contemplated that he should have
rights in the growing trees-or whether the seller is to
cut them before the buyer can act in regard to them.
There is some support for this theoretical t est in the
decisions-although it is nowhere expressed-but not a
great deal. On the other hand, a distinction, or test, occasionally expressed, but not more precisely followed, is
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that if the contract contemplates an immediate sever-

ance of the trees it is a sale of personal property, and

covered by the 17th section of the Statute, while if it

contemplates that the trees shall be left to grow still fur-

ther it is a sale of an interest in realty.

The truth is that courts have neither expressed nor

intuitively followed any consistent rule in regard to such

contracts. As one court expresses the matter, "Whether

the sale of growing trees is the sale of an interest in or

concerning land has long been a much controverted sub-

ject in the courts of England, as well as in the courts of

the several states of the Union. The question has been

differently decided in different jurisdictions, and by dif-

ferent courts, or at different times by the same court

within the same jurisdiction. The courts of England

particularly have varied widely in their holdings on the

subject. ' '"
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53— Hirth v. Graham, 50 O. S.

57, 40 Am. St. 641. No attempt is

made here to cite the holdings of

particular states, but only a few

representative ones on either side.

Held, contract for an interest in

land: Seymour v. Cuchway, 100

Wis. 580, 69 Am. St. 957, buyer to

cut, but no emphasis laid on that

fact; Hirth v. Graham, 50 O. S. 57,

40 Am. St. 641, buyer to cut;

that if the contract contemplates an immediate severance of the trees it is a sale of personal property, and
covered by the 17th section of the Statute, while if it
contemplates that the trees shall be left to grow still further it is a sale of an interest in realty.
The truth is that courts have neither expressed nor
intuitively followed any consistent rule in regard to such
contracts. As one court expresses the matter, "Whether
the sale of growing trees is the sale of an interest in or
concerning land has long been a much controverted subject in the courts of England, as well as in the courts of
the several states of the Union. The question has been
differently decided in different jurisdictions, and by different courts, or at different times by the same court
within the same jurisdiction. The courts of England
particularly have varied widely in their holdings on the .
subject.' ' 53

Owens V. Lewis, 46 Ind. 488, 15

Am. Rep. 295, buyer to cut; Cool

V. Peters, etc. Co., 87 Ind. 531, buy-

er to cut; Slocum v. Seymour, 36

N. J. L. 138, 13 Am. Rep. 432, buyer

to cut; Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45

N. H. 313, id.; Harrell v. Miller,

35 Miss. 700, 72 Am. Dec. 154, id.;

Mizell V. Burnett, 4 Jones (N. C.)

249, 69 Am. Dec. 744, id.; Fluharty

V. Mills, 49 W. Va. 446, id.; Ala.

Mineral Land Co. v. Jackson, 121

Ala. 172, 77 Am. St. 46.

Held not an interest In land:

Emerson r. Shores, 95 Me. 237, 85

Am. St. 404, buyer was to cut;

Marshall v. Green, 1 C. P. Div. 35,

id.; White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 378,

unless by deed; Ryasse v. Reese,

4 Mete. (Mass.) 372, 83 Am. Dec.

481, because "in contemplation of

immediate separation" by the

buyer; Smith v. Bryan, 5 Md. 141,

59 Am. Dec. 104, buyer to cut;

Leonard v. Medford, 85 Md. 666,

37 L. R. A. 449, on ground of im-

mediate separation by buyer;

Robbins v. Farwell, 193 Pa. 37,

idem; Fish v. Cap well, 18 R. I.

667, 49 Am. St. 807; Turner v.

Planter's Lumber Co., 92 Miss. 767,

131 Am. St. 552, seller to cut; Kill-

more V. Hewlett, 48 N. Y. S. 569,

seller to cut.

63-Hirth v. Graham, 50 O. S.
57, 40 Am. St. 641. No attempt is
made here to cite the holdings of
particular states, but only a few
representative ones on either side.
Held, contract for an interest in
land: Seymour v. Cuchway, 100
Wis. 580, 69 Am. St. 957, buyer to
cut, but no emphasis laid on that
fact; Hirth v. Graham, 50 0. S. 57,
40 Am. St. 641, buyer to cut;
Owens v. Lewis, 46 Ind. 488, 15
Am. Rep. 295, buyer to cut; Cool
v. Peters, etc. Co., 87 Ind. 531, buyer to cut; Slocum v. Seymour, 36
N. J. L. 138, 13 Am. Rep. 432, buyer
to cut; Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45
N. H. 313, id.; Harrell v. Miller,
35 Miss. 700, 72 Am. Dec. 154, id.;
Mizell v. Burnett, 4 Jon es (N. C.)
249, 69 Am. Dec. 744, id.; Fluharty
v. Mills, 49 W. Va. 446, id.; Ala.
Min ral Land Co. v. J ackson, 121
Ala. 172, 77 Am. St. 46.
Held not an interest in land:

Emerson v. Shores, 95 Me. 237, 85
Am. St. 404, buyer was to cut;
Marshall v. Green, 1 C. P. Div. 35,
id.; White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 378,
unless by deed; Ryasse v. Reese,
4 Mete. (Mass.) 372, 83 Am. Dec.
481, because "in contemplation of
immediate separation" by the
buyer; Smith v. Bryan, 5 Md. 141,
59 Am. Dec. 104, buyer to cut;
Leonard v. Medford, 85 Md. 666,
37 L. R. A. 449, on ground of im·
mediate S!=lparation by buyer;
Robbins v. Farwell, 193 Pa. 37,
idem; Fish v. Capwell, 18 R. I.
667, 49 Am. St. 807; Turner v.
Planter's Lumber Co., 92 Miss. 767,
131 Am. St. 552, seller to cut; Killmore v. Howlett, 48 N. Y. S. 569,
seller to cut.
Sale of grass, held interest in
land: Smith v. Leighton, 39 Kan.
544, 5 Am . St. 778, buyer to cut;
Ross v. Cook, 71 Kan. 117, buyer
to cut; Kirkeby v. Erickson, 90

Sale of grass, held interest in

land: Smith v. Leighton, 39 Kan.

544, 5 Am. St. 778, buyer to cut;

Ross V. Cook, 71 Kan. 117, buyer

to cut; Kirkeby v. EJrickson, 90

[,I

I

IL..

1

ER 'ET A CH~VE

0

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 249

Price. — The original statute did not apply to every

sale of goods, but only to those contracts in which the

price should be 10 pounds Sterling or upwards. The

majority of statutes enacted in this country apply only

when the price is $50 or more, but others vary as to the

amount, from that of Florida, which applies to every

contract, to that of Ohio, which applies only when the

price is $2,500 or more.

To bring a contract within the Statute it is not essen-

tial that the price of any one thing be so great as the

amount fixed by the Statute, or that a price so great as

that amount be expressly stated in the agreement. It

is sufficient if the amount required to be paid by the, terms

of any one contract is greater than the amount stated in

the Statute. As illustration,^* one Allard showed samples

of women's hats to Greasert and told him the price per

dozen, or per piece, thereof and from these the latter

made up an order for goods. The procedure Avas that
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Allard showed each sample in turn and Greasert either

passed it by or ordered one or more like it. No one hat

was priced at more than $3.00 and no type of hat was

ordered in quantity of more than $24.00 worth. The

sum total of the order came to more than the amount

named in the Statute. The court held, on trial of the case,

that the transaction did not constitute a series of con-

tracts for each hat or each type of hat, but that the

entire transaction was one single contract for all the hats

at the total price.^^

Minn. 299, 101 Am. St. 411, buyer and sizes of lumber given orally

to cut; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 at one time; Oilman v. Hill, 36 N.

East 601. H. 311; Standard Wall Paper Co.

Not an interest in land. Kreisle v. Towns, 72 N. H. 324; Brown v.

V. Wilson, — Tex. — , 148 S. W. Snider, 126 Mich. 19S, "The author-

1132, buyer to cut. ities cited undoubtedly establish

54 — Allard v. Greasert, 61 N. Y. the proposition that because a sep-

1; citing and following Baldey v. arate price was agreed upon for

Parker, 2 B. & C. 41. each article of merchandise, or be-

55 — Accord, Cooke v. Millard, 65 cause some of the articles pur-

N. Y. 352, order for various kinds chased were to be delivered at one

249

Price.-The original statute did not apply to every
sale of goods, but only to those contracts in which the
price should be 10 pounds Sterling or upwards. The
majority of statutes enacted in this country apply 9nly
when the price is $50 or more, but others vary as to the
amount, from that of Florida, which applies to every
contract, to that of Ohio, which applies only when the
price is $2,500 or more.
To bring a contract within the Statute it is not essential that the price of any one thing be so great as the
amount fixed by the Statute, or that a price so great as
that amount be expressly stated in the agreement. It
is sufficient if the amount required to be paid by the.terms
of any one contract is greater than the amount stated in
the Statute. As illustration, 54 one Allard showed samples
of women's hats to Greasert and told him the price per
dozen, or per piece, thereof and from these the latter
made up an order for goods. The procedure was that
Allard showed each sample in turn and Greasert either
passed it by or ordered one or more like it. No one hat
was priced at more than $3.00 and no type of hat was
ordered in quantity of more than $24.00 worth. The
sum total of the order came to more than the amount
named in the Statute. The court held, on trial of the case,
that the transaction did not constitute a series of contracts for each hat or each type of hat, but that the
entire transaction was one single contract for all the hats
at the total price. 55
Minn. 299, 101 Am. · St. 411, buyer
to cut; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6
East 601.
Not an interest in land. Kreisle
v. Wilson, - Tex. - , 148 S. W.
1132, buyer to cut.
54-Allard v . Greasert, 61 N. Y.
1; citing and following Baldey v.
Parker, 2 B. & C. 41.
55-Accord, Cooke v. Millard, 65
N. Y. 352, order for various kinds

and sizes of lumber given orally
at one time; Gilman v. Hill, 36 N.
H. 311; Standard Wall Paper Co.
v. Towns, 72 N. H. 324; Brown v.
Snider, 126 Mich. 198, "The authorities cited undoubtedly establish
the proposition that because a separate price was agreed upon for
each article of merchandise, or because some of the articles purchased were to be delivered at one
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Even if the total amount to be paid under the contract

is not known at the time it is entered into, the agreement

must be in writing if events ultimately fix the price at

more than the statutory amount. Thus, a contract for the

sale of all flax to be raised on certain land at $5.00 per

ton was held to need a writing in view of the fact that over

20 tons were actually raised.^^

The great difficulty in these cases is to know when a

transaction constitutes one single contract and when it

amounts to several related, but distinct, contracts. There

appear to be no decisions bearing upon that point where

the amount of the price has been the one particular point

involved. There are, however, a number of illuminating

opinions upon the matter of single or several contracts

raised by the question of what delivery and acceptance

will suffice to make a contract enforcible despite absence

of a writing. To avoid duplication of discussion they

are not cited in this place, but reference is made to the
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discussion under that topic.

2. Memorandum Requieed by the Statute,

The writing required by the Statute is some note or

memorandum of the bargain, signed by the parties to

be charged or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.

Character of the Memorandum. — It is inunaterial when

the writing is made, so long as it represents the terms

of the real agreement.^''^

No formality in the written instrument is required.

Any kind of a writing which sufficiently sets out the

terms of the contract and is properly signed is sufficient.

time and some at another, it would following Watts v. Friend, 10 B. &

not follow that the transaction was C. 446; Carpenter v. Galloway, 73

Even if the total amount to be paid under the contract
is not known at the time it is entered into, the agreement
must be in writing if events ultimately fix the price at
more than the statutory amount. Thus, a contract for the
sale of all flax to be ra? sed on certain land at $5.00 per
ton was held to need a writing in view of the fact that over
20 tons were actually raised. 56
The great difficulty in these cases is to know when a
transaction constitutes one single contract and when it
amounts to several related, but distinct, contracts. There
appear to be no decisions bearing upon that point where
the amount of the price has been the one particular point
involved. There are, however, a number of illuminating
opinions upon the matter of single or several contracts
raised by the question of what delivery and acceptance
will suffice to make a contract enforcible despite absence
of a writing. To avoid duplication of discussion they
are not cited in this place, but reference is made to the
discussion under that topic.

not a single transaction, constitut- Ind. 418.

Ing but one contract." 57 — Emery v. Boston Terminal

2.

56— Brown v. Sanborn, 21 Minn. Co., 178 Mass. 172, 86 Am. St. 473,

402; Bowman v. Conn. 8 Ind. 58, dictum.

MEMORANDUM REQUIRED BY THE STATUTEf

The writing required by the Statute is some note or
memorandum of the bargain, signed by the parties to
be charged or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
Character of the Memorandum.-It is immaterial when
the writing is made, so long as it represents the terms
of the r eal agreement. 67
No formality in the written instrument is required.
Any kind of a writing which sufficiently sets out the
t erms of the contract and is properly signed is sufficient.
time and some at another, it would
not follow tha t the transaction was
not a single tran saction, constituting but one contract ."
56- Brown v. Sanborn, 21 Minn.
402 ; Bowman v. Conn. 8 Ind. 58,

c..

following Watts v. Friend, 10 B. &
C. 446; Carpenter v. Galloway, 73
Ind. 418.
57- Emery v. Boston Terminal
Co., 178 Mass. 172, 86 Am. St. 473,
dictum.
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Even a telegram is sufficient as a writing — although the

original copy, signed by the party in person, is not pro-

duced.^*

Purpose of the Memorandum. — The purpose for which

251

Even a telegram is sufficient as a writing-although the
original copy, signed by the party in person, is not produced.68

the writing was made is likewise immaterial. Thus, a

memorandum made by a party solely for his own use and

never shown to the other party is sufficient if the other

Purpose of the Memorandum.-The purpose for which

party learns of it in time to compel its production in evi-

dence. ''There is no evidence," said the court in one

case,^^ ''that this note was ever seen by the appellee

(plaintiff) or even its existence known to him until the

trial; and it certainly never was delivered to him, or

went out of the possession of the appellants, until pro-

duced in court. * * * The Statute was passed * * *

to prevent the defendant from suffering loss, upon the

parole testimony of either a perjured or mistaken wit-

ness. * * * It made the defendant only liable when a

note or memorandum of the bargain signed by himself
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was produced at the trial. If produced from the defend-

ant's own custody, it guards against the mischief that

the Statute w^as passed to prevent, just as well as if pro-

duced from the custody of the plaintiff. ' '^°

Even a letter stating that the writer will not be bound

by his contract is sufficient if it incidentally sets out

the terms of the contract.^^ But of course a letter deny-

ing that any contract was ever entered into would not be

a memorandum of a contract even though it might set

out the terms of an alleged contract.^^

58 — Brewer v. Harst-Lachmund 59 — Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546,

Co., 127 Cal. 240, 50 L. R. A. 240, 42 Am. Rep. 343.

annotated; Dunning v. Roberts, 35 60 — Accord, The Argus Co. v.

Barb. (N. Y.) 463. Mayor, etc., 55 N. Y. 495, minutes

Minute book, The Argus Co. v. of a meeting; Johnson v. Dodgson,

Mayor, etc., 55 N. Y. 495. 2 M. & W. 653.

Letter by defendant to a third 61 — Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546,

person, Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. 42 Am. Rep. 343.

Y. 138, 62— Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,

150 N. Y. 314, 55 Am. St. 680.

the writing was made is likewise immaterial. Thus, a
memorandum made by a party solely for his own use and
never shown to the other party is sufficient if the other
party learns of it in time to compel its production in evidence. ''There is no evidence,'' said the court in one
case, 59 "that this note was ever seen by the appellee
(plaintiff) or even its existence known to him until the
trial; and it certainly never was deliver ed to him, or
went out of the possession of the appellants, until produced in court. * * * The Statute was passed * * *
to prevent the defendant from suffering loss, upon the
parole testimony of either a p erjured or mistaken witness. * * * It made the defendant only liable when a
note or memorandum of the bargain signed by himself
was produced at the trial. If produced fro1n the def endant's own custody, it guards against the mischief that
the Statute was passed to prevent, just as well as if produced from the custody of the plaintiff.' ' 60
Even a letter stating that the writer will not be bound
by his contract is sufficient if it incidentally sets out
the terms of the contract. 61 But of course a letter denying that any contract was ever entered into would not be
a memorandum of a contract even though it might set
out the terms of an alleged contract. 62
58-Brewer v. Harst-Lachmund
Co., 127 Cal. 240, 50 L. R. A. 240,
annotated; Dunning v. Roberts, 35
Barb. (N. Y.) 463.
Minute book, The Argus Co. v.
Mayor, etc., 55 N. Y. 495.
Letter by defendant to a third
person, Marks v. Cow din, 226 N.
Y. 138.
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59-Drury v . Young, 58 Md. 546,
42 Am. Rep. 343.
60-Accord, The Argu s Co. v.
Mayor, etc., 55 N. Y. 495, minutes
of a meeting; Johnson v. Dodgson,
2 M. & W. 653.
61-Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546,
42 Am. Rep. 343.
62-Wilson v. Lewiston Mill 80.,
150 N . Y. 314, 55 Am. St. 680.
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Signature. — The Statute requires that the memoran-

dum be signed by the party to be charged or by his

agent. Even a memorandum made entirely in the hand-

writing of the party to be cliarged is not sufficient if

not signed by him.^^

The signature, however, need not be at the end of the

memo r andum.^*

Neither need it be the full name of the party to be

charged. The function of the signature required by

the Statute is undoubtedly for the verification of the

writing and ''signed" has therefore been given its broad

literal meaning, to make a distinguishing mark, or mani-

festation. *'It is hardly necessary to add that the signa-

ture is valid and binding, though made with the initials

of the party only. ' '^^ A letter signed with only the Chris-

tian name of the writer has been held sufficient as a

written memorandum.®^

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

63— Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2;

Watson V. Winston, (Tex.) 43 S.

W. 852; Copehart v. Hale, 6 W. Va.

547; Newby v. Rogers, 40 Ind. 9,

even a writing signed by the plain-

tiff and produced from the custody

of the defendant is not suflScient.

"When the statute spealis of 'the

party to be charged' it must be un-

derstood to mean the defendant to

the action. The note or memoran-

dum must be signed by him."

It is not necessary that it be

Signature.-The Statute requires that the memorandum be signed by the party to be charged or by his
agent. Even a memorandum made entirely in the handwriting of the party to be charged is not sufficient if
not signed by him. 63
The signature, however, need not be at the end of the
memorandum. 64
Neither need it be the full name of the party to be
charged. The function of the signature required by
the Statute is undoubtedly for the verification of the
writing and "signed" has therefore been given its broad
literal meaning, to make a distinguishing mark, or manifestation. "It is hardly necessary to add that the signature is valid and binding, though made with the initials
of the party only.' ' 65 A letter signed with only the Christian name of the writer has been held sufficient as a
written memorandum. 66

signed by both parties, Newby v.

Rogers, 40 Ind. 9; First Presby-

terian Church V. Swanson, 100 III.

Ap. 39; Bowers v. Whitney, 88

Minn. 168; Bristol v. Mente, 80 N.

Y. S. 52, 178 N. Y. 599; Dennis

Simmons Co. v. Corey, 140 N. C.

462, 6 L. R. A. (n. s.) 468; Wil-

liams V. Robinson, 73 Me. 186, 40

Am. Rep. 352; Knapp v. Beach,

52 Ind. Ap. 573.

Contra, Wilkinson v. Heaven-

rich, 58 Mich. 574, 55 Am. Rep. 708.

64 — Drury v. Young, 50 Md. 542,

42 Am. Rep. 343; Merritt v. Cla-

son, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 102, 7 Am.

Dec. 286.

But the statutes of some states

require the memorandum to be

"subscribed."

65 — Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen

(Mass.) 474; Salmon Falls Mfg.

Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446.

66— Walker v. Walker, 175 Mass.

349.

Cf. Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind. 136,

36 Am. Rep. 193.

Defendant's "Mark" is sufficient.

Foye V. Patch, 132 Mass. 405; Sym-

bols, Brown v. Butcher's Bk., 6

Hill (N. Y.) 443, 41 Am. Dec. 755,

indorsement on a negotiable in-

63-Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2;
Watson v. Winston, (Tex.) 43 S.
W. 852; Copehart v. Hale, 6 W. Va.
547; Newby v. Rogers, 40 Ind. 9,
even a writing signed by the plaintiff and produced from the custody
of the defendant is not sufficient.
"When the statute speaks of 'the
party to be charged' it must be understood to mean the defendant to
the action. The note or memorandum must be signed by him."
It is not necessary that it be
signed by both parties, Newby v.
Rogers, 40 Ind. 9; First Presbyterian Church v. Swanson, 100 Ill.
Ap. 39; Bowers v. Whitney, 88
Minn. 168; Bristol v. Mente, 80 N.
Y. S. 52, 178 N. Y. 599; Dennis
Simmons o. v. Corey, 140 N. C.
462, 6 L. R. A. (n. s.) 468; Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 186, 40
Am. Rep. 352; Knapp v. Beach,
52 Ind. Ap. 573.

strument.
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Oontra, Wilkinson v. Heavenrich, 58 Mich. 574, 55 Am. Rep. 708.
64-Drury v. Young, 50 Md. 542,
42 Am. Rep. 343; Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 102, 7 Am.
Dec. 286.
But the statutes of some states
require the memorandum to be
"subscribed."
65-Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen
(Mass.) 474; Salmon Falls Mfg.
Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 446.
66-Walker v. Walker, 175 Mass.
349.
Cf. Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind. 136,
36 Am. Rep. 193.
Defendant's "Mark" is sufficient.
Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 405; Symbols, Brown v. Butcher's Bk., 6
Hill (N. Y.) 443, 41 Am. Dec. 755,
indorsement on a negotiable instrument.
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The character and medium with which the signing is

done is also not material. Thus it is a sufficient signing

although the signature be made mth a pencil,*'' or by

means of a rubber stamp. *^

As the purpose of the signed writing is to show that

the particular contract alleged was made by the particular

defendant it is fair to assume that the primary purpose

of the signature is to connect the defendant mth the

writing. Theoretically, therefore, the signature should

have some characteristic as a signature — distinct from

a name — ^by which to identify the signer. It should be

his owii chirography, for instance, or that characteristic

of his agent. Practically, however, it is not at all essen-

tial that the signature be characteristic of the defendant

beyond the fact that it is his name. A signature made

by a rubber stamp, for instance, even though affixed by

an agent, is held to supply the requirements of the

Statute, without any indication in the decisions that it
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should be a facsimile of the party's own handw^riting.*^

Likewise, a name printed by means of a typewriter has

been held a sufficient ''signing" of the instrument, al-

though it was certainly in no way inherently character-

istic of the party to be charged."''*' Courts have even gone

so far as to hold that the name of a party printed on a

paper prior to the making of the contract afterward

evidenced by the paper is a sufficient ''signing.'"^ In

67— Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. Y. S. 780; Garton Toy Co. v. Bus-

(N. Y.) 102, 7 Am. Dec. 286; 14 weU Lumber Co., 150 Wis. 341.

Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Myers v. Van- 71— Goldowitz v. Kupfer & Co.,

derbelt, 84 Pa. 510. 141 N. Y. 531, name printed at

68 — Streff v. Colteaux, 64 HI. Ap. bottom of a circular containing

179; Deep River Bank's App., 73 the terms of a contract alleged to

Conn. 341. have been made afterward; Ham-

69 — Deep River Bank's App., ilton v. State, 103 Ind. 96, name

73 Conn. 341; Streff v. Colteaux, of prosecuting attorney printed at

64 111. Ap. 179, "It is ordinarily bottom of a blank form on which

the act of making a paper one's an indictment was later written

own that is important, rather than held a signature,

the manner of so doing." The fact that the signature was

70 — Landecker v. Bank, 130 N. made before the contract was
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The character and medium with which the signing is
done is also not material. Thus it is a sufficient signing
although the signature be made with a pencil,67 or by
means of a rubber stamp. 68
As the purpose of the signed writing is to show that
the particular contract alleged was made by the particular
defendant it is fair to assume that the primary purpose
of the signature is to connect the defendant with the
writing. Theoretically, therefore, the signature should
have some characteristic as a signature-distinct from
a name-by which to identify the signer. It should be
his own chirography, for instance, or that characteristic
of his agent. Practically, however, it is not at all essential that the signature be characteristic of the defendant
beyond the fact that it is his name. A signature made
by a rubber stamp, for instance, even though affixed by
an agent, is held to supply the requirements of the
Statute, without any indication in the decisions that it
should be a facsimile of the party's own handwriting. 69
Likewise, a name printed by means of a typewriter has
been held a sufficient "signing" of the instrument, although it was certainly in no way inherently characteristic of the party to be charged. 7° Courts have even gone
so far as to hold that the name of a party printed on a
paper prior to the making of the contract afterward
evidenced by the paper is a sufficient "signing'. " 71 In
67-Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns.
(N. Y.) 102, 7 Am. Dec. 286; 14
Johns. (N. Y.) 484; Myers v. Vanderbelt, 84 Pa. 510.
68-Streff v. Colteaux, 64 Ill. Ap.
179; Deep River Bank's App., 73
Conn. 341.
69-Deep River Bank's App.,
73 Conn. 341; Streff v. Colteaux,
64 Ill. Ap. 179, "It is ordinarily
the act of making a paper one's
own that is important, rather than
the manner of so doing."
70-Landecker v. Bank, 130 N.
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Y. S. 780; Garton Toy Co. v. Buswell Lumber Co., 150 Wis. 341.
71-Goldowitz v. Kupfer & Co.,
141 N. Y. 531, name printed at
bottom of a circular containing
the terms of a contract alleged to
have been made afterward; Hamilton v. State, 103 Ind. 96, name
of prosecuting attorney printed at
bottom of a blank form on which
an indictment was later written
held a signature.
The fact that the signature was
made before the contract was
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Drury v. Young'^ a memorandum was held to be duly

signed by the defendant although the instrument had

never been delivered to the plaintiff and the defendant's

name appeared on it only in the form of a printed letter-

head, at the top of the paper.

These cases, although undoubtedly accepted as author-

ity, are scarcely within the rule laid down in McMillen

V. Terrell, '^ as follows: "The law does not prescribe

the particular place where the obligor's name must be

placed ; it may be at the beginning, or in the body, at the

close or perhaps on the margin of the instrument; but

wherever placed, it must be done with the intention of

thereby executing it as the obligation of the party so

signing it. If the signature is placed at the close, at

the ordinary place of signature, the inference is that it

was so placed as the final execution of the instrument.

This inference, however, does not necessarily arise where

the name is found at the commencement or in the body.
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In such case there should be some evidence, either in

the form of the instrument or the circumstances attend-

ing the signature, showdng that it was the intention of

the party thereby to execute it. * * * The Statute is

plain and unequivocal, and should not be evaded by

judicial refinement, but should be so administered as to

subserve the purpose for which it was enacted."

Signing by Agent. — The signing may be done by an

agent of the party, as is indicated by many of the cases

already discussed. This is in accord with the specific

provision of the Statute. It ordinarily appears that

the party's own name was signed by the agent — as, for

instance, in using a rubber stamp — and such signing is

effective whether the agent appends also his own name as

agent or not. But a signing by the agent of his own

drawn has been held to be no bar But contra, Hodgkins v. Bond, 1

to its effectiveness. Ulen v. Kit- N. H. 284.

tredge, 7 Mass. 233; Underwood v. 72—50 Md. 542, 42 Am. Rep. 343.

Hossack, 38 111. 208. 73—23 Ind. 163.

Drury v. Young 72 a memorandum was held to be duly
signed by the defendant although the instrument had
never been delivered to the plaintiff and the defendant's
name appeared on it only in the form of a printed letterhead, at the top of the paper.
These cases, although undoubtedly accepted as authority, are scarcely within the rule laid down in McMillen
v. Terrell, 73 as follows: ''The law does not prescribe
the particular place where the obligor 's name must be
placed; it may be at the beginning, or in the body, at the
close or perhaps on the margin of the instrument; but
wherever placed, it must be done with the intention of
thereby executing it as the obligation of the party so
signing it. If the signature is placed at the close, at
the ordinary place of signature, the inference is that it
was so placed as the final execution of the instrument.
This inference, however, does not necessarily arise where
the name is found at the commencement or in the body.
In such case there should be some evidence, either in
the form of the instrument or the circumstances attending the signature, showing that it was the intention of
the party thereby to execute it. * * * The Statute is
plain and unequivocal, and should not be evaded by
judicial refinement, but should be so administered as to
subserve the purpose for which it was enacted."
--Signing by Agent.-The signing may be done by an
agent of the party, as is indicated by many of the cases
already discussed. This is in accord with the specific
provision of the Statute. It ordinarily appears that
the party's own name was signed by the agent-as, for
instance, in using a rubber stamp-and such signing is
effective whether the agent appends also his own name as
agent or not. But a signing by the agent of his own
drawn has been held to be no bar
t o its effectiveness. Ulen v. Kittredge, 7 fass . 233; Unde rwood v.
H ossack, 38 Ill . 20 8.
D1
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But contra, Hodgkins v. Bond, 1
N. H. 284.
72-5 0 Md. 542, 42 Am. Rep. 343.
73-23 Ind. 163.
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name only, without writing that of his principal, is suf-

ficient to charge the principal if he be otherwise shown

by the contract as the person concerned.'''*

The party claiming under the contract, however,, can

not himself be an agent for the party to be charged so

as to sign for the latterJ^

Separate Papers. — "When the memorandum consists of

several separate pieces of paper it is not essential that

they all be signed by the party to be charged. It is suf-

255

name only, without writing that of his principal, is sufficient to charge the principal if he be otherwise shown
by the contract as the person concerned. 74
The party claiming under the contract, however,. can
not himself be an agent for the party to be charged so
as to sign for the latter. 75

ficient if the ''memorandum" be signed.

That the ' ' memorandum ' ' may consist of several sepa-

rate and distinct documents is well settled. There must

be some connection between the various unsigned papers

and the one on which the signature appears, but this con-

nection may be either physical or through relation of

the contents.

As a physical connection it need not be a fixed one.

A letter and the envelope in w^hich it was sent, for
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instance, are sufficiently connected to be used together

as constituting the memorandum.'''^ In another case two

documents, neither of which by itself was a sufficient

memorandum, were read in connection one with the other

74— Haskell v. Tukesbury, 92 son v. Buck, 35 N J. 338, 10 Am.

Me. 551, 69 Am. St. 529, quoting Rep. 243; but inasmuch as one

from Union Bk. v. Coster, 3 N. Y. party to the contract can not sign

203, 53 Am. Dec. 280, "The pro- as agent of the other party so as

visions of the Statute are complied to satisfy the statute, an auction-

with if the names of competent eer who has himself an interest

contracting parties appear in the in the sale can not sign as agent

writing, and, if the party be an of the other party. Bent v. Cobb,

agent, it is not necessary that the 9 Gray (Mass.) 397, 69 Am. Dec.

name of the principal shall be dis- 295; Tull v. David, 45 Mo. 445,

closed in the writing." Kingsley v. lOO Am. Dec. 385.

Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23, 69 Am. St.

486; White v. Dahlquist Mfg. Co.,

75 — Witson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,

179 Mass. 427; Brodhead v. Rein- ^^O N. Y. 314, 55 Am. St. 680; John-

bold, 200 Pa. 618, 86 Am. St. 735. «°^ ^- B"«^' ^5 N. J. 338, 10 Am.

Separate Papers.-When the memorandum consists of
several separate pieces of paper it is not essential that
they all be signed by the party to be charged. It is sufficient if the "memorandum" be signed.
. That the ''memorandum'' may consist of several separate and distinct documents is well settled. There must
be some connection between the various unsigned papers
and the one on which the signature appears, but this connection may be either physical or through relation of
the contents.
As a physical connection it need not be a fixed one.
A letter and the envelope in which it was sent, for
instance, are sufficiently connected to be used together
as constituting the memorandum. 76 In another case two
documents, neither of which by itself was a sufficient
memorandum, were read in connection one with the other

Rep. 243

76— Pe

memorandum is concerned. John- Q. B. 688

An auctioneer may be agent of

both parties, so far as signing the 76 — Pearce v. Gardner [1897] 1

74-Haskell v. Tuk'esbury, 92
Me. 551, 69 Am. St. 529, quoting
from Union Bk. v. Coster, 3 N. Y.
203, 53 Am. Dec. 280, "The provisions of the Statute are complied
with if the names of competent
contracting parties appear in the
writing, and, if the party be an
agent, it is not necessary that the
name of the principal shall be disclosed in the writing." Kingsley v.
Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23, 69 Am. St.
486; White v. Dahlquist Mfg. Co.,
179 Mass. 427; Brodhead v. Reinbold, 200 Pa. 618, 86 Am. St. 735.
An auctioneer may be agent of
both parties, so far as signing the
memorandum is concerned. John-

son v. Buck, 35 N J. 338, 10 Am.
Rep. 243; but inasmuch as one
party to the contract can not sign
as agent of the other party so as
to satisfy the statute, an auctioneer who has himself an interest
in the sale can not sign as agent
of the other party, Bent v. Cobb,
9 Gray (Mass.) 397, 69 Am. Dec.
295; Tull v. David, 45 Mo. 445,
100 Am. Dec. 385.
75-Witson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,
150 N. Y. 314, 55 Am. St. 680; Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J. 338, 10 Am.
Rep. 243.
76-Pearce v. Gardner [1897] 1
Q. B. 688.
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because they had been pinned together at the time of

sale.''^''' A writing on an unsigned leaf of a book was

treated as a sufficient memorandum because of the signa-

ture on the leather folder in which it was kept.''^^

Relation of Papers. — When separate documents are

allowed to be read together because of the relation of the

because they had been pinned together at the time of
sale. 77 A writing on an unsigned leaf of a book was
treated as a sufficient memorandum because of the signature on the leather folder in which it was kept. 78

subject matter, there is generally a specific reference in

the signed paper to the unsigned one. This reference,

however, need not be specific nor even apparent from a

mere reading of the document. It is sufficient if there is

in fact a reference when the meaning of the document is

explained.'''®

Thus, in Beckwith v. Talbot®" a written agreement had

been signed by the plaintiff but not by the defendant.

But the defendant had signed certain letters in which

he several times referred to ' ' the agreement. ' ' The court

held that there was a memorandum signed by the defend-

ant, saying, "What agreement could he possibly refer to
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but the only one which, so far as appears, was ever

made. * * * It is undoubtedly a general rule that col-

lateral papers, adduced to supply the defect o-f signature

of a written agreement under the Statute of Frauds,

should on their face sufficiently demonstrate their refer-

ence to such agreement without the aid of parole proof.

But the rule is not absolute. There may be cases in

which it would be a violation of reason and common sense

to ignore a reference which derives its significance from

such proof. If there is ground for any doubt in the

matter, the general rule should be enforced. But where

77 — Tallman v. Franklin, 14 N. Cal. Ap. 782; Leesley Bros. v.

Y. 587. Fruit Co., 162 Mo. Ap. 195, no ref-

erence by one to the other at all.

Allen V. Burnett, 92 S. C. 95; Poel

V. Brunswick, etc. Co., 144 N. Y.

S. 725, even though the second one

purports to be a repudiation of the

79— Willis V. Ellis, 98 Miss. 197; other.

78— Jones v. Joyner, 82 L. T. (n.

8.) 768. See also Jelks v. Barrett,

52 Miss. 315. But compare, Wil-

stoch V. Heyd, 122 Ind. 574.

Albion Lumber Co. v. Lowell, 20 80—95 U. S. 289.

--Relation of Papers.-When separate documents are
allowed to be read together because of the relation of the
subject matter, there is generally a specific reference in
the signed paper to the unsigned one. This reference,
however, need not be specific nor even apparent from a
mere reading of the document. It is sufficient if there is
in fact a reference when the meaning of the document is
explained. 79
Thus, in Beckwith v. Talbot80 a written agreement had
been signed by the plaintiff but not by the defendant.
But the defendant had signed certain letters in which
he several times ref erred to ''the agreement.'' The court
held that there was a memorandum signed by the defendant, saying, ''What agreement could he possibly refer to
but the only one which, so far as appears, was ever
made. * * * It is undoubtedly a general rule that collateral papers, adduced to supply the defect o-f signature
of a written agreement under the Statute of Frauds, .
should on their face sufficiently demonstrate their reference to such agreement without the aid of parole proof.
But the rule is not absolute. There may be cases in
which it would be a violation of reason and common sense
to ignore a r eference which derives its significance from
such proof. If there is ground for any doubt in the
matter, the general rule should be enforced. But where
77-Tallman v. Franklin, 14 N.
Y. 587.
78-Jones v. Joyner, 82 L. T. (n.
s.) 768. See also Jelks v. Ba:r;rett,
52 Miss. 315. But compare, Wilstoch v. Heyd, 122 Ind. 574.
79-Willis v. Ellis, 98 Miss. 197;
Albion Lumber Co. v. Lowell, 20
C.1
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Cal. Ap. 782; Leesley Bros. v.
Fruit Co., 162 Mo. Ap. 195, no reference by one to the other at all.
Allen v. Burnett, 92 S. C. 95; Poel
v. Brunswick, etc. Co., 144 N. Y.
S. 725, even though the se ond one
purports to be a repudiation of the
other.
80-95 u. s. 289.
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there is no ground for doubt, its enforcement would aid,

instead of discouraging, fraud. "^^

But to the extent that a reference is necessary, the

reference must appear from the document itself. The

fact that they do refer to the same subject matter 'and

are in fact supplementary can not be shown by extraneous

evidence;, the relationship must appear from the face

of the documents. "If it be necessary to adduce parole

evidence, in order to connect a signed paper with others

unsigned, by reason of the absence of any internal evi-

dence in the signed paper to show a reference to, or con-

nection with the unsigned papers, then the several papers

taken together do not constitute a memorandum in writ-

ing of the bargain, so as to satisfy the statute."^''

This latter statement and the decisions in accord with

it are not precisely in harmony with the decision in Beck-

with v. Talbot, supra. The difference, however, seems

to be less in the law than in the application. The cases
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are agreed that separate documents can not be used as

one memorandum if extraneous evidence is necessary to

show their connection.^^ On the other hand, it is settled

that parole evidence may be received as a means of inter-

pretation of the expressions used in the writing. If,

when so explained and interpreted, the language of one

document clearly relates to another, that other may be

used in connection with it, even though the language

when unexplained shows no apparent connection. This

is the doctrine of Beckwith v. Talbot. The court allowed

the phrase "the agreement" to be explained by parole

evidence. When so explained, it clearly related to the

other paper, in the opinion of the court.®* The conflict

81— Ryan v. United States, 136 66 Ga. 338, 42 Am. Rep. 72.

U. S. 68; Little v. Dougherty, 11 83— Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J.

Colo. 103; Coe v. Tough, 116 N. Y. 338, 10 Am. Rep. 243; Thayer v.

273; Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. Y. Luce, 22 O. S. 62.

138. 84— Wilkinson v. Taylor Mfg.

82— North v. Mendel, 73 Ga. 400, Co., 67 Miss. 231; Bauman v.

54 Am. Rep. 879; Smith v. Jones, James, 3 Ch. 508.
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there is no ground for doubt, its enforcement would aid,
instead of discouraging, fraud.' ' 81
But to the extent that a reference is necessary, the
reference must appear from the document itself. The
fact that they do refer to the saine subject matter ' and
are in fact supplementary can not be shown by extraneous
evidence;. the relationship must appear from the face
of the docunients. "If it be necessary to adduce parole
evidence, in order to connect a signed paper with others
unsigned, by reason of the absence of any internal evidence in the signed paper to show a reference to, or connection with the unsigned papers, then the several papers
taken together do not constitute a memorandum in writing of the bargain, so as to satisfy the statute.' ' 82
This latter statement and the decisions in accord with
it are not precisely in harmony with the decision in Beckwith v. Talbot, supra. The difference, however, seems
to be less in the law than in the application. The cases
are agreed that separate documents can not be used as
one memorandum if extraneous evidence is necessary to
show their connection. 83 On the other hand, it is settled
that parole evidence may be received as a means of interpretation of the expressions used in the writing. If,
when so explained and interpreted, the language of one
document clearly relates to another, that other may be
used in connection with it, even though the language
when unexplained shows no apparent connection. This
is the doctrine of Beckwith v. Talbot. The court allowed
the phrase "the agreement" to be explained by parole
evidence. When so explained, it clearly related to the
other paper, in the opinion of the court. 84 The conflict
81-Ryan v. United States, 136
U. S. 68; Little v. Dougherty, 11
Colo. 103; Coe v. Tough, 116 N. Y.
273; Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. Y.
138.
82-North v. Mendel, 73 Ga. 400,
54 Am. Rep. 879; Smith v. Jones,

66 Ga. 338, 42 Am. Rep. 72.
83-Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J.
338, 10 Am. Rep. 243; Thayer v.
Luce, 22 0. S. 62.
84-Wilkinson v. Taylor Mfg.
Co., 67 Miss. 231; Bauman v.
James, 3 Ch. 508.
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between various decisions is largely due to the lack of

any standard as to when the relationship is sujjiciently

indicated by the language of instruments.

There are many decisions, however, to the effect that

no reference by one document to the other is necessary

at all if from their contents it can be said that they ob-

viously relate to the same subject matter. In Brewer v.

Horst-Lachmund Co.^^ the only writing was in the form of

two telegrams, neither of which referred to the other and

neither of which alone was a sufficient memorandum.

The court allowed them to be used together because * ' on

their face, the last one was sent to the plaintiff in response

to the first." Similarly, in Lerned v. Wannemacher^^

there were two identical written statements of a sale of

coal. Each one showed all the terms of the contract,

except the names of the parties. One paper was signed

by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant. Thus

one paper showed the name of the seller, the other the
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name of the buyer. There was no reference in either to

the other. Nevertheless the court allowed the two to be

read together, whereby the entire contract was shown.®''

Contents of Memorandum. — As to the contents of the

memorandum, the law is more simple and definite than the

apparent confusion in its application indicates. The rule

is simply, that the memorandum must show the terms

of the contract. It is not sufficient for the memorandum

to show that some contract was entered into ; it must show

what that contract was}^

85 — 127 Cal. 643, 50 L. R. A. 240. to the other need not be made, if,

86 — 9 Allen (Mass.) 412. by inspection and comparison, it

87 — Leesley Bros. v. Fruit Co., appears that they severally relate

162 Mo. Ap. 195; Peyck Bros. v. to, and form a part of, the same

Ahrens, 98 Mo. Ap. 456, "If some transaction." Welsh v. Brainerd,

only of the writings be signed, ref- 95 Minn. 234; Gaines v. McAdam,

between various decisions is largely due to the lack of
any standard as to when the relationship is sufficiently
indicated by the lang·uage of instruments.
There are many decisions, however, to the effect that
no reference by one document to the other is necessary
at all if fro1n their contents it can be said that they obviously relate to the same subject matter. In Brewer v.
Horst-Lachmund Co. 85 the only writing was in the form of
two telegrams, neither of which referred to the other and
neither of which alone was a sufficient memorandum.
The court allowed them to be used together because "on
their face, the last one was sent to the plaintiff in response
to the first.'' Similarly, in Lerned v. Wannemacher86
there were two identical written statements of ~ sale of
coal. Each one showed all the terms of the contract,
except the names of the parties. One paper was signed
by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant. Thus
one paper showed the name of the seller, the other the
name of the buyer. There was no reference in either to
the other. Nevertheless the court allowed the two to be
read together, whereby the entire contract was shown. 87

erence must specifically be made 79 111. Ap. 201; Crystal Palace

therein to those which are not so Flouring Co. v. Butterfield, 15

signed. But if each of the writ- Colo. Ap. 246.

IngB be 80 signed, such reference 88 — "The note or memorandum

Contents of Memorandum.-As to the contents of the
memorandum, the law is more simple and definite than the
apparent confusion in its application indicates. The rule
is simply, that the memorandum must show the terms
of the contract. It is not sufficient for· the memorandum
to how that some contract was entered into; it must show
what that contract was. 88
85-127 Cal. 643, 50 L. R. A. 240.
86-9 Allen (Mass.) 412.
87-Leesley Bros. v. Fruit Co.,
162 Mo. Ap. 195; Peyck Bros. v.
Ahrens, 98 Mo. Ap. 456, "If some
only of the writings be signed, reference must specifically be made
therein to those which are not so
signed. But if each of the writings be so signed, such reference

to the other need not be made, if,
by inspection and comparison, it
appears that they severally relate
to, and form a part of, the same
transaction." Welsh v. Brainerd,
95 Minn. 234; Gaines v. McAdam,
79 Ill. Ap. 201; Crystal Palace
Flouring Co. v. Butterfield, 15
Colo. Ap. 246.
88-"The note or memorandum
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--Names of Parties.-The parties involved in the contract must be shown by the writing, else it does not of
itself show a contract. "It takes two parties to make
a contract; and a writing which names only one party,
and does not in any manner indicate who the other party
is, does not set forth a contract. It is well established
that where the statute requires the contract to be in writing there can be no binding contract unless both parties
thereto are named in the writing, or so described therein
as that they may be identified.' ' 89

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 259

Names of Parties. — The parties involved in the con-

tract must be shown by the writing, else it does not of

itself show a contract. '*It takes two parties to make

a contract; and a writing which names only one party,

and does not in any manner indicate who the other party

is, does not set forth a contract. It is well established

that where the statute requires the contract to be in writ-

ing there can be no binding contract unless both parties

thereto are named in the writing, or so described therein

as that they may be identified. ' '®®

Consideration. — For the same reason, the consid-

eration must be sho^vn. Without consideration there can

be no contract, and a writing, therefore, which states no

consideration states no contract. It does not matter

that there was in fact a consideration, any more than

it matters that there was in fact a contract. The writing

--Consideration.-For the same reason, the consideration must be shown. Without consideration there can
be no contract, and a writing, therefore, which states no
consideration states no contract. It does not matter
that there was in fact a consideration, any more than
it matters that there was in fact a contract. The writing
must do more than merely indicate that there was a
contract; it must show what that contract was. Ho-wever we may define "contract" in other relations, in this
connection the ''contract'' is not the promise alone; it
is the promise and the consideration. Hence, a writing
which does not show the consideration as well a~ the
promise does not show the contract and is insufficient
to satisfy the Statute.90

must do more than merely indicate that there was a

contract; it must show what that contract was. How-
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ever we may define ^'contract" in other relations, in this

connection the ''contract" is not the promise alone; it

is the promise and the consideration. Hence, a writing

which does not show the consideration as well as the

promise does not show the contract and is insufficient

to satisfy the Statute.®''

* * * must disclose with sub- v. Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23, 69 Am. St.

stantial accuracy every fact ma- 486. If the signer appears as an

terial to constitute a contract of agent only, with no personal lia-

bargain and sale. It is therefore bility, the principal's name must

essential that such a note or mem- also appear somewhere; the mem-

orandum shall contain within it- orandum must name someone who

self a description of the property is liable, Langstroth v. J. C. Tur-

agreed to be sold by which it can ner Co., 148 N. Y. S. 224.

be known or identified, of the price 90 — Rains v. Patton, 191 Ala.

to be paid for it, of the party who 349; Kemensky v. Chapin, 193

sells it, and of the party who buys Mass. 500; Am. Iron & Steel Co. v.

it." Am. Iron & Steel Co. v. Mid- Midland Steel Co., 101 Fed. 200;

land Steel Co., 101 Fed. 200. Carter v. Timber Co., 184 Mo. Ap.

89 — Ogelesby Co. v. Williams 523, "In determining the sufficiency

Co., 112 Ga. 359; Darnell v. Laf- of a writing to evidence a con-

lerty, 113 Mo. Ap. 282; Kingsley tract within the Statute of Frauds

• * * must disclose with substantial accuracy every fact material to constitute a contract of
bargain and sale. It is therefore
essential that such a note or memorandum shall contain within itself a description of the property
agreed to be sold by which it can
be known or identified, of the price
to be paid for it, of the party who
sells it, and of the party who buys
it." Am. Iron & Steel Co. v. Midland Steel Co., 101 Fed. 200.
89-0gelesby Co. v. Williams
Co., 112 Ga. 359; Darnell v. Laf·
ferty, 113 Mo. Ap. 282; Kingsley
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486. If the signer appears as an
agent only, with no personal liability, the principal's name must
also appear somewhere; the memorandum must name someone who
is liable, Langstroth v. J. C. Turner Co., 148 N. Y. S. 224.
90-Rains v. Patton, 191 Ala.
349; Kernen sky v. Chapin, 193
Mass. 500; Am. Iron & Steel Co. v.
Midland Steel Co., 101 Fed. 200;
Carter v. Timber Co., 184 Mo. Ap.
523, "In determining the sufficiency
of a writing to evidence a contract within the Statute of Frauds
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The memorandum need not state anything more than

was included in the contract itself. The place or time of

delivery, for instance, are not essential to be determined

upon in an oral contract. A contract in which that

matter has been quite ignored by the parties is quite

enforcible. Therefore, if such matters have not been

included in the contract the memorandum need not con-

tain anything in regard to them.^^

But, on the other hand, it is not sufficient that the mem-

orandum merely show a contract. It must show the con-

tract on which suit is brought. And, inasmuch as the

party sued can use oral evidence to disprove the making

of the contract as alleged in the suit, this means that

the memorandum must show the contract actually made.®^

Accordingly, if terms as to time of delivery and the

like, although not necessary to a valid contract, have in

fact been agreed upon, the memorandum is not sufficient
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unless it does show such terms.®^

there are three essential and nec-

essary ingredients. (1) the par-

ties, (2) the subject matter, and

(3) the consideration or price.

Where the writing lacks any of

these essential elements there is

no enforcible contract." Booth v.

A. Levy, etc. Co., 21 Cal. Ap. 427;

Glasgow Milling Co. v. Burgher,

122 Mo. Ap. 14; Rigby v. Gaymon,

95 S. C. 489.

THE LAW OF SALES

The memorandum need not state anything more than
was included in the contract itself. The place or time of
delivery, for instance, are not essential to be determined
upon in an oral contract. A contract in which that
matter has been quite ignored by the parties is quite
enforcible. Therefore, if such matters have not been
included in the contract the memorandum need not contain anything in regard to them. 91
But, on the other hand, it is not sufficient that the memorandum merely show a contract. It must show the contract on which suit is brought. And, inasmuch as the
party sued can use oral evidence to disprove the making
of the contract as alleged in the suit, this means that
the memorandum must show the contract actually made. 92
Accordingly, if terms as to time of delivery and the
like, although not necessary to a valid contract, have in
fact been agreed upon, the memorandum is not sufficient
unless it does show such terms. 93

91— Willis V. Ellis, 98 Miss. 197;

Crosby v. Bouchard, 82 Vt. 66;

Darnell v. Lafferty, 113 Mo. Ap.

282. If the contract itself gives

the buyer a choice, the memoran-

dum need not be more explicit.

Am. Iron & Steel Co. v. Midland

Steel Co., 101 Fed. 200. If

price is left to future determina-

tion, memorandum need not show

more. Booth v. A. Levy etc. Co.,

21 Cal. Ap. 427.

92 — "It is not sufficient that the

note or memorandum may express

the terms of a contract. It is es-

there are three essential and necessary ingredients. (1) the parties, (2) the subject matter, and
(3) the consideration or price.
Where the writing lacks any of
these essential elements there is
no enforcible contract." Booth v.
A. Levy, etc. Co., 21 Cal. Ap. 427;
Glasgow Milling Co. v. Burgher,
122 Mo. Ap. 14; Rigby v. Gaymon,
95 s. c. 489.

sential that it shall completely evi-

dence the contract which the

parties made. If instead of prov-

ing the existence of that contract,

it * * * evidenced a contract in

terms and conditions different

from that which the parties en-

tered into, it fails to comply with

the statute." Poel v. Brunswick-

Balke-Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310.

"It becomes necessary then to

examine and ascertain what are

the essential terms of this con-

tract before we can pass upon the

question of whether the memoran-

dum is sufficient to assert itself

91-Willis v. Ellis, 98 Miss. 197;
Crosby v. Bouchard, 82 Vt. 66;
Darnell v. Lafferty, 113 Mo. Ap.
282. If the contract itself gives
the buyer a choice, the memorandum need not be more explicit,
Am. Iron & Steel Co. v. Midland
Steel Co., 101 Fed. 200.
If
price is left to future determination, memorandum need not show
more. Booth v. A. Levy etc. Co.,
21 Cal. Ap. 427.

without parole evidence." Darnell

92-"It is not sufficient that the
note or memorandum may express
the terms of a contract. It is essential that it shall completely evidence the contract which the
parties made. If instead of proving the existence of that contract,
it * * * evidenced a contract in
terms and conditions different
from that which the parties entered into, it fails to comply with
the statute." Poel v. BrunswickBalke-Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310.
"It becomes necessary then to
examine and ascertain what are
the essential terms cf this contract before we can pass upon the
question of whether' the memorandum is sufficient to assert itself
without parole evidence." Darnell
v. Lafferty, 113 Mo. Ap. 282.
93-Arky v. Commission Co.,
185 Mo. Ap. 241; Crosby v. Bouch·
ard, 82 Vt. 66.

V. Lafferty, 113 Mo. Ap. 282.

93 — Arky v. Commission Co.,
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Subject Matter of the Contract. — The promise of

the seller is the consideration for the promise of the buyer.

Therefore, under the foregoing rule, the seller's promise

as well as that of the buyer must appear in the writing.

And as the seller's promise is to convey title to some

thing, what that thing is must be shown by the memo-

randum.^*

Self-Explanation of the Memorandum. — None of these

essentials, however, need be stated with such fullness and

precision as to be at once intelligible to any reader. A

--Subject Matter of the Contract.-The promise of
the seller is the consideration for the promise of the buyer.
Therefore, under the foregoing rule, the seller's promise
as well as that of the buyer mu t appear in the writing.
And as the seller's promise is to convey title to some
thing, what that thing is must be shown by the memorandum.94

memorandum written in Russian would undoubtedly be

sufficient though not intelhgible to the average American.

One phrased in the technical idiom of a particular trade

would suffice if accurately translatable to a court, though

unintelligible to the unlearned reader. Similarly, a mem-

orandum which has a precise and definite meaning to

one who is acquainted with the facts surrounding the

transaction is sufficient, even though it be unintelligible

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

to one unfamiliar with the circumstances. *'It is always

permissible to show the surroundings and circumstances

of the contract and it is sufficient, as against the Statute

of Frauds, that, after the court is put in the same posi-

tion as the parties themselves, the terms and subject mat-

ter of the contract are made certain. ' '^^

94— Carter v. Timber Co., 184 494. Accord, Bowers v. Ocean Acci-

Mo. Ap. 523. dent Co., 97 N. Y. S. 485, Affd. 187

95— Carter v. Timber Co., 184 N. Y. 561; Flash v. Rossiter, 102 N.

Mo. Ap. 523. Y. S. 449; Bank v. Securities Co.,

The description of the subject 141 Mo. Ap. 524; Moses Co. v. Stack-

matter need not be explicit on the Gibbs Co., 56 Wash. 529; Haskell

face of the memorandum if it can v. Tukesbury, 92 Me. 551, 69 Am.

be made so by a showing of the St. 529; In Darnell v. Lafferty, 113

circumstances. Thus, a "memo- Mo. Ap. 282, the court said, "It

randum of sale of stock of W. C. must be remembered that however

C." was held suflBcient when inter- minute and precise in the matter

preted through extrinsic evidence of detail a description may be, that

to m.ean that stock of W. C. C. in the last analysis, resort must be

which the seller had authority to had to parole; that the last and

sell, Willett v. Smith, 214 Mass. final step in all transactions of

Self-Explanation of the Memorandum.-None of these
essentials, however, need be stated with such fullness and
precision as to be at once intelligible to any reader. A
memorandum written in Russian would undoubtedly be
sufficient though not intelligible to the average American.
One phrased in the technical idiom of a particular trade
would suffice if accurately translatable to a court, though
unintelligible to the unlearned reader. Similarly, a memorandum which has a precise and definite meaning to
one who is acquainted with the facts surrounding the
transaction is sufficient, even though it be unintelligible
to one unfamiliar with the circumstances. "It is always
permissible to show the surroundings and circumstances
of the contract and it is sufficient, as against the Statute
of Frauds, that, after the court is put in the same position as the parties themselves, the terms and subject matter of the contract are made certain.' '95
94-Carter v. Timber Co., 184
Mo. Ap. 523.
95-Carter v. Timber Co., 184
Mo. Ap. 523.
The description of the subject
matter need not be explicit on the
face of the memorandum if it can
be made so by a showing of the
circumstances. Thus, a "memorandum of sale of stock of W. C.
D." was held sufficient when interpreted through extrinsic evidence
to mean that stock of W. C. C.
which the seller had authority to
sell, Willett v. Smith, 214 Mass.

494. Accord, Bowers v. Ocean Accident Co., 97 N. Y. S. 485, Affd. 187
N. Y. 561; Flash v. Rossiter, 102 N.
Y. S. 449; Bank v. Securities Co.,
141 Mo. Ap. 524; Moses Co. v. StackGibbs Co., 56 Wash. 529; Haskell
v. Tukesbury, 92 Me. 551, 69 Am.
St. 529; In Darnell v. Lafferty, 113
Mo. Ap. _282, the court said, "It
must be remembered that however
minute and precise in the matter
of detail a description may be, that
in the last analysis, resort must be
had to parole; that the last and
final step in all transactions of
Origi al fr m
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THE LAW OF SALES
SATISFACTION OF THE STATUTE BY ACCEPTANCE AND

3. Satisfaction of the Statute by Acceptance and

RECEIPT OF THE

Receipt of the Goods

Goons

If there is no memorandum, the Statute nevertheless

If there is no memorandum, the Statute nevertheless
allows the contract to be enforced if "the buyer shall
accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the
same.''

allows the contract to be enforced if **the buyer shall

accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the

same. ' '

''Receive'' and "Accept" Do Not Relate to Title.—

In connection with this proposition it should be borne in

mind that the Statute of Frauds has nothing to do di-

rectly with title. The fact that a buyer has title will avail

him little if, because of the Statute, he can not prove the

"Receive" and "Accept" Do Not Relate to Title.-

contract through which he claims it. On the other hand,

the Statute may preclude his proving even a wholly ex-

In connection with this proposition it should be borne in
mind that the Statute of Frauds has nothing to do directly with title. The fact that a buyer has title will avail
him little if, because of the Statute, he can not prove the
contract through which he claims it. On the other hand,
the Statute may preclude his proving even a wholly executory contract to sell, since, as we have seen, the Statute
is held to apply to executory contracts as well as to executed ones. Therefore, cases involving ''delivery and

ecutory contract to sell, since, as we have seen, the Statute

is held to apply to executory contracts as well as to ex-

ecuted ones. Therefore, cases involving ** delivery and

this kind is the process of identi-
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fication, and, if perchance a con-

troversy arise, resort must event-

ually be had to parole evidence to

fit even the most detailed and

minute description to the thing de-

scribed. * * * Under the rule

above stated, the language em-

ployed, 'ten head of cows and

heifers' being applicable to sev-

eral head of cows and to several

head of heifers, it is competent to

show by parole what cows and

what heifers were referred to."

this kind is the process of identification, and, if perchance a controversy arise, resort must eventually be had to parole evidence to
fit even the most detailed and
minute description to the thing described. * * * Under the rule
above stated, the language employed, 'ten head of cows and
h eifer s' being applicable to seve ral head of cows and to several
h ead of h eifers, it is competent to
sh ow by parole what cows and
what heifers were referred to."
The same rule of explanation
through extr insic evidence applies to the other parts of the
memorandum. W illett v. Smith,
214 Mass. 494; Booth v. A. Levy
etc. Co., 21 Cal. Ap. 427.
The names of the parties n eed
not be used if they a r e so described that knowledge of the circumstanc s makes them defini te.
Darnell v.Lafferty,113 Mo.Ap.282;

The same rule of explanation

through extrinsic evidence ap-

plies to the other parts of the

memorandum. Willett v. Smith,

214 Mass. 494; Booth v. A. Levy

etc. Co., 21 Cal. Ap. 427.

The names of the parties need

not be used if they are so de-

scribed that knowledge of the cir-

cumstances makes them definite.

Darnell v. Laff erty, 113 Mo. Ap. 282 ;

Allen V. Burnett, 92 S. C. 95. In

Kingsley v. Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23,

69 Am. St. 486, the court said,

quoting from an English case,

"Parole evidence is always neces-

sary to show that the party sued

is the person making the con-

tract and bound by it. Whether

he does so in his own name, or in

that of another, or in a feigned

name, or whether the contract be

signed by his own hand, or by that

of an agent, are inquiries not dif-

ferent in their nature from the

question who is the person who

has just ordered goods in a shop.

If sued for the price, and his

identity is made out, the contract

is not varied by appearing to have

been made by him in a name not

Allen v. Burnett, 92 S. C. 95. In
Kingsley v. Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23,
69 Am. St. 486, the court said,
quoting from an English case,
"Parole evidence is always necessary to show that the party sued
is the person making the contract and bound by it. Whether
he does so in his own name, or in
that of another, or in a feigned
name, or whether the contract be
signed by his own hand, or by that
of an agent, are inquiries not different in their nature from the
question who is the person who
has just ordered goods in a shop.
If sued for the price, and his
identity is made out, the contract
is not varied by appearing to have
been made by him in a name not
his own." Haskell v. Tukesbury,
92 Me. 551, 69 Am. St. 529, "Friend
George" h eld sufficient; White v.
Dahlquist Mfg, Co., 179 Mass. 427.

his own." Haskell v. Tukesbury,

92 Me. 551, 69 Am. St. 529, "Friend

Ulgltl.l
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George" held sufficient; White v.

Dahlquist Mfg. Co., 179 Mass. 427.

I TE

ET A CHIVE

UNIVERS TY OF CA IFOR

~A

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 263

acceptance" as bearing upon the question of whether title

has passed or not have no necessary relation to the mat-

ter of receipt, or delivery, and acceptance as affecting

the Statute.

"Receive" as used in the Statute refers to possession,

not merely to title. Passing of title, sometimes called

delivery, or receipt, of title, is not enough to satisfy the

Statute.ss

Similarly, "accept" relates to the physical thing

and not to the title.* An excellent illustration is found

in Riley v. Bancroft's Est.^'^ This involved a sale of

liquor by the plaintiff, who did business in Omaha, to

the defendant, who lived in Springfield. The plaintiff

was licensed to sell liquor in Omaha, but not in Spring-

field. The liquor was delivered to a carrier in Omaha in

such a way that, by the usual rules,title would have passed

there. But, as discussed hereafter, delivery to a carrier

and acceptance by it do not satisfy the Statute. The
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only acceptance w^hich would suffice to take the contract

out of the Statute occurred in Springfield. The defendant

contended that title did not pass until such acceptance

and that the sale was therefore void, as the seller had no

license to sell in Springfield. The court, however, de-

cided in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that title

could be accepted by the buyer, and was so accepted in

Omaha, even though there was not such acceptance of

the goods as was required by the statute until they

reached Springfield.^*

96— Rodgers v. Jones, 129 Mass. a creditor of the seller levied upon

420. See also the cases cited in them. The court held that title

the following notes. could not pass until there had

97 — 51 Neb. 864. been such delivery to the buyer

98 — Occasional courts fall into and acceptance by him as would

confusion on this point, as for in- satisfy the Statute of Frauds,

stance in Nugent v. Beakes, 54 N. Such a holding was obviously in

Y. S. 486. After delivery of goods conflict with the conclusive

such as contracted for to a carrier, authorities, already cited, to the

but before delivery to the buyer, effect that title does pass on de-

•See Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, (3).

263

acceptance'' as bearing upon the question of whether title
has passed or not have no necessary relation to the matter of receipt, or delivery, and acceptance as affecting
the Statute.
"Receive" as used in the Statute refers to possession,
not merely to title. Passing of title, sometimes called
delivery, or receipt, of title, is not enough to satisfy the
Statute.96
Similarly, "accept" relates to the physical thing
and not to the title.* An excellent illustration is found
in Riley v. Bancroft's Est. 97 This involved a sale of
liquor by the plaintiff, who did business in Omaha, to
the defendant, who lived in Springfield. The plaintiff
was licensed to sell liquor in Omaha, but not in Springfield. The liquor was delivered to a carrier in Omaha in
such a way that, by the usual rules, title would have passed
there. But, as discussed hereafter, delivery to a carrier
and acceptance by it do not satisfy the Statute. The
only acceptance which would suffice to take the contract
out of the Statute occurred in Springfield. The defendant
contended that title did not pass until such acceptance
and that the sale was the ref ore void, as the seller had no
license to sell in Springfield. The court, however, decided in favor of the plaintiff on the ground that title
could be accepted by the buyer, and was so accepted in
Omaha, even though there was not such acceptance of
the goods as was required by the statute until they
reached Springfield.98
96-Rodgers v. Jones, 129 Mass.
See also the cases cited in
the following notes.
97-51 Neb. 864.
98-0ccasional courts fall into
confusion on this point, as for instance in Nugent v. Beakes, 54 N.
Y. S. 486. After delivery of goods
such as contracted for to a carrier,
but before delivery to the buyer,
420.

•see

a creditor of the seller levied upon
them. The court held that title
could not pass until there had
been such delivery to the buyer
and acceptance by him as would
satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Such a holding was obviously in
conflict with
the
conclusive
authorities, already cited, to the
effect that title does pass on de-

Uniform Sales Act, Section 4, (3).
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Conversely, there may be such receipt and acceptance

of the physical thing as will satisfy the Statute without

any passing of title at all. Thus, in Pinkham v. Mattox,*®

the contract provided expressly that the title should not

pass upon delivery to the buyer, but should remain in the

seller until payment of the price. The buyer received

possession of the goods and kept them without objection.

Later, on being sued for the price, the buyer set up the

Statute and contended that, as he had never received the

goods as owner, there was no acceptance within the mean-

ing of the Statute. This contention the court overruled

and held that, despite the retention of title in the seller,

there was such acceptance as would satisfy the Statute.^®®

Change of Position. — Although "receive" as used in

the Statute refers to delivery and receipt of the thing

itself, rather than to the title, such delivery and receipt

do not necessarily require a change of physical position.

There is some slight suggestion that not even a change of
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physical possession is necessary."^

livery to a carrier. The result statute although title to all has

itself was sound, however, because not passed. McKnight v. Dunlap,

Conversely, there may be such receipt and acceptance
of the physical thing as will satisfy the Statute without
any passing of title at all. Thus, in Pinkham v. Mattox,99
the cont ract provided expressly that the title should not
pass upon delivery to the buyer, but should remain in the
seller until payment of the price. The buyer received
possession of the goods and kept them without objection.
Later, on being sued for the price, the buyer set up the
Statute and contended that, as he had never received the
goods as owner, there was no acceptance within the meaning of the Statute. This contention the court overruled
and held that, despite the retention of title in the seller,
there was such acceptance as would satisfy the Statute. Ioo

the contract involved expressly 5 N. Y. 537.

provided that title should not pass 101 — Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East

until after an actual inspection by 192, as the opinion is read in the

the buyer. light of the facts. Devine v. Warn-

In another case, Shindler v. er, 76 Conn. 229; Devine v. Warner,

Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, 49 Am. Dec. 75 Conn. 375, "While it is true that

316, counsel attempted to support there may be an acceptance and

the proposition that physical de- actual receipt of the goods by

livery was not necessary to take the vendee pursuant to a sale, un-

the case out of the Statute by accompanied by a manual delivery

citing Dewett v. Warner, 12 Mass. or actual change of custody — as in

311, 7 Am. Dec. 74, in which it cases where the vendee is already

Change of Position.-Although ''receive'' as used in
the Statute refers to delivery and receipt of the thing
itself, rather than to the title, such delivery and receipt
do not necessarily require a change of physical position.
There is some slight suggestion that not even a change of
physical possession is necessary. IOI

had been held merely that physi- in possession, or the vendor re-

cal delivery was not essential to tains the custody as bailee of the

the passing of title. The court, vendee, thus assuming a new re-

however, recognized the difference lation to the goods — yet the law

in requirements. requires that the proof in such

99 — 53 N. H. 600. cases should be clear and un-

100 — Acceptance of a part will equivocal, and establish an actual

take the whole contract out of the change of the relation of the

livery to a carrier. The result
itself was sound, however, because
the contract involved expressly
provided that title should not pass
until after an actual inspection by
the buyer.
In another case, Shindler v.
Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, 49 Am. Dec.
316, counsel attempted to support
the proposition that physical de·
livery was not necessary to take
the case out of the Statute by
citing Dewett v. Warner, 12 Mass.
311, 7 Am. Dec. 74, in which it
h ad been h eld merely that physi·
cal delivery was not essential to
the passing of title. The court,
h owever, recognized the difference
in r equirements.
99-53 N. H. 600.
100- Acceplance of a part will
take the whole contract out of the
[,~,I
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statute although title to an has
not passed. McKnight v. Dunlap,
5 N. Y. 537.
101-Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East
192, as the opinion is read in the
light of the facts. Devine v. Warn·
er, 76 Conn. 229; Devine v. Warner,
75 Conn. 375, "While it is true that
there may be an acceptance and
actual receipt of the goods by
the vendee pursuant to a sale, un·
accompanied by a manual delivery
or actual change of custody-as in
cases where the vendee is already
in possession, or the vendor re·
tains the custody as bailee of the
vendee, thus assuming a new relation to the goods-yet the law
requires that the proof in such
cases should be clear and unequivocal, and establish an actual
change of the relation of the
11~11
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Since, however, receipt of the goods does refer to the

physical thing a physical change of possession should

be necessary. And this is in fact the rule, although

change of possession docs not necessarily mean change

of position. In one case the court said, ''I am aware

that there are cases in which it has been adjudged that

where the articles sold are ponderous, a symbolical or

constructive delivery will be equivalent in its legal effect

to an actual delivery. The delivery of a key of a ware-

house in Avhich goods sold are deposited, furnishes an

example of this kind."^*"^ In this case, however, there

had never been an actual transfer of anything. When

the buyer examined the lumber sold, and agreed to take

it, the plaintiff, as seller, said ''the lumber is yours."

It was on the strength of this that the plaintiff con-

tended the Statute had been satisfied. The court held,

that "here there was no delivery, either actual or sym-

bolical." ''Mere words of contract unaccompanied by
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any act can not amount to a delivery. To hold other-

wise would be repealing the Statute. ' '^°^

Mutuality of Intent. — The term "receipt" connotes

a giving by some one else. It is suggestive of a recipro-

cal, two-party affair. Therefore there is no "receipt,"

within the meaning of the Statute, of goods which one

person has taken, or otherwise acquired, from another

person mthout the latter 's consent. There is nothing

parties to the property." But, Lumber Co. v. Hunholtz, 132 Wis.

actual receipt means such posses- 613, "mere words inter partes will

sion by the buyer as "to unequiv- not, under the statute of frauds,

ocally place the property within effect a change of possession."

the power and under the exclu- Ladnier v. Ladnler, 90 Miss. 475,

sive dominion of the buyer as an 43 So. 946.

absolute owner," Urbanski v. Ku- If the buyer is already in pos-

tinski 86 Conn. 22. session, mere words may be suffi-

102 — Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. cient for only "acceptance" is

Since, however, receipt of the goods does refer to the
physical thing a physical change of possession should
be necessary. And this is in fact the rule, although
change of possession does not nece sarily mean charrge
of position. In one case the court said, "I am aware
that there are cases in which it has been adjudged that
where the articles sold are ponderous, a symbolical or
constructive delivery will be equivalent in its legal effect
to an actual delivery. The delivery of a key of a warehouse in which goods sold are deposited, furnishes an
example of this kind.' ' 102 In this case, however, there
had never been an actual transfer of anything. When
the buyer examined the lumber sold, and agreed to take
it, the plaintiff, as seller, said "the lumber is yours."
It was on the strength of this that the plaintiff contended the Statute had been satisfied. The court held,
that ''here there was no delivery, either actual or symbolical.'' '' }i·f ere words of contract unaccon1panied by
any act can not amount to a delivery. To hold otherwise would be repealing the Statute.' ' 103

Y. 261, 49 Am. Dec. 316. necessary in such case, Godkin v.

103— Accord, J. H. Silkman Weber, 154 Mich. 207.

Mutuality of Intent.-The term ''receipt'' connotes
a giving by some one else. It is suggestive of a reciprocal, two-party affair. Therefore there is no "receipt,"
within the meaning of the Statute, of goods which one
person has taken, or otherwise acquired, from another
person without the latter's consent. There is nothing
parties to the property." But,
actual receipt means such possession by the buyer as "to unequivocally place the property within
the power and under the exclusive dominion of the buyer as an
absolute owner," Urbanski v. Kutinski 86 Conn. 22.
102-Shindler v. Houston, 1 N.
Y. 261, 49 Am. Dec. 316.
103-Accord, J. H. Silkman
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Lumber Co. v. Hunholtz, 132 Wis.
613, "mere words inter partes will
not, under the statute of frauds,
effect a change of possession."
Ladnier v. Ladnier, 90 Miss. 475,
43 So. 946.
If the buyer is already in possession, mere words may be sufficient for only "acceptance" is
necessary in such case, Godkin v.
Weber, 154 Mich. 207.
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in such one-sided basis of possession to open the way to

proof of a contract}'^*

Receipt and Acceptance Both Essential. — Mere actual

in such one-sided basis of possession to open the way to
proof of a contract. 104

receipt of the goods, while essential, is not alone suf-

ficient to take the contract out of the Statute. There

must be *' acceptance " as well as receipt. Thus, mere

dehvery of a car load of goods onto a buyer's side-

track, without any act of acceptance by the buyer, does

not satisfy the Statute. ^°^ Similarly, delivery by the

seller of wood contracted for, upon property owned by

the buyer, even though done according to the buyer's

direction, is not enough. ^°^ It is not enough even if the

buyer subsequently moves the wood from one place to

another in order to make a passage way through it.^®''

Acceptance. — As the foregoing discussion indicates

clearly that something more than physical receipt of the

goods is necessary to constitute ''receipt and accept-

ance," the question is presented, what constitutes ac-
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ceptance ?

A concise answer is given in one case,^®* as follows:

''If the vendee does any act to the goods, of wrong if he

is not the owner of the goods, and of right if he is owner

of the goods, the doing of that act is evidence that he

has accepted them."

Receipt and Acceptance Both Essential.-Mere actual
receipt of .the goods, while essential, is not alone sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute. There
must be "acceptance" as well as receipt. Thus, mere
delivery of a car load of goods onto a buyer's sidetrack, without any act of acceptance by the buyer, does
not satisfy the Statute. 105 Similarly, delivery by the
seller of wood contracted for, upon property owned by
the buyer, even though done according to the buyer's
direction, is not enough. 106 It is not enough even if the
buyer subsequently moves the wood from one place to
another in order to make a passage way through it. 107

The literal statement of this test is in conflict with the

proposition that a contract of conditional sale can be

taken out of the Statute through the buyer's receipt and

104 — Washington Ice Co. v. 106 — Dauphiny & Co. v. Red

Webster, 62 Me. 341, 16 Am. Rep. Poll Co., 123 Cal. 548.

107— Wade v. N. Y. & O. M.

Ry. Co., 52 N. Y. 627.

462; Matthieson Co. v. McMahon,

38 N. J. L. 536.

105— Calvert v. Schultz, 143

Mich. 441; Eichberg Co. v. Paper 108 — Leonard v. Medford, 85

Co., 119 Mo. Ap. 262, delivery to Md. 666, 37 L. R. A. 449, quoting

warehouse of a terminal company from Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. & Bl.

and notification to buyer; Kemen- 21.

sky V. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500.

Acceptance.-As the foregoing discussion indicates
clearly that something more than physical receipt of the
goods is necessary to constitute "receipt and acceptance,'' the question is presented, what constitutes acceptance 1
A concise answer is given in one case, 108 as follows:
''If the vendee does any act to the goods, of wrong if he
is not the owner of the goods, and of right if he is owner
of the goods, the doing of that act is evidence that he
has accepted them. ''
The literal statement of this test is in conflict with the
proposition that a contract of conditional sale can be
taken out of the Statute through the buyer's receipt and
104-Washington Ice Co. v.
Webster, 62 Me. 341, 16 Am. Rep.
462; Matthieson Co. v. McMahon,
38 N. J. L. 536.
105-Calve rt v. Schultz, 143
Mich. 441; Eichberg Co. v. Paper
Co., 119 Mo. Ap. 262, delivery to
warehouse of a t erminal company
and notification to buyer; Kemensky v. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500.
C.:oi. ·-~
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106-Dauphiny & Co. v. Red
Poll Co., 123 Cal. 548.
107-Wade v. N. Y. & 0. M.
Ry. Co., 52 N. Y. 627.
108-Leonard v. Medford, 85
Md. 666, 37 L. R. A. 449, quoting
from Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. & Bl.
21.
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acceptance of the goods concerned, even though the title

does not pass to him at all.^°^ But the general idea seems

to accord with the cases, and if for ''o^vner" is under-

stood one who has some legal right in the goods them-

selves the test is correct and readily applicable.

Certainly there is authority to the effect that mere

physical receipt by the buyer himself, and even use by

him, as for the purpose of testing the goods, does not

necessarily constitute an acceptance. ^^°

On the other hand, if the buyer, having actually re-

ceived the goods, does assert rights in them there may

be an ' ' acceptance, ' ' even though such assertion of right

is on a theory other than that of the contract alleged.

For instance, in Durkee v. Powell,^^^ the defendant had

bought a house. The seller claimed, and the court agreed,

that the shades and screens had been sold as personalty

by an independent contract, although to the same buyer.

The defendant took possession of the screens, etc., along
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with the house and, denying the second contract, asserted

a right of possession of them as part of the realty. The

court held this to be a sufificient receipt and acceptance

to take the contract out of the Statute. It should be noted

that the receipt in this case was by virtue of the contract,

although the acceptance was under a different claim.

If such a decision seems still to leave the question of

contract to the possibly perjured testimony of the par-

109 — Pinkliam v. Mattox, 53 as owner." Other authority for

N. H. 600. this proposition is cited in the

110 — Lloyd V. Wright, 25 Ga. case. As a matter of fact, how-

215; Wainscott v. Kellogg, 84 Mo. ever, the discussion in this case

Ap. 621; Hatch v. Gluck, 93 N. Y. was unnecessary, because the

S. 508; Mechanical Boiler Clean- buyer had never "accepted" the

ing Co. V. Kellner, 62 N. J. L. 544, plaintiff's offer to sell and there

559, "Another proposition that is was, in consequence, no contract

vouched for upon principle and by of sale at all. Darnell v. Young,

the weight of authority is that 105 Md. 280, buyer took control of

possession itself is not evidence goods only for purpose of sending

of an acceptance, and that a com- them back to seller.

pliance with the statute would re- --- „- N Y <? 268

quire an acceptance by the vendee

267

acceptance of the goods concerned, even though the title
does not pass to him at all. 109 But the general idea seems
to accord with the cases, and if for ''owner'' is understood one who has some legal right in the goods the;nselves the test is correct and readily applicable.
Certainly there is authority to the effect that mere
physical receipt by the buyer himself, and even use by
him, as for the purpose of testing the goods, does not
necessarily constitute an acceptance. 110
.
On the other hand, if the buyer, having actually received the goods, does assert rights in them there may
be an" acceptance," even though such assertion of right
is on a theory other than that of the contract alleged.
For instance, in Durkee v. Powell, 111 the defendant had
bought a house. The seller claimed, and the court agreed,
that the shades and screens had been sold as personalty
by an independent contract, although to the same buyer.
The defendant took possession of the screens, etc., along
with the house and, denying the second contract, asserted
a right of possession of them as part of the realty. The
court held this to be a sufficient receipt and acceptance
to take the contract out of the Statute. It should be noted
that the receipt in this case was by virtue of the contract,
although the acceptance was under a different claim.
If such a decision seems still to leave the question of
contract to the possibly perjured testimony of the par109-Pinkham v. Mattox, 53
N. H. 600.
110-Lloyd v. Wright, 25 Ga.
215; Wainscott v. Kellogg, 84 Mo.
Ap. 621; Hatch v. Gluck, 93 N. Y.
S. 508; Mechanical Boiler Cleaning Co. v. Kellner, 62 N. J. L. 544,
559, "Another proposition that is
vouched for upon principle and by
the weight of authority is that
possession itself is not evidence
of an acceptance, and that a compliance with the statute would require an acceptance by the vendee
Digitiz
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as owner." Other authority for
this proposition is cited in the
case. As a matter of fact, however, the discussion in this case
was unnecessary, because the
buyer had never "accepted" the
plaintiff's offer to sell and there
was, in consequence, no contract
of sale at all. Darnell v. Young,
105 Md. 280, buyer took control of
goods only for purpose of sending
them back to seller.

111-77 N. Y. S. 368.
Original from
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ties, it must be borne in mind that, unlike the written
memorandum, the receipt and acceptance of goods is
not supposed to show what the contract was. Its purpose is merely to furnish a basis for supposing that there
was really some sort of a contract between the parties.
The way is then opened for evidence, oral or otherwise,
as to just what the contract was. 112
There is no rule, and can be none, as to what sort of
act will or will not indicate acceptance. As the test
above quoted says, any act that indicates an assertion
of legal interest in the goods may serve for acceptance.
As the possible acts so indicating are multitudinous, they
can not and need not be legally hall-marked. The whole
matter is a question of fact in each particular case-the
fact of whether the act done indicates an assertion of
right in the goods. Many courts answer this as a judicial
conclusion. 113 Many courts, however, leave the question
to be decided by the jury. 11 4

ties, it must be borne in mind that, unlike the written

memorandum, the receipt and acceptance of goods is

not supposed to show what the contract was. Its pur-

pose is merely to furnish a basis for supposing that there

was really some sort of a contract between the parties.

The way is then opened for evidence, oral or otherwise,

as to just what the contract was.^^^

There is no rule, and can be none, as to what sort of

act will or will not indicate acceptance. As the test

above quoted says, any act that indicates an assertion

of legal interest in the goods may serve for acceptance.

As the possible acts so indicating are multitudinous, they

can not and need not be legally hall-marked. The whole

matter is a question of fact in each particular case — the

fact of whether the act done indicates an assertion of

right in the goods. Many courts answer this as a judicial

conclusion. ^^^ Many courts, however, leave the question

to be decided by the jury.^^*
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Acceptance by Agent. — The receipt and accept-

ance need not be by the buyer personally, but may be

done through an agent.*^*

112— Slater Brick Co. v. Shakel- Walla etc. Co., 64 Wash. 285, id.;

ton, 30 Mont. 390. Godkin v. Weber, 154 Mich. 207;

In Edgar v. Breck & Sons, 172 Richards v. Burrows, 62 Mich. 117,

Mass. 581, the acceptance was causing wood to be repiled;

made under such circumstances as Schmidt v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529,

to refute the idea of a warranty oral statements.

by the seller. The court held, 114— Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S.

however, that the acceptance did 557; Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H.

not constitute a new contract, but 600; Jarrell v. Young, 105 Md.

only opened the way for proof of 280.

--Acceptance by Agent.-The receipt and acceptance need not be by the buyer personally, but may be
done through an agent. 115

the real contract which in fact 115 — Daniel v. Hannah, 106 Ga.

contained a warranty. 91; Wilcox etc. Co. v. Green, 72

113 — Koster v. Koedding, 68 N. Y. 17; Jones v. Mechanics Bk.,

N. Y. S. 794, holding that keeping 29 Md. 287, 96 Am. Dec. 533;

a horse for 24 hours and using Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.

him was an acceptance; MacEvoy 325, through attornment of third

V. Aronson, 92 N. Y. S. 724, in- person in possession,

112-Slater Brick Co. v. Shakelton, 30 Mont. 390.
In Edgar v. Breck & Sons, 172
Mass. 581, the acceptance was
made under such circumstances as
to refute the idea of a warranty
by the seller. The court held,
however, that the acceptance did
not constitute a new contract, but
only opened the way for proof of
the real contract which in fact
contained a warranty.
113-Koster v. Koedding, 68
N. Y. S. 794, holding that keeping
a horse for 24 hours and using
him was an acceptance; MacEvoy
v. Aronson, 92 N. Y. S. 724, inferr ed from unreasonable delay in
returning physical possession;
Adams County etc. Co. v. Walla

ferred from unreasonable delay in An administrator is not an

returning physical possession; agent, for such a purpose. Smith

Adams County etc. Co. v. Walla v. Brennan, 62 Mich. 349.

E

Walla etc. Co., 64 Wash. 285, id.;
Godkin v. Weber, 154 Mich. 207;
Richards v. Burrows, 62 Mich. 117,
causing wood to be re piled;
Schmidt v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529,
oral statements.
114-Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S.
557; Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H.
600; Jarrell v. Young, 105 Md.
280.
115-Daniel v. Hannah, 106 Ga.
91; Wilcox etc. Co. v. Green, 72
N. Y. 17; Jones v. Mechanics Bk.,
29 Md. 287, 96 Am. Dec. 533;
Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.
325, through attornment of third
person in possession.
An administrator is not an
agent, for such a purpose, Smith
v. Brennan, 62 Mich. 349.
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Acceptance by Carrier. — Title to goods which

were unspecified at the time the contract was entered

into is generally held to pass to the buyer on the seller's

delivery to a carrier of goods conforming to the contract.

As has already been pointed out, this is based on the

theory — or the legal fiction — that the carrier is the

buyer's agent to assent to the seller's specification. In

a sense the carrier is the buyer's agent to accept the

title to the goods. It is occasionally said, therefore, that

"the carrier is the buyer's agent to accept." So far as

this means "to accept title/ ^ it is, in some measure, cor-

rect. But it is incorrect to say that the carrier is agent

to accept the goods, within the meaning of the Statute.

Delivery of goods to a carrier and its acceptance of them

for carriage to the buyer may constitute actual receipt

of them by the buyer. But it does not constitute accept-

ance of them by either the buyer or his agent. This is

so even though the buyer has himself designated the
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carrier to be used.^^^

There is some conflict on this point, more apparent

than real, how^ever, when the facts are examined. In

Cross v. 'Donnell,"'' the buyer of certain hoops had

carefully examined them and agreed to take specific ones.

He directed that these be delivered, for him, to a certain

boat, which was done. The court held the Statute to be

satisfied, saying, "Here the defendants accepted the

hoops. * * * There is nothing in the Statute which

requires that the accepting and receiving at the same

time. Either may precede the other. * * * j^ has

finally been settled, both in this country and in England,

that a delivery to a general carrier, not designated by

the purchaser, is not a sufficient compliance with the

116— Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 A. Levy & Co., 21 Cal. Ap. 427;

Mass. 447, 7 Am. Rep. 545; Mc- DarneU v. Young, 105 Md. 280;

Cormick Mach. Co. v. Cusack, 116 Shelton v. Thompson-Bennett Co.,

Mich. 647; Card v. Ramos, 23 Cal. 96 Mo. Ap. 327.

Ap. 303, "delivery" and "receipt" m^u n. Y. 661, 4 Am. Rep.

are not synonymous; Kemensky ^.g..

V. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500; Booth v.
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--Acceptance by Carrier.-Title to goods which
were unspecified at the time the contract wa · entered
into is generally held to pass to the buyer on the seller's
delivery to a carrier of goods conforming to the contract.
As has already been pointed out, this is ba ed on the
theory-or the legal fiction-that the carrier is the
buyer's agent to a sent to the seller's specification. In
a sense the carrier is the buyer's agent to accept the
title to the goods. It is occasionally said, therefore, that
''the carrier is the buyer's agent to accept.'' So far as
this means ''to accept title,'' it is, in some measure, correct. But it is incorrect to say that the carrier is agent
to accept the goods, within the ineaning of the Statute.
Delivery of goods to a carrier and its acceptance of them
for carriage to the buyer may constitute actual receipt
of them by the buyer. But it does not constitute accept. ance of them by either the buyer or his agent. This is
so even though the buyer has himself designated the
carrier to be used. 116
There is some conflict on this point, more apparent
than real, however, when the facts are examined. In
Cross v. 0'Donnell, 117 the buyer of certain hoops had
carefully examined them and agreed to take specific ones.
He directed that these be delivered, for him, to a certain
boat, which ·was done. The court held the Statute to be
satisfied, saying, "Here the defendants accepted the
hoops. * * * There is nothing in the Statute which
requires that the accepting and receiving at the same
time. Either may precede the other. * * * It has
finally been settled, both in this country and in England,
that a delivery to a general carrier, not designated by
the purchaser, is not a sufficient compliance with the
116-Johnson v . Cuttle, 105
Mass. 447, 7 Am. Rep. 545; McCormick Mach. Co. v. Cusack, 116
Mich. 647; Gard v. Ramos, 23 Cal.
Ap. 303, "delivery" and "receipt"
are not synonymous; Kemensky
v. Chapin, 193 Mass. 500; Booth v.

A. Levy & Co., 21 Cal. Ap. 427;
Darnell v. Young, 105 Md. 280;
Shelton v. Thompson-Bennett Co.,
96 Mo. Ap. 327.
117-44 N. Y. 661, 4 Am. Rep.
721.

Digitize by

Origi al from

I TERNET A CHIVE

LJNIVERS TY OF CA IFORNIA

270
270 THE LAW OF SALES

Statute, Eodgers v. Phillips,"* and for the best of rea-

sons. In such a case the purchaser has done nothing

beyond making the void contract. He has neither ac-

cepted nor received the goods himself, nor authorized

or designated any agent to do it for him. But, in this

case, the purchasers designated the agents of the 'Cur-

lew' to receive and transport the hoops to them. They

were the agents of defendants for the purpose of receiv-

ing the hoops from the plaintiffs. It is not necessary

to determine in this case that a mere carrier, designated

by the buyer, can both accept and receive for him, so

as to make a compliance with the Statute ; but I can find

no reason, founded upon principle or authority, to doubt

that, after the buyer has accepted the article purchased,

a carrier, designated by him to take and transport it,

can bind him as his agent in receiving it. ' '^^®

Time of Acceptance. — The receipt and acceptance

need not be coincident with the making of the contract,
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but may take place any time thereafter.'^''"

Furthermore, as the cases cited on the various points

above clearly show, the acceptance need not be coinci-

dent with the receipt, but may follow it. It has been said

even that acceptance may precede receipt.^^^

Receipt and Acceptance of Part of the Goods. — Eeceipt

and acceptance of a part of the goods contracted for is

sufficient to take the entire contract out of the statute

'fHE LAW OF SALES

Statute, Rodgers v. Phillips, 118 and for the best of reasons. In such a case the purchaser has done nothing
beyond making the void contract. He has neither accepted nor received the goods himself, nor authorized
or designated any agent to do it for him. But, in this
case, the purchasers designated the agents of the 'Curlew' to receive and transport the hoops to them. They
were the agents of defendants for the purpose of receiving the hoops from the plaintiffs. It is not necessary
to determine in this case that a mere carrier, designated
by the buyer, can both accept and receive for him, so
as to make a compliance with the Statute; but I can find
no reason, founded upon principle or authority, to doubt
that, after the buyer has accepted the article purchased,
a carrier, designated by him to take and transport it,
can bind him as his agent in receiving it. ' ' 119

and permit oral evidence of the sale of the whole amount.

A somewhat extreme illustration is Garfield v. Paris."^

118—40 N. Y. 519. 63 Mo. 563; Slater Brick Co. v.

119— Real conflict is found in Shakelton, 30 Mont. 390; Gabriel

Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314, 7 Am. v. Kildare Elevator Co., 18 Okla.

Dec. 309, where the buyer had not 318; Raymond v. Colton, N. Y.

accepted, but had merely desig- 104 Fed. 219.

nated the carrier.

,„.„.,, -, ^^ ^„ 121 — Cross V. O Donnell, 44 N.

120— Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 „ o^-, a ^

XT TT ^«« ii^T T^ • v-x ,^ , H. 661, 4 Am. Rep. 721.

N. H. 600; McKnight v. Duulap,

5 N. Y. 537; Rickey v. Tenbroek, 122—96 U. S. 557.

--Time of Acceptance.-The receipt and acceptance
need not be coincident with the making of the contract,
but may take place any time thereafter. 120
Furthermore, as the cases cited on the various points
above clearly show, the acceptance need not be coincident with the receipt, but may follow it. It has been said
even that acceptance may precede receipt. 121
Receipt and Acceptance of Part of the Goods.-Receipt
and acceptance of a part of the goods contracted for is
sufficient to take the entire contract out of the statute
and permit oral evidence of the sale of the whole amount.
A somewhat extreme illustration is Garfield v. Paris. 122
118-40 N. Y. 519.
119- R eal conflict is found in
S pen cer v. H ale, 30 Vt. 314, 7 Am.
Dec. 309, wher e the buyer had not
a ccep t e d, b ut h a d merely designated the carrier.
120-Pinkh am v. Mattox, 53
N . II . 600; McKnight v. Dunlap,
5 N. Y. 637; Rickey v. T en broek,
D1grn.l
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63 Mo. 563; Slater Brick Co. v.
Shakelton, 30 Mont. 390; Gabriel
v. Kildare Elevator Co., 18 Okla.
318; Raymond v. Colton, N. Y.
104 Fed. 219.
121- Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N.
H. 661, 4 Am. Rep. 721.
122-96

u. s.

657.
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The defendant had contracted to buy Hquor from the

plaintitr, the goods being described by the contract, but

not then identified. As part of the contract the plaintiff

agreed to furnish labels of a special type, other than

those ordinarily on the bottles. The plaintiff did send

a bunch of such labels to the defendant and the jury

found that they were accepted by him. On suit for the

purchase price, the defendant set up the Statute. The

court held, however, that the receipt and acceptance of

the labels opened the way for oral proof of the entire

contract.^*'

As to the propriety of this rule, another court has

said,^*^* '*It has been insisted that this construction may

leave a purchaser, who buys and receives a single article,

liable to be charged as the purchaser of more, if the

vendor can bring perjured witnesses to say that it was

delivered as part of the greater number purchased. Par-

ties are exposed to the commission of perjury, in rela-
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tion to all facts depending on human testimony. If the

sanctions of an oath, and a severe cross-examination

prove an insufficient security, the party liable to suffer

must seek protection in the congruity and consistency

of truth, and the extreme difficulty of making falsehood

accord with the context of circumstances. The Statute

of Frauds has interposed some salutory safeguards. If

they are not sufficiently enlarged, the legislature alone

has power to extend its provisions."

Must be Goods Contracted For. — The goods ac-

tually received and accepted must be part of the goods

covered by the contract alleged. The mere fact that

the defendant has accepted certain goods will not open

123 — Accord, French v. Boston Md. 15, 109 Am. St. 552; Leonard

Nat'l Bk., 179 Mass. 405; MacEvoy v. Medford, 85 Md. 666, 37 L. R. A.

V. Aronson, 92 N. Y. S. 724; New 449; Ford v. Howgate, 106 Me.

England etc. Co. v. Standard etc. 517; Conelly Construction Co. v.

Co., 165 Mass. 328, 52 Am. St. 516; Royce, 35 Okla. 425.

Weeks v. Crie, 94 Me. 458, 80 Am. -„. r»„,r,-., „ n/r^^ « io ht aoa

„^ ,,„ „, ^ ' o, .X,- ..«, 124 — Davis V. Moore, 13 Me. 424.

St. 410; Richardson v. Smith, 101
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The defendant had contracted to buy liquor from the
plaintiff, the goods being described by the contract, but
not then identified. As part of the contract the plaintiff
agreed to furnish labels of a special type, other t:p.an
those ordinarily on the bottles. The plaintiff did send
a bunch of such labels to the defendant and the jury
found that they were accepted by him. On suit for the
purchase price, the defendant set up the Statute. The
court held, however, that the receipt and acceptance of
the labels opened the way for oral proof of the entire
contract. 123
As to the propriety of this rule, another court has
said,1 24 "It has been insisted that this construction may
leave a purchaser, who buys and receives a single article,
liable to be charged as the purchaser of more, if the
vendor can bring perjured witnesses to say that it was
delivered as part of the greater number purchased. Parties are exposed to the commission of perjury, in relation to all facts depending on human testimony. If the
sanctions of an oath, and a severe cross-examination
prove an insufficient security, the party liable to suffer
must seek protection in the congruity and consistency
of truth, and the extreme difficulty of making falsehood
accord with the context of circumstances. The Statute
of Frauds has interposed some salutory safeguards. If
they are not sufficiently enlarged, the legislature alone
has power to extend its provisions."
--Must be Goods Contracted For.-The goods actually received and accepted must be part of the goods
covered by the contract alleged. The mere fact that
the defendant has accepted certain goods will not open
123-Accord, French v. Boston
Nat'l Bk., 179 Mass. 405; MacEvoy
v. Aronson, 92 N. Y. S. 724; New
England etc. Co. v. Standard etc.
Co., 165 Mass. 328, 52 Am. St. 516;
Weeks v. Crie, 94 Me. 458, 80 Am.
St. 410; Richardson v. Smith, 101

Md. 15, 109 Am. St. 552; Leonard
v. Medford, 85 Md. 666, 37 L. R. A.
449; Ford v. How gate, 106 Me.
517; Conelly Construction Co. v.
Royce, 35 Okla. 425.
124-Davis v. Moore, 13 Me. 424.
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the way to proof of some contract which did not cover
those goods. Acceptance of goods does not permit proof
of any and every contract of sale between the parties,
but only of the particular contract under which the goods
were delivered and. received. In Richardson v. Smith,1 25
for instance, the contract was for the sale of a number
of cases of canned tomatoes. At the time the contract
was made the defendant had received, and apparently
accepted, a couple of cans as samples. These cans so
received, however, were not deducted from the number
which the plaintiff agreed to furnish for the price stated.
It was held that no part of the goods contracted for had
been received by the buyer. The court said, 126 "The
receipt and acceptance of the buyer of samples of the
goods are held to be a compliance with the Statute when
the samples are considered and treated by both parties
as constituting a part of the goods sold and as diminishing the quantity or weight of such goods to the extent
of their own bulk, otherwise the taking of saniples has
no effect upon the validity of the contract."

272 THE LAW OF SALES

the way to proof of some contract which did not cover

those goods. Acceptance of goods does not permit proof

of any and every contract of sale between the parties,

but only of the particular contract under which the goods

were dehvered and received. In Richardson v. Smith/^^

for instance, the contract was for the sale of a number

of cases of canned tomatoes. At the time the contract

was made the defendant had received, and apparently

accepted, a couple of cans as samples. These cans so

received, however, were not deducted from the number

which the plaintiff agreed to furnish for the price stated.

It was held that no part of the goods contracted for had

been received by the buyer. The court said,^^^ "The

receipt and acceptance of the buyer of samples of the

goods are held to be a compliance wdth the Statute when

the samples are considered and treated by both parties

as constituting a part of the goods sold and as diminish-

ing the quantity or weight of such goods to the extent

of their own bulk, otherwise the taking of samples has
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no effect upon the validity of the contract."

Must Have Been Received Under the Contract. —

It obviously follows from this principle that the goods

* ' accepted ' ' must have been received under and by virtue

of the contract. Hence, even though the buyer takes pos-

session of the goods under a claim of o\\^lership or other-

wise, it is not an ''acceptance" of them under the con-

tract of sale if the seizure were by way of trespass, or

foreclosure of a mortgage, or attachment, or for some

other reason than the contract.^^'' This is not inconsistent

with the decision in Durkee v. Poivell, supra, because in

that case the goods were received under the contract

125—101 Md. 15, 109 Am. St. 127— Hudson v. Emmons, 107

552. Mich. 549; Washington Ice Co. v.

126 — Quoting from the Amer- Webster, 62 Me. 341. 16 Am. Rep.

--Must Have Been Received Under the Contract.-

lean and English Encyclopedia of 4G2; Baker v. Cuyler, 12 Barb.

Law and citing considerable (N. Y.) C67. See also, ante, p. 265.

It obviously follows from this principle that the goods
''accepted'' must have been received under and by virtue
of the contract. Hence, even though the buyer takes possession of the goods under a claim of ownership or otherwise, it is not an "acceptance" of them under the contract of sale if the seizure were by way of trespass, or
foreclosure of a mortgage, or attachment, or for some
other reason than the contract. 127 This is not inconsistent
with the decision in Durkee v. Powell, supra, because in
that case the good were received under the contract

authority.

125-101 Md. 15, 109 Am. St.
552.
126-Quotin g from the American and English En yclopedia of
Law and citing considerabl
aulhority.

127-Hudson v. Emmons, 107
Mich. 549; Washin gton Ice Co. v.
Webster, 62 Me. 341. 16 Am. Rep.
4132; Baker v. Cuyler, 12 Barb.
(N. Y.) 667. Sec also, ante, p. 265.
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which was later denied. They were not taken by trespass

originally.

273

which was later denied. They were not taken by trespass
originally.

Separate Contracts. — Another phase of the s^me

rule is the fact that receipt and acceptance of goods de-

livered under one contract will not admit oral proof of

another contract, even though the latter has been entered

into coincidently with the first or is otherwise intimately

related to it. In Tompkins v. Sheehan^^* the defendant

had contracted to buy 1900 shares of stock then owned,

in severalty, by five different persons. The arrangement

was made through one owner as an agent representing

all of the others and the defendant contracted to take

all 1900 shares. The certificates of one owner, the plain-

tiff, were not immediately at hand and those of the other

o^vners, representing 1700 shares, were deUvered and

accepted by the defendant. Thereafter the plaintiff's

shares w^ere delivered, but were refused. On suit it was

contended that acceptance of the 1700 shares opened
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the way for oral proof of the contract. The court held

that it was not a question of proving the contract ; that

there were in fact five separate contracts and that accept-

ance of goods covered by four of them would not open

the wa}' for proof of the fifth. ^^^

The most difficult problem arising out of this rule is

to determine when there is one entire contract, under

which a pari: of the goods have been received and ac-

cepted, and vdien there are merely two or more coinci-

dent and related but wholly independent contracts. There

are no rules for determining this issue. Decisions involv-

ing the same essential facts have not been sufiiciently

numerous so that any judicial custom can be deduced. As

yet, therefore, each case depends upon the conclusion

of the particular judge, without the guidance of rule,

although possibly influenced by other decisions on more

128—158 N. Y. 617. Weeks v. Crie, 94 Me. 458, 80 Am.

129— Accord, McCormick Mach. St. 410.

Co. V. Cusack, 116 Mich. 647;

-Separate Contracts.-Another phase of the Sa)lle
rule is the fact that receipt and acceptance of goods delivered under one contract will not admit oral proof of
another contract, even though the latter has been entered
into coincidently with the first or is otherwise intimately
related to it. In Tompkins v. Sheehan128 the defendant
had contracted to buy 1900 shares of stock then owned,
in severalty, by five different persons. The arrangement
was made through one owner as an agent representing
all of the others and the defendant contracted to take
all 1900 shares. The certificates of one owner, the plaintiff, were not immediately at hand and those of the other
owners, representing 1700 shares, were delivered and
accepted by the defendant. Thereafter the plaintiff's
shares were delivered, but were refused. On suit it was
contended that acceptance of the 1700 shares opened
the way for oral proof of the contract. The court held
that it was not a question of proving the contract; that
there were inf act five separate contracts and that acceptance of good;- covered by four of them would not open
the way for proof of the fifth. 129
The most difficult problem arising out of this rule is
to determine \vhen there is one entire contract, under
which a part of tho goods have been received and accepted, and vd1en there are merely two or more coincident and related but \:d1olly independent contracts. There
are no rules for determining this issue. Decisions involving the same essential fact have not been sufficiently
numerous so that any judicial custom can be deduced. As
yet, therefore, each case depends upon the conclusion
of the particular judge, without the guidance of rule,
although possibly influenced by other decisions on more
128-158 N. Y. 617.
129-Accord, McCormick Mach.
Co. v. Cusack, 116 Mich. 647;

Weeks v. Crie, 94 Me. 458, 80 Am.
St. 410.
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or less similar facts. There is no need here for reference
to particular cases which have, on their own facts, been
held to show or not to show an entire contract. 180
Many courts recognizing that the question is entirely
one of fact-though, properly speaking, it is one of
conclusion, rather than of actual fact-have shifted the
burden of the conclusion to the jury. In Weeks v. Crie, 131
the trial court had instructed the jury as a matter of law,
that if the two contracts were made at the same interview they constituted a single agreement in this respect.
The upper court said, ''Whether such negotiations for
separate articles result in one entire contract for the
whole, or whether the contract for each remains separate
and distinct, may depend upon many circumstances. It
raises a question of fact properly to be passed upon by a
jury. * * * If the circumstances are such as to lead to
a reasonable supposition that the parties intended that
the whole series of transactions should constitute one

THE LAW OF SALES

or less similar facts. There is no need here for reference

to particular cases which have, on their own facts, been

held to show or not to show an entire contract.^^°

Many courts recognizing that the question is entirely

one of fact — though, properly speaking, it is one of

conclusion, rather than of actual fact — have shifted the

burden of the conclusion to the jury. In Weeks v. Crie,"*

the trial court had instructed the jury as a matter of law,

that if the two contracts were made at the same inter-

view they constituted a single agreement in this respect.

The upper court said, ''Whether such negotiations for

separate articles result in one entire contract for the

whole, or whether the contract for each remains separate

and distinct, may depend upon many circumstances. It

raises a question of fact properly to be passed upon by a

jury. * * * If the circumstances are such as to lead to

a reasonable supposition that the parties intended that
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the whole series of transactions should constitute one

130 — By way of illustration, in

Ford V. Howgate, 106 Me. 517, the

contract was held to be entire al-

though covering shares of stock

and an interest in an automobile.

One keenly analytical text-

writer, Williston, Contracts, Sec.

863, however, lays down this prop-

osition: — "The essential test to

determine whether a number of

promises constitute one contract

or more than one is simple. It

130-By way of illustration, in
Ford v. Howgate, 106 Me. 517, the
contract was held to be entire although covering shares of stock
and an interest in an automobile.
One keenly analytical textwriter, Williston, Contracts, Sec.
863, however, lays down this proposition :-"The essential test to
determ ine whether a number of
promises constitute one contract
or more than one is simple. It
can be nothing else than the
a nswer to an inquiry whether the
parties assent ed to all the promises as a single whole, so that
there would have been no bargain
whatever , if any promise or set
or promises were struck out." But
as the writ er him self states and
as is obvious from the decisions
discussed, this test is exceedingly
1ndefinHe in its application.
A clear disti nction should be
kept in mind between this ques-

can be nothing else than the

answer to an inquiry whether the

parties assented to all the prom-

ises as a single whole, so that

there would have been no bargain

whatever, if any promise or set

of promises were struck out." But

as the writer himself states and

as Is obvious from the decisions

discussed, this test is exceedingly

Indefinite in its application.

A clear distinction should be

kept In mind between this ques-

tion of whether there is one single

contract or several separate ones

and the question whether one

single contract is itself entire or

is divisible, so that breach of one

part is or is not breach of the

whole contract. For instance, in

Herbert v. Rhodes, etc. Co., 106

111. Ap. 579, a contract for the

sale of twelve dozen pairs of pants

was held to be divisible, so that

the buyer could keep one dozen

pairs and reject the other eleven

dozen pairs. It seems impossible,

however, that, had the question

of the Statute been involved, the

court would have held it to be

twelve separate contracts. Cases

involving only the entirety or

u1

divisibility of an admittedly single

ILIL.

y

contract should not properly be

treated as authority on the ques-

tion whether there is one contract

or more.

131—94 Me. 458, 80 Am. St. 410.
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tion of whether there is one single
contract or several separate ones
and the question whether one
single contract is itself entire or
is divisible, so that breach of one
part is or is not breach of the
whole contract. For instance, in
Herbert v. Rhodes, etc. Co., 106
Ill. Ap. 579, a contract for the
sale of twelve dozen pairs of pants
was held to be divisible, so that
the buyer could keep one dozen
pairs and reject the other eleven
dozen pairs. It seems impossible,
however, that, bad the question
of the Statute been involved, the
court would have held it to be
twelve separate contracts. Cases
involving only the entirety or
divisibility of an admittedly single
contract should not properly be
treated as authority on the question whether there is one contract
or more.
131-94 Me. 458, 80 Am. St. 410.
•
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trade, they may be regarded as one entire contract ; other-

wise not. * * * Whether the negotiations constituted

one contract or more was a question of fact, and should

have been submitted to the jury."

This shifting of the responsibility to the jury would

seem undesirable. Inasmuch as the jury have no defini-

tion of the distinction between one contract and several

contracts to work on, there can be no pretense of con-

sistency in their decisions. Although the conclusion

sought is in a sense a question of fact, it is at best a

conclusion only. In reaching it the judge at least has the

benefit of prior conclusions which may be analogous,

even though they be not so frequent as to constitute a

rule.

4. Satisfaction of the Statute by Payment, or Giving

OF Earnest Money

All that has just been said of receipt and acceptance

as satisfying the Statute is true also — so far as it can
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be applied — of payment as a satisfaction of the Statute.

In addition to its reference to receipt and acceptance

of goods the Statute also permits proof of an oral con-

tract if the buyer has given ''something in earnest to

bind the bargain or in part payment." The phrases ''in

trade, they may be regarded as one entire contract; otherwise not. '"' ~ * Whether the negotiations constituted
one contract or more was a question of fact, and should
have been submitted to the jury.''
This shifting of the responsibility to the jury would
seem undesirable. Inasmuch as the jury have no definition of the distinction between one contract and several
contracts to work on, there can be no pretense of consistency in their decisions. Although the conclusion
sought is in a sense a question of fact, it is at best a
conclusion only. In reaching it the judge at least has the
benefit of prior conclusions which may be analogous,
even though they be not so frequent as to constitute a
rule.

earnest" and "in part payment" are treated by the

courts as being synonymous. ^^'^

4.

SATISFACTION OF THE STATUTE BY PAYMENT, OR GIVING

Time of Payment. — The payment need not be made at

OF EARNEST MONEY

the time of the making of the contract, but may be at

any time thereafter.^^^

132 — Groomer v. McMilan, 143 vldes that the buyer "shall at the

Mo. Ap. 612; Howe v. Hayward, time pay some part of the pur-

108 Mass. 54; Hudnut v. Weir, chase money," the rule is other-

100 Ind. 501. wise. Effect is given to the re-

133 — Driggs v. Bush, 152 Mich. quirement and it is held that

53. See also the cases cited in the while payment need not be concur-

followins rotes. rent with the original making of

Where, however, a statute like the agreement, at least, when it is

that o£ New York expressly pro- made, "the parties must reaffirm

All that has just been said of receipt and acceptance
as satisfying the Statute is true also-so far as it can
be applied-of payment as a satisfaction of the Statute.
In addition to its reference to receipt and acceptance
of goods the Statute also permits proof of an oral contract if the buyer has given ''something in earnest to
bind the bargain or in part payment.'' The phrases ''in
earnest" and "in part payment" are treated by the
courts as being synonymous. 132
Time of Payment.-The payment need not be made at
the time of the making of the contract, but may be at
any time thereafter. 133
132-Groomer v. McMilan, 143
Mo. Ap. 612; Howe v. Hayward,
108 Mass. 54; Hudnut v. Weir,
100 Ind. 501.
133-Driggs v. Bush, 152 Mich.
63. See also the cases cited in the
followin g notes.
Where, however, a statute like
that of New York expressly pro-
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vides that the buyer "shall at the
time pay some part of the purchase mone y," the rule is otherwise. Effect is given to t he requirement and it is held that
while payment need not be concurrent with the original making of
the agreement, at least, when it is
made, "the parties must reaffirm
Orig1r.t1I fr n1
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Medium of Payment. — The payment need not be in

money. As lias already been pointed out, the Statute

applies to contracts of barter and exchange as well as

to technical sales. ''Payment" is accordingly construed

to cover the goods, services, or any other thing which

forms the quid pro quo for the title. ^^*

Since the cancellation of an existing debt is perfectly

vahd consideration for a promise, it follows that the

payment may be in the form of canceling a debt. Thus,

giving credit on notes of the seller is such a payment by

the buyer as will take the matter out of the Statute."^

Promise as Payment — However, just as in the case

of alleged receipt of part of the goods, mere words are not

sufficient of themselves to constitute payment. There

must he payment. "The payment may be made in money

or property, or in the discharge of an existing debt, in

whole or in part, due from the vendor to the purchaser.

Or the extinguishment of, or pa^Tnent upon a promis-

Medium of Payment.-The payment need not be in
money. As has already been pointed out, the Statute
applies to contracts of barter and exchange as well as
to technical sales. ''Payment'' is accordingly construed
to cover the goods, services, or any other thing which
forms the quid pro quo for the title. 134
Since the cancellation of an existing debt is perfectly
valid consideration for a promise, it follows that the
payment may be in the form of canceling a debt. Thus,
giving credit on notes of the seller is such a payment by
the buyer as will take the matter out of the Statute. 135
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sory note held by the latter against the former. A mere

agreement to apply the purchase money to either of these

objects would not be enough, because the contract would

still rest in words, and nothing more. The agreement

to pay the note or satisfy the debt must be consummated

and carried into effect by an act which shall be obligatory

or restate the terms of the con- bin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 523; Koewing

tract." And this reaffirmance v. Wilder, N. Y., 128 Fed. 558; Bur-

must be express and for the pur- ton v. Gage, 85 Minn. 355, assign-

pose. Koewing v. Wilder, N. Y., ment of another contract as pay-

128 Fed. 558; Colton v. Raymond, ment.

N. Y., 114 Fed. 863; Milos v. Cf. Hewson v. Peterman Mfg.

Covacevitch, 40 Ore. 239. Co., 76 Wash. 600, in which jt was

134 — "The term 'purchase held that the buyer's resignation

money' as used in this statute, from a company was not part pay-

means simply the compensation ment even though it might have

or consideration which the seller been a valid "consideration" for

is to receive for his property," the seller's promise.

Johnson v. Tabor, 101 Miss. 78, 13n— Johnson v. Tabor, 101 Miss.

citing Devin v. Himer, 29 la. 297; 78; Diekman v. Young, 87 Mo. Ap.

Driggs v Bush, 152 Mich. 53; Bra- 530.

--Promise as Payment-However, just as in the case
of alleged receipt of part of the goods, mere words are not
sufficient of themselves to constitute payment. There
must be payment. ''The payment may be made in money
or property, or in the discharge of an existing debt, in
whole or in part, due from the vendor to the purchaser.
Or the extinguishment of, or payrnent upon a promissory note held by the latter against the former. A mere
agreement to apply the purchase money to either of these
obj ect s would not be enough, because the contract would
still rest in words, and nothing more. The agreement
to p ay the note or satisfy the debt must be consun1mated
and carried into effect by an act which shall be obligatory
or r estate th e t erms of the contract."
And t h is reaffirmance
must be express and for the purpose. K oewing v. Wilder, N. Y.,
128 Fed. 558; Colton v. Raymond,
N. Y., 114 Fed. 863 ; Milos v.
Covacevitch, 40 Ore. 23 9.
134-"The term 'p u r ch a s e
money' as used in this statute,
means simply the compensation
or consideration which t he seller
is to rercive for his property,"
.Johnson v . Tabor, 101 Miss . 78,
f'it ing Devin v. H imer, 29 Ia. 297;
Driggs v Bush, 152 Mich. 53; Brau1g1 I
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bin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 523; Koewing
v. Wilder, N. Y., 128 Fed. 558; Burton v. Gage, 85 Minn. 355, assignment of another contract as payment.
Cf. Hewson v. Peterman Mfg.
Co., 76 Wash. 600, in which 1t was
held that the buyer's resignation
from a company was not part payment even though it might have
been a valid "consideration" for
the seller's promise.
135-Johnson v. Tabor, 101 Miss .
78 ; Die kman v. Young, 87 Mo. Ap.
530.
Origir I fr m
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upon the purchaser and enable the vendor to enforce the

contract of sale. The note should be delivered up and

cancelled; or, if the purchase money falls short of com-

plete payment, it should be extinguished by an indorse-

ment made upon it in writing which shall operate effect-

ually as an extinguishment pro tanto. And if the pur-

chase money is to be applied to pay an open account, in

whole or in part, the creditor and purchaser should part

with some written evidence of such application which

shall bind him and put it in the power of his debtor and

vendor to enforce the contract. "^^®

Mutuality Required. — The alleged payment, to be

really such, must be not only delivered by the buyer,

but also must be accepted by the seller. Thus, mere physi-

cal receipt of a draft by the seller, even though the buyer

intended it as payment, is not payment if the seller has

never accepted it as such.^" And, in general, the receipt

277

upon the purchaser and enable the vendor to enforce the
contract of sak. The note should be delivered up a.nd
cancelled; or, if the purchase money falls short of complete payment, it should be extinguished by an indor£ement made upon it in writing which shall operate effectually as an extinguishment pro tanto. And if the purchase money is to be applied to pay an open account, in
whole or in part, the creditor and purchaser should part
with some written evidence of such application which
shall bind him and put it in the power of his debtor and
vendor to enforce the contract.' ' 136

and acceptance of a check, draft or other paper is not pay-
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ment, "unless it is received by the seller and agreed that

it is an absolute payment; and this must be clearly estab-

lished."^^* A fortiori, mere tender of payment which is

refused by the seller is not enough to take the case out of

the Statute.^3^

Conversely, a physical transfer by the buyer to the

seller of things which he does not intend the seller to

keep in payment, will not amount to a payment.^*®

136— Brabin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. Dwinell, 101 Neb. 712, 164 N. W.

519; Accord, Gorman v. Brossard, 722; Knohn v. Bantz, 68 Ind. 277,

120 Mich. 611; Milos v. Covace- note; Combs v. Bateman, 10 Barb,

witch, 40 Ore. 239. (N. Y.) 573, note.

137 — Johnson v. Morrison, 163 A check which is received in

Mich. 322; Young v. Ingalsbe, 208 payment is "payment" within the

N. Y. 503; Driggs v. Bush, 152 meaning of the Statute, Logan v.

Mich. 53. Carroll, 72 Mo. Ap. 613; McLure

138 — Groomer v. McMillan, 143 v. Sherman, 70 Fed. 190.

Mo. Ap. 612, holding also that a 139 — Hershey Lumber Co. v. St,

draft, not so received in payment, Paul etc. Co., 66 Minn. 449.

is not even something given in -.An Ttr • ttj ^ h^^ -, ^

,, , 140 — Weir V. Hudnut, 115 Ind.

earnest. Accord, Hessberg v. -^r

Welsh, 147 N. Y. S. 44; Bates v.

Mutuality Required.-The alleged payment, to be
really such, must be not only delivered by the buyer,
but also must be accepted by the seller. Thus, mere physical receipt of a draft by the seller, even though the buyer
intended it as payment, is not payment if the seller has
never accepted it as such. 137 And, in general, the receipt
and acceptance of a check, draft or other paper is not payment, "unless it is received by the seller and agreed that
it is an absolute payment; and this must be clearly established.' n 3s A fortiori, mere tender of payment which is
refused by the seller is not enough to take the case out of
the Statute. 139
Conversely, a physical transfer by the buyer to the
seller of things which he does not intend the seller to
keep in payment, will not amount to a payment. 140
136-Brabin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y.
619; Accord, Gorman v. Brossard,
120 Mich. 611; Milos v. Covacewitch, 40 Ore. 239.
137-Johnson v. Morrison, 163
Mich. 322; Young v. Ingalsbe, 208
N. Y. 503; Driggs v. Bush, 152
Mich. 53.
138-Groomer v. McMillan, 143
Mo. Ap. 612, holding also that a
draft, not so received in payment,
is not even something given in
earnest.
Accord, Hessberg v.
Welsh, 147 N. Y. S. 44; Bates v.

Dwinell, 101 Neb. 712, 164 N. W.
722; Knohn v. Bantz, 68 Ind. 277,
note; Combs v. Bateman, 10 Barb.
(N. Y.) 573, note.
A check which is received in
payment is "payment" within the
meaning of the Statute, Logan v.
Carroll, 72 Mo. Ap. 613; McLure
v. Sherman, 70 Fed. 190.
139-Hershey Lumber Co. v. St.
Paul etc. Co., 66 Minn. 449.
140-Weir v. Hudnut, 115 Ind.
525.
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Through Agents. — Payment need not be made directly

to the seller, but may be received and accepted by an

agent."^

5. Effect of Failure to Satisfy the Statute

If there be no memorandum, no part payment, nor

Through Agents.-Payment need not be made directly
to the seller, but may be received and accepted by an
agent. 141

receipt and acceptance of the goods, the original Statute

provides that the contract shall not "be allowed to be

5.

good". In the various states the phraseology differs.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SATISFY THE STATUTE,

Some declare such contracts '^ invalid," others make them

**void." Still others pro\ide that they "shall not be

binding." This variation of form of expression, how-

ever, seems to have httle if any effect upon the judicial

interpretation. To say that a contract "shall not be

allowed to be good" seems obviously only a lengthier

way of saying that it is "void," or "invahd." Except

for sporadic instances, the courts do treat them as synony-

mous. The effect of the Statute depends upon the mean-

ing given by the courts to these expressions.
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Does Not Destroy the Contract. — As was indicated

heretofore, there is considerable question whether the

primary purpose of the Statute is to prevent perjury

or to protect property.^*^ Whatever the answer to that

may be, it may be said in general that the Statute is

treated as being for the benefit of the parties to the con-

tract, rather than for the benefit of the public. It is not

applied to the prevention of perjury nearly so widely

as its literal statement, that the contract shall not be

allowed to be good, would admit.

As between the parties, if the parties to the suit do

not themselves choose to take advantage of the Statute,

141 — Case v. Cramer, 34 Mont. 142 — See ante, p. 238. The object

142; Jones v. Wattles, 66 Neb. of the law is to prevent false

533. But such alleged agent must swearing and perjury, Michels v.

If there be no memorandum, no part payment, nor
receipt and acceptance of the goods, the original Statute
provides that the contract shall not "be allowed to be
good". In the various states the phraseology differs.
Some declare such contracts ''invalid,'' others make them
"void." Still others provide that they "shall not be
binding.'' This variation of form of expression, however, seems to have little if any effect upon the judicial
interpretation. To say that a contract ''shall not be
allowed to be good'' seems obviously only a lengthier
way of saying that it is ''void,'' or ''invalid.'' Except
for sporadic instances, the courts do treat them as synonymous. The effect of the Statute depends upon the meaning given by the courts to these expressions.

at least have had authority to West. 109 111. Ap. 418; Townsend

make a contract. City Drug Co. v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325.

V. Am. Soda Co., 13 Ga. Ap. 435.

Does Not Destroy the Contract.-As was indicated
heretofore, there is considerable question whether the
primary purpose of the Statute is to prevent perjury
or to protect property. 142 Whatever the answer to that
may be, it may be said in general that the Statute is
treated as being for the benefit of the parties to the contract, rather than for the benefit of the public. It is not
applied to the prevention of perjury nearly so widely
as its literal statement, that the contract shall not be
allowed to be good, would admit.
As between the parties, if the parties to the suit do
not themselves choose to take advantage of the Statute,
141-Case v. Cramer, 34 Mont.
142; Jones v. Wattles, 66 Neb.
533. But such alleged agent must
at least have had authority to
make a contract. City Drug Co.
v. Am. Soda Co., 13 Ga. Ap. 435.
Ul!:fl
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142-See ante, p. 238. The object
of the law is to prevent false
swearing and perjury, Michels v.
West, 109 Ill. Ap. 418; Townsend
v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325.
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the court will not of its own initiative object to the proof

of the contract, nor consider whether the testimony is apt

to be perjured."^ It is too late for even a party to

object that the contract is not in writing, after the trial

has been had without such objection.^**

If the contract is permitted to be proved because there

has been such acceptance, or part payment, or memo-

randum, as will take it out of the Statute, its terms and

its effects are considered as of the date it was entered

into. If proved, it takes effect as a valid oral contract, not

as though it were some new agreement entered into at the

time the acceptance or payment occurred, or the memo-

randum was written. For instance, in Vincent v. Ger-

mond,^" the plaintiff had sold four cattle to the defendant

with the express stipulation that the risk of loss should

be on the defendant. It was an oral contract, with noth-

ing to take it out of the Statute. One of the cattle died.

Subsequently the defendant received and accepted the
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remaining three. The seller was given judgment against

him for the price of all four cattle. Although the fourth

animal was not in existence when the receipt and accept-

ance took place, the buyer's liability was determined by

the terms of the oral contract and as of the date on

which it was entered into.^*^

In fact, there is nothing to indicate but that the con-

tract is good and valid in all respects, if it can be proved.

-As Regards Third Persons. — As regards third per-

sons, not parties to the contract, or in pri^dty with the

143— Booker v. Wolf, 195 111. mulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633; Riley v.

365; Mather v. Scoles, 35 Ind. 1, Bancroft's Est., 51 Neb. 864, hold-

referring to the 4th section only. ing that title passed when the con-

144 — Simis v. Wissel, 41 N. Y. tract was made, even though the

S. 1024, referring to sec. 4; Mich- acceptance which permitted proof

els V. West, 109 111. Ap. 418, sec. 4. of the contract did not take place

145—11 Johns. (N. Y.) 283. till some time after; Amsinck v.

146 — Accord, Townsend v. Har- Am. Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 195, title

graves, 118 Mass. 325, citing passes so as to give buyer an in-

Leather Cloth Co. V. Hieronimus, surable interest at date of oral

L. K. 10 Q B. 140; Phillips v. Oc- contract.
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the court will not of its own initiative object to the proof
of the contract, nor consider whether the testimony is apt
to be perjured. 148 It is too late for even a party to
object that the contract is not in writing, after the trial
has been had without such objection. 144
If the contract is permitted to be proved because there
has been such acceptance, or part payment, or memorandum, as will take it out of the Statute, its terms and
its effects are considered as of the date it was entered
into. If proved, it takes effect as a valid oral contract, not
as though it were some new agreement entered into at the
time the acceptance or payment occurred, or the memorandum was written. For instance, in Vincent v. Germond,145 the plaintiff had sold four cattle to the defendant
with the express stipulation that the risk of loss should
be on the defendant. It was an oral contract, with nothing to take it out of the Statute. One of the cattle died.
Subsequently the defendant received and accepted the
remaining three. The seller was given judgment against
him for the price of all four cattle. Although the fourth
animal was not in existence when the receipt and acceptance took place, the buyer's liability was determined by
the terms of the oral contract and as of the date on
which it was entered into. 146
In fact, there is nothing to indicate but that the contract is good and valid in all respects, if it can be proved.
--As Regards Third Persons.-As regards third persons, not parties to the contract, or in privity with the
143-Booker v. Wolf, 195 Ill.
365; Mather v. Scoles, 35 Ind. 1,
referring to the 4th section only.
144-Simis v. Wissel, 41 N. Y.
S. 1024, referring to sec. 4; Michels v. West, 109 Ill. Ap. 418, sec. 4.
145-11 Johns. (N. Y.) 283.
146-Accord, Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, citing
Leather Cloth Co. v. Hieronimus,
L. R. 10 Q B. 140; Phillips v. Oc·
D1git1ze by
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mulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633; Riley v.
Bancroft's Est., 51 Neb. 864, holding that title passed when the contract was made, even though the
acceptance which permitted proof
of the contract did not take place
till some time after; Amsinck v.
Am. Ins. Co:, 129 Mass. 195, title
passes so as to give buyer an insurable interest at date of oral
contract.
Origiral fr m
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parties, the contract is equally good and valid if proved.
Moreover, as regards such third persons, the contract
does not need to conform to the Statute in order to be
provable. .As to them the oral contract is not only allowed
to be good; it is even allowed to be proved, despite objection and appeal to the Statute. In Jackson v. Stanfield, 147 for instance, the plaintiff sued to recover damages because defendant had induced the Studebaker
Bros. to break a contract with plaintiff. This contract
was oral, for the sale of chattels, and came within the
Statute. The court said, "It is urged that the contract
between the Studebaker Bros. Manufacturing Company
and appellant Newton Jackson is void under the Statute
of Frauds, because the value of the lumber was over $50,
and the :finding does not show that the offer was accepted
in writing. If this be true, it is no concern of the appellees (the defendants). Parties to contracts and their
privies can alone take advantage of the fact that a contract is invalid under the Statute of Frauds. 1fany forms
of expression by this and other courts illustrate the
doctrine that a third person can not make the Statute
of Frauds available to overthrow a transaction between
other persons; that the defense of this Statute is purely
a personal one and can not be made by strangers. 148 It
concerns the remedy alone, and the modern law is well
settled that, in the absence of a statutory provision to
the contrary, the effect of the Statute is not to render
the agreement void, but simply to prevent its direct
enforcement by the parties, and to refuse damages for
its breach ". 149

parties, the contract is equally good and valid if proved.

Moreover, as regards such third persons, the contract

does not need to conform to the Statute in order to be

provable. As to them the oral contract is not only allowed

to be good; it is even allowed to be proved, despite ob-

jection and appeal to the Statute. In Jackson v. Stan-

field,^*'' for instance, the plaintiff sued to recover dam-

ages because defendant had induced the Studebaker

Bros, to break a contract with plaintiff. This contract

was oral, for the sale of chattels, and came within the

Statute. The court said, **It is urged that the contract

between the Studebaker Bros. Manufacturing Company

and appellant Newton Jackson is void under the Statute

of Frauds, because the value of the lumber was over $50,

and the finding does not show that the offer was accepted

in writing. If this be true, it is no concern of the ap-

pellees (the defendants). Parties to contracts and their

privies can alone take advantage of the fact that a con-
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tract is invalid under the Statute of Frauds. Many forms

of expression by this and other courts illustrate the

doctrine that a third person can not make the Statute

of Frauds available to overthrow a transaction between

other persons ; that the defense of this Statute is purely

a personal one and can not be made by strangers. ^*^ It

concerns the remedy alone, and the modern law is well

settled that, in the absence of a statutory provision to

the contrary, the effect of the Statute is not to render

the agreement void, but simply to prevent its direct

enforcement by the parties, and to refuse damages for

its breach".^*®

147—137 Ind. 592, 23 L. R. A. 82, 233 Am. Rep. 30; Int. & G. N.

588. Ry. V. Searight, 8 Tex. Civ. Ap.

148 — Citing other Indiana cases 593; Cowan v. Adams, 10 Me. 374,

and 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 25 Am. Dec. 242.

659. An insurance company can not

149 — The Indiana statute pro- defeat the claim of insured on the

vides that such contracts "shall theory that a contract between the

not be valid." Accord. Benton v. insured and some one else was

Pratt. 2 Wend. (N. Y.) .385, 20 Am. rendered void by the Statute.

Dec. 623; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. Northwestern Mutual Life Co. v.

147-137 Ind. 592, 23 L. R. A.
588.
148-Citing other Indiana cases
and 8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
659.
149- The Indiana statute provides th at s uch contracts "shall
not be valid." Accord, Benton v.
Pratt, 2 W end. (N. Y.) 385, 20 Am.
Dec. 623 ; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y.
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82, 233 Am. Rep. 30; Int. & G. N.
Ry. v. Searight, 8 Tex. Civ. Ap.
593; Cowan v. Adams, 10 Me. 374,
25 Am. Dec. 242.
An insurance com pany can not
defeat the claim of insur ed on the
theory that a contract b etwe en the
insured a nd som e on e else wa s
r end r od void by the Statute.
Northwestern Mutual Life Co. v.
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^As to Persons in Privity with the Parties. — A third

person, however, who is in privity of relation with a

party to a contract can take advantage of the Statute

to protect himself. Thus a buyer in good faith from one

in possession of the goods can use the Statute in defense

against a plaintiff who claims the property under a prior

oral contract.""

Creditors. — Creditors of a seller are not consid-

ered as privies to the contract and therefore can not set

Heiman, 93 Ind. 24, promise to

answer for debt of another;

-As to Persons in Privity with the Parties.-A third
person, however, who is in privity of relation with a
party to a contract can take advantage of the Statu~e
to protect himself. Thus a buyer in good faith from one
in possession of the goods can use the Statute in defense
against a plaintiff who claims the property under a prior
oral contract. 160

Mutual Mills Co. v. Gordon, 20 111.

Ap. 559; Amsinck v. Am. Ins. Co.,

129 Mass. 185, dictum; Cowell v.

Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 N. C. 684,

sale of land.

--Creditors.-Creditors of a seller are not considered as privies to the contract and therefore can not set

In an action for damages be-
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cause the defendant company

had failed to deliver the message

which would have created a profit-

able contract between plaintiff and

a third person, it was held that

the company had no defense in the

fact that, because of the Statute,

plaintiff could not have enforced

the contract had the message

been delivered. Purdom Naval

Stores Co. v. Western Union Tel.

Co., 153 Fed. 327; Kratz v. Stocke,

42 Mo. 351.

A written contract for sale of

land on condition that it has not

already been sold can not be en-

forced if there had been in fact a

previous sale, even though that

sale itself was oral only and not

enforcible because of the Statute.

Jacob V. Smith, 28 Ky. 380; Bo-

hannon v. Pace, 36 Ky. 194. The

rights of creditors to set up the

Statute are noted hereafter.

In possible conflict with this

principle, that a third person can

not take advantage of the statute,

are the cases cited in the follow-

ing notes.

150 — First National Bk. v. Blair

State Bk., 80 Neb. 400, 127 Am.

St. 752. The reason given in this

case is not that the second buyer

is in privity with his seller in rela-

tion to the first contract, but the

seller, in making the second sale,

"repudiates and avoids" the first

contract.

In Mahan v. U. S., 16 Wall. 143,

the government, as confiscator of

cotton alleged to be the property

of A, was allowed to set up the

Statute in defense to a claim by

B that the cotton had previously

Heiman, 93 Ind. 24, promise to
answer for debt of another;
Mutual Mills Co. v. Gordon, 20 Ill.
Ap. 559; Am sin ck v. Am . Ins. Co.,
129 Mass. 185, dictum; Cowell v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 N. C. 684,
sale of land.
In an action for damages because the defendant company
had failed to deliver the message
which would have created a profitable contract between plaintiff and
a third person, it was held that
the company had no defense in the
fact that, because of the Statute,
plaintiff could not have enforced
the contract had the message
been delivered.
Purdom Naval
Stores Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 153 Fed. 327; Kratz v. Stocke,
42 Mo. 351.
A written contract for sale of
land on condition that it has not
already been sold can not be en·
forced if there had been in fact a
previous sale, even though that
sale itself was oral only and not
enforcible because of the Statute.
Jacob v. Smith, 28 Ky. 380; Bohannon v. Pace, 36 Ky. 194. The
rights of creditors to set up the
Statute are noted hereafter.
In possible conflict with this
principle, that a third person can

not take advantage of the statute,
are the cases cited in the follow·
ing notes.
150-First National Bk. v. Blair
State Bk., 80 Neb. 400, 127 Am.
St. 752. The reason given in this
case is not that the second buyer
is in privity with his seller in rela·
tion to the first contract, but the
seller, in making the second sale,
"repudiates and avoids" the first
contract.
In Mahan v. U. S., 16 Wall. 143,
the government, as c.onfiscator of
cotton alleged to be the property
of A, was allowed to set up the
Statute in defense to a claim by
B that the cotton had previously
been sold to her by oral contract.
The theory appears to be, however, that the Statute made the
sale void.
Sonneman v. Mertz, 221 Ill. 362.
In Petty v. Petty, 4 B. Monroe
(Ky.) 215, 39 Am. Dec. 501, it was
held, without r eason given, that
heirs of land could set up the
statute against an oral contract
made by their father on consideration
of
marriage.
Accord,
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 Tenn. 282,
45 S. W . 677; Sebben v. Trezevant, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 213.

been sold to her by oral contract.
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The theory appears to be, how-
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up the Statute to derogate the effect of the contract. 151

up the Statute to derogate the effect of the contract."^

As a Defense. — In another way, also, oral contracts

within the Statute have in fact been allowed to be good

As a Defense.-In another way, also, oral contracts
within the Statute have in fact been allowed to be good
even as between the parties. This is the case in which
suit on a provable contract is defeated by showing that
such written, or otherwise provable contract, has been
rescinded through the substitution of a later oral contract. Even though the later contract is within the Statute and suit could not be brought upon it, some courts
have nevertheless recognized its effect as putting an end
to the original contract for which it was substituted. 162

even as between the parties. This is the case in which

suit on a provable contract is defeated by showing that

such written, or otherwise provable contract, has been

rescinded through the substitution of a later oral con-

tract. Even though the later contract is within the Stat-

ute and suit could not be brought upon it, some courts

have nevertheless recognized its effect as putting an end

to the original contract for which it was substituted."^

151 — Cresswell v. McCaig, 11

Neb. 222; Cahill v. Bigelow, 18

Pick. (Mass.) 369; Gordon v.

Tweedy, 71 Ala. 202 land; Brown

V. Rawlings, 72 Ind. 505 land;

Minus V. Morse, 15 O. 568, 45 Am.

Dec. 90 land.
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An assignee for benefit of credi-

tors can not set up tbe statute if

the seller, his assignor, himself

does not, Walker's Assignee v.

151-Cresswell v. McCaig, 11
Neb. 222 ; Cahill v. Bigelow, 18
Pick. (Mass.) 369; Gordon v.
Tweedy, 71 Ala. 202 land; Brown
v. Rawlings, 72 Ind. 505 land;
Minus v. Morse, 15 0. 568, 45 Am.
Dec. 90 land.
An assignee for benefit of creditors can not set up the statute if
the seller, his assignor, himself
does not, Walker's Assignee v.
Walker, 21 Ky. L. R. 1521.
In Waite v. McKelvey, 71 Minn.
167, however, it was held that a
sheriff who had levied on chattels
acquired all the title that the
judgment debtor-the seller-had,
and therefore could set up the
statute a gainst an alleged buyer
under a n oral contract. The theory
wa s t hat th e statute made the contract void.
152- Reed v. McGrew, 5 0. 376,
sale o! land ; Dearborn v. Cross, 7
Cow. (N. Y.) 48, sale of land.
In general, a contr act w ithin the
s tat ut e may be proved as a defense t o an action on the common
counts, Laffey v. Kaufman, 134
Cal. 391; W eber v. W eber , - K y.
- , 76 S. W . 507; Sch ech inger v.
Gau lt, 35 Okla. 416, though Statute

Walker, 21 Ky. L. R. 1521.

In Waite v. McKelvey, 71 Minn.

167, however, it was held that a

sheriff who had levied on chattels

acquired all the title that the

judgment debtor — the seller — had,

and therefore could set up the

statute against an alleged buyer

under an oral contract. The theory

was that the statute made the con-

tract void.

152— Reed v. McGrew, 5 O. 376,

sale of land; Dearborn v. Cross, 7

Cow. (N. Y.) 48, sale of land.

In general, a contract within the

statute may be proved as a de-

fense to an action on the common

counts, Laffey v. Kaufman, 134

Cal. 391; Weber v. Weber, — Ky.

— , 76 S. W. 507; Schechinger v.

Gault, 35 Okla. 416. though Statute

made It "invalid"; McKinnie v.

Harvie, 28 Minn. 18; Sims v.

Hutchins, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 328;

Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383.

In Morris v. Baron & Co., H. of

L. 87 L. J. R. (K. B.) 145, an oral

contract for sale of goods was held

sufficient to defeat a prior en-

forcible contract for sale of goods

for which the latter had been sub-

stituted. A positive action on the

latter contract was refused. Some

stress is given to the fact that

the particular statute here in-

volved provided only that oral

contracts should not "be enforced

by action."

The question of whether a con-

tract of sale can be rescinded or

altered by a later agreement not

in writing is not peculiar to con-

L

made it "invalid"; McKinnie v.
Harvie, 28 Minn. 18; Sims v.
Hutchins, 8 S. & M. (Miss.) 328;
Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383.
In Morris v. Baron & Co., H . ot
L. 87 L. J. R. (K. B.) 145, an oral
contract for sale of goods was held
sufficient to defeat a prior enforcible contract for sale of goods
for which the latter had been substituted. A positiv:e action on the
latter contract was refused. Some
stress is given to the fact that
the particular statute here involved provided only that oral
contracts should not "be enforced
by action."
The question of whether a contract of sale can be rescinded or
altered by a later agreement not
in writing is not peculiar to contracts of sale, nor in any way related to the statute of frauds. It
is merely the general question as
to whether any contract whi ch is
itself required to be in writing can
be altered by subsequent oral contract. The Statute of Frauds its elf does not cover the question.
There is consid erable conflict in
the decis ions on the question.
Re scission by oral agreement

~·

tracts of sale, nor in any way re-

lated to the statute of frauds. It

Is merely the general question as

to whether any contract which is

itself required to be in writing can
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In various other respects, also, courts have given effect

to a contract on which no action could have been main-

tained directly."^

On the other hand, if the Statute is intended to pre-

vent perjury, rather than merely to protect property

rights, ^^* the damage is equally great whether a contract

is sued on or is set up in defense. For this reason other

courts have refused to admit evidence of an oral contract

within the Statute even by way of defense."^

was recognized in Proctor v.

Thompson, 13 Abbott, N. C. (N.

Y.) 340.

Oral extension of time was al-

lowed in Neppach v. Oregon etc.

In various other respects, also, courts have given effect
to a contract on which no action could have been maintained directly .153
On the other hand, if the Statute is intended to prevent perjury, rather than merely to protect property
rights, 154 the damage is equally great whether a contract
is sued on or is set up in defense. For this reason other
courts have refused to admit evidence of an oral contract
within the Statute even by way of defense. 166

.1

R. R., 46 Ore. 374, 7 Ann. Gas.

1035, in which much conflicting

authority is cited.
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153 — Such is its use to show

value in an action on quasi-con-

tract. Murphy v. DeHaan, 116 la.

61, although statute provided that

"no evidence should be given" of

such contracts.

Contra, because made "void,"

Sutton V. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112.

was recognized in Proctor v.
Thompson, 13 Abbott, N. C. (N.
Y.) 340.
Oral extension of time was allowed in Neppach v. Oregon etc.
R. R., 46 Ore. 374, 7 Ann. Cas.
1035, in wllich much conflicting
authority is cited.

To show the amount of rent due,

Evans v. Winona Lumber Co., 30

Minn. 515; Steele v. Anheuser-

Busch Ass'n, 57 Minn. 18.

To show amount of damage,

Bumis v. Hines, 94 Va, 413.

For various other purposes.

Michels V. West, 109 m. Ap. 418;

Coughlin V. Knowles, 7 Mete.

(Mass.) 57.

154 — "The statute of frauds and

perjuries (was) a great and neces-

sary security to private property",

Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk. 4,

*p. 440.

155 — Scotten v. Brown, 4 Har.

(Del.) 324; Bernier v. Cabot Mfg.

Co., 71 Me. 506; King v. Welcome,

5 Gray (Mass.) 41, statute provid-

ed only that "no action shall be

153-Such is its use to show
value in an action on quasi-con·
tract. Murphy v. DeHaan, 116 la.
61, although statute provided that
"no evidence should be given" of
such contracts.
Oontra, because made "void,"
Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112.
To show the amount of rent due,
Evans v. Winona Lumber Co., 30
Minn. 515; Steele v. AnheuserBusch Ass'n, 57 Minn. 18.
To show amount of damage,
Burrus v. Hines, 94 Va. 413.

For various other purposes,
Michels v. West, 109 Ill. Ap. 418;
Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Mete.
(Mass.) 57.
154-"The statute of frauds and
perjuries (was) a great and necessary security to private property",
Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk. 4,
*p. 440.
155-Scotten v. Brown, 4 Har.
(Del.) 324; Bernier v. Cabot Mfg.
Co., 71 Me. 506; King v. VI.\el come,
5 Gray (Mass.) 41, statute provided only that "no action shall be
brought"; Zeuske v. Zeuske, 55
Ore. 65, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 557;
Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. Co., 96 Ala.
515, statute made contract "void";
Lemon v. Randall , 124 Mich. 687,
id.; Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 405;
Kelley v. Thompson, 181 Mass.
122, not allowed by way of establishing a set-off.

brought"; Zeuske v. Zeuske, 55

Ore. 65, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 557;

Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. Co., 96 Ala.

515, statute made contract "void";

Lemon v. Randall, 124 Mich. 687,

id.; Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 405;

Kelley v. Thompson, 181 Mass.

122, not allowed by way of estab-

lishing a set-off.
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Uniform legislation called the Uniform Sales Act has

been enacted in a number of states in an attempt to

eliminate diversity of judicial rulings in regard to sales

and contracts to sell. This Uniform Act was approved

by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-

UNIFORM SALES ACT

form States Laws in 1906. Since that time it has been

adopted, with some minor changes, in the follow^ing states

and territories : Alaska, 1913 ; Arizona, 1907 ; Connecti-

cut, 1907; Illinois, 1915; Iowa, 1919; Maryland, 1910;

Massachusetts, 1908; Michigan, 1913; Minnesota, 1917;

Nevada, 1915 ; New Jersey, 1907 ; New York, 1911 ; North

Dakota, 1917; Ohio, 1908; Oregon, 1919; Pennsylvania,

1915 ; Ehode Island, 1908 ; Tennessee, 1919 ; Utah, 1917 ;

Wisconsin, 1911 ; Wyoming, 1917.

The following is the text of the Uniform Act as pre-

sented by the Commissioners. Under each section are

digested such decisions as seem to interpret, clarify, or

apply the rule. These citations, however, do not purport
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to be a complete reference to the cases decided under the

Act. For fuller citation of such decisions the reader is

referred to ''The Uniform State Laws, Annotated," by

C. T. Terry and to ''Some Reasons Why the Code States

Should Adopt the Uniform Sales Act," by Lauriz Void,

in 6 Calif. L. R. 37. Not all of these decisions refer ex-

pressly to the Act, but they are assumed to have been

made ^\^th reference to it, because they were rendered

subsequent to its adoption in the particular state — ad-

mittedly a somewhat dubious assumption.

It seems unnecessary for the author himself to under-

take conoments on the Act. The reader can interpret it

285

Uniform legislation called the Uniform Sales Act has
been enacted in a number of states in an attempt to
eliminate diversity of judicial rulings in r ega rd t o sales
and contracts to sell. This Uniform Act was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioner s on Uniform States Laws in 1906. Since that time it h as been
adopted, with some minor changes, in the following stat es
and territories: Alaska, 1913; Arizona, 1907; Connecticut, 1907; Illinois, 1915; Iowa, 1919; Maryland, 1910;
Massachusetts, 1908; Michigan, 1913; Minnesota, 1917;
Nevada, 1915; New Jersey, 1907; New York, 1911; North
Dakota, 1917; Ohio, 1908; Oregon, 1919 ; P ennsylvania,
1915; Rhode Island, 1908; Tennessee, 1919; Utah, 1917;
Wisconsin, 1911; Wyoming, 1917.
The following is the text of the Uniforn1 Act a s presented by the Commissioners. Under each section a re
digested such decisions as seem to interpret, clarify, or
apply the rule. These citations, however, do not purport
to be a complete reference to the cases decided under th e
Act. For fuller citation of such decisions the r eader is
referred to "The Uniform State L aws, Annotated," by
C. T. Terry and to ''Some Reasons \Vhy the Code States
Should Adopt the Uniform Sales Act," by Lauriz Vold,
in 6 Calif. L. R. 37. Not all of these decisions r ef er expressly to the Act, but they are a ssumed to haYe been
made with reference to it, because they were r ender ed
subsequent to its adoption in the particular st ate- admittedly a somewhat dubious assumption.
It seems unnecessary for the author himself to undertake comments on the Act. The reader can interpret it
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equally well for himself through a comparison of its pro-

visions with the relevant rules of the Common Law as

set out in the preceding text. To facilitate this, the re-

lated sections of the Act are noted throughout the text.

The purpose of the Act is to procure uniformity of

rule and it should be so interpreted. (See sections 73
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and 74.)

equally well for himself through a comparison of its provisions with the relevant rules of the Common Law as
set out in the preceding text. To facilitate this, the related sections of the Act are noted throughout the text.
The purpose of the Act is to procure uniformity of
rule and it should be so interpreted. (See sections 73
and 74.)
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AN ACT TO MAKE UNIFORM THE LAW OF

SALES OF GOODS

PART I

Formation of the Contract

Section 1. — Contracts to Sell and Sales. — (1.) A con-

AN ACT TO MAKE UNIFORM THE LAW OF
SALES OF GOODS

tract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees

to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a con-

sideration called the price.

(2.) A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller

transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a con-

sideration called the price.

(3.) A contract to sell or a sale may be absolute or

PART I

conditional.

(4.) There may be a contract to sell or a sale between

one part owner and another.

FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT

Furnishing of food in a restaurant is not a "sale" either at com-

mon law or under the Act, Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314.

But compare, Friend v. Childs Co., Mass., 120 N. E. 407; Barring-

ton V. Hotel Astor, 171 N. Y. S. 840.
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"Passing of title (is) the cardinal difference between sale and

the relation of principal and factor." Act not mentioned. McGraw

V. Hanway, 120 Md. 197.

A "sale" requires "transfer of the general or absolute property as

distinguished from a special property." Act not mentioned. In re

Grand Union Co., (N. Y.) 219 Fed. 353.

Section 2. — Capacity — Liabilities for Necessaries. —

Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law

concerning capacity to contract, and to transfer and

acquire property.

Where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant,

or to a person who by reason of mental incapacity or

287

Section 1.-Contracts to Sell and Sales.-(1.) A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees
to tr an sf er the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
(2.) A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller
transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
( 3.) A contract to sell or a sale may be absolute or
conditional.
( 4.) There may be a contract to sell or a sale between
one part owner and another.
Furnishing of food in a restaurant is not a "sale" either at common law or under the Act, Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314.
But compare, Friend v. Childs Co., Mass., 120 N. E. 407; Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 171 N. Y. S. 840.
"Passing of title (is) the cardinal difference between sale and
the relation of principal and factor." Act not mentioned. McGraw
v. Hanway, 120 Md. 197.
A "sale" requires "transfer of the general or absolute property as
distinguished from a special property." Act not mentioned. In re
Grand Union Co., (N. Y.) 219 Fed. 353.

Section 2.-Capacity-Liabilities for Necessaries.Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law
concerning capacity to contract, and to transfer and
acquire property.
Where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant,
or to a person who by reason of mental incapacity or
287
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drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he must pay a

reasonable price therefor.

Necessaries in this section mean goods suitable to the

condition in life of such infant or other person, and to his

actual requirements at the time of delivery.

FOBMALITIES OF THE CONTRACT

Section 3. — Form of Contract or Sale. — Subject to the

provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf,

drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he must pay a
reasonable price therefor.
Necessaries in this section mean goods suitable to the
condition in life of such infant or other person, and to his
actual requirements at the time of delivery.

a contract to sell or a sale may be made in writing

(either with or without seal), or by word of mouth, or

FORMALITIES OF THE CONTRACT

partly in writing and partly by word of mouth, or may

be inferred from the conduct of the parties.

(See related provisions of the next section.)

Section 4. — Statute of Frauds. — (1.) A contract to sell

or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of

five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable

by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods

or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and
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actually receive the same, or give something in earnest

to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some

note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale

be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that

behalf.

Section 3.-Form of Contract or Sale.-Subject to the
provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf,
a contract to sell or · a sale may be made in writing
(either with or without seal), or by word of mouth, or
partly in writing and partly by word of mouth, or may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties.
(See related provisions of the next section.)

Adoption of the Act repealed the existing statute of frauds making

"void" sales of $50 or more in value. Eigen v. Rosolin, 85 N. J. L. 515.

A contract whereby the parties agree to purchase property jointly

from a third person and each to provide a part of the funds therefor

is not a "contract of sale", even though the goods are to be divided in

specie. There is a distinction between such agreements that the title

shall come to the parties jointly and contracts whereby one agrees to

take title himself and thereafter transfer an interest to the other.

Stock V. Roth Bros. Co., 162 Wis. 281.

When, under a single contract of sale in which the seller agrees

to buy back the goods, there is receipt and acceptance of the goods

by the buyer, the statute is so far satisfied that the buyer can enforce

the seller's agreement to buy back. Armstrong v. Orler, 220 Mass. 112.

Payment of part of price takes an oral contract out of the statute.

Meyer v. Shapton, 178 Mich. 417.

Section 4.-Statute of Frauds.-(1.) A contract to sell
or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of
five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable
by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods
or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and
actually receive the same, or give something in earnest
to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some
note or memorandum in writing· of the contract or sale
be signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that
behalf.
Adoption of the Act repealed the existing statute of frauds making
"void" sales of $50 or more in value. Eigen v. Rosolin, 85 N. J. L. 515.
A contract whereby the parties agree to purchase property jointly
from a third person and each to provide a part of the funds therefor
is not a "contract of sale", even though the goods are to be divid ed in
specie. There is a distinction between such agreements that the title
shall come to the partie s jointly and contracts whereby one agrees to
take title himself and thereaf'ter transfer an interest to the other.
Stock v. Roth Bros. Co., 162 Wis. 281.
When, under a single contract of sale in which the seller agrees
to buy back the goods, there is receipt and acceptance of the goods
by th e buye r , the sta tute is so far satisfied that the buyer can enforce
the sell er 's agr eement t o b uy ba le Armstrong v . Orler, 220 Mass . 112.
P ayment of part of pr ice t akes an oral contract out of the statute.
Mey r v. Sh apt on, 178 Mich . 417.
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The memorandum may consist of various papers connected by refer-

ence and "it matters not how informal or bunglingly constructed the

writing may be." Spiegel v. Lowenstein, 147 N. Y. S. 655.

The memorandum must show the agreement as entered into, with

all its terms and conditions. Bauman v. Mendell Lunepp Co., 153

N. Y. S. 896.

Action for purchase price of tar. Plaintiffs admitted that they had

agreed to furnish tar which should be satisfactory to highway com-

missioner. The written memorandum did not contain this provision.

Held, memorandum insuflEicient to satisfy the statute. Barrett Mfg.

Co. V. Ambrosio, Conn., 96 Atl. 930.

Printed signature, delivered by the defendant, is sufBcient. Goldo-

witz V. Kupfer & Co., 141 N. Y. S. 531.

Signature by agent in his own name is sufficient to bind his prin-

cipal. Hager v. Henneberger, 145 N. Y. S. 152.

A sale of corporate stock is within the statute. De Nunzio v. De-

Nunzio, 90 Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323.

Growing crops are within the statute. Willard v. Higdon, 123
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Md. 447.

Sale of a house, then a part of the realty, to be removed by the buyer.

Held, if title was to pass before severance it was a sale of realty, other-

wise of personalty. Fact that buyer is to do the severing is important

only in determining the intent as to when title was to pass. Held error

to exclude evidence as to such real intent. Wetkopski v. N. H. Gas

Co., 88 Conn. 1.

(2.) The provisions of this section apply to every

such contract or sale, notwithstanding the goods

may be intended to be delivered at some future time or

may not at the time of such contract or sale be actually

made, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for deliv-

ery, or some act may be requisite for the making or com-

pleting thereof, or rendering the same fit for dehvery;

but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller

especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to

others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the

provisions of this section shall not apply.

As to sale of wheat, etc., to be threshed, shucked, or gathered,

the Act changes the prior rule and such contracts are now within the

statute. Willard v. Higdon, 123 Md. 447.

A contract to manufacture a suit of clothes from cloth of a special

pattern is covered by the exception and need not be in writing.

Schneider v. Lezinsky, 162 N. Y. S. 769.

Sale of clothing to be made out of existing cloth held not within

the statute; the Act was not mentioned. Davis v. Blanchard, 138

N. Y. S. 202.

The memorandum may consist of various papers connected by reference and "it matters not how informal or bunglingly constructed the
writing may be." Spiegel v. Lowenstein, 147 N. Y. S. 655.
The memorandum must show the agreement as entered into, with
all its terms and conditions. Bauman v. Mendell Lunepp Co., 153
N. Y. S. 896.
Action for purchase p1·ice of tar. Plaintiffs admitted that they had
agreed to furnish tar which should be satisfactory to highway commissioner. The written memorandum did not contain this provision.
Held, memorandum insufficient to satisfy the statute. Barrett Mfg.
Co. v. Ambrosio, Conn., 96 Atl. 930.
Printed signature, delivered by the defendant, is sufficient. Goldowitz v. Kupfer & Co., 141 N. Y. S. 531.
Signature by agent in his own name is sufficient to bind his principal. Hager v. Henneberger, 145 N. Y. S. 152.
A sale of corporate stock is within the statute. De Nunzio v. DeNunzio, 90 Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323.
Growing crops are within the statute. Willard v. Higdon, 123
Md. 447.
Sale of a house, then a part of the realty, to be removed by the buyer.
Held, if title was to pass before severance it was a sale of realty, otherwise of personalty. Fact that buyer is to do the severing is important
only in determining the intent as to when title was to pass. Held error
to exclude evidence as to such real intent. Wetkopski v. N. H. Gas
Co., 88 Conn. 1.

(2.) The provisions of this section apply to every
such contract or sale, notwithstanding the goods
may be intended to be delivered at some future time or
may not at the time of such contract or sale be actually
made, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering· the same fit for delivery;
but if the goods are to be manufactured by the seller
especially for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the
provisions of this section shall not apply.
As to sale of wheat, etc., to be threshed, shucked, or gathered,
the Act changes the prior rule and such contracts are now within the
statute. Willard v. Higdon, 123 Md. 447.
A contract to manufacture a suit of clothes from cloth of a special
pattern is covered by the exception and need not be in writing.
Schneider v. Lezinsky, 162 N. Y. S. 769.
Sale of clothing to be made out of existing cloth held not within
the statute; the Act was not mentioned. Davis v. Blanchard, 138
N. Y. S. 202.
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(3.) There is an acceptance of goods within the mean-

ing of this section when the buyer, either before or after

delivery of the goods, expresses by words or conduct

his assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods.

Acceptance may precede delivery. Laundry Co. v. Whitmore, 92

UNIFORM SALES ACT

(3.) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the buyer, either before or after
delivery of the goods, expresses by words or conduct
his assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods.

0. S. 44, dictum.

The Act "seems to separate acceptance from receipt and provide

that the former requirement may be satisfied by words or conduct,

while the latter presupposes a delivery by the seller and requires some

intentional act of receipt on the part of the purchaser." But such

actual receipt, whether before or after the acceptance, is essential.

Friedman v. Pious, 158 Wis. 435.

Whether or not acceptance and receipt have taken place is a

question of fact for the jury. Laundry Co. v. Whitmore, 92 O. S. 44;

Friedman v. Pious, 158 Wis. 435, although the finding of the jury may

be reversed for lack of evidence.

Subject Matter of Contract

Section 5. — Existing and Future Goods. — (1.) The
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goods which form the subject of a contract to sell may

be either existing goods, 0"\vned or possessed by the

seller, or goods to be manufactured or acquired by the

seller after the making of the contract to sell, in this act

Ac ce 1~ t ance may precede delivery.
Laundry Co. v. Whitmore, 92
O. S. 44, dict um.
The Act "seems to separate acceptance from receipt and provide
that the former requirement may be satisfied by words or conduct,
whfle the latter presupposes a delivery by the seller and requires some
intentional act of receipt on the part of the purchaser." But such
actual receipt, whether before or after the acceptance, is essential.
Friedman v. Pious, 158 Wis. 435.
Whether or not acceptance and receipt have taken place is a
question of fact for the jury. Laundry Co. v. Whitmore, 92 0. S. 44;
Friedman v. Pious, 158 Wis. 435, although the finding of the jury may
be reversed for lack of evidence.

called ''future goods."

(2.) There may be a contract to sell goods, the acquisi-

tion of which by the seller depends upon a contingency

SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTRACT

which may or may not happen.

.

(3.) Where the parties purport to effect a present

sale of future goods, the agreement operates as a contract

to sell the goods.

Section 6. — Undivided Shr.res. — (1.) There may be a

contract to sell or a sale of an undivided share of goods.

If the parties intend to effect a j)reseiit sale, the buyer, by

force of the agreement, becomes an owner in common

with the owner or owners of the remaining shares.

(2.) In the case of fungible goods, there may be a

sale of an undivided share of a specific mass, though the

seller purports to sell and the buyer to buy a definite num-

Section 5.-Existing and Future Goods.-( 1.) The
goods which form the subject of a contract to sell may
be either existing goods, owned or possessed by the
seller, or goods to be manufactured or acquired by the
seller after the making of the contract to sell, in this act
called ''future goods.''
(2.) There may be a contract to sell goods, the acquisition of which by the seller depends upon a contingency
which may or may not happen.
( 3.) Where the parties purport to effect a present
sale of future goods, the agreement operates as a contract
to sell the goods.
Section 6.--Undivided Shrires.-( 1.) There may be a
contract to sell or a sale of an undivided share of good .
If the parties intend to effect a present sale, the buyer, by
for ·o f the agreem nt, becomes an owner in common
with tho owner or own rs of the r emaining shar es.
(2.) In tho raso of fungible goods, ther e may be a
sale of an undivid d share of a specific mass, though the
seller purpor ts to sell and the buyer to buy a definite numDI iti.l
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ber, weight or measure of the goods in the mass, and

though the number, weight or measure of the goods in the

mass is undetermined. By such a sale the buyer becomes

o\Mier in common of such a share of the mass as the

number, weight or measure bought bears to the numbrer,

weight or measure of the mass. If the mass contains less

than the number, weight or measure bought, the buyer

becomes the owner of the whole mass and the seller is

bound to make good the deficiency from similar goods

unless a contrary intent appears.

Section 7. — Destruction of Goods Sold. — (1.) Where

the parties purport to sell specific goods, and the goods

without the knowledge of the seller have wholly perished

at the time when the agreement is made, the agreement

is void.

ber, weight or measure of the goods in the mass, and
though the number, weight or measure of the goods in the
mass is undetermined. By such a sale the buyer becomes
owner in common of such a share of the mass as the
number, weight or measure bought bears to the num~e r,
weight or measure of the mass. If the mass contains less
than the number, weight or measure bought, the buyer
becomes the owner of the whole mass and the seller is
bound to make good the deficiency from similar goods
unless a contrary intent appears.

(2.) Where the parties purport to sell specific goods,

and the goods without the knowledge of the seller have

perished in part or have wholly or in a material part so
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deteriorated in quality as to be substantially changed in

character, the buyer may at his option treat the sale —

(a.) As avoided, or

(b.) As transferring the property in all of the exist-

ing goods or in so much thereof as have not deteriorated,

and as binding the buyer to pay the full agreed price if

the sale was indivisible, or to pay the agreed price for the

goods in which the property passes if the sale was

divisible.

Section 8. — Destruction of Goods Contracted to be

Sold. — (1.) Where there is a contract to sell specific

goods, and subsequently, but before the risk passes to the

buyer, without any fault on the part of the seller or the

buyer, the goods wholly perish, the contract is thereby

avoided.

(2.) W^here there is a contract to sell specific goods,

and subsequently, but before the risk passes to the buyer,

without any fault of the seller or the buyer, part of the

Section 7.-Destruction of Goods Sold.-(1.) Where
the parties purport to sell specific goods, and the goods
without the knowledge of the seller have wholly perished
at the time when the agreement is made, the agreement
is void.
( 2.) Where the parties purport to sell specific goods,
and the goods without the knowledge of the seller have
perished in pa1·t or have wholly or in a material part so
deteriorated in quality as to be substantially changed in
character, the buyer may at his option treat the sale( a.) As avoided, or
(b.) As transferring the property in all of the existing goods or in so much thereof as have not deteriorated,
and as binding the buyer to pay the full agreed price if
the sale was jndivisible, or to pay the agreed price for the
goods in which the property passes if the sale was
.divisible.
Section 8.-Destruction of Goods Contracted to be
Sold.-(1.) Where ther e is a contract to sell specific
goods, and subsequently, but before the risk passes to the
buyer, without any fault on the part of the seller or the
buyer, the goods wholly perish, the contract is thereby
avoided.
( 2.) Wher e there is a contract to sell specific goods,
and subsequently, but befor e the risk passes to the buyer,
without any fault of the seller or the buyer, part of the
Digitize- by

Origi al from

I TE NET ARCHIVE

UNIVERS TY OF CA I ORNIA

292
292 UNIFORM SALES ACT

goods perish, or the whole or a material part of the

goods so deteriorate in quality as to be substantially

changed in character, the buyer may at his option treat

the contract —

(a.) As avoided, or

(b.) As binding the seller to transfer the property in

all of the existing goods or in so much thereof as have not

deteriorated, and as binding the buyer to pay the full

agreed price if the contract was indivisible, or to pay the

agreed price for so much of the goods as the seller, by

the buyer's option, is bound to transfer if the contract

was divisible.

The Price

Section 9. — Definition and Ascertainment of Price. —

(1.) The price may be fixed by the contract, or may be

left to be fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it

may be determined by the course of dealing between the

parties.
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(2.) The price may be made payable in any personal

UNIFORM SALES ACT

goods perish, or the whole or a material part of the
goods so deteriorate in quality as to be substantially
changed in character, the buyer may at his option treat
the contract( a.) As a voided, or
(b.) As binding the seller to transfer the property in
all of the existing goods or in so much thereof as have not
deteriorated, and as binding the buyer to pay the full
agreed price if the contract was indivisible, or to pay the
agreed price for so much of the goods as the seller, by
the buyer's option, is bound to transfer if the contract
was divisible.

property.

(3.) Where transferring or promising to transfer any

interest in real estate constitutes the whole or part of the

consideration for transferring or for promising to trans-

fer the property in goods, this act shall not apply.

(4.) "VVliere the price is not determined in accordance

with the foregoing provisions the buyer must pay a rea-

sonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question

of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular

case.

Section 10. — Sale at a Valuation. — (1.) Where there

is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price or on

terms to be fixed by a third person, and such third person

without fault of the seller or the buyer, cannot or does

not fix the price or terms, the contract or the sale is there-

by avoided ; but if the goods or any part thereof have been

delivered to and appropriated by the buyer he must pay

a reasonable price therefor.

THE PRICE

Section 9.-Definition and Ascertainment of Price.( 1.) The price may be fixed by the contract, or may be
left to be fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it
may be determined by the course of dealing between the
parties.
( 2.) The price may be made payable in any personal
property.
(3.) Where transferring or promising to transfer any
interest in real estate constitutes the whole or part of the
consideration for transferring or for promising to transfer the property in goods, this act shall not apply.
( 4.) Where the price is not determined in accordance
with the foregoing provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question
of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular
case.
Section 10.-Sale at a Valuation.-(1.) Where there
is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price or on
terms to be fixed by a third person, and such third person
without fault of the seller or the buyer, cannot or does
not fix the price or terms, the contract or the sale is thereby avoided; but if the goods or any part thereof have been
delivered to and appropriated by the buyer he must pay
a reasonable price therefor.
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(2.) Where such third person is prevented from fix-

ing the price or terms by fault of the seller or the buyer,

the party not in fault may have such remedies against the

party in fault as are allowed by Parts IV and V of 'this

act.

Conditions and Warranties

Section 11.— Effect of Conditions.— (1.) Where the

293

(2.) Where such third person is prevented from fixing the price or terms by fault of the seller or the buyer,
the party not in fa ult may have such remedies against the
party in fault as are allowed by Parts IV and V of ..this
act.

obligation of either party to a contract to sell or a sale

CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES

is subject to any condition Avhich is not performed, such

party may refuse to proceed with the contract or sale or

he may waive performance of the condition. If the other

party has promised that the condition should happen or

be performed, such first mentioned party may also treat

the non-performance of the condition as a breach of

warranty.

Seller allowed to refuse delivery of current installments until

buyer had paid sums already due according to contract. Nat'l Contract-

ing Co. V. Vulcanite etc. Co., 192 Mass. 247.
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Sec. 11 (1). first part, applied, Brought v. Redewell Music Co., 17

Ariz. 393 ; Potter Press Co. v. Newark Daily etc. Co., 82 N. J. L. 671.

Seller is not in default until buyer has performed conditions prece-

dent to seller's liability. Murphy v. Moon Motor Car Co., 131 N. Y. S.

873.

(2.) Where the property in the goods has not passed,

the buyer may treat the fulfillment by the seller of his

obligation to furnish goods as described and as warranted

expressly or by implication in the contract to sell as a con-

dition of the obligation of the buyer to perform his

promise to accept and pay for the goods.

Whether or not buyer had reasonable time in which to test the

goods left to the jury. Fechteler v. Whittemore, 205 Mass. 6.

Description of cloth to be manufactured identifies the subject

matter of the contract and seller can not recover without proof that

he tendered cloth conforming to this description. This condition

precedent to recovery called a "warranty." Putnam-Hooker Co. v.

Hewins, 204 Mass. 426.

Section 12. — Definition of Express Warranty. — Any

afiirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating

to the goods is an express warranty if the natural

Section 11.-Effect of Conditions.-(1.) Where the
obligation of either party to a contract to sell or a sale
is subject to any condition which is not performed, such
party may refuse to proceed with the contract or sale or
he may waive performance of the condition. If the other
party has promised that the condition should happen or
be performed, such first mentioned party may also treat
the non-performance of the condition as a breach of
warranty.
Seller allowed to refuse delivery of current installments until
buyer had paid sums already due according to contract. Nat'l Contracting Co. v. Vulcanite etc. Co., 192 Mass. 247.
Sec. 11 (1), first part, applied, Brought v. Redewell Music Co., 17
Ariz. 393; Potter Press Co. v. Newark Daily etc. Co., 82 N. J. L. 671.
Seller is not in default until buyer has performed conditions prece·
dent to seller's liability. Murphy v. Moon Motor Car Co., 131 N. Y. S.
873.

(2.) Where the property in the goods has not passed,
the buyer may treat the fulfillment by the seller of his
obligation to furnish goods as described and as warranted
expressly or by implication in the contract to sell as a condition of the obligation of the buyer to perform his
promise to accept and pay for the goods.
Whether or not buyer had reasonable time in which to test the
g\lods left to the jury. Fechteler v. Whittemore, 205 Mass. 6.
Description of cloth to be manufactured identifies the subject
matter of the contract and seller can not recover without proof that
he tendered cloth conforming to this description. This condition
precedent to recovery called a "warranty." Putnam-Hooker Co. v.
Hewins, 204 Mass. 426.

Section 12.-Definition of Express Warranty.-Any
affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller r elating
to the goods is an express warranty if the natural
Origiral fr m
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tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases
the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value
of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty!!

tendency of such afifirmation or promise is to induce the

buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases

the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value

of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a state-

ment of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a

warranty^

Section 13. — Implied Warranties of Title. — ^In a con-

tract to sell or a sale, unless a contrary intention appears,

there is —

(1.) An implied warranty on the part of the seller

that in case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods

Section 13.-Implied Warranties of Title.-In a contract to sell or a sale, unless a contrary intention appears,
there is(1.) An implied warranty on the part of the seller
that in case of a sale he has a right to sell the goods
at the time when the property is to pass;
(2.) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have
and enjoy quiet possession of the goods as against any
lawful claims existing at the time of the sale;
(3.) An implied warranty that the goods shall be
free at the time of the sale from any charge or encumbrance in favor of any third person, not declared or
known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract or sale is made.
( 4.) This section shall not, however, be held to render liable a sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee, or other person professing to sell by virtue of authority in fact or
law, goods in which a third person has a legal or equitable interest.

at the time when the property is to pass ;

(2.) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have

and enjoy quiet possession of the goods as against any

lawful claims existing at the time of the sale;

(3.) An implied warranty that the goods shall be

free at the time of the sale from any charge or encum-

brance in favor of any third person, not declared or
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known to the buyer before or at the time when the con-

tract or sale is made.

(4.) This section shall not, however, be held to ren-

der liable a sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee, or other per-

son professing to sell by virtue of authority in fact or

law, goods in which a third person has a legal or equit-

able interest.

Followed, Hartley v. Rotman, 200 Mass. 372.

An outstanding mortgage of which buyer knows is not a breach

of implied warranty of title; Act not mentioned. Dreisbach v. Eckel-

kamp, 82 N. J. L. 726.

Warranty of title is not negatived by seller's lack of possession.

Kirkpatrick v, Kepler, 164 Wis. 558.

Section 14. — Implied Warranty in Sale by Description.

— Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by

description, there is an implied warranty that the goods

shall correspond with the description and if the contract

or sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not

sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the

Followed, Hartley v. Rotman, 200 Mass. 372.
An outstanding mortgage of which buyer knows is not a breach
ot implied warranty of title; Act not mentioned. Dreisbach v. Eckelkamp, 82 N. J. L. 726.
Warranty of title is not negatived by seller's lack of possession.
Kirkpatrick v, Kepler, 164 Wis. 558.

Section 14.-Implied Warranty in Sale by Description.
-Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by
description, there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall correspond with the description and if the contract
or sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not
ufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the
DI
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sample if the goods do not also correspond with the de-

scription.

295

sample if the goods do not also correspond with the description.

The warranty implied from description may be negatived by

express statement that there is no warranty; also by a known custom

among dealers to refuse a warranty. Ross v. Northrup & Co., 156

Wis. 327.

Declared to be a mere codification of the common law, Lissberger

V. Kellogg, 78 N. J. L. 85.

Section 15.~Implied Warranties of Quality.— Subject

to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that

behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to

The warranty implied from description may be negatived by
express statement that there is no warranty; also by a known cu2tom
among dealers to refuse a warranty. Ross v. Northrup & Co., 156
Wis. 327.
Declared to be a mere codification of the common law, Lissberger
v. Kellogg, 78 N. J, L. 85,

the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods

supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as

follows :

(1.) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,

makes known to the seller the particular purpose for

which the goods are required, and it appears that the

buyer rehes on the seller's skill or judgment (whether
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he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an

implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit

for such purpose.

(2.) Where the goods are bought by description from

a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether

he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an

implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchant-

able quality.

(3.) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is

no implied warranty as regards defects which such exam-

ination ought to have revealed.

(4.) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a

specified article under its patent or other trade name,

there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any

particular purpose.

(5.) An implied warranty or condition as to quality

or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by

the usage of trade.

(6.) An express warranty or condition does not nega-

Section 15.-Implied Warranties of Quality.-Subject
to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that
behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to
the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as
follows:
( 1.) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purpose.
(2.) Where the goods are bought by description from
a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
( 3.) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is
no implied warranty as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
( 4.) In the case of a con tract to sell or a sale of a
specified article under its patent or other trade name,
there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any
particular purpose.
(5.) An implied warranty or condition as to quality
or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by
the usage of trade.
(6.) An express warranty or condition does not negaDig trz
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tive a warranty or condition implied under this act un-

less inconsistent therewith.

(1.) Followed and applied, Brought v. Redewill Music Co., 17

tive a warranty or condition implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith.

Ariz. 393.

(1.) There is an implied warranty that a machine built for a

special purpose will do the work expected of it. Act not mentioned.

Kelsey v. J. W. Ringrose Co., 152 Wis. 499.

A warranty of quality may be implied by custom even when the

sale is of specific articles. Proctor v. Atlantic Fish Co., 208 Mass. 351.

(1.) (3.) One who bought chops from a butcher, allowing the

butcher to select them, held to have so relied on the seller's knowledge

as to raise an implied warranty of their fitness for food. Gearing v.

Berkson, 223 Mass. 257.

(6.) Accord, warranty of merchantability implied; Act not men-

tioned. Wolverine Spice Co. v. Fallow, 182 Mich. 361.

(1.) There is no implied warranty of fitness in a sale of specific

goods by one dealer in meats to another such dealer. Baker v.

Kamantowsky, 188 Mich. 589.
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Followed, Pentland v. Jacobson, 189 Mich. 339.

(4.) Sale of coal under a trade name does not imply any fitness

for purpose for which seller is aware that buyer intends it. Based

on common law as well as Act. Quemahoning Coal Co. v. Sanitary

etc. Co., 88 N. J. L. 174.

The furnishing of food in a restaurant is not a "sale" and therefore

sec. 15 of the Act does not apply. Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314.

There is no implied warranty of fitness for purpose where article

is specific and parties deal on equal terms; Act not mentioned. Com-

mercial Realty Co v. Dorsey, 114 Md. 172.

(1.) Seller of ice cream held impliedly to have warranted it fit

for consumption. Race v. Krum, 147 N. Y. S. 818.

Sale of a stallion for breeding purposes; seller not himself a

breeder of horses. Held, no implied warranty of fitness; Act not

mentioned. Thompson v. Miser, 82 O. S. 289.

Sale of preserve jar caps under trade name of "Sure-Seal" does not

imply any warranty of fitness for known purpose. Sure Seal Co. v.

Loeber, 157 N. Y. S. 327.

"Gasoline" is a generic name and a sale thereof does not negative

an implied warranty of fitness. Berry v. Wadhams Oil Co., 156

Wis. 588.

Sale of vacuum cleaners under a trade name gives rise to no

implied warranty of fitness. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Wisconsin etc. Co., 161

Wis. 632.

Sale by Sample

Section 16. — Implied Warranties in Sale by Sample. —

Tn the case of a contract to sell or a sale by sample :

(1.) Followed and applied, Brought v. Redewill Music Co., 17
Ariz. 393.
(1.) There is an implied warranty that a machine built for a
special purpose will do the work expected of it. Act not mentioned.
Kelsey v. J. W. Ringrose Co., 152 Wis. 499.
A warranty of quality may be implied by custom even when the
sale is of specific articles. Proctor v. Atlantic Fish Co., 208 Mass. 351.
(1.)
(3.) One who bought chops from a butcher, allowing the
butcher to select them, held to have so relied on the seller's knowledge
as to raise an implied warranty of their fitness for food. Gearing v.
Berkson, 223 Mass. 257.
(6.) Accord, warranty of merchantability implied; Act not mentioned. Wolverine Spice Co. v. Fallow, 182 Mich. 361.
(1.) There is no implied warranty of fitness in a sale of specific
goods by one dealer in meats to another such dealer. Baker v.
Kamantowsky, 188 Mich. 589.
Followed, Pentland ,v. Jacobson, 189 Mich. 339.
( 4.) Sale of coal under a trade name does not imply any fitness
for purpose for which seller is aware that buyer intends it. Based
on common law as well as Act. Quemahoning Coal Co. v. Sanitary
etc. Co., 88 N. J. L. 174.
The furnishing of food in a restaurant is not a "sale" and therefore
sec. 15 of the Act does not apply. Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314.
There is no implied warranty of fitness for purpose where article
is specific and parties deal on equal terms; Act not mentioned. Commercial Realty Co v. Dorsey, 114 Md. 172.
(1.) Seller of ice cream held impliedly to have warranted it fit
for consumption. Race v. Krum, 147 N. Y. S. 818.
Sale of a stallion for breeding purposes; seller not himself a
breeder of horses. Held, no implied warranty of fitness; Act not
mentioned. Thompson v. Miser, 82 0. S. 289.
Sale of preserve jar caps under trade name of "Sure-Seal" does not
imply any warranty of fitness for known purpose. Sure Seal Co. v.
Loeber, 157 N. Y. S. 327.
"Gasoline" is a generic name and a sale thereof does not negative
an implied warranty of fitness. Berry v. Wadhams Oil Co., 156
Wis. 588.
Sale of vacuum cleaners under a trade name gives rise to no
implied warranty of fitness. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Wisconsin etc. Co., 161
Wis. 632.

SALE BY SAMPLE

ecti n 16.-lmplied Warranties in Sale by Sample.ln the case of a contract to sell or a sale by sample:
1
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(a) There is an implied warranty that the bulk shall

correspond with the sample in quality.

(b) There is an implied warranty that the buyer

shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the

bulk with the sample, except so far as otherwise pro-

vided in section 47 (3).

(c) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind,

there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be

free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable

which would not be apparent on reasonable examination

of the sample.

(c.) Followed, on common law authority, West End Mfg. Co. v.

Warren Co., 198 Mass. 320.

Applied, Gascoigne v. Cary Brick Co., 217 Mass. 302.

Promise of seller to furnish goods like sample called an "implied"

warranty that they should be like sample. Borden v. Fine, 212

Mass. 425.

Inference that goods corresponding to sample were promised by

(a) There is an implied warranty that the bulk shall
correspond with the sample in quality.
(b) There is an implied warranty that the buyer
shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing 'the
bulk with the sample, except so far as otherwise provided in section 47 ( 3).
( c) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind,
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable
which would not be apparent on reasonable examination
of the sample.
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seller held negatived by other circumstances of the agreement. Andro-

vette V. Parks, 207 Mass. 86.

Sale of potatoes "like sample". Bulk of the potatoes were in fact

like sample, but sample itself was unmarketable, although this was not

discernible by the buyer on ordinary inspection. Held, breach of implied

warranty of merchantability. Steward v. Voll & Son, 81 N. J. L. 323.

Sale of "pussy willow" satin, "as is," "like sample". Goods delivered

were not like sample. Held term "as is" was not inconsistent with

"like sample" and there was a breach of obligation. Schwartz v. Kohn,

155 N. Y. S. 547.

PART II

Transfee of Peoperty as Between Sellee and Buyer

Section 17.— No Property Passes Until Goods are

Ascertained. — Where there is a contract to sell unas-

certained goods no property in the goods is transferred

to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained,

but property in an undivided share of ascertained goods

may be transferred as provided in section 6.

The goods sold may be ascertained by linear delimitation on a

larger mass even though there be no physical separation. Carroll v.

Haskins, 212 Mass. 593.

Title to such part of goods contracted for as is specific passes at

(c.) Followed, on common law authority, West End Mfg. Co. v.
Warren Co., 198 Mass. 320.
Applied, Gascoigne v. Cary Brick Co., 217 Mass. 302.
Promise of seller to furnish goods like sample called an "implied"
warranty that they should be like sample. Borden v. Fine, 212
Mass. 425.
Inference that goods corresponding to sample were promised by
seller held negatived by other circumstances of the agreement. Androvette v. Parks, 207 Mass. 86.
Sale of potatoes "like sample". Bulk of the potatoes were in fact
like sample, but sample itself was unmarketable, although this was not
discernible by the buyer on ordinary inspection. Held, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability. Steward v. Voll & Son, 81 N. J. L. 323.
Sale of "pussy willow" satin, "as is," "like sample". Goods delivered
were not like sample. Held term "as is" was not inconsistent with
"like sample" and there was a breach of obligation. Schwartz v. Kohn,
155 N. Y. &. 641.

PART II
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AS BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER

Section 17.-No Property Passes Until Goods are
Ascertained.-Where there is a contract to sell unascertained goods no property in the goods is transferred
to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained,
but property in an undivided share of ascertained goods
may be transferred as provided in section 6.
The goods sold may be ascertained by linear delimitation on a
larger mass even though there be no physical separation. Carroll v.
Haskins, 212 Mass. 593.
Title to such part of goods contracted for as is specific passes at
y
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once; title to such part as is not specific does not pass until speciflca-

tion. Bondy v. Hardina, 216 Mass. 44.

once; title to such part as is not specific does not pass until specUlc&·
tion. Bondy v. Hardina, 216 Mass. 44.

Section 18. — Property in Specific Goods Passes When

Parties so Intend. — (1.) Where there is a contract to

sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is

transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to

the contract intend it to be transferred.

(2.) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of

the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the con-

tract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade and the

circumstances of the case.

"The words, 'I hereby transfer my full right of ownership of

* * * ', would not be conclusive of the title in the defendant in eiror

even if they were unqualified; because their effect must be determined

by the intention of the parties as disclosed by a consideration of all

the facts and circumstances of the transaction." Piano Co. v. Piano

Co., 85 O. S. 196.

In Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523,
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property described as "all my hay except 30 tons" was held "specific

Section 18.-Property in Specific Goods Passes When
Parties so lntend.-(1.) Where there is a contract to
sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is
transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to
the contract intend it to be transferred.
(2.) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of
the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade and the
circumstances of the case.

and ascertained" within the meaning of this section — a somewhat sur-

prising use of the terms.

Seller's intent to pass title is as essential as buyer's intent to

receive it. Atlantic Bldg. Supp. Co. v. Vulcanite etc. Co., 203 N. Y.

133, 96 N. E. 370.

Applied, White v. Lansing Chem. Co., 92 Conn. 186; Dinsmore v.

Maag-Wohmann Co., 122 Md. 177; Wilson v. International Ry. Co.,

160 N. Y. S. 367.

Section 19. — Rules for Ascertaining Intention. — Unless

a different intention appears, the following are rules for

ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time

at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer.

Rule 1. — ^Where there is an unconditional contract to

sell specific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in

the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made

and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or

the time of delivery, or both, be postponed.

"It may be conceded that as between the parties where there has

been a sale of specific goods, and especially where the price has been

paid, the title will pass without a delivery of the goods." Piano Co,

V. Piano Co.. 85 O. S. 196.

"The words, 'I hereby transfer my full right of ownership of
• • • ', would not be conclusive of the title in the defendant in error
even if they were unqualified; because their effect must be determined
by the intention of the parties as disclosed by a consideration of all
the facts and circumstances of the transaction." P.i ano Co. v. Piano
Co., 85 0. S. 196.
In Cassinelli v. Humphrey Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523,
property described as "all my hay except 30 tons" was held "specific
and ascertained" within the meaning of this section-a somewhat surprising use of the terms.
Seller's intent to pass title is as essential as buyer's intent to
receive it. Atlantic Bldg. Supp. Co. v. Vulcanite etc. Co., 203 N. Y.
133, 96 N. E. 370.
Applied, White v. Lansing Chem. Co., 92 Conn. 186; Dinsmore v.
Maag-Wohmann Co., 122 Md. 177; Wilson v. International Ry. Co.,
160 N. Y. S. 367.

Section 19.-Rules for Ascertaining Intention.-Unless
a different intention appears, the following are rules for
ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time
at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer.
Rule 1.-Where there is an unconditional contract to
sell sp cific goods, in a deliverable state, the property in
the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made
and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or
the time of delivery, or both, be postponed.
"It may be conceded that as between the parties where there has
been a sale of specific goods, and especially where the price has been
paid, the title will pass without a delivery of the goods." Piano Co.
v. Piano Co., 85 0. S. 196.
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Recognized as rules of presumption only, Cassinelli v. Humphrey

Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523.

Title does not pass if anything remains to be done by the seller

to ascertain the total price, Elder v. Insurance Co., 206 111. App. 172.

299

Recognized as rules of presumption only, Cassinelli v. Humphrey
Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523.
Title does not pass if anything remains to be done by the seller
to ascertain the total price, Elder v. Insurance Co., 206 Ill. App. 172.

Rule 2. — Where there is a contract to sell specific goods

~
and the seller is bound to do something to the goods, for

the purpose of putting them into a dehverable state, the

property does not pass until such thing be done.

Automatic Co. v. Automatic Co., 208 Mass. 252, 94 N. E. 462, sale

of "specific goods" to be completed. Held, no title passed till com-

pletion, despite words of present sale. Provision of Act said to be

an enactment of the common law. Distinguishes prior cases wherein

Rule 2.-Where there is a contract to sell specific goods
and the seller is bound to do something to the goods, for
the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the
property does not pass until such thing be done.

evident intent was to sell goods in unfinished state, with a collateral

contract to complete them.

Title does not pass if something remains to be done by seller

to ascertain total price, Elder v. Ins. Co., 206 111. Ap. 172.

A rule of presumption only, Wright v. Frank A. Andrews Co.,

212 Mass. 186, 98 N. E. 798.
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It will be noted that the Act does not state any presumption as aris-

ing from fact that seller has reserved right to measure goods to de-

termine total price. In this respect it differs from the English Sales

Act. The draftsman of the American Act, Mr. Samuel Williston, is of

opinion that the presumption of intent not to pass title in such case

is irrational and unsound. The Act is, therefore, probably intended to

exclude such a presumption. No court has passed on it to the writer's

knowledge. The nearest approach is Elder v. Insurance Co., 206 111.

Ap. 172, which rather confusedly lays down the common law presump-

tion as dictum, but does not refer to the Act.

Rule 3. — (1.) When goods are delivered to the buyer

'*on sale or return," or on other terms indicating an in-

tention to make a present sale, but to give the buyer an

option to return the goods instead of paying the price,

the property passes to the buyer on delivery, but he may

revest the property in the seller by returning or tendering

the goods within the time fixed in the contract, or, if no

time has been fixed, within a reasonable time.

Declaratory of the common law. Geo. A. Ohl & Co. v. Barnet Co.,

88 N. J. L. 45, 93 Atl. 715.

Does not apply where there is no contract of sale at all, but delivery

of possession is made only with the idea of eventually negotiating

a sale, Fox v. Proctor, 145 N. Y. S. 709, 160 App. Div. 12.

Applied, Siegel v. Union Ass. Co., 152 N. Y. S. 662, 90 Miscl. 550.

Automatic Co. v. Automatic Co., 208 Mass. 252, 94 N. E. 462, sale
of "specific goods" to be completed. Held, no title passed till completion, despite words of present sale. Provision of Act said to be
an enactment of the common law. Distinguishes prior cases wherein
evident intent was to sell goods in unfinished state, with a collateral
contract to complete them.
Title does not pass if something remains to be done by seller
to ascertain total price, Elder v. Ins. Co., 206 Ill. Ap. 172.
A rule of presumption only, Wright v. Frank A. Andrews Co.,
212 Mass. 186, 98 N. E. 798.
It will be noted that the Act does not state any presumption as arising from fact that seller has reserved right to measure goods to determine total price. In this respect it differs from the English Sales
Act. The draftsman of the American Act, Mr. Samuel Williston, is of
opinion that the presumption of intent not to pass title in such case
is irrational and unsound. The Act is, therefore, probably intended to
exclude such a presumption. No court has passed on it to the writer's
knowledge. The nearest approach is Elder v. Insurance Co., 206 Ill.
Ap. 172, which rather confusedly lays down the common law presumption as dictum, but does not refer to the Act.
'

Rule 3.-( 1.) When goods are delivered to the buyer
''on sale or return,'' or on other terms indicating an intention to make a present sale, but to give the buyer an
option to return the goods instead of paying the price,
the property passes to the buyer on delivery, but he may
revest the property in the seller by returning or tendering
the goods within the time fixed in the contract, or, if no
time has been fixed, within a reasonable time.
Declaratory of the common law. Geo. A. Ohl & Co. v. Barnet Co.,
88 N. J. L. 45, 93 Atl. 715.
Does not apply where there is no contract of sale at all, but delivery
ot possession is made only with the idea of eventually negotiating
a sale, Fox v. Proctor, 145 N. Y. S. 709, 160 App. Div. 12.
Applied, Siegel v. Union Ass. Co., 152 N. Y. S. 662, 90 Misc!. 550.
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(2.) When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or on trial or on satisfaction, or other similar
terms, the property therein passes to the buyer( a.) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to
the seller or does any other act adopting the transaction;
(b.) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance
to the seller, but retains the goods without giving notice
of rejection, then if a time has been fixed for the return
of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no
time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable
time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.

(2.) When goods are delivered to the buyer on ap-

proval or on trial or on satisfaction, or other similar

terms, the property therein passes to the buyer —

(a.) "When he signifies his approval or acceptance to

the seller or does any other act adopting the transac-

tion;

(b.) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance

to the seller, but retains the goods without giving notice

of rejection, then if a time has been fixed for the return

of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no

time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable

time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.

Applied, Emery Thompson Co. v. Graves, Conn., 98 Atl. 331; Rice

V. Dinsmore, 124 Md. 276, 92 Atl. 847; Dinsmore v. Rice, 128 Md. 209,

97 Atl. 537.

Rule 4. — (1.) Where there is a contract to sell unas-

certained or future goods by description, and goods of

that description and in a dehverable state are uncondi-
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tionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller

with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the

assent of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon

Applied, Emery Thompson Co. v. Graves, Conn., 98 Atl. 331; Rice
v. Dinsmore, 124 Md. 276, 92 Atl. 847; Dinsmore v. Rice, 128 Md. 209,
97 Atl. 537.

passes to the buyer. Such assent may be expressed or

implied, and may be given either before or after the

appropriation is made.

The word "appropriate", as here used undoubtedly connotes in-

Rule 4.-(1.) Where there is a contract to sell unascertained or future g·oods by description, and goods of
that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller
with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the
assent of the seller, the property in the goods thereupon
passes to the buyer. Such assent may be expressed or
implied, and may be given either before or after the
appropriation is made.

tent to pass the title as well as intent to identify property to which

the contract is to apply. The section, therefore, does not offer any

solution of the question as to when such intent may be assumed

to exist.

Title does not pass to unascertained goods. Chandler etc. Co. v.

Shea, 213 Mass. 398, 100 N. E. 663; Bondy v. Hardina, 216 Mass. 44,

102 N. E. 935.

The seller must intend to pass title as well as the buyer to take

it. Atlantic Bldg. Supp. Co. v. Vulcanite etc. Co., 203 N. Y. 133,

96 N. E. 370.

(2.) Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell, the

seller delivers the goods to the buyer, or to a carrier or

other bailee (whether named by the buyer or not) for the

purpose of transmission to or holding for the buyer, he

The word "appropriate", as here used undoubtedly connotes in·
tent to pass the title as well as intent to identify property to which
the contract is to apply. The section, therefore, does not offer any
solution of the question as to when such intent may be assumed
to exist.
Title does not pass to unascertained goods. Chandler etc. Co. v.
Shea, 213 Mass. 398, 100 N. E. 663; Bondy v. Hardina, 216 Mass. 44,
102 N. E. 935.
The seller must intend to pass title as well as the buyer to take
it. Atlantic Bldg. Supp. Co. v. Vulcanite etc. Co., 203 N. Y. 133,
96 N. E. 370.

Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell, the
sell r delivers the goods to the buyer, or to a carrier or
othr r b ile (whrth r nam d b. th bu. r or not) for the
purpos f tnrn . mj. ion to or holding f r the buyer, he
(2.)
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is presumed to have unconditionally appropriated the

goods to the contract, except in the cases provided for in

the next rule and in section 20. This presumption is ap-

plicable, although by the terms of the contract, the buyer

is to pay the price before receiving delivery of the goods,

and the goods are marked with the words ''collect on

delivery ' ' or their equivalents.

Title passed on delivery to the carrier, Engemann v. D. L. & W.

R. R., 88 N. J. L. 45, 97 Atl. 152; State v. Buyer, 93 O. S. 72, 112

N. E. 197.

Buyer is liable in case of loss, "not only on general principles of

is presumed to have unconditionally appropriated the
goods to the contract, except in the cases provided for in
the next rule and in section 20. This pre umption is applicable, although by the t erms of the contract, the buyer
is to pay the price before receiving delivery of the goods,
and the goods are marked with the words "collect on
delivery'' or their equivalents.

law, but under Sales Law, sec. 127," Schanz v. Bramwell, 143 N. Y.

S. 1057.

Goods not conforming to the contract were delivered to the carrier

and rejected by the buyer. Held "title never passed to" buyer and

he was not responsible for their safe return to seller, Dube v. Liberty

Clothing Co., 153 N. Y. S. 577, 91 Miscl. 64.

Seller can not after delivery to carrier, by changing consign-
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ment, retake title. McCollom v. Minn. etc. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 435,

139 N. W. 1129.

Delivery to a local express company named by buyer held to pass

title. Levy v. Radkay, 233 Mass. 29, 123 N. E. 97.

Title to goods, not identified at the making of the contract, was

held to have passed to the buyer through the seller's delivery to

a carrier, notwithstanding that the buyer had "attempted to repudi-

ate" the contract before shipment. Home Pattern Co. v. Mertz, 88

Conn. 22, 90 Atl. 33. This is utterly inconsistent with the rule that title

will not pass without buyer's consent. See discussion in text of seller's

right of action for purchase price.

In sale of oil to be manufactured, held that title passed on

delivery into cars furnished by buyer even though seller then con-

signed the cars to other persons. Held also that title passed when

oil was placed in seller's own tanks, contract providing that if buyer

failed to provide cars, seller should place the oil in its tanks for

buyer. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 176 N. Y. S. 169.

Rule 5. — If the contract to sell requires the seller to

deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular place,

or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the

buyer, or to a particular place, the property does not

pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or

reached the place agreed upon.

Goods were sold at a stated price "less freight". Buyer refused to

accept goods which were shipped freight collect. Action to recover

Title passed on delivery to the carrier, Engemann v. D. L. & W.
R. R., 88 N. J. L. 45, 97 Atl. 152; State v. Buyer, 93 0. S. 72, 112
N. E . 197.
Buyer is liable in case of loss, "not only on general principles of
law, but under Sales Law, sec. 127," Schanz v. Bramwell, 143 N. Y.
s. 1057.
Goods not conforming to the contract were delivered to the carrier
and rejected by the buyer. Held "title never passed to" buyer and
he was not responsible for their safe return to seller, Dube v. Liberty
Clothing Co., 153 N. Y. S. 577, 91 Misc!. 64.
Seller can not after delivery to carrier, by changing consignment, retake title. McCollom v. Minn. etc. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 435,
139 N. W. 1129.
Delivery to a local express company named by buyer held to pass
title, Levy v. Radkay, 233 Mass. 29, 123 N. E. 97.
Title to goods, not identified at the making of the contract, was
held to have passed to the buyer through the seller's delivery to
a carrier, notwithstanding that the buyer had "attempted to repudiate" the contract before shipment. Home Pattern Co. v. Mertz, 88
Conn. 22, 90 Atl. 33. This is utterly inconsistent with the rule that title
will not pass without buyer's consent. See discussion in text of seller's
right of action for purchase price.
In sale of oil to be manufactured, held that title passed on
delivery into cars furnished by buyer even though seller then consigned the cars to other persons. Held also that title passed when
oil was placed in seller's own tanks, contract providing that if buyer
failed to provide cars, seller should place the oil in its tanks for
buyer. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 176 N. Y. S. 169.

Rule 5.-If the contract to sell requires the seller to
deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular place,
or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the
buyer, or to a particular place, the property does not
pass until the goods have been delivered to the buyer or
reached the place agreed upon.
Goods were sold at a stated price "less freight" . Buyer refused to
accept goods which were shipped freight collect. Action to recover
by

I TERNET ARCHIVE

Or1g1 al from

UNIVERS TY OF CA IFORNIA

302

UNIFORM SALES ACT

302 UNIFORM SALES ACT

contract price. Held title had passed to buyer because "while the

amount undoubtedly measured what the buyer would have to pay for

carriage, the stipulation could be found to have been intended by the

parties as a discount from the seller's regular prices, and not as a

prepayment of the freight. The question was one of fact." Twitchell-

Champlin Co. v. Radowsky, 207 Mass. 72.

Whether or not the seller is to deliver to a particular place

and who is to pay the freight are questions for the jury, Engeman v.

D. L. & W. R. R., 88 N. J. L. 45, 97 Atl. 152.

Garven v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 210 Mass. 275, title still in seller

so that he could sue carrier for negligence, despite delivery to carrier

and taking of bill of lading in buyer's name, because seller had obli-

gated himself to deliver to buyer. See also, Barrie v. Quimby, 206

Mass. 259, 92 N. E. 451.

Helbum Leather Co. v. Stone, 205 111. App. 347, title held to have

passed to buyer on arrival of goods in the city named as place of

delivery, without actual delivery of possession to buyer by the

carrier.
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Fact that carrier got its boat with the goods aboard to buyer's

dock but was unable to land because dock was already occupied,

did not constitute a delivery so as to make buyer liable for loss,

Westmoreland Coal Co v. Syracuse Ltg. Co., 145 N. Y. S. 420, 159

App. Div. 323.

Delivery to an express company is not delivery to the buyer under

this section, Hauptman v. Miller, 157 N. Y. S. 1104, 94 Miscl. 266,

and seller can sue the express company, Conroy v. Barrett, 158 N. Y. S.

549, 95 Miscl. 247.

Plaintiff sold codfish to defendant "C. I. F." — which was interpreted

to mean that the agreed price covered cost of transportation and in-

surance. Plaintiff took out bill of lading in his own name. Held, fact

that seller was to insure was evidence of the "different intention"

referred to in §19, and title passed despite seller's obligation to pay

freight. Smith Co. v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, 110 Atl, 94, 10 A. L. R. 697.

Section 20. — Reservation of Right of Possession or

Property When Goods Are Shipped.

(1.) Where there is a contract to sell specific goods,

or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the

contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract or

appropriation, reserve the right of possession or prop-

erty in the goods until certain conditions have been ful-

filled. The right of possession or property may be thus

reserved notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to.

contract price. Held title had passed to buyer because "while the
amount undoubtedly measured what the buyer would have to pay for
carriage, the stipulation could be found to have been intended by the
parties as a discount from the seller's regular prices, and not as a
prepayment of the freight. The question was one of fact." TwitchellChamplin Co. v. Radowsky, 207 Mass. 72.
Whether or not the seller is to deliver to a particular place
and who is to pay the freight are questions for the jury, Engeman v.
D. L. & W. R. R., 88 N. J. L. 45, 97 AU. 152.
Garven v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 210 Mass. 275, title still in seller
so that he could sue carrier for negligence, despite delivery to carrier
and taking of bill of lading in buyer's name, because seller had obligated himself to deliver to buyer. See also, Barrie v. Quimby, 206
Mass. 259, 92 N. E. 451.
Helbum Leather Co. v. Stone, 205 Ill. App. 347, title held to have
passed to buyer on arrival of goods in the city named as place of
delivery, without actual delivery of possession to buyer by the
carrier.
Fact that carrier got its boat with the goods aboard to buyer's
dock but was unable to land because dock was already occupied,
did not constitute a delivery so as to make buyer liable for loss,
Westmoreland Coal Co v. Syracuse Ltg. Co., 145 N. Y. S. 420, 159
App. Div. 323.
Delivery to an express company is not delivery to the buyer under
this section, Hauptman v. Miller, 157 N. Y. S. 1104, 94 Miscl. 266,
and seller can sue the express company, Conroy v. Barrett, 158 N. Y. S.
549, 95 Miscl. 247.
Plaintiff sold codfish to defendant "C. I. F."-which was interpreted
to mean that the agreed price covered cost of transportation and insurance. Plaintiff took out bill of lading in his own name. Held, fact
that seller was to insure was evidence of the "different intention"
referred to in §19, and title passed despite seller's obligation to pay
freight. Smith Co. v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107, 110 AU. 94, 10 A. L. R. 697.

the buyer or to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose

of transmission to the buyer.

Section 20.-Reservation of Right of Possession or

Property When Goods Are Shipped.
Where there is a contract to sell specific goods,
or where goods are subsequently appropriated to the
contract, the seller may, by the terms of the contract or
appropriation, reserve the right of possession or property in the goods until certain conditions have been fulfill d. The right of possession or property may be thus
rescrv d notwithstanding the delivery of the goods to .
th buy r r to a arri r or other bailee for the purpose
of transmi sion to the buyer.
( 1.)
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(2.) Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of

lading the goods are deliverable to the seller or his agent,

or to the order of the seller or of his agent, the seller

thereby reserves the property in the goods. But if, except

for the form of the bill of lading, the property would

have passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the

seller 's property in the goods shall be deemed to be only

for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer

of his obligations under the contract.

(3.) "Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of

lading the goods are deliverable to the order of the

buyer or of his agent, but possession of the bill of lading

is retained by the seller or his agent, the seller thereby

reserves a right to the possession of the goods as against

the buyer.

If sale is of specific goods title passes before shipment and a

subsequent taking of bill of lading in seller's name "can not reserve

a title," but only "the jus disponendi." Even a real reservation of
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"title" by taking bill of lading in seller's name puts the risk of

loss on the buyer, because of section 22 of the Act, read in connection

with section 20. Alderman Bros. Co. v. Westinghouse etc. Co., 92

Conn. 419, 103 Atl. 267.

Plaintiff, as seller, had shipped melons according to contract, f. o. b.

place of shipment, bill of lading making them deliverable to himself.

( 2.) Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of
lading the goods are deliverable to the seller or his agent,
or to the order of the seller or of his agent, the seller
thereby reserves the property in the goods. But if, except
for the form of the bill of lading, the property would
have passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the
seller's property in the goods shall be deemed to be only
for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer
9f his obligations under the contract.
( 3.) Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of
lading the goods are deliverable to the order of the
buyer or of his agent, but possession of the bill of lading
is retained by the seller or his agent, the seller thereby
reserves a right to the possession of the goods as against
the buyer.

The melons rotted while in transit. Held, the title was in the seller

and the risk of loss on him. No reference was made to the Act and

the court cited such authorities as Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Cudahy

Packing Co., 260 Pa. 135, in which it was held that title and risk of

loss were seller's, because of seller's unfulfilled obligation to deliver.

Gilbert v. Ayoob, 71 Pa. Sup. Ct. 336.

Unspecific goods sold, seller obligated to deliver at buyer's town;

goods shipped by bill of lading in name of seller's agent; bill of lading

presented but neither paid nor refused; goods destroyed; held "title"

was in buyer and, also, risk of loss was on him. Kinney v. Horwitz,

93, Conn. 211, 105 Atl. 438. It may be observed that adoption of the Act

has not altogether produced consistent or logical decisions.

Goods were shipped by bill of lading in seller's name and bill

of lading with draft attached sold to a bank. Dictum to effect that

bank could sue carrier in a titular action. Act not referred to. Penin-

sular Bk. V. Citizen's Nat'l Bk., 186 la. 418, 172 N. "W. 293.

In Boss V. Hutchinson, 169 N. Y. S. 513, the seller's taking the

bill of lading in his own name was held to be a reservation of

"property and possession." The buyer paid the contract price under

protest. On suit he claimed this payment to have been under duress.

If sale is of specific goods title passes before shipment and a
subsequent taking of bill of lading in seller's name "can not reserve
a title," but only "the jus disponendi." Even a real reservation of
"title" by taking bill of lading in seller's name puts the risk of
loss on the buyer, because of section 22 of the Act, read in connection
with section 20. Alderman Bros. Co. v. Westinghouse etc. Co., 92
Conn. 419, 103 Atl. 267.
Plaintiff, as seller, had shipped melons according to contract, f. o. b.
place of shipment, bill of lading making them deliverable to himself.
The melons rotted while in transit. Held, the title was in the seller
and the risk of loss on him. No reference was made to the Act and
the court cited such authorities as Pittsburgh etc. Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 260 Pa. 135, in which it was held that title and risk of
loss were seller's, because of seller's unfulfilled obligation to deliver.
Gilbert v. Ayoob, 71 Pa. Sup. Ct. 336.
Unspecific goods sold, seller obligated to deliver at buyer's town;
goods shipped by bill of lading in name of seller's agent; bill of lading
presented but neither paid nor refused; goods destroyed; held "title"
was in buyer and, also, risk of loss was on him. Kinney v. Horwitz,
93, Conn. 211, 105 Atl. 438. It may be observed that adoption of the Act
has not altogether produced consistent or logical decisions.
Goods were shipped by bill of lading in seller's name and bill
of lading with draft attached sold to a bank. DictU?n to effect that
bank could sue carrier in a titular action. Act not referred to. Peninsular Bk. v. Citizen's Nat'l Bk., 186 Ia. 418, 172 N. W. 293.
In Boss v. Hutchinson, 169 N. Y. S. 513, the seller's taking the
bill of lading in his own name was held to be a reservation of
"property and possession." The buyer paid the contract price under
protest. On suit he claimed this payment to have been under duress.
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Held, the buyer was not under duress in making the payment, as is

the case where one pays to get possession of his own goods, because

they were not the buyer's goods. Accd., Rylance v. Jas. Walker Co.,

129 Md. 475, 99 Atl. 597.

Risk of loss on buyer despite seller's reservation of title through

taking bill of lading in his own name. Had been previously decided,

however, that title had in fact passed to buyer. Smith Co. v. Marano,

267 Pa. 107, 110 Atl. 94, 10 A. L. R. 697.

See also the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, Section 40.

(4.) Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer

for the price and transmits the bill of exchange and bill

UNIFORM SALES ACT

Held, the buyer was not under duress in making the payment, as is
the case where one pays to get possession of his own goods, because
they were not the buyer's goods. Aced., Rylance v. Jas. Walker Co.,
129 Md. 475, 99 Atl. 597.
Risk of loss on buyer despite seller's reservation of title through
taking bill of lading in his own name. Had been previously decided,
however, that title had in fact passed to buyer. Smith Co. v. Marano,
267 Pa. 107, 110 Atl. 94, 10 A. L. R. 697.
See also the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, Section 40.

of lading together to the buyer to secure acceptance or

payment of the bill of exchange, the buyer is bound to

return the bill of lading if he does not honor the bill of

exchange, and if he wrongfully retains the bill of lading

he acquires no added right thereby. If, however, the

bill of lading provides that the goods are deliverable to

the buyer or to the order of the buyer, or is indorsed in
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blank, or to the buyer by the consignee named therein,

one who purchases in good faith, for value, the bill of

lading, or goods from the buyer mil obtain the property

in the goods, although the bill of exchange has not been

honored, provided that such purchaser has received de-

livery of the bill of lading indorsed by the consignee

named therein, or of the goods, without notice of the

facts making the transfer wrongful.

Section 21. — Sale by Auction. — In the case of sale by

auction —

(1.) Where goods are put up for sale by auction in

lots, each lot is the subject of a separate contract of sale.

(2.) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer

announces its completion by the fall of the hammer, or

in other customary manner. Until such announcement

is made, any bidder may retract his bid; and the auc-

tioneer may withdraw the goods from sale unless the

auction has been announced to be without reserve.

(3.) A right to bid may be reserved expressly by or

on behalf of the seller.

( 4.) Where the seller of goods draws on the buyer
for the price and transmits the bill of exchange and bill
of lading together to the buyer to secure acceptance or
payment of the bill of exchange, the buyer is bound to
return the bill of lading if he does not honor the bill of
exchange, and if he wrongfully retains the bill of lading
he acquires no added right thereby. If, however, the
bill of lading provides that the goods are deliverable to
the buyer or to the order of the buyer, or is indorsed in
blank, or to the buyer by the consignee named therein,
one who purchases in good faith, for value, the bill of
lading, or goods from the buyer will obtain the property
in the goods, although the bill of exchange has not been
honored, provided that such purchaser has received delivery of the bill of lading indorsed by the consignee
named therein, or of the goods, without notice of the
facts making the transfer wrongful.
Section 21.-Sale by Auction.-In the case of sale by
auction(1.) Where goods are put up for sale by auction in
lots, each lot is the subject of a separate contract of sale.
(2.) A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer
announces its completion by the fall of the hammer, or
in other customary manner. Until such announcement
is made, any bidder may retract hi bid; and the auctioneer may withdraw the goods from sale unless the
aucti n has been announced to he without r .· rve.
(.. ) A right t bid may be reserved expressly by or
on behalf of the seller!
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(4.) Where notice has not been given that a sale by-

auction is subject to a right to bid on behalf of the seller,

it shall not be lawful for the seller to bid himself or to

employ or induce any person to bid at such sale on his

behalf, or for the auctioneer to employ or induce any

person to bid at such sale on behalf of the seller or know-

ingly to take any bid from the seller or any person em-

ployed by him. Any sale contravening this rule may be

treated as fraudulent by the buyer.

Section 22. — Risk of Loss. — Unless otherwise agreed,

the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property

therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the prop-

erty therein is transferred to the buyer the goods are

at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or

(4.) Where notice has not been given that a sale by
auction is subject to a right to bid on behalf of the seller,
it shall not be lawful for the seller to bid himself or to
employ or induce any person to bid at such sale on l~is
behalf, or for the auctioneer to employ or induce any
person to bid at such sale on behalf of the seller or knowingly to take any bid from the seller or any person employed by him. Any sale contravening this rule may be
treated as fraudulent by the buyer.

not, except that —

(a.) Where delivery of the goods has been made to

the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the

contract and the property in the goods has been retained
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by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer

of his obligations under the contract, the goods are at

the buyer's risk from the time of such delivery.

(b.) Where delivery has been delayed through the

fault of either buyer or seller the goods are at the risk

of the party in fault as regards any loss which might not

have occurred but for such fault.

Transfer of Title

Section 23. — Sale by a Person Not the Owner. — (1.)

Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are

sold by a person who is not the owaier thereof, and who

does not sell them under the authority or with the con-

sent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to

the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the

goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the

seller's authority to sell.

(2.) Nothing in this act, however, shall affect —

(a.) The provisions of any factors' acts, recording

Section 22.-Risk of Loss.-Unless otherwise agreed,
the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property
therein is transferred to the buyer, but when the property therein is transferred to the buyer the goods are
at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or
not, except that( a.) Where deli very of the goods has been made to
the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the
contract and the property in the goods has been retained
by the seller merely to secure perf onnance by the buyer
of his obligations under the contract, the goods are at
the buyer's risk from the time of such delivery.
(b.) Where delivery has been delayed through the
fault of either buyer or seller the goods are at the risk
of the party in fault as regards any loss which might not
have occurred but for such fault.
TRANSFER OF TITLE

Section 23.-Sale by a Person Not the Owner.-(1.)
Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are
sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who
does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to
the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the
goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.
( 2.) Nothing in this act, however, shall affect( a.) The provisions of any factors' acts, recording
D1gmze by
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acts, or any enactment enabling the apparent owner of

goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner

thereof.

(b.) The validity of any contract to sell or sale under

any special common law or statutory power of sale or

under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

This does not change the common law rule in respect to sale of

negotiable instruments. Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, purchaser

of stolen bonds protected. Brown v. Perera, 176 N. Y. S. 215, purchaser

of stolen foreign money protected.

Entrusting a chauffeur with possession of automobile for pur-

pose of shipment to another place does not permit the chauffeur to

vest title in a bona fide purchaser. Canales v. Earl, 168 N. Y. S. 725.

One who has a voidable title, secured by fraud, can vest a purchaser

without notice of the defect with a good title, citing Kingsford v.

Merry, 1 H. & N. 503 ; B. & O. S. W. Ry. v. Good, 82 O. S. 278, 92 N. E.

435.

One who buys goods from a thief and sells them himself is liable
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to the true owner for conversion. Reichard v. Hutton, 142 N. Y. S.

935, 158 App. Div. 122.

Section 24. — Sale by One Having a Voidable Title. —

Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto,

but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale,

the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he

buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice

of the seller's defect of title.

One who took the goods in good faith, but in payment of a pre-

existing debt, was held not to be within this rule (the Act was not

acts, or any enactment enabling the apparent owner of
goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner
thereof.
(b.) The validity of any contract to sell or sale under
any special common law or statutory power of sale or
under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
This does not change the common law rule in respect to sale of
negotiable instruments. Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, purchaser
of stolen bonds protected. Brown v. Perera, 176 N. Y. S. 215, purchaser
of stolen foreign money protected.
Entrusting a chauffeur with possession of automobile for purpose of shipment to another place does not permit the chauffeur to
vest title in a bona fide purchaser. Canales v. Earl, 168 N. Y. S. 725.
One who has a voidable title, secured by fraud, can vest a purchaser
without notice of the defect with a good title, citing Kingsford v.
Merry, 1 H. & N. 503; B. & 0. S. W. Ry. v. Good, 82 0. S. 278, 92 N. E.
435.
One who buys goods from a thief and· sells them himself is liable
to the true owner for conversion. Reichard v. Hutton, 142 N. Y. S.
935, 158 App. Div. 122.

expressly mentioned). W. G. Ward Co. v. American etc. Co., 247

Pa. 267.

Section 25. — Sale by Seller in Possession of Goods

Already Sold. — Where a person having sold goods con-

tinues in possession of the goods, or of negotiable docu-

ments of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by

that person, or by an agent acting for him, of the goods

or documents of title under any sale, pledge, or other

disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying

value for the same in good faith and without notice of the

previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person

making the delivery or transfer were expressly author-

ized by the owner of the goods to make the same.

Section 24.-Sale by One Having a Voidable Title.Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto,
but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale,
the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided he
buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice
of the seller's defect of title.
One who took the goods in good faith, but in payment of a preexisting debt, was held not to be within this rule (the Act was not
expressly mentioned). W. G. Ward Co. v. American etc. Co., 247
Pa. 267.

Section 25.-Sale by Seller in Possession of Goods
Already Sold.-Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods, or of negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by
that person, or by an agent acting for him, of the goods
or do uments of title under any sale, pledge, or other
dispositi n thereof, to any person receiving and paying
value f r the same in good faith and without notice of the
pr vious ·al , sh 11 have the same effect as if the person
making th delivery or transfer were expres ly authoriz d 1 y th wn r f the goods to make the same.
1
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In Urbansky v. Kutinsky, 86 Conn. 22, where the action was be-

tween the parties themselves, it was left to the jury to say whether

title had not passed despite the seller's retention of actual possession.

The act was not mentioned in this connection.

As between the parties, title passes, Patchin v. Rowell, 86 Ccuin.

372, 85 Atl. 511; Hallet & Davis Piano Co. v. Starr Piano Co., 85

O. S. 196, 97 N. E. 377.

As to third parties, "It is the general holding that there must

be not only a delivery to the vendee claiming the goods, but there

must be an actual and visible change of possession." Act not cited.

Hallet & Davis Piano Co. v. Starr Piano Co., 85 O. S. 196, 97 N. E. 377.

Section 26. — Creditors' Rights Against Sold Goods in

Seller's Possession. — Where a person having sold goods

307

In Urbansky v. Kutinsky, 86 Conn. 22, where the action was between the parties themselves, it was left to the jury to say whether
title had not passed despite the seller's retention of actual possession.
The act was not mentioned in this connection.
As between the parties, title passes, Patchin v. Rowell, 86 Cann.
372, 85 Atl. 511; Hallet & Davis Piano Co. v. Starr Piano Co., 85
0. S. 196, 97 N. E. 377.
As to third parties, "It is the general holding that there must
be not only a delivery to the vendee claiming the goods, but there
must be an actual and visible change of possession." Act not cited.
Hallet & Davis Piano Co. v. Starr Piano Co., 85 0. S. 196, 97 N. E. 377.

continues in possession of the goods, or of negotiable

documents of title to the goods and such retention of

possession is fraudulent in fact or is deemed fraudulent

under any rule of law, a creditor or creditors of the seller

may treat the sale as void.
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Title passes as between the parties despite seller's retention of

possession, but "can not stand against a subsequent attaching creditor

without notice." Patchin v. Rowell, 86 Conn. 372, 85 Atl. 511.

Section 27. — Definition of Negotiable Documents of

Title. — A document of title in which it is stated that the

goods referred to therein will be dehvered to the bearer,

or to the order of any person named in such document is

a negotiable document of title.

Section 26.-Creditors' Rights Against Sold Goods in
Seller's Possession.-Where a person having sold goods
continues in possession of the goods, or of negotiable
documents of title to the goods and such retention of
possession is fraudulent in fact or is deemed fraudulent
under any rule of law, a creditor or creditors of the seller
may treat the sale as void.

A certificate of stock is not within the meaning of this Act. Millard

V. Green, Conn., 110 Atl. 177, 9 A. L. R. 1610.

Section 28. — Negotiation of Negotiable Documents by

Delivery. — A negotiable document of title may be nego-

tiated by delivery, —

Title passes as between the parties despite seller's retention of
possession, but "can not stand against a subsequent attaching creditor
without notice." Patchin v. Rowell, 86 Conn. 372, 85 Atl. 511.

(a.) "Where by the terms of the document the car-

rier, warehouseman or other bailee issuing the same un-

dertakes to deliver the goods to the bearer, or

(b.) Where by the terms of the document the carrier,

warehouseman or other bailee issuing the same under-

takes to deliver the goods to the order of a specified per-

Section 27.-Definition of Negotiable Documents of
Title.-A document of title in which it is stated that the
goc ds ref erred to therein will be delivered to the bearer,
or to the order of any person named in such document is
a negotiable document of title.
A certificate of stock is not within the meaning of this Act. Millard
v. Green, Conn., 110 Atl. 177, 9 A. L. R. 1610.

Section 28.-N egotiation of Negotiable Documents by
Delivery.-A negotiable document of title may be negotiated by delivery,( a.) Where by the terms of the document the carrier, warehouseman or other bailee issuing the same undertakes to deliver the goods to the bearer, or
(b.) Where by the terms of the document the carrier,
warehouseman or other bailee issuing the same undertakes to deliver the goods to the order of a specified perDigitize by
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son, and such person or a subsequent indorsee of the

document has indorsed it in blank or to bearer.

AVhere by the terms of a negotiable document of title

the goods are deliverable to bearer or where a negotiable

document of title has been indorsed in blank or to bearer,

any holder may indorse the same to himself or to any

other specified person, and in such case the document

shall thereafter be negotiated only by the indorsement of

such indorsee.

Section 29. — Negotiation of Negotiable Documents by

Indorsement. — A negotiable document of title may be

negotiated by the indorsement of the person to whose

order the goods are by the terms of the document deliv-

erable. Such indorsement may be in blank, to bearer or

to a specified person. If indorsed to a specified person,

son, and such person or a subsequent indorsee of the
document has indorsed it in blank or to bearer.
\\7bere by the t erms of a negotiable document of title
the goods are deliverable to bearer or where a negotiable
document of title has been indorsed in blank or to bearer,
any holder may indorse the same to himself or to any
other specified person, and in such case the document
shall thereafter be negotiated only by the indorsement of
such indorsee.

it may be again negotiated by the indorsement of such

person in blank, to bearer or to another specified person.

Subsequent negotiation may be made in like manner.
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Section 30. — Negotiable Documents of Title Marked

**Not Negotiable." — If a document of title which con-

tains an undertaking by a carrier, warehouseman or other

bailee to deliver the goods to the bearer, to a specified

person or order, or to the order of a specified person, or

which contains words of like import, has placed upon it

the words ''not negotiable," ''non-negotiable" or the

like, such a document ma}' nevertheless be negotiated by

the holder and is a negotiable document of title within

the meaning of this act. But nothing in this act con-

tained shall be construed as limiting or defining the effect

upon the obligations of the carrier, warehouseman, or

other bailee issuing a document of title of placing thereon

Section 29.-Negotiation of Negotiable Documents by
Indorsement.-A negotiable document of title may be
negotiated by the indorsement of the person to whose
order th~ goods are by the terms of the document deliverable. Such indorsement may be in blank, to bearer or
to a specified person. If indorsed to a specified person,
it may be again negotiated by the indorsement of such
p er son in blank, to bearer or to another specified person.
Subsequent negotiation may be made in like manner.

the words "not negotiable," "non-negotiable," or the

like.

Section 31. — Transfer of Non-Negotiable Documents. —

A document of title which is not in such form that it can

Section 30.-Negotiable Documents of Title Marked
''Not Negotiable.''-If a document of title which contains an undertaking by a carrier, war ehouseman or other
bailee to deliver the goods to the bear er, to a specified
person or order, or to the order of a specified person, or ,
which contains words of like import, has placed upon it
the words "not negotiable," "non-negotiable " or the
like, such a document ma3 nevertheless be negotiated by
the holder and is a negotiable document of title within
the meaning of this act. But nothing in this act cont ained shall be construed as limiting or defining the effect
u pon th obligations of the carrier, war ehouseman, or
oth r bailee i suing a document of title of placing thereon
the words " not negotiable," "non-negotiable," or the
like.
Section 31.-Transfer of Non-Negotiable Documents.A docum nt of title which i not in such form that it can
'!::!' · - -
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be negotiated by delivery may be transferred by the

holder by delivery to a purchaser or donee. A non-

negotiable document can not be negotiated and the in-

dorsement of such a document gives the transferee ho

additional right.

Section 32. — Who May Negotiate a Document. — A ne-

gotiable document of title may be negotiated —

(a.) By the owner thereof, or

be negotiated by delivery may be transferred by the
holder by delivery to a purchaser or donee. A nonnegotiable document can not be negotiated and the indorsement of such a document gives the transferee fio
additional right.

(b.) By any person to whom the possession or custody

of the document has been entrusted by the owner, if, by

the terms of the document the bailee issuing the docu-

ment undertakes to deliver the goods to the order of the

person to whom the possession or custody of the docu-

ment has been entrusted, or if at the time of such en-

trusting the document is in such form that it may be

negotiated by delivery.

Section 33. — Rights of Person to Whom Document has

Been Negotiated. — A person to whom a negotiable docu-
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ment of title has been duly negotiated acquires thereby,

(a.) Such title to the goods as the person negotiating

the document to him had or had ability to convey to a

purchaser in good faith for value and also such title to

the goods as the person to whose order the goods were to

be delivered by the terms of the document had or had

ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value,

and

The Uniform Bills of Lading Act goes further and provides that he

shall have such title as the consignor and consignee had power to

Section 32.-Who May Negotiate a Document.-A negotiable document of title may be negotiated( a.) By the owner thereof, or
(b.) By any person to whom the possession or custody
of the document has been entrusted by the owner, if, by
the terms of the document the bailee issuing the document undertakes to deliver the goods to the order of the
person to whom the possession or custody of the document has been entrusted, or if at the time of such entrusting the document is in such form that it may be
negotiated by delivery.

convey.

(b.) The direct obligation of the bailee issuing the

document to hold possession of the goods for him accord-

ing to the terms of the document as fully as if such

bailee had contracted directly with him.

Section 34. — Rights of Person to Whom Document Has

Been Transferred. — A person to whom a document of

Section 33.-Rights of Person to Whom Document has
Been Negotiated.-A person to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated acquires thereby,
(a.) Such title to the goods as the person negotiating
the document to him had or had ability to convey to a
purchaser in good faith for value and also such title to
the goods as the person to whose order the goods were to
be delivered by the terms of the document had or had
ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value,
and
The Uniform Bills of Lading Act goes further and provides that he
shall have such title as the consignor and consignee had power to
convey.

(b.) The direct obligation of the bailee issuing the
document to hold possession of the goods for him according to the terms of the document as fully as if such
bailee had con tr acted directly with him.
Section 34.-Rights of Person to Whom Document Has
Been Transferred.-A person to whom a document of
D1git1z
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title has been transferred, but not negotiated, acquires
thereby, as against the transferor, the title to the goods,
subject to the terms of any agreement with the transferor.
If the document is non-negotiable, such person also
acquires the right to notify the bailee who issued the
document of the transfer thereof, and thereby to acquire
the direct obligation of such bailee to hold possession of
the goods for him according to the terms of the document.
Prior to the notification of such bailee by the transferor or transferee of a non-negotiable document of title,
the title of the transferee to the goods and the right to
acquire the obligation of such bailee may be defeated by
the levy of an attachment or execution upon the goods
by a creditor of the transferor, or by a notification to
such bailee by the transferor or a subsequent purchaser
from the transferor of a subsequent sale of the goods by
the transferor.

title has been transferred, but not negotiated, acquires

thereby, as against tlie transferor, the title to the goods,

subject to the terms of any agreement with the trans-

feror.

If the document is non-negotiable, such person also

acquires the right to notify the bailee who issued the

document of the transfer thereof, and thereby to acquire

the direct obHgation of such bailee to hold possession of

the goods for him according to the terms of the docu-

ment.

Prior to the notification of such bailee by the trans-

feror or transferee of a non-negotiable document of title,

the title of the transferee to the goods and the right to

acquire the obligation of such bailee may be defeated by

the le\'y of an attachment or execution upon the goods

by a creditor of the transferor, or by a notification to

such bailee by the transferor or a subsequent purchaser

from the transferor of a subsequent sale of the goods by

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the transferor.

Section 35. — Transfer of Negotiable Document With-

out Indorsement. — Where a negotiable document of title

is transferred for value by delivery, and the indorse-

ment of the transferor is essential for negotiation, the

transferee acquires a right against the transferor to com-

pel him to indorse the document unless a contrary inten-

tion appears. The negotiation shall take effect as of the

time when the indorsement is actually made.

Section 36. — Warranties on Sale of Document. — A per-

son who for value negotiates or transfers a document of

title by indorsement or delivery, including one who as-

signs for value a claim secured by a document of title

unless a contrary intention appears, warrants :

(a.) That the document is genuine;

(b.) That he has a legal right to negotiate or trans-

Section 35.-Transfer of Negotiable Document Without Indorsement.-Where a negotiable document of title
is transferred for value by delivery, and the indorsement of the transferor is essential for negotiation, the
transferee acquires a right against the transferor to compel him to indorse the document unless a contrary intention appears. The negotiation shall take effect as of the
time when the indorsement is actually made.

fer it;

Section 36.-Warranties on Sale of Document.-A person who for value negotiates or transfers a document of
title by indorsement or delivery, including one who assigns for value a claim secured by a document of title
unless a contrary intention appears, warrants:
(a.) That the document i genuine;
(b.) That he has a legal right to negotiate or transfer it;
D1
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(c.) That he has knowledge of no fact which would

impair the validity or worth of the document, and

(d.) That he has a right to transfer the title to the

goods and that the goods are merchantable or fit for 'a

particular purpose, whenever such warranties would have

been implied if the contract of the parties had been to

transfer without a document of title the goods repre-

sented thereby.

Section 37. — Indorser Not a Guarantor. — The indorse-

ment of a document of title shall not make the indorser

liable for any failure on the part of the bailee who issued

the document or previous indorsers thereof to fulfill their

respective obhgations.

(c.) That he has knowledge of no fact which would
impair the validity or worth of the document, and
( d.) That he has a right to transfer the title to the
goods and that the goods are merchantable or fit for" a
particular purpose, whenever such warranties would have
been implied if the contract of the parties had been to
transfer without a document of title the goods represented thereby.
~

Section 38. — When Negotiation Not Impaired by

Fraud, Mistake or Duress. — The validity of the negotia-

tion of a negotiable document of title is not impaired by

the fact that the negotiation w^as a breach of duty on the

part of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact
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that the o^vner of the document was induced by fraud,

mistake or duress to entrust the possession or custody

thereof to such person, if the person to whom the docu-

ment w^as negotiated or a person to whom the document

Section 37.-lndorser Not a Guarantor.-The indorsement of a document of title shall not make the indorser
liable for any failure on the part of the bailee who issued
the document or previous indorsers thereof to fulfill their
respective obligations.

was subsequently negotiated paid value therefor, with-

out notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, mistake or

duress.

Applied, Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E.

1025; Commercial Bank v. Canal Bank, 239 U. S. 520, 36 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 194.

Section 39. — Attachment or Levy Upon Goods for

Which a Negotiable Document Has Been Issued. — If

goods are delivered to a bailee by the ouTier or by a per-

son whose act in conveying the title to them to a purchaser

in good faith for value would bind the owner and a nego-

tiable document of title is issued for them they can not

thereafter, while in the possession of such bailee, be at-

Section 38:-When Negotiation Not Impaired by
Fraud, Mistake or Duress.-The validity of the negotiation of a negotiable document of title is not in1paired by
the fact that the negotiation was a breach of duty on the
part of the person making the n egotiation, or by the fact
that the owner of the document was induced by fraud,
mistake or duress to entrust the possession or custody
thereof to such person, if the person to whom the document was negotiated or a person to wh01n the docu1nent
was subsequently negotiated paid value therefor, without notice of the breach of duty, or fraud, mistake or
duress.
Applied, Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E .
1025; Commercial Bank v. Canal Bank, 239 U. S. 520, 36 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 194.

Section 39.-Attachment or Levy Upon Goods for
Which a Negotiable Document Has Been Issued.-If
goods are delivered to a bailee by the owner or by a person whose act in conveying the title to them to a purchaser
in good faith for value would bind the owner and a negotiable document of title is issued for them they can not
thereafter, while in the possession of such bailee, be atDigitize- by
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tached by garnishment or otherwise or be levied upon
under an execution unless the document be first surrendered to the bailee or its negotiation enjoined. The
bailee shall in no case be compelled to deliver up the
actual possession of the goods until the document is
surrendered to him or impounded by the court.

tached by garnishment or otherwise or be levied upon

under an execution unless the document be first sur-

rendered to the bailee or its negotiation enjoined. The

bailee shall in no case be compelled to deliver up the

actual possession of the goods until the document is

surrendered to him or impounded by the court.

Section 40. — Creditors' Remedies to Reach Negotiable

Documents. — A creditor whose debtor is the owner of

a negotiable document of title shall be entitled to such

aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction by injunc-

tion and otherwise in attaching such document or in

satisfying the claim by means thereof as is allowed at

Section 40.-Creditors' Remedies to Reach Negotiable
Documents.-A creditor whose debtor is the owner of
a negotiable document of title shall be entitled to such
aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction by injunction and otherwise in attaching such document or in
satisfying the claim by means thereof as is allowed at
law or in equity in. regard to property which can not
readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal
process.

law or in equity in regard to property which can not

readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal

process.

PART III

Performance of the Contract

Section 41. — Seller Must Deliver and Buyer Accept
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Goods. — It is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods,

and of the buyer to accept and pay for them, in accord-

ance with the terms of the contract to sell or sale.

Section 42. — Delivery and Payment are Concurrent

Conditions. — Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the

goods and payment of the price are concurrent condi-

tions ; that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing

to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange

for the price and the buyer must be ready and willing

to pay the price in exchange for possession of the goods.

A codification of the common law, Gnien v. Geo. A. Ohl & Co.,

81 N. J. L. 626, 80 Atl. 547; British Aluminum Co. v. Trefts, 148

PART III

N. Y. S. 144, 163 App. Div. 184.

Section 43. — Place, Time and Manner of Delivery. —

(1.) \Vhether it is for the buyer to take possession of

PERFORMANCE OF THE

C~NTRACT

Section 41.-Seller Must Deliver and Buyer Accept
Goods.-It is the duty of the seller to deliver the goods,
and of the buyer to accept and pay for them, in accordance with the terms of the contract to sell or sale.
Section 42.-Delivery and Payment are Concurrent
Conditions.-Unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the
goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions; that is to say, the seller must be ready and willing
to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange
for the price and the buyer must be ready and willing
to pay the price in exchange for possession of the goods.
A codification of the common law, Gruen v. Geo. A. Ohl & Co.,
81 N. J. L. 626, 80 Atl. 547; British Aluminum Co. v. Trefts, 148
N. Y. S. 144, 163 App. Div. 184.

[..,
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Section 43.-Place, Time and Manner of Delivery.(!.) Whether it is for the buyer to take possession of
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the goods or for the seller to send them to the buyer is a

question depending in each case on the contract, express

or implied, between the parties. Apart from any such

contract, express or impHed, or usage of trade to the

contrary, the place of deUvery is the seller's place of

business if he have one, and if not his residence; but in

case of a contract to sell or a sale of specific goods,

which to the knowledge of the parties when the contract

or the sale was made were in some other place, then that

place is the place of delivery.

(2.) Where by a contract to sell or a sale the seller

is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for

sending them is fixed, the seller is bound to send them

within a reasonable time.

(3.) Where the goods at the time of sale are in the

possession of a third person, the seller has not fulfilled

his obHgation to deliver to the buyer unless and until

such third person acknowledges to the buyer that he holds
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the goods on the buyer's behalf; but as against all others

than the seller the buyer shall be regarded as having

received delivery from the time when such third person

first has notice of the sale. Nothing in this section,

however, shall affect the operation of the issue or trans-

fer of any document of title to goods.

(4.) Demand or tender of delivery may be treated as

ineffectual unless made at a reasonable hour. What is

a reasonable hour is a question of fact.

(5.) Unless otherwise agreed, the expenses of, and

incidental to, putting the goods into a deliverable state

must be borne by the seller.

Section 44. — Delivery of Wrong Quantity. — (1.)

Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods

less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them,

but if the buyer accepts or retains the goods so delivered,

knowing that the seller is not going to perform the con-

tract in full, he must pay for them at the contract rate.

If, however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods

313

the goods or for the seller to send them to the buyer is a
question depending in each case on the contract, express
or implied, between the parties. Apart from any such
contract, express or implied, or usage of trade to the
contrary, the place of delivery is the seller's place of
business if he have one, and if not his residence; but in
case of a contract to sell or a sale of specific goods,
which to the knowledge of the parties when the contract
or the sale was made were in some other place, then that
place is the place of delivery.
(2.) Where by a contract to sell or a sale the seller
is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for
sending them is :fixed, the seller is bound to send them
within a reasonable time.
(3.) vVhere the goods at the time of sale are in the
possession of a third person, the seller has not fulfilled
his obligation to . deliver to the buyer unless and until
such third person acknowledges to the buyer that he holds
the goods on the buyer's behalf; but as against all others
than the seller the buyer shall be regarded as having
received delivery from the time when such third person
first has notice of the sale. Nothing in this section,
however, shall affect the operation of the issue or transfer of any document of title to goods.
( 4.) Demand or tender of delivery may be treated as
ineffectual unless made at a reasonable hour. What is
a reasonable hour is a question of fact.
(5.) Unless otherwise agreed, the expenses of, and
incidental to, putting the goods into a deliverable state
must be borne by the seller.
Section 44. - Delivery of Wrong Quantity. - (1.)
Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods
less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may rej ect them,
but if the buyer accepts or retains the goods so delivered,
knowing that the seller is not going to perform the contract in full, he must pay for them at the contract rate.
If, however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods
Digitize by
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delivered before he knows that the seller is not going to
perform his contract in full, the buyer shall not be liable
for more than the fair value to him of the goods so received.
(2.) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity
of goods larger than he contracted to sell, the buyer may
accept the goods included in the contract and reject the
rest, or he n1ay r eject the whole. If the buyer accepts the
whole of the goods so delivered he must pay for them
at the contract rate.
( 3.) Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods
he contracted to sell mixed with goods of a different description not included in the contract, the buyer may accept the goods which are in accordance with the contract
and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.
( 4.) The provisions of this section are subject to any
usage of trade, special agreement, or course of dealing
between the parties.

delivered before he knows that the seller is not going to

perform his contract in full, the buyer shall not be liable

for more than the fair value to him of the goods so re-

ceived.

(2.) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity

of goods larger than he contracted to sell, the buyer may

accept the goods included in the contract and reject the

rest, or he may reject the whole. If the buyer accepts the

whole of the goods so delivered he must pay for them

at the contract rate.

(3.) Where the seller dehvers to the buyer the goods

he contracted to sell mixed with goods of a different de-

scription not included in the contract, the buyer may ac-

cept the goods which are in accordance with the contract

and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.

(4.) The provisions of this section are subject to any

usage of trade, special agreement, or course of dealing

between the parties.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

AppUed, Rock Glen Salt Co. v. Segal, 229 Mass. 115, 118 N. E. 239;

Boyd V. Second-hand Supply Co., 14 Ariz. 36, 123 Pac. 619; Powers

V. Dodgson, 194 Mich. 133, 160 N. W. 432, (sub-sec. 3).

"Used and disposed of", in sub-sec. 1, "means something more than

merely accepting. It contemplates a situation in which the buyer

cannot return the goods to the seller." Hence, offering goods for

resale, but without succeeding in reselling does not preclude a rejec-

tion by the buyer. Kinschman v. Crawford Plummer Co., 150 N. Y. S.

886, 165 App. Div. 259.

A tender of 81 pieces to a buyer who has ordered only 50 pieces

may be refused by the buyer; Act not referred to. Galland v. Kass,

152 N. Y. S. 1074.

Failure to tender full amount may be acquiesced in by buyer and

justified by course of dealing; Act not cited. Monroe v. Trenton

Co., (N. Y.) 206 Fed. 456,

Section 45. — Delivery in Instalments. — (1.) Unless

otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to

accept delivery thereof by instalments.

(2.) Where there is a contract to sell goods to be de-

livered by stated instalments, which are to be separately

paid for, and the seller makes defective deliveries in

respect of one or more instalments, or the buyer neglects

Applied, Rock Glen Salt Co. v. Segal, 229 Mass. 115, 118 N. E. 239;
Boyd v. Second-hand Supply Co., 14 Ariz. 36, 123 Pac. 619; Powers
v. Dodgson, 194 Mich. 133, 160 N. W. 432, (sub-sec. 3).
"Used and disp6sed of", in sub-sec. 1, "means something more than
merely accepting. It contemplates a situation in which the buyer
cannot return the goods to the seller." Hence, offering goods for
resale, but without succeeding in reselling does not preclude a rejection by the buyer. Kinschman v. Crawford Plummer Co., 150 N. Y. S.
886, 165 App. Div. 259.
A tender of 81 pieces to a buyer who has ordered only 50 pieces
may be refused by the buyer; Act not referred to. Galland v. Kass,
152 N. Y. S. 1074.
Failure to tender full amount may be acquiesced in by buyer and
justified by course of dealing; Act not cited. Monroe v. Trenton
Co., (N. Y.) 206 Fed. 456.

DI

Section 45.-Delivery in Instalments.-(1.) Unless
otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to
accept d livery ther of by instalments.
(2.) vVhere there is a contract to sell goods to be deliv red by stat d instalment , which are to be separately
pai for, and th s ll r m k s def ctive deliveries in
respe t of ne rm r instalment , or the buyer neglects
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or refuses to take delivery of or pay for one or more in-

stalments, it depends in each case on the terms of the con-

tract and the circumstances of the case, whether the

breach of contract is so material as to justify the injured

party in refusing to proceed further and suing for dam-

ages for breach of the entire contract, or whether the

breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for compen-

sation, but not to a right to treat the whole contract as

broken.

Section 46. — Delivery to a Carrier on Behalf of the

Buyer. — (1.) Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell

or a sale, the seller is authorized or required to send the

goods to the buyer, dehvery of the goods to a carrier,

whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of

transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of

or refuses to take delivery of or pay for one or more instalments, it depends in each case on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case, whether the
l>reach of contract is so material as to justify the injured
party in refusing to proceed further and suing for damages for breach of the entire contract, or whether the
breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for compensation, but not to a right to treat the whole contract as
broken.

the goods to the buyer, except in the cases provided for

in section 19, Rule 5, or unless a contrary intent appears.

(2.) Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the
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seller must make such contract with the carrier on behalf

of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the

nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the

case. If the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost

or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline

to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to him-

self, or may hold the seller responsible in damages.

(3.) Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent

by the seller to the buyer under circumstances in which

the seller knows or ought to know that it is usual to

insure, the seller must give such notice to the buyer as

may enable him to insure them during their transit, and,

if the seller fails to do so, the goods shall be deemed to be

at his risk during such transit.

Section 47. — Right to Examine the Goods. — (1.)

Where goods are delivered to the buyer, which he has

not previously examined, he is not deemed to have ac-

cepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable

Section 46.-Delivery to a Carrier on Behalf of the
Buyer.-(1.) Where, in pursuance of a contract to sell
or a sale, the seller is authorized or required to send the
goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier,
whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of
transmission to the buyer is deemed to be a delivery of
the goods to the buyer, except in the cases provided for
in section 19, Rule 5, or unless a contrary intent appears.
(2.) Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the
seller must make such contract with the carrier on behalf
of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the
nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the
case. If the seller omit so to do, and the goods are lost
or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline
to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself, or may hold the seller responsible in damages.
( 3.) Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent
by the seller to the buyer under circumstances in which
the seller knows or ought to know that it is u sual to
insure, the seller must give such notice to the buyer as
may enable him to insure them during their transit, and,
if the seller fails to do so, the goods shall be deemed to be
at his risk during such transit.
Section 47.-Right to Examine the Goods.-(1.)
Where goods are delivered to the buyer, which he has
not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable
D.". ·-- ~
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opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascer-

opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract.
( 2.) Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders
delivery of goods to the buyer, he is bound, on request,
to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the purpose of ascertaining whether
they are in conformity with the contract.

taining whether they are in conformity with the contract.

(2.) Unless otherwise agreed, when the seller tenders

delivery of goods to the buyer, he is bound, on request,

to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examin-

ing the goods for the purpose of ascertaining whether

they are in conformity with the contract.

As to what is an inspection, Act not mentioned, see Mosler Safe

Co. V. Thore, 217 Mass. 153.

Title did not pass, despite delivery to carrier, before buyer's in-

spection, and seller could sue carrier in tort. This interpretation —

not being limited to cases where goods delivered did not conform to

contract — conflicts with the rule that title presumably passes on

As to what is an inspection, Act not mentioned, see Mosler Safe
Co. v. Thore, 217 Mass. 153.
Title did not pass, despite delivery to carrier, before buyer's inspection, and seller could sue carrier in tort. This interpretationnot being limited to cases where goods delivered did not conform to
contract-conflicts with the rule that title presumably passes on
delivery to a carrier of goods conforming to the carrier. There is no
discussion and the holding seems to be for a special purpose. Garvan
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 210 Mass. 275.
In D. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 363 (N. Y. Dist.),
the court held that title passed to the buyer on mere receipt by him
of the goods, subject to "rescission" by him if inspection showed
non-conformity with the contract. Here again the conclusion was
obviously reached, regardless of precedent, for the particular purpose
of the case.
In Urbansky v. Kutinsky, 86 Conn. 22, the common law rule is
clearly followed and an agreement to take an existing and definitely
identified chattel was held to preclude any right of inspection as a
precedent to the passing of title.
Applied, Bridgeport Hardware Co. v. Bouniol, 89 Conn. 254.
Buyer's receipt or goods and retention of them without inspection,
or reason for not inspecting, held to constitute an acceptance of title.
Fort Wayne Printing Co. y. Hurley-Reilly Co., 163 Wis. 179; Gerli
& Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N. J. L. 128.
Seller can not recover price without proof that he has offered
to buyer delivery of goods which conform to the requirements of the
contract. Alamo Cattle Co. v. Hall, 220 Fed. (Arizona) 832.
An acceptance after inspection in which a material error was made,
without fault of the buyer, may be set aside and, at least, the seller's
right to recovery made to depend on a new inspection. Herman H.
Hettler Lumber Co. v. Olds, 221 Fed. (Mich.) 612.

delivery to a carrier of goods conforming to the carrier. There is no

discussion and the holding seems to be for a special purpose. Garvan

V. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 210 Mass. 275.

In D. L. &, W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 363 (N. Y. Dist),

the court held that title passed to the buyer on mere receipt by him
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of the goods, subject to "rescission" by him if inspection showed

non-conformity with the contract. Here again the conclusion was

obviously reached, regardless of precedent, for the particular purpose

of the case.

In Urbansky v. Kutinsky, 86 Conn. 22, the common law rule is

clearly followed and an agreement to take an existing and definitely

identified chattel was held to preclude any right of inspection as a

precedent to the passing of title.

Applied, Bridgeport Hardware Co. v. Bouniol, 89 Conn. 254.

Buyer's receipt of goods and retention of them without inspection,

or reason for not inspecting, held to constitute an acceptance of title.

Fort Wayne Printing Co. y. Hurley-Reilly Co., 163 Wis. 179; Gerli

& Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N. J. L. 128.

Seller can not recover price without proof that he has offered

to buyer delivery of goods which conform to the requirements of the

contract. Alamo Cattle Co. v. Hall, 220 Fed. (Arizona) 832.

An acceptance after inspection in which a material error was made,

without fault of the buyer, may be set aside and, at least, the seller's

right to recovery made to depend on a new inspection. Herman H.

Hettler Lumber Co. v. Olds, 221 Fed. (Mich.) 612.

(3.) Where goods are delivered to a carrier by the

seller, in accordance with an order from or agreement

with the buyer, upon the terms that the goods shall not

be delivered by the carrier to the buyer until he has paid

the price, whether such terms are indicated by marking

the goods with the words * * collect on delivery, ' ' or other-

(3.) Where goods are delivered to a carrier by the
seller, in accordance with an order from or agreement
with the buy r, upon the term that the goods shall not
be d liv r d by the carri r to the buyer until he ha paid
the pri , wheth r uch term are indicated by marking
the good with the word "collect on delive.r y," or other1
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wise, the buyer is not entitled to examine the goods be-

fore payment of the price in the absence of agreement

permitting such examination.

Section 48. — What Constitutes Acceptance. — The buyer

wise, the buyer is not entitled to examine the goods before payment of the price in the absence of agreement
permitting such examination.

is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates

to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the

goods have been delivered to him, and he does any act

in relation to them which is inconsistent with the OA\'Tier-

ship of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a reasonable

time, he retains the goods without intimating to the

seller that he has rejected them.

Use of part of goods, under entire contract, after knowledge that

the other part was unsatisfactory amounts to acceptance of the whole;

Emery Thompson etc. Co. v. Graves, 91 Conn. 71, 98 Atl. 331.

Applied to question of acceptance for purpose of satisfying Statute

of Frauds, DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 90 Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323.

Retention and use for two years after knowledge of defect is

acceptance, but recovery of damages is allowed. Otis Elevator Co. v.
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Headley, 81 N. J. L. 173, 80 Atl. 109.

Section 48.-What Constitutes Acceptance.-The buyer
is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates
to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the
goods have been delivered to him, and he does any act
in relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a reasonable
time, he retains the goods without intimating to the
seller that he has rejected them.

Right to "rescind" lost by use after knowledge of defect, Gerli

& Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 83 N. J. L. 7, 84 Atl. 1065; Emert v. Nib-

blink, 179 Mich. 335, 146 N. W. 120.

Whether or not there has been actual acceptance and whether

there has been an unreasonable delay are questions for the jury.

Hayes v. Kluge, 86 N. J. L. 657, 92 Atl. 358.

What acts amount to acceptance is a question for the court.

Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. United etc. Co., 87 N. J. L. 656, 94 Atl. 630,

semble.

"Reasonable time" is a question of law when the facts are undis-

puted. Am. Steam etc. Co. v. Mechanics etc. Co., 214 Mass. 299,

101 N. E. 376.

Section 49. — Acceptance Does Not Bar Action for Dam-

ages. — In the absence of express or implied agreement

of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall

not discharge the seller from liability in damages or

other legal remedy for breach of any promise or war-

ranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But, if, after

acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to

the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty

within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought

Use of part of goods, under entire contract, after knowledge that
the other part was unsatisfactory amounts to acceptance of the whole:
Emery Thompson etc. Co. v. Graves, 91 Conn. 71, 98 Atl. 331.
Applied to question of acceptance for purpose of satisfying Statute
of Frauds, DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 90 Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323.
Retention and use for two years after knowledge of defect is
acceptance, but recovery of damages is allowed . Otis Elevator Co. v.
Headley, 81 N. J. L. 173, 80 Atl. 109.
Right to "rescind" lost by use after knowledge of defect, Gerli
& Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 83 N. J. L. 7, 84 Atl. 1065; Emert v. Nibblink, 179 Mich. 335, 146 N. W. 120.
Whether or not there has been actual acceptance and whether
there has been an unreasonable delay are questions for the jury.
Hayes v. Kluge, 86 N. J. L. 657, 92 Atl. 358.
What acts amount to acceptance is a question for the court.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. United etc. Co., 87 N. J. L. 656, 94 Atl. 630,
semble.
"Reasonable time" is a question of law when the facts are undisputed. Am. Steam etc. Co. v. Mechanics etc. Co., 214 Mass. 299,
101 N. E. 376.

Section 49.-Acceptanee Does Not Bar Action for Damages.-In the absence of express or implied agreement
of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall
not discharge the seller from liability in damages or
other legal remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But, if, after
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to
the seller of the breach of any pronuse or warranty
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought
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to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable

therefor.

If the buyer does waive breach of condition and accept title to

to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable
therefor.

the goods tendered, he must then rely on recovery of damages for

breach of warranty and can not set up failure of consideration, or

non-acceptance. Potter Press Co v. Newark etc. Co., 82 N. J. L.

671, dictum.

Acceptance of goods despite a breach of condition precludes any

recovery, as by way of set off or recoupment, by the buyer. Placed on

common law precedents; Act not mentioned. Cheboygan Paper Co. v.

Eichberg, 184 Mich. 30.

An implied warranty does not survive acceptance; Act not men-

tioned and no authority cited. Ferguson v. Netter, 204 N. Y. 505, 98

N. E. 16.

Express warranty does survive acceptance; Act not mentioned.

Condit V. Onward Const. Co., 210 N. Y. 88, 103 N. E. 886.

Rescission and return of the goods are inconsistent with acceptance

and recovery of damages. Gerli & Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N. J.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0ms3v53g
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

L. 128, 76 Atl. 335.

Applied, Gascoigne v. Cary Brick Co., 217 Mass. 302, 104 N. E. 734.

Section 50. — Buyer Is Not Bound to Return Goods

Wrongly Delivered. — Unless otherwise agreed, where

goods are delivered to the buyer, and he refuses to ac-

cept them, having the right so to do, he is not bound to

return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he notifies

the seller that he refuses to accept them.

Section 51. — Buyer's Liability for Failing to Accept

If the buyer does waive breach of condition and accept title to
the goods tendered, he must then rely on re-::overy of damages for
breach of warranty and can not set up failure of consideration, or
non-acceptance. Potter Press Co . v . Newark etc. Co., 82 N. J. L.
671, dictum.
Acceptance of goods despite a breach of condition precludes any
recovery, as by way of set off or recoupment, by the buyer. Placed on
common law precedents; Act not mentioned. Cheboygan Paper Co. v.
Eichberg, 184 Mich. 30.
An implied warranty does not survive acceptance; Act not mentioned and no authority cited. Ferguson v. Netter, 204 N. Y. 505, 98
N. E. 16.
Express warranty does survive acceptance; Act not mentioned .
Condit v. Onward Const. Co., 210 N. Y. 88, 103 N. E. 886.
Rescission and return of the goods are inconsistent with acceptance
and recovery of damages. Gerli & Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Mills, 80 N. J.
L. 128, 76 Atl. 335.
Applied, Gascoigne v. Cary Brick Co., 217 Mass. 302, 104 N. E. 734.

Delivery. — ^AVhen the seller is read}^ and willing to de-

liver the goods, and requests the buyer to take delivery,

and the buyer does not within a reasonable time after

such request take delivery of the goods, he is liable to the

seller for any loss occasioned by his neglect or refusal

to take delivery, and also for a reasonable charge for the

care and custody of the goods. If the neglect or refusal

of the buyer to take delivery amounts to a repudiation

or breach of the entire contract, the seller shall have the

rights against the goods and on the contract hereinafter

provided in favor of the seller when the buyer is in

default.

Section 50.-Buyer Is Not Bound to Return Goods
Wrongly Delivered.-Unless otherwise agreed, where
goods are delivered to the buyer, and he refuses to accept them, having the right so to do, he is not bound to
return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he notifies
the seller that he refuses to accept them.
Section 51.-Buyer 's Liability for Failing to Accept
Delivery.-When the seller is ready and willing to deliver the goods, and requests the buyer to take delivery,
and the buyer does not within a reasonable time after
such request take delivery of the goods, he is liable to the
seller for any loss occasioned by his neglect or refusal
to take delivery, and also for a reasonable charge for the
care and custody of the goods. If the neglect or refusal
of the buyer to take delivery amounts to a repudiation
or breach of the entire contract, the seller shall have the
right. again t the goods and on the contract hereinafter
provided in favor f the seller when the buyer is in
default.
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PART IV

PART IV

Rights of Unpaid Seller Against the Goods

Section 52.— Definition of Unpaid Seller.— (1.) The

seller of goods is deemed to be an unpaid seller within

RIGHTS

OF

UNPAID SELLER AGAINST THE Goons

the meaning of this act —

~
(a.) When the whole of the price has not been paid

or tendered.

(b.) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable in-

strument has been received as conditional payment, and

the condition on which it was received has been broken by

Section 52.-Definition of Unpaid Seller.-(1.) The
seller of good is deemed to be an unpaid seller within
the meaning of this act-

reason of the dishonor of the instrument, the insolvency

of the buyer, or othermse.

(2.) In this part of this act the term "seller" includes

an agent of the seller to whom the bill of lading has been

( a.) When the whole of the price has not been paid
or tendered.

indorsed, or a consignor or agent who has himself paid,

or is directly responsible for, the price, or any other per-

son who is in the position of a seller.

Section 53. — Remedies of an Unpaid Seller. — (1.)
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Subject to the provisions of this act, notwithstanding

that the property in the goods may have passed to the

buyer, the unpaid seller of goods, as such, has —

(a.) A lien on the goods or right to retain them for

the price while he is in possession of them ;

(b.) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable instru1nent has been received as conditional payment, and
the condition on which it ·\:vas received has been broken by
reason of the dishonor of the instrument, the insolvency
of the buyer, or otherwise.

(b.) In case of the insolvency of the buyer, a right of

stopping the goods in transitu after he has parted with

the possession of them;

(c.) A right of resale as limited by this act ;

(d.) A right to rescind the sale as limited by this act.

(2.) Where the property in goods has not passed to

the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in addition to his other

remedies, a right of withholding delivery similar to and

coextensive with his rights of lien and stoppage in

( 2.) In this part of this act the term ''seller'' includes
an agent of the seller to whom the bill of lading has been
indorsed, or a consignor or agent who has himself paid,
or is directly responsible for, the price, or any other person who is in the position of a seller.

transitu where the property has passed to the buyer.

Section 53.-Remedies of an Unpaid Seller.-(1.)
Subj ect to the provisions of this act, notwithstanding
that the property in the goods may have passed to the
buyer, the unpaid seller of goods, as such, has( a.) A lien on the goods or right to retain them for
the price while he is in possession of them;
(b.) In case of the insolvency of the buyer, a right of
stopping the goods in transiti1, after he has parted with
the possession of them;
( c.)

A right of resale as limited by this act ;

(d.)

A right to rescind the sale as limited by this act.

( 2.) Where the property in goods has not passed to
the bu3 er, the unpaid seller ha , in addition to hi other
remedies, a right of withholding delivery similar to and
coextensive with his rights of lien and stoppage in
transitu where the property has passed to the buyer.
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Unpaid Sellee's Lien

UNPAID SELLER'S LIEN

Section 54. — When Right of Lien May Be Exercised. —

(1.) Subject to the provisions of this act, the unpaid

seller of goods who is in possession of them is entitled to

retain possession of them until payment or tender of the

price in the following cases, namely:

(a.) Where the goods have been sold without any

stipulation as to credit;

(b.) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but

the term of credit has expired ;

(c.) Where the buyer becomes insolvent.

(2.) The seller may exercise his right of lien not-

withstanding that he is in possession of the goods as

agent or bailee for the buyer.

Section 55. — Lien After Part Delivery. — Where an un-

paid seller has made part delivery of the goods, he may

exercise his right of lien on the remainder, unless such

part delivery has been made under such circumstances

tion.
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as to show an intent to waive the lien or right of reten-

Section 56. — When Lien Is Lost. — (1.) The unpaid

seller of goods loses his lien thereon —

(a.) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other

bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer with-

Section 54.-When Right of Lien May Be Exercised.( 1.) Subject to the provisions of this act, the unpaid
seller of goods who is in possession of them is entitled to
retain possession of them until payment or tender of the
price in the following cases, namely:
(a.) Where the goods have been sold without any
stipulation as to credit;
(b.) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but
the term of credit has expired ;
( c.) Where the buyer becomes insolvent.
( 2.) The seller may exercise his right of lien notwithstanding that he is in possession of the goods as
agent or bailee for the buyer.

out reserving the property in the goods or the right to

the possession thereof;

(b.) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains

possession of the goods;

(c.) By waiver thereof.

Lien lost by carrier's authorized delivery to buyer even though

freight charges were not paid. Norfolk Hardwood Co. v. N. Y. C.

R. R., 202 Mass. 160.

Delivery of possession of negotiable warehouse receipts is delivery

of the goods so as to terminate lien. Rummell v. Blanchard, 216

N. Y. 348, Id. 153 N. Y. S. 159.

When lien is lost by delivery of possession it is not revived by

Section 55.-Lien After Part Delivery.-Where an unpaid seller has made part delivery of the goods, he may
exercise his right of lien on the remainder, unless such
part delivery has been made under such circumstances
as to show an intent to waive the lien or right of retention.

buyer's subsequont return of possession and refusal to pay. Northern

Grain Co. v. Whiffler, 153 N. Y. S. 723.

Section 56.-When Lien Is Lost.-(1.) The unpaid
seller of goods loses his lien thereon( a.) When he delivers the goods to a carrier or other
bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer without reserving the property in the goods or the right to
the possession thereof;
(b.) When the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains
possession of the goods ;
(c.) By waiver thereof.
Lien lost by carrier's authorized deliyery to buyer even though
freight charges were not paid. Norfolk Hardwood Co. v. N. Y. C.
R. R., 202 Mass. 160.
Delivery of possession of negotiable warehouse receipts is delivery
of the goods so as to terminate lien. Rummell v. Blanchard, 216
N. Y. 348, Id. 153 N. Y. S. 159.
When lien is lost by delivery of possession it is not revived by
buyer's subsequ nt r turn of possession and refusal to pay. Northern
[Grain Co. v. Whiffler, 153 N. Y. S. 723.
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(2.) The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien thereon,
does not lose his lien by reason only that he has obtained
judgment or decree for the price of the goods.
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(2.) The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien thereon,

does not lose his lien by reason only that he has obtained

judgment or decree for the price of the goods.

Capriano v. Italian Importing Co., 151 N. Y. S. 994.

Capriano v. Italian Importing Co., 151 N. Y. S. 994.

Stoppage in Teansitu

Section 57 — Seller May Stop Goods on Buyer's Insol-

vency. — Subject to the provisions of this act, when the

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU

buyer of goods is or becomes insolvent, the unpaid seller

who has parted with the possession of the goods has the

right of stopping them in transitu, that is to say, he may

resume possession of the goods at any time while they

are in transit, and he will then become entitled to the

same rights in regard to the goods as he would have

had if he had never parted with the possession.

Eight of stoppage in transitu does not exist where there is no

transit; it can not be involved where goods have been put in possession

of a warehouseman merely as such. Rummell v. Blanchard, 216

N. Y. 348.
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Term "stoppage in transitu" as used in Act, compared with broader,

loose usage, Boyd v. Secondhand Supply Co., 14 Ariz. 36.

Section 58. — When Goods Are in Transit. — (1.) Goods

are in transit within the meaning of section 57 —

(a.) From the time when they are delivered to a car-

rier by land or water, or other bailee for the purpose of

1

Section 57-Seller May Stop Goods on Buyer's Insolvency .-Subject to the provisions of this act, when the
buyer of goods is or becomes insolvent, the unpaid seller
who has parted with the possession of the goods has the
right of stopping them in transitu, that is to say, he may
resume possession of the goods at any time while they
are in transit, and he will then become entitled to the
same rights in regard to the goods as he would have
had if he had never parted with the possession.

transmission to the buyer, until the buyer, or his agent

in that behalf, takes delivery of them from such carrier

or other bailee;

(b.) If the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the

carrier or other bailee continues in possession of them,

even if the seller has refused to receive them back.

(2.) Goods are no longer in transit within the mean-

ing of section 57 —

Right of stoppage in transit,u does not exist where there is no
transit; it can not be invoked where goods have been put in possession
of a warehouseman merely as such. Rummell v. Blanchard, 216
N. Y. 348.
Term "stoppage in transitu" as used in Act, compared with broader,
loose usage, Boyd v. Secondhand Supply Co., 14 Ariz. 36.

(a.) If the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, obtains

delivery of the goods before their arrival at the appointed

destination ;

(b.) If, after the arrival of the goods at the appointed

destination, the carrier or other bailee acknowledges to

Section 58.-When Goods Are in Transit.-(1.) Goods
are in transit within the meaning of section 57( a.) From the time when they are delivered to a carrier by land or water, or other bailee for the purpose of
transmission to the buyer, until the buyer, or his agent
in that behalf, takes delivery of them from such carrier
or other bailee;
(b.) If the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the
carrier or other bailee continues in possession of them,
even if the seller has ref used to receive them back.
(2.) Goods are no longer in transit within the meaning of section 57( a.) If the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, obtains
delivery of the goods before their arrival at the appointed
destination;
(b.) If, after the arrival of the goods at the appointed
destination, the carrier or other bailee acknowledges to
Digitize- by
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the buyer or his agent that he holds the goods on his

behalf and continues in possession of them as bailee for

the buyer or his agent ; and it is immaterial that a fur-

ther destination for the goods may have been indicated

by the buyer;

(c.) If the carrier or other bailee wrongfully refuses

to dehver the goods to the buyer or his agent in that

behalf.

(3.) If goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the

buyer, it is a question depending on the circumstances

of the particular case, wether they are in the possession

of the master as a carrier or as agent of the buyer.

(4.) If part delivery of the goods has been made to

the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, the remainder of

the goods may be stopped in transitu, unless such part

delivery has been made under such circumstances as to

show an agreement with the buyer to give up possession

of the whole of the goods.
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Termination of the transit is a question of fact, rather than

law, and termination is not necessarily shown by fact that goods

had reached destination, buyer had inspected them and taken

samples and carrier had notified buyer that storage charges were

running against the goods. Coleman v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 215

Mass. 45. Cf. Norfolk Hardwood Co. v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 202 Mass. 160.

Buyer turned his bill of lading in to the railroad company and

it was stamped "cancelled by delivery," although the goods never

actually left the carrier's possession. Held, this terminated the

seller's right of stoppage even though the buyer later rejected the

goods, got his bill of lading back from the carrier and had the

the buyer or his agent that he holds the goods on his
behalf and continues in possession of them as bailee for
the buyer or his agent; and it is immaterial that a further destination for the goods may have been indicated
by the buyer ;
( c.) If the carrier or other bailee wrongfully refuses
to deliver the goods to the buyer or his agent in that
behalf.
(3.) If goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the
buyer, it is a question depending on the circumstances
of the particular case, wether they are in the possession
of the master as a carrier or as agent of the buyer.
( 4.) If part delivery of the goods has been made to
the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, the remainder of
the goods may be stopped in transitu, unless such part
delivery has been made under such circumstances as to
show an ag·reement with the buyer to give up possession
of the whole of the goods.

"cancelled" stamp scratched off. Northern Grain Co. v. Whiffler,

153 N. Y. S. 723.

Section 59.— Ways of Exercising the Right to Stop.—

(1.) The unpaid seller may exercise his right of stop-

page in transitu either by obtaining actual possession of

the goods or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier

or other bailee in whose possession the goods are. Such

notice may be given either to the person in actual posses-

sion of the goods or to his principal. In the latter case

the notice, to be effectual, must be given at such time and

Termination of the transit is a question of fact, rather than
law, and termination is not necessarily shown by fact that goods
had reached destination, buyer had inspected them and taken
samples and carrier had notified buyer that storage charges were
running against the goods. Coleman v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 215
Mass. 45. Cf. Norfolk Hardwood Co. v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 202 Mass. 160.
Buyer turned his bill of lading in to the railroad company and
it was stamped "cancelled by delivery," although the goods never
actually left the carrier's possession. Held, this terminated the
seller's right of stoppage even though the buyer later rejected the
goods, got his bill of lading back from the carrier and had the
"cancelled" stamp scratched off. Northern Grain Co. v. Whiffler,
153 N. Y. S. 723.

Section 59.-Ways of Exercising the Right to Stop.( 1.) The unpaid seller may exorcise his right of toppage in transitu either by obtaining actual possession of
the goods or by giving notice of his claim to the carrier
r other bailee in whose possession the goods are. Such
noti ·c may be gi.ven either t th per on in actual possession of th g
s or to his principal. In the latter case
th ' n ti , to b ff tual, mu t be gi.ven at such time and
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under such circumstances that the principal, by the exer-

cise of reasonable diligence, may prevent a delivery to

the buyer.

(2.) When notice of stoppage in transitu is given by

the seller to the carrier, or other bailee in possession of

the goods, he must redeliver the goods to, or according to

the directions of, the seller. The expenses of such deliv-

ery must be borne by the seller. If, however, a negotia-

ble document of title representing the goods has been

issued by the carrier or other bailee, he shall not be

obhged to deliver or justified in delivering the goods to

the seller unless such document is first surrendered for

cancellation.

Transfer by buyer to a sub-buyer of a non-negotiable bill of lading

does not defeat the seller's right of stoppage in transitu; the words

"non-negotiable" stamped on the bill put the sub-buyer on notice. Gass

V. Southern Pacific Co., 137 N. Y. S. 261.

Resale by the Seller
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Section 60. — When and How Resale May Be Made. —

(1.) Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or

under such circumstances that the principal, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, may prevent a delivery to
the buyer.
( 2.) When notice of stoppage in transitu is given py
the seller to the carrier, or other bailee in possession of
the goods, he must redeliver the goods to, or according to
the directions of, the seller. The expenses of such delivery must be borne by the seller. If, however, a negotiable document of title representing the goods has been
issued by the carrier or other bailee, he shall not be
obliged to deliver or justified in delivering the goods to
the seller unless such document is first surrendered for
cancellation.

where the seller expressly reserves the right of resale in

case the buyer should make default, or where the buyer

has been in default in the payment of the price an unrea-

sonable time, an unpaid seller having a right of hen or

having stopped the goods in transitu may resell the goods.

He shall not thereafter be hable to the original buyer

Transfer by buyer to a sub-buyer of a non-negotiable bill of lading
does not defeat the seller's right of stoppage in transitu; the words
"non-negotiable" stamped on the bill put the sub-buyer on notice. Gass
v. Southern Pacific Co., 137 N. Y. S. 261.

upon the contract to sell or the sale or for any profit made

by such resale, but may recover from the buyer damages

RESALE BY THE SELLER

for any loss occasioned by the breach of the contract or

the sale.

(2.) Where a resale is made, as authorized in this

section, the buyer acquires a good title as against the

original buyer.

(3.) It is not essential to the validity of a resale that

notice of an intention to resell the goods be given by the

seller to the original buyer. But where the right to resell

is not based on the perishable nature of the goods or upon

Section 60.-When and How Resale May Be Made.( 1.) Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or
where the seller expressly reserves the right of resale in
case the buyer should make default, or where the buyer
has been in default in the payment of the price an unreasonable time, an unpaid seller having a right of lien or
having stopped the goods in transitu may resell the goods.
He shall not thereafter be liable to the original buyer
upon the contract to sell or the sale or for any profit made
by such resale, but may recover from the buyer damages
for any loss occasioned by the breach of the contract or
the sale.
( 2.) . . Where a resale is made, as authorized in this
section, the buyer acquires a good title as against the
original buyer.
( 3.) It is not essential to the validity of a resale that
notice of an intention to resell the goods be given by the
seller to the original buyer. But where the right to resell
is not based on the perishable nature of the goods or upon
Digitize- by
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an express provision of the contract or the sale, the giving

or failure to give such notice shall be relevant in any issue

involving the question whether the buyer had been in

default an unreasonable time before the resale was made.

(4.) It is not essential to the validity of a resale that

notice of the time and place of such resale should be

given by the seller to the original buyer.

(5.) The seller is bound to exercise reasonable care

and judgment in making a resale, and subject to this

requirement may make a resale either by public or pri-

vate sale.

Rescission by the Seller

Section 61. — When and How the Seller May Rescind

the Sale. — (1.) An unpaid seller having a right of lien

or having stopped the goods in transitu, may rescind

the transfer of title and resume the property in the goods,

where he expressly reserved the right to do so in case

the buyer should make default, or where the buyer has

an express provision of the con tract or the sale, the giving
or failure to give such notice shall be relevant in any issue
involving the question whether the buyer had been in
default an unreasonable time before the resale was made.
( 4.) It is not essential to the validity of a resale that
notice of the time and place of such resale should be
·
given by the seller to the original buyer.
( 5.) The seller is bound to exercise reµ,sonable care
and judgment in making a resale, and subject to this
requirement may make a resale either by public or private sale.
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been in default in the payment of the price an unrea-

RESCISSION BY THE SELLER

sonable time. The seller shall not thereafter be liable

to the buyer upon the contract to sell or the sale, but may

recover from the buyer damages for any loss occasioned

by the breach of the contract or the sale.

(2.) The transfer of title shall not be held to have

been rescinded by an unpaid seller until he has manifested

by notice to the buyer or by some other overt act an

intention to rescind. It is not necessary that such overt

act should be communicated to the buyer, but the giving

or failure to give notice to the buyer of the intention to

rescind shall be relevant in any issue involving the ques-

tion whether the buyer had been in default an unreason-

able time before the right of rescission was asserted.

Seller still in possession of ring held liable to buyer for conversion

and breach of contract for refusal to deliver on buyer's tender of

price, even though the buyer had failed to pay for many months after

the sale and had even written a letter suggesting that the transaction

be rescinded, the seller never having shown any intent to rescind.

Wright V. Andrews, 212 Mass. 186.

Section 61.-When and How the Seller May Rescind
the Sale.-(1.) An unpaid seller having a right of lien
or having stopped the goods in transitu, may rescind
the transfer of title and resume the property in the goods,
where he expressly reserved the right to do so in case
the buyer should make def a ult, or where the buyer has
been in default in the payment of the price an unreasonable time. The seller shall not thereafter be liable
to the buyer upon the contract to sell or the sale, but may
recover from the buyer damages for any loss occasioned
by the breach of the contract or the sale.
(2.) The transfer of title shall not be held to hav-e
been rescinded by an unpaid seller until he has manifested
by notice to the buyer or by some other overt act an
intention to rescind. It is not necessary that such overt
act should be communicated to the buyer, but the giving
or failure to give notice to the buyer of the intention to
rescind shall be relevant in any issue involving the question whether the buyer had been in default an unreasonable time before the right of rescission was asserted.
Seller still in possession of ring held liable to buyer for conversion
and breach of contract for refusal to deliver on buyer's tender of
price, even though the buyer had failed to pay for many months after
the sale and had even written a letter suggesting that the transaction
be rescinded, the seller never having shown any intent to rescind.
Y/rlght v. Andrews, 212 Mass. 186.
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Resale without public auction upheld, Tyng & Co. v. Woodward,

121 Md. 422; Id, 123 Md. 98.

Resale without public auction upheld, Tyng & Co. v. Woodward,
121 Md. 422; Id, 123 Md. 98.

Section 62. — Effect of Sale of Goods Subject to Lien

or Stoppage in Transitu. — Subject to the provisions of

this act, the unpaid seller's right of lien or stoppage in

transitu is not affected by any sale, or other disposition

of the goods which the buyer may have made, unless

the seller has assented thereto.

If, however, a negotiable document of title has been

issued for goods, no seller's lien or right of stoppage in

transitu shall defeat the right of any purchaser for value

in good faith to whom such document has been nego-

tiated, whether such negotiation be prior or subsequent

to the notification to the carrier, or other bailee who

issued such document, of the seller's claim to a lien or

right of stoppage in transitu.

A provision of the EJnglish Act, similar to the first paragraph is

interpreted as to the meaning of "assent" in Mordaunt Brothers v.
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The British Oil etc. Co., (1910) 2 K. B. 502.

The question raised in the text as to the effect of transfer of a

bill of lading, after the original seller had actually reacquired posses-

sion is possibly answered by Section 59 (2), "If, however, a negotiable

document of title representing the goods has been issued by the carrier

or other bailee, he shall not be obliged to deliver or justified in deliver-

ing the goods to the seller unless such document is first surrendered

for cancellation." Transfer of a non-negotiable bill does not defeat

right to stop. Gass v. Southern Pacific Rr. Co., 137 N. Y. S. 261.

Section 62.-Effect of Sale of Goods Subject to Li~n
or Stoppage in Transitu.-Subject to the provisions of
this act, the unpaid seller's right of lien or stoppage in
transitu is not affected by any sale, or other disposition
of the goods which the buyer may have made, unless
the seller has assented thereto.
If, however, a negotiable document of title has been
issued for goods, no seller's lien or right of stoppage in
transitu shall defeat the right of any purchaser for value
in good faith to whom such document has been negotiated, whether such negotiation be prior or subsequent
to the notification to the carrier, or other bailee who
issued such document, of the seller's claim to a lien or
right of stoppage in transitu.

PART V

Actions for Breach of the Contract

Remedies of the Seller

Section 63. — Action for the Price. — (1.) Where, under

a contract to sell or a sale, the property in the goods has

passed to the buyer, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or

refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the

contract or the sale, the seller may maintain an action

against him for the price of the goods.

A provision of the English Act, similar to the first paragraph is
interpreted as to the meaning of "assent" in Mordaunt Brothers v.
The British Oil etc. Co., (1910) 2 K. B. 502.
The question raised in the text as to the effect of transfer of a
bill of lading, after the original seller had actually reacquired possession is possibly answered by Section 59 (2), "If, however, a negotiable
document of title representing the goods has been issued by the carrier
or other bailee, he shall not be obliged to deliver or justified in delivering the goods to the seller unless such document is first surrendered
for cancellation." Transfer of a non-negotiable bill does not defeat
right to stop. Gass v. Southern Pacific Rr. Co., 137 N. Y. S. 261.

PART V
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT
REMEDIES OF THE SELLER

Section 63.-Action for the Price.-(1.) Where, under
a contract to sell or a sale, the property in the goods has
passed to the buyer, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or
refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the
contract or the sale, the seller may maintain an action
against him for the price of the goods.
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(2.) Where, under a contract to sell or a sale, the price
"is payable on a day certain, irrespective of delivery or of
transfer of title, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or
refuses to pay such price, the seller may maintain an
action for the price, although the property in the goods
has not passed, and the goods have not been appropriated
to the contract. But it shall be a defense to such an
action that the seller at any time before judgment in such
action has manifested an inability to pe~f orm the contract or the sale on his part or an intention not to perform it.
( 3.) Although the property in the goods has not
passed, if they cannot readily be resold for a reasonable
price, and if the provisions of section 64 (4) are not applicable, the seller may offer to deliver the goods to the
buyer, and, if the buyer refuses to receive them, may
notify the buyer that the goods are thereafter held by the
seller as bailee for the buyer. Thereafter the seller may
treat the goods as the buyer's and may maintain an
action for the price.

(2.) Where, under a contract to sell or a sale, the price

is payable on a day certain, irrespective of delivery or of

transfer of title, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or

refuses to pay such price, the seller may maintain an

action for the price, although the property in the goods

has not passed, and the goods have not been appropriated

to the contract. But it shall be a defense to such an

action that the seller at any time before judgment in such

action has manifested an inability to perform the con-

tract or the sale on his part or an intention not to per-

form it.

(3.) Although the property in the goods has not

passed, if they cannot readily be resold for a reasonable

price, and if the provisions of section 64 (4) are not ap-

plicable, the seller may offer to dehver the goods to the

buyer, and, if the buyer refuses to receive them, may

notify the buyer that the goods are thereafter held by the

seller as bailee for the buyer. Thereafter the seller may
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treat the goods as the buyer's and may maintain an

action for the price.

Buyer refused to accept goods not specified at time of contract.

Seller was allowed to sue for entire purchase price, on the authority

of Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70, the Act not being mentioned.

Storm V. Rosenthal, 141 N. Y. S. 339. Right to sue, regardless of

passage of title by agreement, stated, without reference to the Act,

Rylance v. Jas. Walker Co., 129 Md. 475, 99 Atl. 597.

Section 64. — Action for Damages for Non-Acceptance

of the Goods. — (1.) Where the buyer wrongfully neglects

or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may

maintain an action against him for damages for non-

acceptance.

(2.) The measure of damages is the estimated loss

directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course

of events, from the buyer's breach of contract.

Buyer refused to accept goods not specified at time of contract.
Seller was allowed to sue for entire purchase price, on the authority
of Van Brocklen v. Smeallie, 140 N. Y. 70, the Act not being mentioned.
Storm v. Rosenthal, 141 N. Y. S. 339. Right to sue, regardless of
passage of title by agreement, stated, without reference to the Act,
Rylance v. Jas. Walker Co., 129 Md. 475, 99 Atl. 597.

(3.) AVhere there is an available market for the goods

in question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of

special circumstances, showing proximate damage of a

greater amount, the difference between the contract price

Section 64.-Action for Damages for Non-Acceptance
of the Goods.-(1.) Wher e the buyer wrongfully neglects
or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may
maintain an action against him for damages for nonacceptance.
(2. ) The measure of damages is the estimated loss
directly and naturally r esulting, in the ordinary course
of events, from the buyer's breach of contract.
( 3.) Where there is an available market for the goods
in qu sii n, the measure of damages is, in the absence of
sp ·ial ·ir ·umstance , showing proximate damage of a
gr at r amount, the differ ence between the contract price
I

~TE

NET A CHIVE

UNIVERS TY OF C/A IFO

~A.

327

UNIFORM SALES ACT
UNIFORM SALES ACT 327

and the market or current price at the time or times when

the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was

fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to

accept. _

(4.) If, while labor or expense of material amount are

necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to fulfill

his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale, the

buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the

seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be

liable to the seller for no greater damages than the seller

would have suffered if he did nothing towards carrying

out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the

buyer's repudiation or countermand. The profit the

seller would have made if the contract or the sale had

been fully performed shall be considered in estimating

such damages.

Section 65. — When Seller May Rescind Contract or

Sale. — Where the goods have not been delivered to the
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buyer, and the buyer has repudiated the contract to sell

or sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his

obligations thereunder, or has committed a material

breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the con-

tract or the sale by giving notice of his election so to do

to the buyer.

Applies to anticipatory breach by buyer, Wetkopsky v. New Haven

Gas Light Co., 90 Conn. 286, 96 Atl. 960.

and the market or current price at the time or times when
the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was
fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to
accept.
( 4.) If, while labor or expense of material amount are
necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to fulfill
his obligations under the contract to sell or the sale, the
buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the
seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be
liable to the seller for no greater damages than the seller
would have suffered if be did nothing towards carrying
out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the
buyer's repudiation or countermand. The profit the
seller would have inade if the contract or the sale had
been fully performed shall be considered in estimating
such damages.

Remedies of the Buyek

Section 66. — Action for Converting or Detaining Goods.

— ^Where the property in the goods has passed to the

buyer and the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to

deliver the goods, the buyer may maintain any action

allowed by law to the o^vner of goods of similar kind

when wrongfully converted or withheld.

Section 67. — Action for Failing to Deliver Goods. —

(1.) Where the property in tlie goods has not passed to

Section 65.-When Seller May Rescind Contract or
Sale.-Where the goods have not been delivered to the
buyer, and the buyer bas repudiated the contract to sell
or sale, or has manifested his inability to perform his
obligations thereunder, or has committed a material
breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract or the sale by giving notice of his election so to do
to the buyer.
Applies to anticipatory breach by buyer, Wetkopsky v. New Haven
Gas Light Co., 90 Conn. 286, 96 Atl. 960.
REMEDIES OF THE BUYER

Section 66.-Action for Converting or Detaining Goods.
-"\Vhere the property in the goods has passed to the
buyer and the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to
deliver the goods, the buyer may maintain any action
allowed by law to the owner of goods of similar kind
when wrongfully converted or withheld.
Section 67.-Action for Failing to Deliver Goods.(1.) Where the property in the goods has not passed to
01 1t1ze by
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the buyer, and the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses

the buyer, and the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses
to deliver the goods, the buyer may maintain an action
against the seller for damages for non-delivery.
( 2.) The measure of damages is the loss directly and
naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events, from
the seller's breach of contract.
( 3.) Where there is an available market for the goods
in question, the measure of damages, in the absence of
i;;pecial circumstances showing proximate damages of a
greater amount, is the difference between the contract
price and the market or current price of the goods at the
time or times when they ought to have been delivered,
or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal
to deliver.

to deliver the goods, the buyer may maintain an action

against the seller for damages for non-delivery.

(2.) The measure of damages is the loss directly and

naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events, from

the seller's breach of contract.

(3.) Where there is an available market for the goods

in question, the measure of damages, in the absence of

special circumstances showing proximate damages of a

greater amount, is the difference between the contract

price and the market or current price of the goods at the

time or times when they ought to have been delivered,

or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal

to deliver. '

Act codifies the common law rule. Banks v. Warner, 85 Conn.

613, 84 Atl. 325.

Although the act fixes the measure of damages it does not con-

stitute them liquidated damages within the meaning of a statute per-
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mitting set-off of liquidated damages. Westminster Metal etc. Co.

V. Coffman, 123 Md. 619, 91 Atl. 716.

The market value at places other than that of delivery may be

shown under proper circumstances. U. S. Commercial Co. v. Joachim-

stahl, — N. J. — , 72 Atl. 46.

The price actually paid by the buyer in getting other goods in

place of those contracted for does not necessarily show the market

price nor fix the damages. Sauer v. McClintic etc. Co., 179 Mich.

618, 146 N. W. 422.

The fact that the buyer has made a contract to resell at a profit,

if unknown to the seller, is not such a "special circumstance" as

will change the measure of damage fixed by sub-section 3. Pope v.

Ferguson, 82 N. J. L. 566, 83 Atl. 353.

Special cause of damage must have been within the seller's con-

templation to be ground for a recovery. Arizona Power Co. v. Racine

Sattley Co., 13 Ariz. 283, 114 Pac. 558.

"The circumstances of each case must determine what measure of

damages should apply, having in view always the giving of actual

compensation for actual loss," McFadden v. Shanley, 16 Ariz. 91,

141 Pac. 732, citing common law authority; Hanson & Parker v.

Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319, 91 N. E. 383.

Section 68. — Specific Performance. — Where the seller

has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained

goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity

Act codifies the common law rule, Banks v. Warner, 85 Conn.
613, 84 Atl. 325.
Although the act fixes the measure of damages it does not constitute them liquidated damages within the meaning of a statute permitting set-off of liquidated damages. Westminster Metal etc. Co.
v. Coffman, 123 Md. 619, 91 Atl. 716.
The market value at places other than that of delivery may be
shown under proper circumstances. U. S. Commercial Co. v. Joachimstahl, - N. J. -, 72 Atl. 46.
The price actually paid by the buyer in getting other goods in
place of those contracted for does not necessarily show the market
price nor fix the damages. Sauer v. Mcclintic etc. Co., 179 Mich.
618, 146 N. W. 422.
The fact that the buyer has made a contract to resell at a profit,
if unknown to the seller, is not such a "special circumstance" as
will change the measure of damage fixed by sub-section 3. Pope v.
Ferguson, 82 N. J. L. 566, 83 Atl. 353.
Special cause of damage must have been within the seller's contemplation to be ground for a recovery. Arizona Power Co. v. Racine
Sattley Co., 13 Ariz. 283, 114 Pac. 558.
"The circumstances of each case must determine what measure of
damages should apply, having in view always the giving of actual
compensation for actual loss," McFadden v. Shanley, 16 Ariz. 91,
141 Pac. 732, citing common law authority; Hanson & Parker v.
Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319, 91 N. E. 383.

c

Section 68.-Specific Performance.-Where the seller
ha. hr k n a contr ct to d liver specific or ascertained
"0 d.·, a · urt having the powers of a court of equity

I TE NET ARCHIVE

UNIVERS TY OF C.A I 0

A

UNIFORM SALES ACT

329

UNIFORM SALES ACT 329

may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by

its judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be

performed specifically, without giving the seller the op-

tion of retaining the goods on payment of damages. The

judgment or decree may be unconditional, or upon such

terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the price

and otherwise, as to the court may seem just.

Section 69. — Remedies for Breach of Warranty. — (1.)

Where there is a breach of w^arranty by the seller, the

buyer may, at his election —

(a.) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the

seller, the breach of warranty by way of recoupment in

may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by
Hs judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be
performed specifically, without giving the seller the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages. The
judgment or decree may be unconditional, or upon such
terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the price
and otherwise, as to the court may seem just.

diminution or extinction of the price ;

(b.) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action

against the seller for damages for the breach of war-

ranty ;

(c.) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property there-

in has not passed, and maintain an action against the
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seller for damages for the breach of warranty;

(d.) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse

to receive the goods, or if the goods have ali^eady been

received, return them or offer to return them to the seller

and recover the price or any part thereof which has been

paid.

Option of rescinding contract for unspecific goods or of keeping

the goods tendered and suing for damages allowed, on common law

authorities. Borden v. Fine, 212 Mass. 425.

Plaintiff agreed to sell "draft arms" which would serve to draw

both still and live beer from the same keg, said arms to be made

according to a special design which the plaintiff submitted to the

buyer. Some arms were received and part of the price paid. The arms

did not accomplish the purpose contemplated by the contract. On

suit by the seller for the rest of the price the defendant claimed the

right of avoiding the contract and recovering the money already paid,

on the ground that the seller in stating that the arms would serve the

purpose contemplated had been guilty of fraud in law (although ad-

mittedly not of fraud in fact). The defendant does not seem to have

based his contention on this section, 69 (1) (d), which seems obviously

apt, and the court made no mention of it in denying the right to

rescind, saying that the seller's representation was a mere statement

Section 69.-Remedies for Breach of Warranty.-(1.)
Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the
buyer may, at his election( a.) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the
seller, the breach of warranty by way of recoupment in
diminution or extinction of the price;
(b.) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action
against the seller for damages for the breach of wari'anty;
( c.) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property therein has not passed, and maintain an action against the
seller for damages for the breach of warranty ;
(d.) R escind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse
to receive the goods, or if the goods have already been
received, return them or offer to return them to the seller
and recover the price or any part thereof which has been
paid.
Option of rescinding contract for unspecific goods or of keeping
the goods tendered and suing for damages allowed, on common law
authorities. Borden v. Fine, 212 Mass. 425.
Plaintiff agreed to sell "draft arms" which would serve to draw
both still and live beer from the same keg, said arms to be made
according to a special design which the plaintiff submitted to the
buyer. Some arms were received and part of the price paid. The arms
did not accomplish the purpose contemplated by the contract. On
suit by the seller for the rest of the price the defendant cla imed the
right of avoiding the contract and recovering the money already paid,
on the ground that the seller in stating that the arms would serve the
purpose contemplated had been guilty of fraud in law (alt hough admittedly not of fraud in fact). The defendant does not seem to have
based his contention on this section, 69 (1) (d), which seems obviously
apt, and the court made no mention of it in de nying the right to
rescind, saying that the seller's representation was a mere statement
D
I:.
Jn
T

I TERNET ARCHIVE

UNIVERS TY OF CA IFORNIA

330

UNIFORM SALES ACT

330 UNIFORM SALES ACT

of opinion as to what arms such as they had designed ought to do.
Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Spring Water Co., 207 Mass. 488.

of opinion as to what arms such as they had designed ought to do.

Am. Soda Fountain Co. v. Spring Water Co., 207 Mass. 488.

(2.) When the buyer has claimed and been granted a

remedy in any one of these ways, no other remedy can

(2.) When the buyer has claimed and been granted a
remedy in any one of these ways, no other remedy can
thereafter be granted.

thereafter be granted.

Breach of condition, or warranty, in one contract does not justify

buyer in refusing to continue with an other contemporaneous but

distinct contract. Hanson v. Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319.

Section 69 (2.) Buyer who has rescinded for breach can not also

Breach of condition, or warranty, in one contract does not justify
buyer in refusing to continue with an other contemporaneous but
distinct contract. Hanson v. Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319.
Section 69 (2.) Buyer who has rescinded for breach can not also
have damages. Gerli & Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Co., 80 N. J. 128.

have damages. Gerli & Co. v. Mistletoe Silk Co., 80 N. J. 128.

(3.) "Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer,

he cannot rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of

warranty when he accepted the goods, or if he fails to

notify the seller within a reasonable time of the election

to rescind, or if he fails to return or to offer to return the

(3.) Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer,
he cannot rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of
warranty when he accepted the goods, or if he fails to
notify the seller ·within a reasonable ti1ne of the election
to rescind, or if he fails to return or to offer to return the
goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as
they were in at the time the property was transferred to
the buyer. But if deterioration or injury of the goods is
due to the breach of warranty, such deterioration or
injury shall not prevent the buyer from returning or
offering to return the goods to the seller and rescinding
the sale.

goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as

they were in at the time the property was transferred to

the buyer. But if deterioration or injury of the goods is
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due to the breach of warranty, such deterioration or

injury shall not prevent the buyer from returning or

offering to return the goods to the seller and rescinding

the sale.

Accord as to remedies and effect of unreasonable delay, but Act

not mentioned and common law cases cited. Question of unreasonable

delay held properly decided by court. Kelsey v. J. W. Ringrose Co.,

152 Wis. 499.

Right of rescission not lost by use without knowledge of the

seller's failure to perform, act not mentioned. Enterprise Mfg. Co.

V. Oppenheim, 114 Md. 368.

Acceptance of one installment with knowledge that it was deficient

in quantity precludes rescission of contract and rejection of other

installments. Craig v. Lane, 212 Mass. 195.

Acceptance with knowledge of defects precludes rescission, Puffer

Mfg. Co. V. Krum, 210 Mass. 211.

Accord. Schindler v. Sperling, 155 N. Y. S. 348.

Resale of perishable goods by the buyer as agent ex necessitate of

Accord as to remedies and effect of unreasonable delay, but Act
not mentioned and common law cases cited. Question of unreasonable
delay held properly decided by court. Kelsey v. J. W. Ringrose Co.,
152 Wis. 499.
Right of rescission not lost by use without knowledge of the
seller's failure to perform, act not mentioned. Enterprise Mfg. Co.
v. Oppenheim, 114 Md. 368.
Acceptance of one installment with knowledge that it was deficient
in quantity precludes rescission of contract and rejection of other
installments. Craig v. Lane, 212 Mass. 195.
Acceptance with knowledge of defects precludes rescission, Puffer
Mfg. Co. v. Krum, 210 Mass. 211.
Accord, Schindler v. Sperling, 155 N. Y. S. 348.
Resale of perishable goods by the buyer as agent ex necessitate of
the seller is not an acceptance of the goods by the buyer. Descalzi
Fruit Co. v. Sweet, 30 R. I. 320.
Applied, Skillings v. Collins, 224 Mass. 275.
Cf. Erwin v. Detwiler, 75 N. J. L. 420.

the seller is not an acceptance of the goods by the buyer. Descalzi

Fruit Co. V. Sweet, 30 R. I. 320.

Applied, SklUings v. Collins, 224 Mass. 275.

Of. Erwin v. Detwiler, 75 N. J. L. 420.

(4.) Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale

and elects to do so, the buyer shall cease to be liable for

c

(4.) Where th buy r is entitled to re cind the sale
and cl cts to d o, the buyer shall cease to be liable for
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the price upon returning or offering to return the goods.

If the price or any part thereof has already been paid,

the seller shall be liable to repay so much thereof as has

been paid, concurrently with the return of the goods, o*r

immediately after an offer to return the goods in ex-

change for repayment of the price.

(5.) Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale

and elects to do so, if the seller refuses to accept an offer

of the buyer to return the goods, the buyer shall there-

after be deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the seller,

the price upon returning or offering to return the goods.
If the price or any part thereof has already been paid,
the seller shall be liable to repay so much thereof as has
been paid, concurrently with the return of the goods, o!:
immediately after an offer to return the goods in exchange for repayment of the price.

but subject to a lien to secure the repayment of any por-

tion of the price which has been paid, and with the reme-

dies for the enforcement of such lien allowed to an unpaid

seller by section 53.

(6.) The measure of damages for breach of warranty

is the loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary

course of events, from the breach of warranty.

(7.) In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such
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loss, in the absence of special circumstances shomng

proximate damage of a greater amount, is the difference

between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to

the buyer and the value they would have had if they had

answered to the warranty.

Left to jury to say whether express warranty was made or not,

( 5.) Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale
and elects to do so, if the seller refuses to accept an offer
of the buyer to return the goods, the buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the seller,
but subject to a lien to secure the repayment of any portion of the price which has been paid, and with the remedies for the enforcement of such lien allowed to an unpaid
seller by section 53.

Gascoine v. Carey Brick Co., 217 Mass. 304.

An express warranty may be merged into a subsequent contract

in such a way as to be eliminated. Hamilton Iron etc. Co. v. Grove-

land etc. Co., 233 Fed. (Ohio) 388.

Interpretation of an express warranty that a horse is "sound,"

Andrews v. Peck, 83 Conn. 666.

An express warranty that chattel is in good condition can not be

pleaded in same count with a promise to keep in repair. White Auto.

Co. V. Dorsey, 119 Md. 251.

Breach of the warranty must be proved by the person relying on it.

Waterman v. School Dist., 182 Mich. 498.

Opinion distinguished, Coleman v. Simpson Co., 147 N. Y. S. 865.

Provision that "any (nursery) stock which does not prove to be

true to name as labeled is to be replaced free, or purchase price re-

funded" held not to limit seller's liability to replacement or cost

price only. Sanford v. Brown Bros. Co., 208 N. Y. 90.

( 6.) The measure of damages for breach of warranty
i8 the loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary
course of events, from the breach of warranty.
(7.) In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such
loss, in the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damage of a greater amount, is the difference
between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to
the buyer and the value they would have had if they had
answered to the warranty.
Left to jury to say whether express warranty was made or not,
Gascoine v. Carey Brick Co., 217 Mass. 304.
An express warranty may be merged into a subsequent contract
in such a way as to be eliminated. Hamilton Iron etc. Co. v. Groveland etc. Co., 233 Fed. (Ohio) 388.
Interpretation of an express warranty that a horse is "sound,"
Andrews v. Peck, 83 Conn. 666.
An express warranty that chattel is in good condition can not be
pleaded in same count with a promise to keep in repair. White Auto.
Co. v. Dorsey, 119 Md. 251.
Breach of the warranty must be proved by the person relying on it.
Waterman v. School Dist., 182 Mich. 498.
Opinion distinguished, Coleman v. Simpson Co., 147 N. Y. S. 865.
Provision that "any (nursery) stock which does not prove to be
true to name as labeled is to be replaced free, or purchase price refunded" held not to limit seller's liability to replacement or cost
price only. Sanford v. Brown Bros. Co., 208 N. Y. 90.
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Section 69 (6 and 7.) Accord, Hanson v. Wittenberg, 205 Mass 319.

Damage for failure to deliver fixed by market price of goods

available at the place and time for delivery. Fowler v. Gress Mfg.

Co., 158 N. Y. S. 524.

Accord with act. White Auto Co. v. Dorsey, 119 Md. 251.

Section 69 (6.) Applied, Foundry Co. v. Stone, 92 O. S. 76.

Special damages allowed, Glann v. White, 181 Mich. 320, 148

N. W.. 210.

Section 70. — Interest and Special Damages. — Nothing

Section 69 (6 and 7.) Accord, Hanson v. Wittenberg, 205 'Mass 319.
Damage for failure to deliver fixed by market price of goods
available at the place and time for delivery. Fowler v. Gress Mfg.
Co., 158 N. Y. S. 524.
Accord with act, White Auto Co. v. Dorsey, 119 Md. 251.
Section 69 (6.) Applied, Foundry Co. v. Stone, 92 0. S. 76.
Special damages allowed, Glann v. White, 181 Mich. 320, 148
N. W .• 210.

in this act shall affect the right of the buyer or the seller

to recover interest or special damages in any case where

by law interest or special damages may be recoverable,

or to recover money paid where the consideration for the

payment of it has failed.

PART VI

Intekpretation

Section 71. — Variation of Implied Obligations. — Where

any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract
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to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived

or varied by express agreement or by the course of deal-

Section 70.-Interest and Special Damages.-N othing
in this act shall affect the right of the buyer or the seller
to recover interest or special damages in any case where
by law interest or special damages may be recoverable,
or to recover money paid where the consideration for the
payment of it has failed.

ing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be

such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.

Section 72. — Rights May Be Enforced By Action. —

PART VI

Where any right, duty or liability is declared by this act,

it may, unless otherwise by this act provided, be enforced

by action.

INTERPRETATION

Section 73. — Rule for Cases Not Provided for by this

Act. — In any case not provided for in this act, the rules

of law and equity, including the law merchant, and in

particular the rules relating to the law of principal and

agent and to the effect of fraud, misrepresentation,

duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other inval-

idating cause, shall continue to apply to contracts to sell

and to sales of ."roods.

Section 71.-Variation of Implied Obligations.-Where
any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract
to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived
or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be
such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.
Section 72.-Rights May Be Enforced By Action.Where any right, duty or liability is declared by this act,
it may, unless otherwise by this act provided, be enforced
by action.
Section 73.-Rule for Cases Not Provided for by this
Act.-In any case not provided for in this act, the rules
of law and equity, including the law merchant, and in
particular the rules relating to the law of principal and
agent and to the effect of fraud, misrepresentation,
dur ss or coercion, mistake, bankrupt y, or other invalidating cause, hall continue to apply to contracts to sell
and to sales of 3oods~
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Section 74. — Interpretation Shall Give Effect to Pur-

pose of Uniformity, — This act shall be so interpreted and

construed, as to effectuate its general purpose to make

uniform the laws of those states which enact it.

The meaning and effect of such provisions in Uniform Acts is

333

Section 74.-Interpretation Shall Give Effect to Purpose of Uniformity.-This act shall be so interp reted and
construed, as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the laws of those states which enact it.

discussed by Jacob Sicherman in 2 Am. Bar Assn. Jrnl. 60.

The marked diversity of decision under the Uniform Negotiable

Instruments Act, is pointed out in 34 Repts. of Am. Bar Assn. 1030,

39 Id. 1065.

In Pope V. Ferguson, 82 N. J. L. 566, the court looked to the deci-

sions in other jurisdictions with the express purpose of securing

uniformity.

Section 75. — Provisions Not Applicable to Mortgages.

— The provisions of this act relating to contracts to

sell and to sales do not apply, unless so stated, to any

transaction in the form of a contract to sell or a sale

The meaning and effect of such provisions in Uniform Acts is
discussed by Jacob Sicherman in 2 Am. Bar Assn. Jrnl. 60.
The marked diversity of decision under the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act, is pointed out in 34 Repts. of Am. Bar Assn. 1030,
39 Id. 1065.
In Pope v. Ferguson, 82 N. J. L. 566, the court looked to the deci·
sions in other jurisdictions with the express purpose of securing
uniformity.

which is intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge,

charge, or other security.
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Section 76. — Definitions. — (1.) In this act, unless the

context or subject matter otherwise requires —

"Action" includes counterclaim, set-off and suit in

equity.

''Buyer" means a person who buys or agrees to buy

goods, or any legal successor in interest of such person.

"Defendant" includes a plaintiff against whom a

right of set-off or counterclaim is asserted.

"Delivery" means voluntary transfer of possession

from one person to another.

Section 75.-Provisions Not Applicable to Mortgages.
-The provisions of this act relating to contracts to
sell and to sales do not apply, unless so stated, to any
transaction in the form of a contract to sell or a sale
which is intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge,
charge, or other security.

"Divisible contract to sell or sale" means a contract

to sell or a sale in which by its terms the price for a

portion or portions of the goods less than the whole is

fixed or ascertainable by computation.

"Document of title to goods" includes any bill of

lading, dock warrant, warehouse receipt or order for the

delivery of goods, or any other document used in the

ordinary course of business in the sale or transfer of

goods, as proof of the possession or control of the goods,

Section 76.-Definitions.-(1.) In this act, unless the
context or subject matter othenvise requires" Action" includes counterclaim, set-off and suit in
equity.
''Buyer'' means a person who buys or agrees to buy
goods, or any legal successor in interest of such person.
''Defendant'' includes a plaintiff against whom a
right of set-off or counterclaim is asserted.
''Delivery'' means voluntary transfer of possession
from one person to another.
"Divisible contract to sell or sale" means a contract
to sell or a sale in which by its terms the price for a
portion or portions of the goods less than the whole i
fixed or ascertainable by computation.
''Document of title to goods'' includes any bill of
lading, dock warrant, warehouse r eceipt or order for the
delivery of goods, or any other docun1ent used in the
ordinary course of business in tho al or transfer of
goods, as proof of the possession or control of tho goods,
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or authorizing or purporting to authorize the possessor
of the document to transfer or receive, either by indorsement or by delivery, goods represented by such document.
"Fault" means wrongful act or default.
"Fungible goods" means goods of which any unit is
from its nature or by mercantile usage treated as the
equivalent of any other unit.

334 UNIFORM SALES ACT

or authorizing or purporting to authorize the possessor

of the document to transfer or receive, either by indorse-

ment or by delivery, goods represented by such docu-

ment.

'* Fault" means wrongful act or default.

''Fungible goods" means goods of which any unit is

from its nature or by mercantile usage treated as the

equivalent of any other unit.

In Gowd V. Healy, 206 N. Y. 423, the contract was for fifty cases

of wine out of a larger quantity, apparently of cases rather than

of wine in bulk. It was held to be a sale of fungible goods.

"Future goods" means goods to be manufactured or

In Gowd v. Healy, 206 N. Y. 423, the contract was for fifty cases
of wine out of a larger quantity, apparently of cases rather than
of wine in bulk. It was held to be a sale of fungible goods.

acquired by the seller after the making of the contract

of sale.

* ' Goods ' ' include all chattels personal other than things

in action and money. The term includes emblements,

industrial growing crops, and things attached to or

''Future goods'' means goods to be manufactured or
acquired by the seller after the making of the contract
of sale.
''Goods'' include all chattels personal other than things
in action and money. The term includes emblements,
industrial growing crops, and things attached to or
forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed
before sale or under the contract of sale.

forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed
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before sale or under the contract of sale.

Corporate stock is goods, wares, and merchandises. Laundry Co. v.

Whitmore, 92 O. S. 44.

"Order" in sections of this act relating to documents

of title means an order by indorsement on the document.

"Person" includes a corporation or partnership, or

two or more persons having a joint or common interest.

"Plaintiff" includes defendant asserting a right of

set-off or counterclaim.

"Property" means the general property in goods, and

not merely a special property.

"Purchaser" includes mortgagee and pledgee.

"Purchases" includes taking as a mortgagee or as a

Corporate stock is goods, wares, and merchandises.
Whitmore, 92 0. S. 44.

pledgee.

"Quality of goods" includes their state or condition.

"Sale" includes a bargain and sale, as well as a sale

Laun.dry Co. v.

and delivery.

"Order" in sections of this act relating to documents
of title means an order by indorsement on the document.
''Person'' includes a corporation or partnership, or
two or more persons having a joint or common interest.
"Plaintiff" includes defendant asserting a right of
set-off or counterclaim.
''Property'' means the general property in goods, and
not merely a special property.
''Purchaser'' includes mortgagee and pledgee.
''Purchases'' includes taking as a mortgagee or as a
pledgee.
''Quality of goods'' includes their state or condition.
'' S le'' includes a bargain and sale, as well as a sale
and d ·livery.

A contract obligating an agent to make a certain number of

"sales" was held to refer only to effectuated transfers of title and

A contract obligating an agent to make a certain number of
"sales" was held to refer only to effectuated transfers of title and
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not to include contracts to transfer title. The act was not mentioned.
UNIFORM SALES ACT 335

Hall v. French Am. Wine Co., 134 N. Y. S. 158.

not to include contracts to transfer title. The act was not mentioned.

Hall V. French Am. Wine Co., 134 N. Y. S. 158.

''Seller" means a person who sells or agrees to sell

goods, or any legal successor in the interest of suclj

person.

''Specific goods" means goods identified and agreed

upon at the time a contract to sell or a sale is made.

"Value" is any consideration sufficient to support a

simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing claim,

whether for money or not, constitutes value where goods

or documents of title are taken either in satisfaction

thereof or as security therefor.

(2.) A thing is done "in good faith" within the mean-

ing of this act when it is in fact done honestly, whether

it be done neghgently or not.

(3.) A person is insolvent within the meaning of this

act who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary

course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become
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due, whether he has committed an act of bankruptcy or

not, and whether he is insolvent within the meaning of

the federal bankruptcy law or not.

(4.) Goods are in a "deliverable state" within^ the

meaning of this act when they are in such a state that

the buyer would, under the contract, be bound to take

delivery of them.

Section 76a. — Act Does Not Apply to Existing Sales

or Contracts to Sell. — None of the provisions of this act

shall apply to any sale, or to any contract to sell, made

prior to the taking effect of this act.

Section 76b. — No Repeal of Uniform Warehouse

Receipt Act or Uniform Bills of Lading Act. — Nothing

ill this act or in any repealing clause thereof shall be

construed to repeal or limit any of the provisions of the

Act to Make Uniform the Law of Warehouse Receipts,

or of the Act to Make Uniform the Law of Bills of Ladins:.

''Seller'' means a person who sells or agrees to sell
goods, or any legal successor in the interest of sue}}.
person.
"Specific goods" means goods identified and agreed
upon at the time a contract to sell or a sale is made.
''Value'' is any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing claim,
whether for money or not, constitutes value where goods
or documents of title are taken either in satisfaction
thereof or as security therefor.
(2.) A thing is done "in good faith" within the meaning of this act when it is in fact done honestly, whether
it be done negligently or not.
( 3.) A person is insolvent within the meaning of this
act who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become
due, whether he has committed an act of bankruptcy or
not, and whether he is insolvent within the meaning of
the federal bankruptcy law or not.
(4.) Goods are in a "deliverable state" within the
•
meaning of this act when they are in such a state that
the buyer would, under the contract, be bound to take
delivery of them.
Section 76a.-Act Does Not Apply to Existing Sales
or Contracts to Sell.-N one of the provisions of this act
shall apply to any sale, or to any contract to sell, made
prior to the taking effect of this act.
Section 76b.-No Repeal of Uniform Warehouse
Receipt Act or Uniform Bills of Lading Act.-Nothing
in this act or in any repealing clause thereof shall be
construed to repeal or limit any of the provisions of the
Act to :J1ake Dniforn1 the Law of v\ arehouse Receipts,
or of the Act to Make Uniform the Law of Bills of Ladin~:.
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Section 77. — Inconsistent Legislation Repealed. — All

acts or parts of acts inconsisteut with this act are hereby-

repealed, except as provided in Section 76b.

Section 77 .-Inconsistent Legislation Repealed.-All
acts or parts of acts inconsistent with thi8 act arc her eby
repealed, except as provided in Section 76b.

Section 78.— Time When the Act Takes Effect.— This

act shall take effect on the day of ,

one thousand nine hundred and

Section 79. — Name of Act. — This act may be cited as

the Uniform Sales Act.

Section 78.-Time When the Act Takes Effect.-This
act shall take effect on the ....... day of .............. ,
one thousand nine hundred and ........ .
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Section 79.-Name of Act.-This act may be cited as
the Uniform Sales Act.
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ACCEPTANCE—

INDEX

of title, 95, 100.

under Statute of Frauds, 262.

ACQUISITION OF GOODS, 72.

ACTIONS—

breach of contract by buyer, 90, 99, 110.

by seller, 152.
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breach of warranty, 184, 199.

for purchase price, 92, 99, 109, 147.

A

after possession retaken, 106.

after title passed, 109.

before possession given, 121.

before title passed, 92.

effect on lien, 119.

effect on right to possession, 103.

for possession, in general, 102.
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AGENT—

acceptance by, 268.

payment by, 278.

sale by, 71N, 203.

signature by, 252.

APPROPRIATION OF GOODS, 40.

ASSIGNMENT, 12.

ATTACHMENT—

as affecting lien, 142.

stoppage in transitu, 142,

as affecting title, 218.

B

BAILMENT, 3, 6.

BARTER, 8, 241.
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BILL OF LADING—

as affecting retention of possession, 219.

as affecting title, 55, 60, 62, 223.

stoppage in transitu, 221.

as indicative of title, 210.

BONDS, 209.

BREACH OF CONTRACT-^

(See, Actions.)

c

BILL OF LADINGas affecting retention of possession, 219.
as affecting title, 55, 60, 62, 223.
stoppage in tramsitu, 221.
as indicative of title, 210.
BONDS, 209.
BREACH OF CONTRACT-::
(See, Actions.)

CARRIER—

delivery to, as affecting inspection, 161.

c

as affecting seller's lien, 113.

as satisfying Statute of Frauds, 269.

as affecting title, 29, 40, 49, 60, 161.

lien of, 143.

CASH SALES, 33.

CHOSES IN ACTION, 13, 243.
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C. O. D., 35.

CONDITIONAL SALE, 99, 102, 106, 206.

CONDITIONS, 29, 32, 39, 157, 168, 173, 180N.

CONSENT—

(See Intent.)

to passing of title, 95, 100.

CONSIDERATION, 8, 17, 185.

CONTRACT—

(See Statute of Frauds.)

essential to a sale, 14, 227.

of sale, 232.

person contracted with, 227.

separate, 249, 273.

to manufacture, 233.

CREDIT—

as affecting right to sue, 109.

lien, 115.

CREDITORS—

rights of, 218.

under Statute of Frauds, 281.

D

DAMAGES, 94, 153, 197.

(See, Actions.)

DELIVERY—

(See, Lien, Stoppage in transitu, Transit)

as affecting title, 17, 27, 29, 32. 60.

as condition precedent to suit, 121.

to carrier (see Carrier).

CARRIERdelivery to, as affecting inspection, 161.
as affecting seller's lien, 113.
as satisfying Statute of Frauds, 269.
as affecting title, 29, 40, 49, 60, 161.
lien of, 143.
CASH SALES, 33.
CHOSES IN ACTION, 13, 243.
C. 0. D., 35.
CONDITIONAL SALE, 99, 102, 106, 206.
CONDITIONS, 29, 32, 39, 157, 168, 173, 180N.
CONSENT( See Intent.)
to passing of title, 95, 100.
CONSIDERATION, 8, 17, 185.
CONTRACT(See Statute of Frauds.)
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of sale, 232.
person contracted with, 227.
separate, 249, 273.
to manufacture, 233.
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lien, 115.
CREDITORSrights of, 218.
under Statute of Frauds, 281.
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DAMAGES, 94, 153, 197.
(See, Actions.)
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as condition precedent to suit, 121.
to carrier (see Carrier).
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ESTOPPEL, 68, 121, 207, 208, 212.

EXAMINATION (see Inspection).

EXCHANGE—

what is, 8.

within Statute of Frauds, 241.

F

FIXTURES, 246.

FOOD, WARRANTY OF, 195.

FRAUD, 212, 225.

as affecting lien, 114.

title, 203.

as ground for rescission, 148.

FRAUDS (See, Statute of Frauds).

FUNGIBLE GOODS, 63, 68, 179.

FUTURE GOODS, 70.
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GIFT, 8, 17.

GOODS NOT IN EXISTENCE, 70.

GOODS, WARES AND MERCHANDISE, 243.

GRASS, 246.

GROWING CROPS, 245.

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS, 40, 168, 182.

INCORPOREAL PROPERTY, 12, 243.

INFANTS, AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT BY, 229.

INSANE PERSONS, AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT BY, 230.

INSOLVENCY—

as affecting lien, 116.

as evidence of fraud, 150.

as permitting stoppage in transitu, 132.

as justifying resale, 125.

evidence of, 118, 133.

INSPECTION, 157, 166.

INTENT—

as to character of transaction, 4, 11.

person contracted with, 227.

Statute of Frauds, 265, 272.

title, 19, 65, 72.

warranty, 186.

conflicting, 60.
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L

LIEN—

LIENcarrier's, 143.
seller's,
what is, 111.
enforcement ot, 122.
loss of, 112.

carrier's, 143.

seller's,

what is, 111.

enforcement of, 122.

loss of, 112.

M

MANUFACTURE OF GOODS—

after buyer's breach, 90.

contract for, 233.

M

effect on title, 75.

MARKET VALUE—

MANUFACTURE OF GOODSafter buyer's breach, 90.
contract for, 233.
effect on title, 75.
MARKET VALUEas showing damages, 89.
recovery of, 148.
MEMORANDUM, 250.
contents of, 258.
signing of, 252.
MONEYas characterizing transaction, 8.
passes free from equities, 209.
recovery of, 157, 177.

as showing damages, 89.

recovery of, 148.

MEMORANDUM, 250.

contents of, 258.
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signing of, 252.

MONEY—

as characterizing transaction, 8.

passes free from equities, 209.

recovery of, 157, 177.

N

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 209, 228N, 243.

NON-EXISTENT GOODS, 70.

NOTICE—

of resale, 90, 91, 129.

of title in another, 225.

Hnder stoppage in trcmsitu, 144, 222.

OPINIONS, 172, 188.

OWNERSHIP, MEANING OF, 2, 18.

PAYMENT (See, Conditional Sale)—

as affecting stoppage in transitu, 276.

N

title, 76.

under Statute of Frauds, 275.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 209, 228N, 243.
NON-EXISTENT GOODS, 70.
NOTICEof resale, 90, 91, 129.
of title in another, 225.
wnder stoppage in troositru, 144, 222.

PERSON CONTRACTED WITH, 227.

PLEDGE, 3, 8.

0
OPINIONS, 172, 188.
OWNERSHIP, MEANING OF, 2, 18.

p
PAYMENT (See, Conditional Sale)as affecting stoppage in troositu, 276.
title, 76.
under Statute of Frauds, 275.
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PLEDGE, 3, 8.
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PLEDGEE, RIGHTS OF, 203, 206, 223.

POSSESSION—

(See, Lien, Stoppage in transitu. Transit.)

as affecting title, 17, 29, 32, 212.

as indicating title, 201.

buyer's right to, 176, 178.

delivery of, 113, 218, 264.

lien by, 112.

recovery of, 102, 106, 130, 134, 147, 201.

retention of, 212.

return of, 177.

PRESUMPTIONS—

of intent as to title, 19, 49, 54, 66.

rebuttal of, 38, 54, 57, 59.

PRICE (See, Actions), 1, 8.

Statute of Frauds, 249.

PUBLIC POLICY, 186, 207, 214.
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PURCHASERS FROM ONE WITHOUT TITLE, 201.

REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTIONS, 38, 54, 59.

RECEIPT, UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 262.

(See, Carrier.)

RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID, 157, 177.

PLEDGEE, RIGHTS OF, 203, 206, 223.
POSSESSION( See, Lien, Stoppage in transitu, Transit.)
as affecting title, 17, 29, 32, 212.
as indicating title, 201.
buyer's right to, 176, 178.
delivery of, 113, 218, 264.
lien by, 112.
recovery of, 102, 106, 130, 134, 147, 201.
retention of, 212.
return of, 177.
PRESUMPTIONSof intent as to title, 19, 49, 54, 66.
rebuttal of, 38, 54, 57, 59.
PRICE (See, Actions), 1, 8.
Statute of Frauds, 249.
PUBLIC POLICY, 186, 207, 214.
PURCHASERS FROM ONE WITHOUT TITLE, 201.

(See, Actions.)

RECOVERY OF POSSESSION—

(See, Actions.)

R

after title passed, 102, 134, 147.

by stoppage in transitu, 130.

effect on right to price, 106.

from third persons, 201.

RESALE, 89, 122.

notice of (See, Notice.)

RESCISSION, 126, 146, 148, 225.

RETENTION OF POSSESSION, 212.

RETURN OF GOODS BOUGHT, 7, 177.

of money paid, 103.

s

SALE—

by agent, 203.

by one not in possession, 219.

by one not owner, 70, 201.

by one having voidable title, 225.

contract for, 14, 227, 232.

REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTIONS, 38, 54, 59.
RECEIPT, UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 262.
(See, Carrier.)
RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID, 157, 177.
(See, Actions.)
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION(See, Actions.)
after title passed, 102, 134, 147.
by stoppage in transitu, 130.
effect on right to price, 106.
from third persons, 201.
RESALE, 89, 122.
notice of (See, Notice.)
RESCISSION, 126, 146, 148, 225.
RETENTION OF POSSESSION, 212.
RETURN OF GOODS BOUGHT, 7, 177.
of money paid, 103.

s
SALEby agent, 203 .
by one not in possession, 219.
by one not owner, 70, 201.
by one having voidable title, 226.
contract for, 14, 227, 232.
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SALE— Cont.

definition of, 1.

distinguished from other transactions, 3, 232.

on approval, 7.

subject matter of, 12.

with right to return, 7.

SELLER'S LIEN (See, Lien).

SEPARABLE CONTRACTS, 249, 273.

SIGNATURE (See, Statute of Frauds).

SPECIFICATION OF GOODS, 40, 168, 182.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 152.

STATUTE OF ELIZABETH, 212.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 231.

acceptance, 262.

amount involved, 249.

effect of, 278.

goods, wares, etc., 243.
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memorandum, 250.

contents of, 258.

signature, 252.

payment, 275.

receipt, 262.

signature, 252.

STOCK CERTIFICATES, 209, 243.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, 130.

effect of, 146.

how effected, 144.

loss of right, 220.

SUIT (See, Actions).

TITLE—

acceptance of, 95, 100.

SALE-Cont.
definition of, l.
distinguished from other transactions, 3, 232.
on approval, 7.
subject matter of, 12.
with right to return, 7.
SELLER'S LIEN (See, Lien).
SEPARABLE CONTRACTS, 249, 273.
SIGNATURE (See, Statute of Frauds).
SPECIFICATION OF GOODS, 40, 168, 182.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 152.
STA TUTE OF ELIZABETH, 212.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 231.
acceptance, 262.
amount involved, 249.
effect of, 278.
goods, wares, etc., 243.
memorandum, 250.
contents of, 258.
signature, 252.
payment, 275.
receipt, 262.
signature, 252.
STOCK CERTIFICATES, 209, 243.

acquisition of, by seller, 72.

delivery, as affecting, 17, 27, 29, 32, 60.

fungible goods, 63.

intent, as to, 16, 19.

lacking in seller, 70, 201.

meaning of, 2, 18.

presumptions as to, 19.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, 130.
effect of, 146.
how effected, 144.
loss of right, 220.
SUIT (See, Actions).

right to acquire, 176, 208, 220.

voidable, 225.

T

warranty of, 189.

when passes, 16.

TITULAR ACTIONS, 152 176, 178,

(See, Actions.)

TI':'LEacceptance of, 95, 100.
acquisition of, by seller, 72.
delivery, as affecting, 17, 27, 29, 32, 60.
fungible goods, 63.
intent, as to, 16, 19.
lacking in seller, 70, 201.
meaning of, 2, 18.
presumptions as to, 19.
right to acquire, 176, 208, 220.
voidable, 225.
warranty of, 189.
when passes, 16.
TITULAR ACTIONS, 152 176, 178.
(See, Actions.)
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TRANSIT, 135.

(See, Stoppage in trcmsitiu)

TREES, 246.

TRESPASS (See, Actions)

u

UNDIVIDED INTEREST, 178.

TRANSIT, 135.
(See, Stoppage in tr<ll'n8itu.)
TREES, 246.
TRESPASS (See, Actions)

UNSPECIFIED PROPERTY, 40, 63.

u

(See, Identification.)

VALUE, RECOVERY OP, 148.

VENDOR'S LIEN (See, Lien).

VOIDABLE TITLE, 225.

w

WAIVER—

UNDIVIDED INTEREST, 178.
UNSPECIFIED PROPERTY, 40, 63.
(See, Identification.)

of breach of warranty, 184N.

of performance of conditions, 103, 174.

v

of right to inspect, 161, 163, 167.

WARRANTY, 168N, 175.
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breach of, 179.

effect, 182, 197.

implied, 181N, 189.

person benefited, 199.

VALUE, RECOVERY OF, 148.
VENDOR'S LIEN (See, Lien).
VOIDABLE TITLE, 225.

theory of, 185.

time of making, 196.

w

what is, 180, 185, 187.

WRITING}—

(See, Statute of Frauds.)

WAIVERof breach of warranty, 184N.
of performance of conditions, 103, 174.
of right to inspect, 161, 163, 167.
WARRANTY, 168N, 175.
breach of, 179.
effect, 182, 197.
implied, 181N, 189.
person benefited, 199.
theory of, 185.
time of making, 196.
what is, 180, 185, 187.
WRITING(See, Statute of Frauds.)
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